



The Palgrave Handbook of Kenyan History

Edited by
Wanjala S. Nasong'o
Maurice N. Amutabi
Toyin Falola

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PREFACE

The Palgrave Handbook of Kenyan History has benefitted from a diverse field of intellectuals, academics, researchers, and university teaching staff from all parts of the country and abroad. The scholars come from different disciplines and backgrounds. The manner in which the twenty-one chapters are organized captures events from the earliest precolonial period through colonial encounters to the time of the country's independence from British colonialism. The chapters contain in-depth research, analysis, and interpretation, allowing for the representation of space, agency, and voices of all stakeholders.

The authors explore different aspects of the country's national history, culture, economics, politics, and environment. Chapters 2–5 explore migration histories, settlements, and the establishment of communities in pre-colonial Kenya. Chapters 6 and 7 dig deep into the country's social history, while Chap. 8 explores the country's premodern political economy. From Chaps. 9–20, the discourse turns to Kenya's colonial history, underlining the development of different politico-economic systems such as agriculture, gender politics and Western-styled politics, trade union movement, social life in colonial settler towns, and the transition from the rise of anticolonial nationalism to the attainment of independence in 1963. Chapter 21 evaluates the dynamics of political consolidation in the immediate post-independence period and the establishment of single-party authoritarianism.

For ease of study and review, the book is divided into two parts, each focusing on a specific time period and multiple themes therein. We are confident that readers will find this division of the book into two chronological and thematic parts most convenient. Part I comprises Chaps. 2–8 and focuses on the country's precolonial period. Part II of the book, comprising Chaps. 9–21 covers the colonial period to the time of independence. The book presents a holistic narration of the country's historical trajectories. The chapters dealing with the pre-colonial aspects of the country's history showcase the ebb and flow of pre-colonial communities, demonstrating how kingdoms were established, flourished, and declined before the advent of British colonialism in the

country in 1888. The chapters on the country's colonial history examine socio-cultural, political, and economic developmental trajectories in the country during the colonial period. Major landmarks in the country's colonial history that are examined in this portraiture include the establishment of white settlements in colonial Kenya in 1897, the outbreak of the First and the Second World Wars in 1914 and 1939, the rise of anti-colonial nationalism in 1945, and the attainment of independence in 1963.

The Palgrave Handbook of Kenyan History is rich in its scope, range, breadth, and depth. Many previous works on Kenya's history have missed vital themes such as the arts, science, and technology. They have not captured the cultural history of the country. They have also not examined the European occupation using deeper and broad tools of analysis in order to unravel the colonial project the way this book has done. The chapters are well written, by experts, and represent the broadest interpretation of Kenya studies. Some of the chapter writers are great Kenyan intellectuals who are respected globally, while others are scholars based abroad whose focus of research is Kenya. Some have conducted field research while others have provided analysis and interpretation that many readers will find invigorating. The editors have paid attention to factual accuracy although the burden still lies with the authors of individual chapters. The editors have tried to create gender balance in the writing of the book, with as many women as men, while being aware of the representation of Kenya's ethnic diversity. The editors have also paid attention to language issues so that the chapters can be understood by the general reader, from high school graduates to university professors, without suffering the burden of complexity or oversimplification.

Many universities in the world are embracing interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approaches in knowledge creation. Many of them are also embracing theories and research approaches that are holistic and objective. These are the approaches that writers in this book have embraced. As editors, we have accommodated all views—left, right, and center—without compromising the subject matter. It is our expectation that many readers will find the book different and unique due to its liberal and open approach to many themes in Kenya studies. We recommend the book for general readers and all research and academic scholars interested in Kenya and African studies, all of whom should find the book interesting.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Kenya in Historical Perspective

Wanjala S. Nasong'o, Maurice N. Amutabi, and Toyin Falola

INTRODUCTION

The Palgrave Handbook of Kenyan History is an attempt to address a wide range of themes and ideas in one volume covering Kenyan history in its multiple manifestations including social, cultural, economic, and political thematic areas. We contend that the book is pioneering in many ways because it seeks to capture Kenyan history in a comprehensive way, including areas previously ignored by other books. The book is divided into two major parts covering twenty-one chapters that focus on many themes, ideas, and discourses on Kenya history from the precolonial period through the colonial period to the political dimensions in the immediate post-independence period. The chapters on precolonial Kenya demonstrate that there has been a transformation in societies that have led to the present development dynamics. The chapters on the colonial state point to the extractive and oppressive logic of the colonial state and confirm to us that the colonial project was based on the exploitation and marginalization of Africans. The chapters demonstrate that although a lot has already been written about Kenya, more needs to be done to address the knowledge gap between what has and has not been written. The chapters show

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that some assumptions held about Kenya require revision to provide full accounts of the major historical events that have taken place in the country. The book makes significant strides in addressing topics previously ignored centering on the social, political, and economic dynamics of the long precolonial moment, and the impact and implications of the colonial enterprise on Kenya and its communities.

Based on research on Kenya by Kenyan scholars, *The Palgrave Handbook of Kenyan History* breaks tradition in analyzing previous accounts that white scholars presented to inject African voices and agency. The book contends that the story of Kenya cannot be complete without paying attention to the various actors who have facilitated transformation from stories about conquest and colonization to accounts of development led by Africans. This handbook has given Kenyan scholars an opportunity to revisit, rewrite, and at the same time correct some previous assumptions and wrongly held views about Kenya. The book also breaks up with the previous notions where the voices of ordinary people have been ignored by incorporating them in many of the accounts presented here. By interviewing and holding discussions with such people, the book demonstrates that history does not necessarily have to champion the views of the most powerful in society. By inviting ordinary people to share accounts of their history, this book shows that ordinary voices have a place in creating knowledge and new ideas.

PART I: THE LONG PRECOLONIAL MOMENT

The book's first part covers seven chapters, Chaps. 2–8. Chapter 2 on Bantu migration and settlement in Kenya demonstrates that Bantu migration needs to be revisited due to new ways of analyzing and interpreting data. Although the chapter reaffirms existing narratives on Bantu migration, there is a need to revisit the whole question of Bantu migration based on new archeological findings that reveal new points of convergence, intermarriage, and exchange of cultural ideas leading to new hybridities. The chapter brings out many issues that speak to the importance of language to reconstruct Africa's past. The chapter shows that assimilation needs to find new impetus and interpretation against declining groups such as Abasuba, who face strong influence from their neighboring Luo and are likely to lose their grip on their social and cultural attributes in the near future. The fact that the three Bantu ethnic groups (Luhya, Kikuyu, and Kamba) occupy the top five positions in terms of population in Kenya is an indication that the Bantu are likely to play leading roles in Kenya's transformation in the future.

Chapter 3 on the Nilotic people addresses an important group that has been responsible for the occupation of vast areas of Kenya. The Nilotic migration caused a lot of tensions and conflicts in many parts of the region in which indigenous and Bantu groups already settled. The fact that Nilotes occupy two (Luo and Kalenjin) of the five top positions in the population figures indicates their likely influence in future events in Kenya. Although the Maasai are not as

plenteous as the Luo and Kalenjin, they caused great upheavals among their neighboring groups as a result of their advanced mechanics of warfare and organization along with the age set system. It is perhaps for this reason that the Maasai interacted with almost all the ethnic groups in Kenya through raiding, intermarriage, nomadic pursuits, and displacement of other ethnic groups.

Chapter 4 examines the migration and settlement into Kenya of Cushites who occupy vast parts of northern and parts of southern Kenya. Cushites belong to the cattle complex corridor of Africa, which stretches from Somalia in the East to Senegal in the West. The chapter notes that Cushites have not received adequate attention among historians. There are very few studies on the Cushitic political, social, economic, and cultural aspects. Many historians tend to focus on the history of the Bantu and Nilotic migrations (see Chaps. 2 and 3). The chapter explains this in terms of the colonial neglect of the pastoralist Cushites and privileging of agricultural communities; the early penetration of Islam in Cushitic areas; which discouraged Christian missionaries from venturing into these areas; and the difficult and unforgiving terrain of the region that rendered it a hardship area that was closed off from the modernizing processes happening in the rest of the country.

The arrival and settlement of Asians and Arabs in Kenya is the subject of the fifth chapter. The Asian and Arab connection to East Africa goes back many centuries, mainly through trade. There are many accounts and archeological findings that have shown that a great deal of business contacts existed between the groups. There was an exchange of goods and cultural ideas that go back many centuries. However, significant Arab arrival in East Africa occurred after the rise of Islam and the advent of Jihads, which led to the significant arrival of Arab princesses and sultans at the Coast of Kenya. Although Kenya had trade links with Asians going back millennia, the construction of the Kenya-Uganda Railway witnessed the influx of Asians who arrived as workers of the railway known as the Indian Coolies. Many Coolies remained behind on the completion of the railway and are responsible for the significant population of Asians in Kenya. The chapter shows that Asians and Arabs wield enormous economic power and are likely to remain a powerful minority in Kenya's commercial, industrial, social, and cultural dispensation in the future.

State formation in colonial Kenya remains unclear. This is the subject of Chap. 6, which addresses an important part of pre-colonial Kenya where the Wanga Kingdom controlled vast areas, from the shores of Lake Victoria up to Naivasha. Existing alongside chiefdoms operating under various state structures, state formation in precolonial Kenya was accompanied by a lot of conflicts and civil wars, which led to the displacement of populations that triggered countermovements. These movements ended with colonization. Kenya had only one centralized precolonial state in Wanga Kingdom compared to the majority of decentralized states in the country. Very little comparisons have been made between the two systems, and more research is needed in this realm, especially on the parameters that made the Maasai state under Ole Mbatian or

Ole Lenana to be seen as decentralized compared to the centralized Wanga kingdom.

The colonial state did not understand African families and their networks. This is the subject of Chap. 7. The chapter reveals that African families had working networks used for social protection. It shows that Africans had vast alliances formed between ethnic groups, which led to the formation of great states involved in elaborate trade networks. The chapter demonstrates that there was the existence of collaboration through intermarriages, formation of military and economic alliances, successful batter trade and other exchanges, and agreements based on the economic mode of production. The mixed economy pursued by this group gave them tremendous advantages in dealing with their neighbors, allowing them to survive beyond the precolonial state. The chapter leads us to ask questions about the poor, modern forms of social protection, and why we should not revisit the good practices from indigenous social protection.

Chapter 8 focuses on the nature of the precolonial economy in Kenya. The chapter argues that in precolonial Kenya, resource accumulation was dependent on whether a community group was agrarian or pastoral. The agriculturalists depended on tilling the land for crop production while for the pastoralists livestock rearing was their principal preoccupation, which, they believed, was given to them by God. However, there were many important economic activities among precolonial communities in Kenya, simply because of the adequate food production from the agricultural sector. These economic activities included handcrafts and manufacturing industries which produced goods that were important to the society, supplementing and complementing agricultural and pastoral activities. The chapter posits that in precolonial Kenya different craft industries emerged as specialization took place beyond agricultural activities. These crafts included pottery, basketry, cloth making, house building, carving, and canoe making, just to mention a few, while, on the other hand, manufacturing industries included iron and copper industries. More significantly, the chapter shows, iron was a very crucial tool to both pastoralists and farmers.

PART II: COLONIAL ENCOUNTERS

This part of the book explicates the colonial encounters in Kenya and the struggles for political independence in all its multifaceted forms. This analysis of colonial encounters is critical to understanding the linkages between the colonial and postcolonial Kenyan contexts and their implications for the dynamics of change and continuity. Kenya's colonial political economy continues to attract scholarly attention. This is the subject of Chap. 9, which is on the colonial political economy that revolved around the exploitation of resources. Slaves, ivory, gold, timber, copper, iron, and other resources were exploited and shipped overseas. In order to maximize the exploitation, this chapter shows that the colonial project instituted massive infrastructure such as railways, ports

and harbors to reach the hinterland of Kenya. Additionally, the Europeans created a dependent agricultural sector dominated by cash crops such as tea, sugar, coffee, maize, wheat, barley, and pyrethrum, which were tied to the metropolis, London. Africans were taxed heavily to supplement state income through direct taxes such as poll tax, hut tax, income tax, and forced labor. The chapter illustrates the ways the colonial state was extractive and exploitative, whose legacy is retained in the remnants of multinational corporations (MNCs) still operating in Kenya today, on which there are debates about the neocolonial project in Kenya.

Chapter 10 examines the origin and history of the Kenya Shilling as an East African currency, noting that it has remained a ubiquitous colonial legacy. For many societies, nations and among individuals, currencies in whatever form have been used to express sublime feelings for the past, the present, and the indefinite future. Kenya has been part of this historical process, and the saga of its currency shows the many characteristics of images, colors, attributes, and patterns that have taken many forms of subtle maneuverings. Two of the most important images that have adorned the Kenyan currency are the coat of arms and the portraits of Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi that reflect the country's historical landscape and the "big man" image of Africa's political economy. The chapter sheds a lot of light on our understanding of how the financial sector in Kenya emerged and developed over time.

The subject of Chap. 11 is colonial agricultural development. From this chapter, we learn that it favored cash crops at the expense of subsistence crops. The chapter shows that a great deal of resources were invested in cash crops such as coffee, tea, sugar, pyrethrum, and cotton, among others, which promoted the welfare of Europeans. The policies in agriculture favored European farmers and settlers and disadvantaged African peasants who were tied down by many structures. The policies also favored farmers more than herders, thereby marginalizing pastoralists in Kenya and creating binary oppositional systems that are in operation to this day and cause many conflicts between farmers and herders. The divide between farmers and pastoralists has led to conflicts, civil wars, and many deaths and displacements in Kenya, which are still experienced by the present populations, and we are under no illusion that this will end soon.

There is no doubt that World Wars I and II had a great impact on Kenya. This is the subject of Chap. 12, which examines the impacts of the two world wars on Kenya. The chapter shows that exposure of African soldiers who fought in WWI and WWII injected new ideas into the minds of Africans. The veterans returned home with ideas of freedom and democracy and were prepared to champion this among native populations. WWI veterans were the first people to voice a demand for independence and freedom led by Harry Thuku in 1922. Even after Harry Thuku was arrested and detained in Kisumu, the national spirit ignited through the Young Kikuyu Association did not die. The spirit was taken up by WWII veterans who actively took to armed struggle led by Dedan Kimathi and the Mau Mau movement. Mau Mau, Kenya's liberation movement, was a realization of the need to take up arms against European

occupation. The success of the liberation struggle in Kenya is largely attributed to Veterans of WW I and II. Scholars are still examining the impact of these wars on nationalism in Kenya.

Members clubs and parties dominated the social life of white settlers. This is the subject of Chap. 13, which addresses colonial socialization in urban settler towns in the white highlands that included Nakuru, Thomson Falls (Nyahururu), Eldoret, Elburgon, Timboroa, Kitale, and Webuye, among others. What emerges from the chapter is evidence of concerted efforts by Europeans to aggrandize African land for their use while systematically pushing natives into African reserves. Evidence indicates that Africans suffered violence as domestic workers and farm laborers and endured many hours of hard labor while suffering discrimination. The chapter shows that the colonial state engaged in many forms of segregation using “Kipande” (passbook) as a method of control of the movement of Africans while Europeans were shielded from any form of suffering by favorable policies. Rules were put in place to ensure that Whites socialized among themselves, while Africans were excluded from such socialization, with the intended consequences being collective oppression of Africans by Whites. Members’ clubs were created in every settler town to which only Whites were admitted. Most of the policies affecting colonial Kenya were planned in these members’ clubs by Whites. There are now discussions on whether the exclusion of other social groups has ended in Kenya.

Europeans were heavily invested in environmental matters. This is the subject of Chap. 14 on the environment under colonialism. This chapter shows that the colonial government was concerned about environmental conservation in order to secure their own survival in the state. The government created many officials in charge of environmental issues, such as forest officers, water officers, wildlife officers, extension workers, and environmental protection officers. The intention was to ensure that the environment remained stable and sustainable for the benefit of the Whites. Laws, rules, and regulations were put in place to ensure that the landscape was retained for the benefit of Europeans. It is against this background that national forests were gazetted for protection by the government, such as Mau, Abardares, Kakamega, Elgon, Samburu, Isiolo, Mt. Kenya, Makindu, and Kaya Forest, among others. It was due to this that the 27 national parks were created in Kenya, including Nairobi, Tsavo, Maasai Mara, Amboseli, Samburu, Kora, Sibilio, Mt. Elgon, Meru, and Nakuru, among others. The parks served exotic values for European enjoyment of wildlife. Africans were seen as a threat to wildlife, yet they had lived with this wildlife for millennia. There are now conversations about a middle ground in conservation where wildlife is not privileged over humans.

The colonial government had tight control over information and media. This is the discussion of Chap. 15 on mass media and cultural change. Mass media was used to propagate cultural exchange in Kenya by Europeans. The chapter shows that Europeans controlled news and often used propaganda to suit their purposes. Newspapers and later radio were put under the firm control of the colonial government. Through selective publication of stories, the

colonial government ensured conformity to their interests within the state. Despite this tight control on mass media, Africans started to produce their own newsletters as an alternative media. These African newsletters were often banned by the colonial state as quickly as they emerged. The media was used to control the people, showing documentaries on good habits such as hygiene, cooking, domesticity, consumer goods, and other behavior change. Many of the films shown to Africans were vetted to ensure that they did not watch films that would allow them to mobilize and arouse their national sentiments or emotions. As the chapter shows, mass media became a very important tool in marketing European goods to Africans and became the most successful conduit of spreading capitalism to Kenya. Recent studies have revealed that habits such as alcohol consumption, smoking, and drinking of soft drinks and processed products were promoted through mass media. This opens discussion on the influence of media in society.

The role of pioneer schools and Makerere University has not received a lot of attention. This is the subject of Chap. 16. The chapter shows that pioneer schools such as Alliance and Maseno played an important role in creating the national elite for Kenya before independence. Many of the Africans recruited to work in the civil service and other arms of government came from Alliance and Maseno and had gone through a purposive indoctrination in imbibing White tastes. Similarly, graduates from Makerere University were indoctrinated into becoming White workers by being given privileges of access to good houses, vehicles, and good workplaces as managers and supervisors on very good salaries. The European socialization of Africans was done through the school system and became an effective weapon in the divide and rule project of the Europeans. Educated Africans were regarded as good and on the side of Europeans, while illiterate Africans were regarded as less important subjects within the empire. There are now debates on whether the current situation is any different.

There are few accounts on the role of women in colonial Kenya. There is a need to revisit the role of women. This is the subject of Chap. 17, which examines the place of women in colonial Kenya and shows that colonial policies were anti-women. The policies took away privileges that existed for women who had served as seers, diviners, medicine people, and leaders among African communities. The British imposed a patriarchal structure that privileged men, many of whom were offered employment in the colonial establishment. Employees of the government were given residential quarters, which were single occupier rooms meant for bachelor men and their families kept in the African reserves. Women were therefore kept out of cities because Europeans believed they would transfer burdens on the men, making them agitate against the state. At the same time, they were seen as carriers of diseases that would be transferred to single White men. The arrangement was therefore to protect White men from African women by keeping these women out of cities. The marginalization of women becomes manifest when it is realized that the first school for girls was created at Alliance Girls High School in 1934, while boys' schools

were established as early as 1912. This is a debate that still rages in postcolonial Kenya.

There is no doubt that trade unionists played an important role in Kenya's liberation, as discussed in Chap. 18. The chapter points out that trade unions became pioneer defenders of Africans. Mobilizations of trade unions created an opportunity for Africans to begin to ask for their rights as taxpayers. The pioneer trade union movement was the Kavirondo Tax Payers Association which advocated for better treatment of African workers in White establishments. Trade unions brought Africans and Asians together, and the pioneer African trade unionists such as Fred Kubai, Bildad Kaggia, Dennis Akumu, and Tom Mboya worked hand in hand with leading Asian trade unions such as Makhan Singh. They joined forces with nationalists and ended up playing an important role in the independence of Kenya. Many trade unionists such as Achieng Oneko, Tom Mboya, and Fred Kubai were important players in the first government of independent Kenya, where Oneko and Mboya became ministers. We need to revisit the role of trade unions against the unflattering role of current trade union leaders.

We are aware of the need to engage in discussions on nationalism and patriotism, given the manner in which some people have sought to elevate some national heroes from some ethnic groups while silencing discussion of those from others. This is the subject of Chap. 19, which examines the rise of anticolonial forces, such as nationalism in Kenya. There is no doubt that there were many men and women in Kenya who fought for independence, but some of them have been marginalized. There is a need to recognize all heroes and heroines who have not been allocated adequate recognition in Kenya's liberation history. The current clamor of naming stadiums, roads, universities, and schools after national heroes and heroines are good efforts toward recognition, which should be encouraged and celebrated.

Discussion of the independence of Kenya cannot end without talking about Lancaster House debates and discussions. This is the subject of Chap. 20, which shows that the Lancaster House Independence Constitutional Negotiations played an important role in the independence of Kenya. Kenya's representatives to Lancaster, led by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, demonstrated the Africans' capacity to negotiate and engage Europeans at their own game. The role of leaders such as Martin Shikuku, Masinde Muliro, and Ronald Ngala, among others, indicates a strong dedication of Kenya's nationalists towards the country's freedom. Lancaster became a place where leaders articulated the vision for Kenya, which was executed after independence. Lancaster Conference allowed Kenyans to measure the quality of leaders based on how the representatives were articulating their grievances in England. It created heroes, and the country is beginning to have conversations on whether their desires have been fulfilled.

Kenya attained political independence from Britain in 1963 in a global context of emerging Cold War rivalries. This Cold War context greatly shaped the political dynamics in Kenya. Indeed, the factional political rivalries and the

disintegration of the nationalist coalition shortly after independence are attributable to this Cold War global context. Chapter 21 rounds off this volume by addressing this critical issue of political factions, especially the rivalry between capitalist and socialist interests. These factional rivalries, manifested in the contestations between KANU and KADU played out very strongly, especially with leading lights in KANU seeking to consolidate power. The decision by KADU leaders Masinde Muliro, Ronald Ngala, and Daniel Moi to join ranks with KANU in parliament alienated some individuals, such as Martin Shikuku, who were regarded as opposition within the merger. The chapter demonstrates that Kenya lost ground in the democratization process as a result of the merger of these two parties, and it became easy for founding President Jomo Kenyatta to consolidate power and create a single-party state. After the 1969 banning of KPU by the government, Kenya was effectively a single-party state even though this was put in law only in 1982 by the introduction of section 2(a) to the constitution, making the country a one-party state by law. The resulting creation of a dormant party structure affected the operation of government with Jomo Kenyatta and his inner circle wielding a tremendous amount of authority that affected the growth of democracy, which was regained in 1992 with the abolition of the single-party rule and establishment of multiparty politics. The promulgation of a new constitution in 2010 ushered the country into a new republic, signaling a critical departure from the colonial state inherited at independence in 1963.

PART I

The Long Precolonial Moment



CHAPTER 2

The Bantu Origins, Migration, and Settlement in Kenya

Pius Kakai Wanyonyi

INTRODUCTION

In discussing Bantu migration and settlement, this chapter firstly examines the theoretical debates propounded by various linguists and historians before narrowing down to specifically analyzing their migration and settlement into the various parts of Kenya. Both historical linguistics and oral traditions, as well as other written sources, are harnessed to bring out as complete a picture of the respective Bantu communities as possible. It is noteworthy that archaeology has also been used in tracing the migration of the Bantu into various parts of Africa. In tracing Bantu migration, archaeologists relied on iron tools. However, as Zeleza (1993, p. 175) has argued, the Bantu expansion into various parts of Africa, including Kenya, predates the use of iron. When discussing the Bantu settlement in various sections, the chapter uses a few selected groups to demonstrate, in greater detail, how the Bantu interacted with other language groups they encountered.

THE THEORETICAL DEBATES

‘Bantu,’ as a concept, was coined by Wilhelm I. Bleek in 1862, after looking at linguistic similarities among these people when referring to ‘people’ (Lwango-Luyingo & Vansina, 1993, p. 76). For instance, the following communities’ word for ‘people’ is very similar:

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<i>Name of community</i>	<i>Word for 'people'</i>
Duala	Bato
Kongo	Bantu
Rwanda	Abantu
Herero	Abandu
Abaluyia	Abandu
Kikuyu	Andu
Swahili	Watu

Source: Lwango-Luyingo (1993, p. 75), and authors' knowledge of the Kenyan group

As can be seen, the word for 'people' among these communities is closely related and all derive from the form made up of the root 'ntu' and the prefix 'ba' denoting the plural. The exact number of communities constituting the Bantu speakers on the continent is not certain. Whereas July (1992, p. 118) assumes that there are approximately 300 Bantu languages, Lwango-Luyingo and Vansina (1993, p. 75) put the number at 400. Nonetheless, the Bantu-speaking communities are probably the leading language family on the entire continent.

A group of linguists has attempted to situate the origin and expansion of the Bantu speakers. They include Harry Johnson, Joseph Greenberg, and Malcolm Guthrie. Johnson (2015) argues that they may have originated from the region between Bahr el Ghazal to the east of Kordofan area and the Benue-Chad basin in the West. According to him, the Bantu first moved eastwards towards Mount Elgon, then proceeded to the shores of Lake Victoria, Tanzania, and the Congo Forest, and around 300 BCE, the large-scale incursion into Central and Southern Africa began (Johnson, 2015). Joseph Greenberg (1949), on the other hand, locates the origin of the Bantu in the middle of the Benue region of Nigeria. Here, one can see that Greenberg's thesis and that of Johnson converge when dealing with the area around Benue confluence. However, unlike Johnson, Greenberg proceeds to argue that from the Benue region, the Bantu moved through the Congo Forest to Central Africa and then to Southern and Eastern Africa.

Malcolm Guthrie (1948) differed with Greenberg's view on the origin of the Bantu. Unlike Greenberg, Guthrie postulated that the most likely origin of proto-Bantu was around the watershed of the Congo and Zambezi Rivers, with a nucleus in the Shaba province of D.R. Congo (Lwango-Luyingo & Vansina, 1993, pp. 76–77). The historian Roland Oliver (1961) sought to reconcile the two seemingly discordant views by stating that Guthrie's findings do not fundamentally contradict Greenberg's outcome. Instead, Oliver argues that Guthrie modified Greenberg's simple hypothesis in a very important way. Hence, Oliver (1961) suggests that the Bantu originated from the Savanna region of Nigeria and crossed the forest to Central Africa, where they found the vegetation and the climate to be the same as the one they were used to and

settled down. Hence, as Oliver argues, the second dispersal took place and saw the Bantu gradually occupy the East, Central, and Southern Africa.

Historians' attempt to reconcile the puzzle about the Bantu origin and migration did not resolve the Bantu question. As the Kenyan case will show, not all the present-day Bantu-speaking communities derive their origin from the West African direction. As the following sub-topics demonstrate, oral traditions played a crucial role in complementing the contribution of historical linguistics and written sources. Indeed, oral traditions did not only contribute to the debate about the Bantu origin and settlement into Kenya, but they also shed light on the origin and expansion of other Kenyan groups, such as the Nilotic and Cushitic speakers.

BANTU SETTLEMENT INTO KENYA

In Kenya, the Bantu family of languages is the largest. They include the Abaluyia, Abagusii, Abakuria, and the Luo assimilated group of the Suba, constituting the Western group. Then, there are the Kikuyu, Embu, Meru, Mbeere, and the Kamba forming the Central Kenya group, while the Mijikenda, Pokomo, Swahili, Taita, and Taveta communities inhabit the coast of the Indian Ocean on the Kenyan side. While most of these groups owe their identity to the linguistic origin, a few others may have been assimilated from other language categories, especially the Nilotic speakers. The chapter proceeds to discuss each of these three groups.

Western Bantu

The Abaluyia is the largest in the population among the Bantu of Western Kenya. They are made up of eighteen sub-ethnic groups (Kakai, 1992, p. 3) with a heterogeneous origin. The eighteen sub-ethnic groups are the Abatachoni, Ababukusu, Abakabras, Abanyala (Navakholo), Abanyala (Port Victoria or Abaongo), Abawanga, Abamarama, Abatsotso, Abedakho, Abesukha, Abanyole, Abashisa, Abalogoli, Abatirichi, Abamarachi, Abakhayo, Abasamia, and Abatura. The Abanyala (Navakholo) and Abanyala (Port Victoria or Abaongo) were once one people. But when the Navakholo group migrated eastwards into their present homeland in Kakamega county, they interacted with neighboring sub-ethnic groups and inherited new characteristics distinct from their former kinsfolk. Hence, as they exist today, they are two distinct sub-ethnic groups. While some, like the Maragoli, Kabras, Abatsotso, Abasamia, and Abawanga, may largely draw their ancestry from the Bantu stock who migrated into the present counties of Buluyia, such as Vihiga, Kakamega, and Busia from Eastern Uganda, others bear a mixed ancestry of both Nilotic and Bantu stock (Were, 1967, pp. 59–80). From Eastern Uganda, some of these communities claim to have been affected by domestic and dynastic disputes, overcrowding, tsetse fly menace, and the longing for a better country (Were, 1967, p. 65). This whole process would appear to have taken

place between the middle of the sixteenth century and the late eighteenth century (Were, 1967, pp. 65–66).

There are still other sub-ethnic groups of the Abaluyia who derive their ancestry from both the Bantu sections of Eastern Uganda and the Nilotic sections, such as the Kalenjin, Maasai, and Luo. Those sharing their roots from the Bantu and the Kalenjin include the Abatachoni, Babukusu, Abatirichi, Abamarama, Abanyala (Navakholo), and Abanyala (Port Victoria), Abakhayo, Abamarachi, Abashisa, and Abanyole. The Idakho and Isukha were also influenced by the Maasai, while the Luo influenced the Abamarama and the Abanyala (Port Victoria). Each of the eighteen sub-ethnic groups of the Abaluyia comprises several clans. Whereas most clans are identified with specific sub-ethnic groups, others cut across several sub-ethnic groups. For instance, a clan of Abasonge are found among Abatachoni, Babukusu, Abasamia, and Abakabras. While among Abatachoni the name of the clan is Abasonge, it is Basonge among Babukusu, Abasonga among Abasamia, and Abasonje among Abakabras. A similar clan is also found among the Luo ethnic group of the broader Nilotic language family. In this latter group, it is known as Usonga.

Various reasons were advanced for compelling this group of the Abaluyia to migrate and settle into their present homeland. These included overpopulation, scarcity of game, the spirit of adventure, the mosquito and tsetse fly menace, and the hostility of new immigrants, especially the Teso and the Luo (Were, 1967, p. 79). Whereas some of these Abaluyia sub-ethnic groups arrived in their land when it had no earlier occupants, others found land which already hosted other Bantu groups or non-Bantu groups, especially the Kalenjin, as was the case in Mt. Elgon in present-day Bungoma county. Indeed, the name Bungoma comes from the Kalenjin clan of the Sabao called Bongomek.

Given their heterogeneous ancestry, these Abaluyia sub-ethnic groups' cultural values are largely varied. For instance, while some stress the rites of circumcision and post-circumcision rituals, others consider such practices a matter of choice. Moreover, while some value fishing, others value mixed farming. Those who value fishing are largely influenced by their residence in the neighborhoods of Lake Victoria and River Nzoia. Those who reside in more distant neighborhoods from the two water bodies practice mixed farming. Still, among both groups, knowledge about fishing and mixed farming has existed for a long time.

Whatever the ancestry, most of these Abaluyia communities stress a Misri Myth of origin. This Misri origin has raised debates among historians. For instance, Were (1967, pp. 62–3) argues that those who refer to the Misri origin do so because of biblical influence. According to him, instead of Misri being a reference to present-day Egypt, it is the present-day regions of Karamoja and Turkana. But Were's dismissal does not seem fair because oral accounts of some Abaluyia sub-ethnic groups, such as the Abatachoni, clearly trace their route from Misri through Turkana. Hence, it is difficult for one to allege that the Abatachoni mistook Turkana or Karamoja for Misri (Kakai, 1992, p. 34). Furthermore, custodians of the Misri accounts were mainly traditional

believers who not only dissociated themselves from colonial influence but were also illiterate.

Ochieng (1975, p. 48), in discussing this Misri origin when reconstructing the history of the Abagusii, posits that it is not fair to dismiss this Misri origin. It must be true that some of those oral accounts referring to Misri must have had some valid reasons. On his part, Ochieng argues that Egyptians ordinarily referred to themselves as Misriyim and to their country as Misri. He further argues that the name derives from the descendants of Mizraim, one of the children of Ham. Ham, also known as Cham or Kam, therefore, originates from Egypt. It means black or burned in Hebrew (Diop, 1974, p. 7). Thus, ancient Misriyim were Black people from whom some ancestors of the Abaluyia and Abagusii claim descent.

The Abagusii, also known as the Gusii or Kisii, are the second group of Western Bantu that this chapter discusses briefly. Unlike the Abaluyia, the Abagusii seem to bear their origin largely from the Bantu language family and entered their present Kenyan homeland of Kisii and Nyamira counties from Eastern Uganda. Like the Abaluyia, the Gusii are made up of several clan clusters, which include Getutu (Kitutu), Mochari (Wanjare), Nyaribari, Bassi, Mochoge, and Mogirango.

Abagusii traditions indicate that in their distant past, they were together with the Kuria, the Maragoli and the Bukusu (two sub-ethnic groups of the Abaluyia), Abasuba, Meru, Embu, Kikuyu, and the Kamba. The Abagusii's tradition would seem to imply that they were with virtually most of the Bantu of Western and Central Kenya (Ochieng, 1974, p. 11). On their way from Eastern Uganda, the Abagusii, Abakuria, and the Maragoli reached Mt. Elgon, a mountain on the present Kenya-Uganda border. From this mountain, they followed River Nzoia up to Yimbo in present-day Siaya County; later approaching Jaka Jok branch of the Luo, which forced them to vacate Yimbo to avoid cattle raids from the latter. Hence, Abagusii and Maragoli crossed River Yala and briefly settled at Alego. But when another Luo group arrived, the Abagusii and Maragoli vacated the area and settled in the present-day Kisumu.

It would appear that famine forced the Abagusii to emigrate further to Kano between 1640 and 1755 AD. It seems also that Kisumu is where the Maragoli separated from the Abagusii and moved northwards into their present homeland of Buluyia counties (Ochieng, 1974, pp. 41–88).

At Kano, the Abagusii's diet included meat, millet, sorghum, yam, vegetables, pumpkin, fish, and fruit. From Kano, the Abagusii moved northwards and ultimately settled into their present counties of Kisii and Nyamira, after having moved through such places as Kabianga and Sotik in Kericho County. On their way, they seem to have clashed with both the Maasai and the Kipsigis due to cattle rustling. As they traversed Kalenjin land, the Gusii were influenced in some of their values, just as they influenced the Kalenjin.

Just like the Abaluyia, Abagusii also refer to a Misri origin. While in his text of the 1974 work, Ochieng dismissed the mention of Misri as referring to the present-day territory of Egypt, in his later work (1975) he made a complete

about-turn and strongly agreed with the view that those communities who refer to Egypt should not be dismissed as merely referring to other drier lands such as Turkana or Karamoja.

The Abakuria, also known as Kuria, are yet another of the Western Bantu group who, in their traditions, claim to have had a Misri origin, just like their Abagusii kinsmen, and wandered around Lake Victoria before settling on their present land in Migori County (Abuso, 1980, p. 69). When their ancestors arrived in their present homeland around 1600 AD, they found Southern Nilotic speakers already settled there. The Abakuria interacted with them and acquired such values as age-set rituals. Incidentally, some of these age-sets like Maina, Ngorongoro, and Nyangi (Abuso, 1980, p. 74) are also found among sections of the Abaluyia and the Kalenjin speakers.

The last groups to be discussed under the Western Bantu group are the Abasuba or Suba (Ayot, 1979, pp. 3–4). Whereas their origin is Bantu, and they are said to have fled from Buganda, Busoga, Sese Islands, and Tanzania, they are largely Luonised and settled on Rusinga and Mfangano Islands in Lake Victoria, as well as the mainland areas of Gembe, Kaksingiri, and Gwasi in Homa Bay County, and others in Migori County.

CENTRAL KENYA GROUP

This group constitutes the Kikuyu, Embu, Meru, Mbeere, and the Kamba occupying such counties as Kirinyaga, Kiambu, Murang'a, Nyandarua, and Nyeri for the Kikuyu; Embu for the Embu and Mbeere; Meru and Tharaka Nithi for the Meru; while Kitui, Machakos, and Makueni are occupied largely by the Kamba. All the communities in these groups are closely related and even some of their myths of origin reflect this. For instance, among the Kikuyu, Muriuki (1969, p. 64) states that there was a man who had four sons. He called them when he was on his deathbed and gave them his possessions. He had a herding staff, a quiver of arrows and a bow, a stabbing spear, and a digging stick. The one who took the herding staff became the ancestor of the pastoral Maasai (Nilotic group), those of a quiver of arrows and bow and stabbing spear became ancestors of the Kamba and Athi, while the one who took a digging stick became an ancestor of the Kikuyu.

While the above myth has included the Nilotic Maasai and the Indigenous Athi, when the discussion of the Central Kenya Bantu is carried out, it emerges that all have many things in common. For the purpose of this chapter, the Kikuyu migration and expansion into their present homeland will be used as an example. The Kikuyu are not only the largest group among the Bantu but also the largest community in Kenya. The Kikuyu myth of origin states that they originated from Gikuyu and Mumbi, who sired ten daughters whose names were Wanjiku, Wambui, Wairimu, Wangechi, Wangui, Wacheera, Nyambura, Wangari, Wanjiru and Wamuyu. It is argued that the first nine daughters got married and, hence, founded the nine clans that constitute the Kikuyu. The tenth daughter never got married; thus, no clan exists in her honor. This myth

binds together all members of the community and points them to God, Ngai, who created their ancestors and gave them their home in Mukurwe wa Nyagathanga. Hence, according to this myth, they expanded from Mukurwe wa Nyagathanga in Murang'a to other parts of their present residence.

The above myth is considered together with other historical accounts. It is argued that the present Kikuyuland was originally covered by a vast forest, which was sparsely settled by hunter-gatherer groups of the Gumba and Athi. The Gumba, besides hunting and gathering, also kept bees, and worked in iron smithing and pottery (Muriuki, 1969, pp. 52–55). The ancestors of the Kikuyu initially interacted with these two Indigenous communities, at times assimilating them, at other times causing the Indigenous groups to evacuate to other places.

From the onset, it would appear that the Kikuyu, also known as Agikuyu, have a heterogeneous descent. Some clans came from the Indigenous groups, others from the Meru, Mbeere, Kamba, and the Maasai. While the ones with a Bantu origin may have arrived in their present homeland from different directions, it seems clear that they could not have also come from the coast. Muriuki's view makes this statement clear: "The Kikuyu proper and the Cuka (group of the Meru) have no tradition of having ever migrated from the coast, let alone Shungwaya" (Muriuki, 1969, p. 68).

According to Muriuki (1969, p. 68), the origin of the Embu, Mbeere, and the Kikuyu was either from the east or northeast of the present Mbeere region. From this general region, the Kikuyu migrated in about the sixteenth century and briefly settled at the confluence of Sagana and Thika rivers, known as Thagicu or Ithanga. From Ithanga, the Kikuyu ancestors moved in small groups westwards, leaving some of their members behind, up to Kirinyaga county. By the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries, the ancestors had reached present-day Murang'a County (Metume) and Southern Nyeri (Gaki) and Kiambu (Kabete). It is suggested that these ancestors of the Kikuyu preferred following river valleys and crossing the rivers by natural bridges (Muriuki, 1969, p. 73). Between the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, according to Muriuki (1969), the ancestors expanded westwards towards Nyandarua. This expansion was along the ridges. The group seemed to have moved slowly until into the middle of the nineteenth century, when they reached the foothills of the Nyandarua. Perhaps the misty cold weather was responsible for the slow pace in these ancestors' migration (Muriuki, 1969, p. 79).

In about a century, the Kikuyu had effectively occupied the area between Thika (South Chania) and Nairobi rivers. This rapid expansion could partly be due to the increase in population and the decline in the Maasai power (Muriuki, 1969, p. 83). Thus, in the 1880s, the area between the Karura and Nairobi rivers was occupied.

Several reasons are advanced for these migrations. They include population expansion, attacks, and cattle raids from such communities as the Oroma and the Maasai, as well as the search for more fertile land in contrast to where they

were migrating from. Besides, the interaction with these other communities bequeathed to the Kikuyu their own values. For instance, from the Gumba, the Kikuyu learned the art of ironworking and pottery (Muriuki, 1969, p. 55). Similarly, it appears that the Gumba taught the Kikuyu the rite and art of circumcision, clitoridectomy, and some features of the age-set system.

Coastal Bantu Group

Coastal Bantu speakers comprise the Mijikenda, Pokomo, Swahili, Taita, and Taveta communities. These communities occupy the coastal counties, including Kilifi, Kwale, Lamu, Mombasa, Tana River, and Taita Taveta. Of these communities, the Mijikenda are the largest. This chapter gives a brief discussion about the origin and expansion of the Mijikenda.

The Mijikenda comprise the nine sub-ethnic groups of the Chonyi, Digo, Duruma, Giriama, Jibana, Kambe, Kauma, Rabai, and Ribe. Most of these groups trace their origin into Kenya from Shungwaya, also known as Singwaya, in the Southern Somali hinterland at the beginning of the seventeenth century (Spear, 1978, p. 4). The Shungwaya was also the cradle land of the Pokomo, Swahili, and Taita. In Shungwaya, the Mijikenda lived together as one family before they were driven out by the Oromo. During their migration South, they split into six separate groups, namely the Digo, Ribe, Giriama, Jibana, Kauma, and the Kambe in the late sixteenth century. It appears from the Chonyi traditions that they too were together with the first six in their migration from Shungwaya (Spear, 1978, p. 31). In fact, it is argued in the tradition of the Chonyi and the Jibana that the latter consider the Chonyi as their senior brothers.

It seems that, unlike the other seven, the Duruma and the Rabai do not share the Shungwaya origins. The Duruma state that their origin was at Rombo in Chaggaland, from where they migrated directly to present-day Rabai land. In their Rabai country, they were later attacked and dispersed throughout Digo and Chonyi land by other Mijikenda groups. Later, the Rabai returned and established their Kayas in their present land (Spear, 1978, p. 33). The Duruma, on the other hand, seem to have three different sources of origin. They consolidated in their present-day Durumaland by adopting Mijikenda culture. The Digo, who were the first to occupy Kwale, guided the Duruma in building the main Duruma Kaya (Spear, 1978, pp. 34–5). Nonetheless, both the Rabai and the Duruma also make references to the Shungwaya origin though their accounts do not receive corroboration from other sources.

CONCLUSION

The chapter has argued that the Bantu speakers are a majority in Kenya and have a heterogeneous origin. While some have a direct linguistic Bantu origin, oral traditions and archaeological information reveal that others, though they now speak the Bantu language, originated elsewhere, especially among the

Nilotic speakers. Examples of such mixed descent groups are found among the Bantu of Western and Central Kenya. Hence, a proper study of the origin and migration of the Bantu speakers needs to use more sources than relying on only linguistic reconstruction.

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The Migration of Nilotes and Their Settlement

Opolot Okia

INTRODUCTION

In telling the story of human migration in early African history, scholars have to rely upon academic fields of inquiry that do not prioritize writing in the transmission of historical narratives due to the paucity of written texts. Consequently, the fields of comparative linguistics, oral tradition, and archaeology become the more important building blocks for writing early African history. Relying primarily upon linguistics and oral tradition, this chapter discusses the migrations of the speakers of one of the significant linguistic phyla in Africa, the Nilotes, and their dissemination in Kenya. In depending upon these historical sources, the attempt is, as Professor William Ochieng noted long ago, to move away from an approach that highlights a few “detribalized slave traders, chiefs and nationalist politicians” to history from the ground up (Ochieng, 1975, p. x).

On the African continent, there are four major native language phyla: the Niger-Congo, the Afroasiatic, the Khoi-San and the Nilo-Saharan. East Africa is the only region in Africa where all four major language groups are represented. The Nilo-Saharan language phylum is approximately 11,000 years old and contains about 20 million speakers and 60 languages. The proto Sahelians developed in the Sahel region, stretching from modern-day Mali to Sudan (Ehret, 2011, p. 40). The Chari-Nile sub-family of Nilo-Saharan is found in East Africa and includes the Eastern Sudanic subgroup comprising various Nilotic languages. Nilotes, who register about 6 million speakers and 15

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languages, are the largest subgroup of the Nilo-Saharan phylum and are found primarily in South Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya.

THE PROTO NILOTES

Between 3000 and 1000 B.C.E., the proto Nilotes emerged as a distinct linguistic group in East Africa in the Bahr el-Ghazal region of what is now South Sudan. Eventually, they slowly differentiated into various subgroups and migrated into different parts of East Africa. While some remained in Sudan, other Nilotic groups migrated along the southern fringes of the Ethiopian Highlands near Lake Turkana in Kenya while other groups dispersed southward into northern Uganda and eventually into Kenya.

The linguistic work of Christopher Ehret (1971) provides a window into proto-Nilotic life. Pastoralism governed Nilotic culture, and, as we shall see, proto-Nilotic culture was the template for all later Nilotic peoples. In contrast to the proto-Bantu speakers, who represent another significant migration in early Africa, we know that the Nilotes had a plethora of words used to describe cattle, which reflected the central importance of pastoralism as a way of life for them. Even among the modern-day progeny of the proto-Nilotes, the Nuer of what is now South Sudan, there are not only several discrete words that are used to describe different types of cattle breeds but also words for varying color shades of cattle, horn sizes, and the age of the cattle (Evans-Pritchard, 1940, p. 45).

The Sanga cattle, one of the important breeds herded by the Nilotes, was indigenous to Africa, unlike the Zebu, which was first domesticated in Asia. Cattle were prominent in Nilotic culture due to their meat, blood, milk, and skins, which were used for bedding, clothing, and other uses. The proto-Nilotes used cattle bones as tools and cattle dung to construct huts. Even cattle urine was sustainable as an ingredient in milk products and insecticides. Cattle milk itself was conducive to a nomadic lifestyle since few storage facilities were required for it, and it could be reproduced daily from the cows. The most important elements necessary for the material reproduction of the society, then, were water and grass for the cattle, which required migration. Although the Nilotes consumed cattle meat on special occasions, cattle held a more significant social importance as mediums of exchange for bridewealth and in settling disputes. Cattle were, in essence, central to social reproduction.

Nilotes preferred spears over bows, and, between 1400 and 500 B.C.E., they were using iron and had pottery. Although Nilotes relied heavily upon cattle, they still cultivated grain crops, like millet, and exchanged cattle products for other grain and wet root crops with other linguistic groups. They also engaged in fishing.

Nilotic culture was polygamous and maintained age sets punctuated by initiation ceremonies. Age sets are social groups determined on the basis of age. Each age set functions as a corporate unit within the society and has a loosely based set of functions that its members are responsible for performing.

Incorporation into the age set is usually performed ceremoniously during an annual initiation period. Because the age sets are determined chronologically, they are normally ranked in a hierarchy based, again, on age. In terms of the sexual division of labor, women were the laborers who milked cattle, tended the homestead, and would have been engaged in agricultural work or exchange for food crops. Men were supposed to play leadership roles and herd the cattle farther afield and defend the homesteads. The Nilotes were patrilineal, meaning they traced descent through the male's lineage. They were also patriarchal, or male-dominated.

With pastoralism as the foundation of their society, the Nilotes practiced transhumance, which influenced their political organization. Transhumance is the cyclical migration of pastoralist peoples from lowland to highland areas dependent upon the season. During the dry season, families, led by elder males, would congregate around wetlands or hilltop areas that had higher amounts of rainfall. However, during the rainy season, pastoralists would disperse more widely in lowland areas due to the abundance of water and grass. During the wet season, different groups of people were often separated by rising water in swamps which made it hard for political organization to develop. However, during the dry season, as groups of families were forced to congregate around receding water sources, a greater degree of political organization developed. With higher population densities during the dry seasons, groups of families would fall under the rule of one person known as *Jago*, or clan chief (Cohen & Atieno-Odhiambo, 1968, p. 145). Even though the Nilotes were mainly acephalous, they subsequently developed a tradition of *rwot* kingship associated with a mythic founder.

Ehret (2002) characterized the proto-Nilotes as “nontheistic.” This meant that their core religious belief was that there was a supernatural power found in an animistic force that permeated everything in nature. As a result, *Jok*, or spirits, were the important currency of religious life. Diviners or herbal healers, who would later be known as *Laibons*, *Orkoiyots*, *Beny*, *Biths*, or *Reths*, among the different Nilotic groups, had the power to tap into this mystic force to help or influence people. For some Nilotic groups, however, *Jok* was simply a remote creator being.

WESTERN NILOTES

By about 1000 B.C.E., the proto-Nilotes had slowly begun to differentiate into three major linguistic subfamilies: the proto-Western Nilotes, the proto-Southern Nilotes, and the proto-Eastern Nilotes. As the proto-Nilotes differentiated, they began to migrate to various areas of East Africa driven by overpopulation and the subsequent search for more grazing land (Ochieng, 1975, p. 29). The Western Nilotes, also known as the River Lake Nilotes, developed just south of the Bahr el Ghazal and eventually settled in Southern Sudan, Northern Uganda, and Northern Kenya. Later, after the original language group broke up, they would become the Burun, Dinka, Nuer, and the

Lwoo. The Lwoo branch, in turn, would later differentiate into the various languages spoken by the Alur, Acholi, Langi, Padhola, and, of course, the Luo of western Kenya. The term “River Lake” Nilote was a reference to the riparian environment of the upper Nile that was home to the proto-Western Nilotes.

The Lwoo were the peripatetic River Lake migrants. Although the Lwoo spread Nilotic culture, it is important to emphasize that the Lwoo, like the proto-Nilotes, did not migrate en masse but in small units. And it is also unlikely that the migrants had a cohesive identity. On the other hand, as the Lwoo spread throughout East Africa, they also promoted state formation or more centralized political leadership through the extension of the *rwot* chieftaincy. Nyikang was the heroic Lwoo founder who was subsequently awarded the title *rwot*, or king. Members of the Royal clan Ororo traced their ancestry back to Nyikang, which gave them the legitimacy to claim the *rwot* or kingship. As the Lwoo migrated and differentiated, other groups also incorporated, or perhaps, inherited *rwot* chieftaincies.

There are two views concerning the Lwoo’s initial movements (Cohen & Atieno-Odhiambo, 1968, pp. 149–152). One view asserts that by about 1000 C.E., the first Lwoo migrants initially moved north from the Bahr el Ghazal region up the Nile while the remnant migrants remained and later migrated south to Pubungu in northern Uganda. The group that moved north eventually became the Shilluk. The second theory is that after an initial movement south to northern Uganda, the Lwoo split. Some migrants moved north back to the Bahr el Ghazal region, while others went further south into Uganda and then into western Kenya. The migration of the Lwoo back into the Bahr el Ghazal region eventually established the Shilluk people. The group that migrated into northern Uganda dispersed into Pubungu in the northwest area of Bunyoro around 1400 C.E. That Pubungu featured in both versions of the migration reveals its historical significance. Pubungu was an important staging area for the Lwoo migration (Ogot, 1967, p. 58). The area was well watered and contained several rivers that fed into the Nile. With an environment conducive to cattle production, the population at Pubungu grew and eventually underwent a process of fission. According to oral traditions, some Lwoo moved further south in Uganda into Bunyoro and established the Bito dynasty that supplanted the resident Chwezi rulers around the fifteenth century. Through time, the Bito eventually dropped their Nilotic language and adopted a Bantu tongue (Wrigley, 1981, p. 220).

The Lwoo in Pubungu eventually migrated and differentiated into the Alur, Acholi, Langi, and Padhola. With the Lwoo impact, the Acholi and the Alur would eventually develop *rwot* chieftaincies. On the other hand, there was no subsequent development of *rwot* chieftaincies among the Langi people. *Rwot* chieftaincies were characterized by a central political figure who commanded authority due to his control of various types of kingship regalia, like drums (Atkinson, 1989, p. 21). He did not rule with absolute power and his political influence was limited and was shared with clans.

After a process of cultural fusion in Pubungu, some of the Lwoo branched off. In Kenya, this branch of Western Nilotes would eventually become the Southern Luo. Southern Luo migrated into western Kenya or Nyanza in three distinct waves. The first movement, which was also the largest, occurred between 1490 C.E. and 1600 C.E. and originated in Acholi land in Northern Uganda before entering Nyanza by way of the Yimbo region. These were known in oral traditions as the Joka Jok. Later, an offshoot of the Padhola, another remnant Lwoo group, from Busoga in Uganda, arrived in Nyanza between 1590 C.E. and 1670 C.E. These were the Jok Owiny, or Owiny Karuoth (Cohen & Atieno-Odhiambo, 1989, p. 19). The last of the Luo migrants, the Jok Omolo, moved into South Nyanza around 1730–1760 C.E. These were more scattered groups from different parts of Buganda and Busoga.

The origin story of the Southern Luo of Kenya is steeped in mythology. According to the Luo oral traditions, one of the migrations from northern Uganda was named after one of the leaders called Ramogi and eventually settled at Ramogi Hill in Nyanza (Ogot, 1967, p. 143). Although the geographic location is not specific, it aligns, generally, with the linguistic origins.

When the Luo arrived in Nyanza, they encountered Bantu speakers and various Khoi San speakers already resident. The first Luo migration was mainly peaceful but the oral traditions on the subsequent migrations allude to battles and the displacement of peoples (Ogot, 1967, pp. 150–153). Although the Luo referred to the autochthonous peoples that they encountered in Nyanza as *mwache*, or barbarians, the relationship between the two groups, though characterized by warfare, also involved trade and intermarriage (Ochieng, 1975, p. 27). The slow Luo incursion also led to a process of state formations among some Luo groups. For example, in Yimbo, the *Jok-Owiny* Luo would eventually create the Kadimo chiefdom around 1680 (Ochieng, 1975, pp. 33–43).

Although it appears that the Owiny groups of Luo were able to eventually achieve higher social status over their new neighbors in Nyanza based upon heredity, in this case a hereditary royal family, the Omolo were not able to replicate social dominance based upon heredity. Instead, the Omolo relied upon the material circumstances of the situation in time to achieve primary status (Cohen & Atieno-Odhiambo, 1989, p. 19). In essence, the Luo conjured status out of the past. Borrowing from their Lwoo ancestors, the Luo attached importance to the possession of sacred royal objects associated with important ancestors that gave the holders special status. These royal objects could include mystically significant spears, beads, stools, scepters, and drums. This enhanced the political legitimacy of some of the Luo groups and gave them special status over the people they subjugated.

Like their Bantu neighbors, the Luo cultivated grain crops, like millet and sorghum, and relied upon the herding of cattle, sheep, goats, and fishing. However, there were differences between the various Luo migrants. The Omolo migrants tended to be more mobile and reliant upon pastoralism as a way of life, while the Owiny group seem to have attached more importance to

cattle mainly for political rituals (Cohen & Atieno-Odhiambo, 1989, p. 19). Consequently, the Owiny groups tended to be more sedentary.

The nineteenth century witnessed the growth of long-distance trade in ivory and slaves to Zanzibar off the East African coast. The trade gradually enveloped the areas around Lake Victoria. Some of the Southern Luo became involved in the trade via Lake Victoria and the Kingdom of Buganda. However, the increase in trading caravans also led to the spread of disease, slave trading, internecine warfare, and famine among the Luo (Ochieng, 1975, pp. 48–51). This state of affairs, in a sense, paved the way for the beginning of colonialism at the close of the nineteenth century.

THE EASTERN NILOTES

The second group of Nilotes were the Eastern Nilotes. They were also called Plains Nilotes due to the environment that most would come to inhabit, which was characterized by arid plains west of Lake Turkana. By about 2000 B.C.E., the proto-Eastern Nilotes moved into the areas of East Africa that encompass northeastern Uganda, northwestern Kenya, and southeastern Sudan (Vossen, 1982, p. 470). Slightly less than 3000 years ago the Eastern Nilotes would further differentiate into the Bari, the Lotuko, the Teso-Turkana, and the Ongamo-Maa and eventually spread into other parts of Sudan, the Congo, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya (Vossen, 1982, pp. 21–22). The Teso-Turkana emerged as a distinct linguistic grouping in an area between Mt. Elgon and Mt. Moruts region straddling Kenya and Uganda. Migrating out of this region, the majority of the Teso-Turkana would eventually occupy southern Ethiopia, north and eastern Uganda, and northwestern Kenya. Later, the Teso and Karamajong peoples would form a significant part of this linguistic group. The migrations of the proto-Ongamo-Maa would be confined mainly to the Rift Valley of Kenya and Tanzania. Moreover, the proto-Ongamo-Maa would be more influenced by contact with Southern Nilotic speakers. The most important period of expansion occurred in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the Maasai came to dominate the Rift Valley in Kenya and Tanzania.

Cattle were central to the economy and lifestyle of the proto-Eastern Nilotes. Despite the importance of cattle keeping, the Eastern Nilotes also practiced mixed farming, cultivating crops like millet and beans. Although the political features of the individual language groups were quite diverse, some common features point back to the ancestral population. In proto-Eastern Nilotic society, ritual experts, or people who were known to be able to channel mystical energy, occupied central importance (Vossen, 1982, p. 24). These mystic practitioners held social prominence due to their ability to bring rain. Age sets and initiation were also an integral part of Eastern Nilotic society and played a role in political and military functions.

Between 1700 C.E. and 1800 C.E., the Teso peoples migrated into their present locations in Eastern Uganda and Western Kenya. According to oral traditions, the Teso emerged and migrated from a place called *Iworopom* (the

Karamojong called the Iteso *Iworopom*) near the Loyoro River south of Mt. Moroto located in Karamoja in Uganda. Gradually, they dispersed to the area around Usuku and then Soroti in Uganda, where they spread again after approximately 150 years in residence (Vossen, 1982, p. 54). The general factor that stimulated the migration was a desire for more land for the burgeoning population (Webster et al., 1973, p. 12). After 1830 the Teso migrated further into the area around Mt. Elgon and Busia and further into Turkana country in Kenya (Ogot, 1967, p. 114). Although linguistic evidence points to an origin on the border between Kenya and Uganda, some oral traditions among the Teso posit an origin in the direction of Ethiopia with entry into Uganda through Karamoja through several migrations over multiple generations (Lawrance, 1957, p. 7).

Prior to their migrations, the Teso, as was the case with the proto-Eastern Nilotes, relied upon pastoralism and maintained more of a nomadic lifestyle. On the other hand, according to oral traditions, the Teso claim that they were agriculturalists prior to herding cattle (Webster et al., 1973, p. 20). Nonetheless, as mixed agriculturalists, the Teso cultivated millet, sorghum, and groundnuts as staples. Politically, the Teso did not have chiefs but were organized according to clans and age sets (Lawrance, 1957, pp. 72–78). When needed, they also formed military confederations (Webster et al., 1973, pp. xvii–xiv). After settling into their new lands, they eventually transitioned into a more sedentary agricultural community (Vossen, 1982, p. 58).

In addition to the Teso, the Turkana emerged as a linguistically cohesive group and expanded into Kenya in two different waves. Alongside the other Teso-Turkana peoples, like the closely related Karamojong, they emerged as a population around the Mt. Moroto area in present-day Uganda and slowly migrated to their present location in Kenya until their movement was checked by the presence of the Nandi (Vossen, 1982, p. 61).

Due probably to the historical mythology surrounding the Maasai during the late nineteenth century, the Ongamo-Maa, and more specifically the Maasai, are the most researched Nilotic subgroup (Vossen, 1982, p. 69). According to linguistic evidence, the Ongamo-Maa emerged as a distinct group around the first millennium of the common era in the plains surrounding the Nyandarua (Aberdares) Range and Mt. Kilimanjaro. Eventually, by the ninth century C.E., the Ongamo and Maa speakers split, with the Ongamo remaining within the environs of Mt. Kilimanjaro.

According to various oral traditions of different Maa speakers, the Maa migrated from an undefined region in the north called *Kerio*, or escarpment, during the early seventeenth century or slightly before (Galaty, 1993, p. 64). As the proto-Maa speakers gradually spread, they came into contact with Eastern Cushitic speakers, which resulted in the borrowing of words and various aspects of Cushitic culture, like prohibitions against the consumption of fowls, male circumcision and female genital mutilation (Vossen, 1982, p. 71). The Maa speakers would continue to migrate and eventually came into contact with Southern Nilotic speakers who already used pastoralism.

Between 1280 C.E. and 1580 C.E., the proto Maa speakers separated into northern Maa, which included the Samburu and Chamus and southern Maa, which included Anusha, Baraguya, and the Maasai (Sommer & Vossen, 1993, p. 29). The Samburu would eventually migrate to the territory around the Cherangany Hills, while the Chamus would be found close to Lake Baringo (Galaty, 1993, p. 68). As the two major Maa sub-branches delineated, they came into violent conflict with each other and also with sedentary agriculturalist communities they encountered (Jacobs, 1968, p. 23). The traditions of Bantu-speaking communities, like the Luhya, also describe armed conflict with Maa speakers during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries who were probably Maasai. The Maa speakers, the Maasai being our reference, would eventually develop an almost purely pastoralist lifestyle, known as the “new pastoralism,” with very little agricultural production (Vossen, 1982, p. 71). This “new pastoralism” was not really new, but it involved living off the meat, milk, and blood of cattle with new forms of social organization. The Maasai, in particular, were organized socially according to age sets (Jacobs, 1968, pp. 10–30).

With the “new pastoralism,” *laibons*—or ritual specialists—became more socially and politically significant. The *laibons* provided divination and services that promoted the healing of sickness. *Laibons* also administered protective medicine to initiate age sets and blessed cattle raids (Spear, 1981, p. 64). Their historical importance is that they provided the social identity that distinguished different Maasai groups, as each group had its *laibon*. During the era of Maasai expansion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the *laibons* began to play more of an active political role in Maasai society.

According to the Maasai oral traditions, the consolidation of the Maasai as more of a corporate political entity occurred around 1778 with the birth of the first *laibon*, Supet, who was also regarded as their greatest spiritual expert (Jacobs, 1968, p. 23). During this period, various Maasai groups slowly expanded. The Kisongo Maasai settled in Northern Tanzania around Mt. Meru, which became the farthest extent Maasai reached, while Purko occupied the north Rift Valley in Kenya (Galaty, 1993, p. 68).

By the nineteenth century, the Maasai underwent another period of rapid expansion and came to dominate the Rift Valley from the southern areas of Lake Turkana to the central highland regions of Tanzania under the successive reigns of the Uasin Gishu, Lakiapiak, and Purko Maasai (Galaty, 1991, p. 182). From approximately 1815 to 1834, the Maasai also became immersed in a long-running civil war as the Il-Maasai, or Purko, the more purely pastoralist group, and Iloikop, or Laikiapiak, who employed mixed farming, fought for supremacy over the Uasin Gishu Plateau and access to pasturage and water. The oral traditions of the Southern Nilotic Nandi people also refer to the civil war between the Il-Maasai and the Iloikop (Sommer & Vossen, 1993, p. 34). Despite the pervasiveness of this specific historical narrative, scholars, like John Galaty, contend that the supposed Iloikop wars were not actually a civil war between two clearly demarcated Maasai groups but instead a series of wars

between various Maasai peoples, each distinguished by different Maa dialects, who were caught up in competition with each other during the overall expansion and migration from the original Maasai core (Jennings, 2005, p. 203). In essence, during the nineteenth-century Iloikop War, all combatants were Iloikop.

The Il-Maasai eventually emerged victorious between 1870 and 1875, but the Maasai, as a whole, suffered from the loss of cattle and depopulation brought on by the warfare. However, one outcome of the civil war was the institutionalization of the position of the *laibon* under the Purko Mbatien, the son of Supet. The Purko victory was short-lived, however. The spread of the bovine cattle disease and rinderpest wiped out their herds. Along with the rinderpest outbreak, smallpox and drought ensued in the late nineteenth century, leading to a propitious diminution of both cattle and people. The calamitous events in the late nineteenth century, in essence, paved the way for the entry of Europeans and collaboration and colonization for the Maasai. Although the British who colonized Kenya feared the Maasai military potential, the Maasai were actually reeling from the effects of cattle disease and drought and could not have offered a real threat to the British. However, the entry of the British into East Africa provided an opportunity for the Maasai to replenish their cattle stocks by working with the British during the “pacification” phase of imperialism.

THE SOUTHERN NILOTES

The third Nilotic subgroup were the Southern Nilotes, or Highland Nilotes, who were further bifurcated into two major groups, the Dadog and Kalenjin. Later, the Kalenjin further differentiated into several different dialects, most notable in Kenya being the Pokot, Nandi, Tugen, Kipsigis, Keiyo, Sabaot, and Marakwet, among others. During the colonial period in Kenya, the Southern Nilotes, along with some of the Plains Nilotes, were also referred to as “Nilo-Hamites” (Seligman, 1966, p. 100–117). The reference to Hamites alluded to the racist idea in the early colonial historiography of Africa that construed the Hamites as a race of light-skinned peoples who came from southwest Asia or the Horn of Africa and created all the advanced civilizations found in sub-Saharan Africa. The Nilo-Hamites were then a mixture of some Nilotic peoples and the Hamites.

The Highland Nilotes formed approximately 800 B.C.E. to 500 C.E. between the Nile River and Lake Turkana region and gradually spread into northern Kenya in the environs around Mt. Elgon and down to the highland areas of Tanzania in the southern plains surrounding Mt. Hanang (Ehret, 1971, p. 3). Oral tradition partially corroborates the origin location. For example, according to Taita arap Towett, the oral traditions of one of the Kalenjin groups, the Kipsigis, point to an amorphous origin in the north but with no specific geographic location identified (Towett, 1979, p. 2).

As the Southern Nilotes gradually diffused, they came into contact with Eastern Cushitic speakers around the southern fringes of the Ethiopian highlands. From the Eastern Cushitic speakers, the Southern Nilotes borrowed customs like fish avoidance, male circumcision, female genital mutilation, and the use of cyclical age sets, as opposed to the proto-Nilotic linear age sets (Ehret, 1971, p. 36). Southern Nilotes would also be influenced by contacts with the proto-Teso-Karamajong (Vossen, 1982, p. 50). Pokot contact with Teso-Karamajong Plains Nilotes left such an indelible mark on the Pokot that it differentiated them from other Highland Nilotes. For instance, the use of long narrow shields, lip plugs, and certain hairstyles among the Pokot originated with the Teso-Karamajong speakers (Ehret, 1971, p. 70). In addition, the Pokot eventually lost the Southern Nilotic practice of cyclical age sets. In contrast to the Pokot, the Nandi speakers would be influenced more by contact with Bantu speakers from the eastern shore of Lake Victoria.

From the linguistic reconstruction of the proto-Southern Nilotic vocabulary, it is apparent that cattle were important in the economic and social matrix of the Southern Nilotic life, as was the case with other Nilotic groups. In addition to herding, the Southern Nilotes cultivated grains, like sorghum and finger millet, and collected honey. Possibly, from contacts with the aforementioned Bantu speakers, the Southern Nilotes also learned to forge iron (Ehret, 1971, p. 44).

After 500 C.E., the Southern Nilotes migrated into the northwestern parts of Kenya, between the Winam (Nyanza) Gulf and Mt. Elgon regions and North Rift Valley and gradually encountered and supplanted the Southern Cushitic speakers who were already resident in those areas (Ehret, 1971, p. 48). With further migration, the Southern Nilotes also encountered Eastern Nilotes, more specifically proto-Maasai, in the plains between the Nyandarua Range and Mt. Kilimanjaro. After the breakup of the Southern Nilotes, the Dadog linguistic group emerged in northwestern Kenya and gradually migrated to the central northern parts of Tanzania between Mt. Kilimanjaro and Lake Natron where they were in contact with proto-Maasai communities. Dadog culture was like Nilotic culture in that they kept cattle, relying upon the milk and blood from their herds. They were also mixed farmers who cultivated grains.

The oral traditions of the various Kalenjin speakers regard Mt. Elgon, or *Tulwop Kony*, as an ancestral homeland (Chelimo & Chelego, 2016, p. 2). As the proto-Kalenjin speakers continued to migrate, the current language groups slowly segregated after 1650 C.E. Around the eastern and southern slopes of the Mt. Elgon region, the Kony, Sabiny, and Pok emerged. And, in the Uasin Gishu plains, the Nandi became prominent, with the Pokot to the north. East and South of Mt. Elgon, other Kalenjin linguistic groups, like the Keiyo, Kipsigis, Tugen, Marakwet, and Terik, also appeared. The Kipsigis would eventually settle in Kericho while the Keiyo and Marakwet would be found in the Kerio Valley (Chelimo & Chelego, 2016, p. 2). Tugen migration eventually ended in Baringo.

Proto-Kalenjins relied upon cattle, and typical of the proto-Southern Nilotes, they both milked and bled their cattle. The Kalenjin employed raiding, as was the case with other pastoralist communities, to acquire cattle. Proto-Kalenjin also cultivated grains, collected honey, and brewed beer (Ehret, 1971, p. 63). Cyclical age sets were the social matrix of proto-Kalenjin society, with age sets changing over every 12 to 15 years (Snell, 1954, p. 3). The proto-Kalenjin believed in a creator god named *Asis*, who was associated with the sun, along with various lesser deities associated with nature (Toweett, 1979, pp. 33–34). To communicate with these gods and channel mystical energy, the Kalenjin employed *orkoiyots* or diviners (Chelimo & Chelego, 2016, p. 8). Politically, the Kalenjin were acephalous or lacked formal bureaucratic state institutions but they were organized socially by clans and age sets controlled by elders and councils of elders.

The nineteenth century brought a lot of economic and social change to the Kalenjins. In the wake of the Iloikop War, the Nandi filled the void created by the depopulation of the Maasai and supplanted the Maasai on the Uasin Gishu plateau as the dominant power (Low, 1963, pp. 308–309). Like the Maasai, the Nandi *orkoiyots* gained more political power as the Nandi became more dominant. As evidence of their military prowess, in contrast to the Maasai, with the start of British imperialism in Kenya, the Nandi fought several battles against them as they struggled for supremacy.

CONCLUSION

Although there have been more scholarly work on the Bantu migrations in African history, other linguistic families have also left their marks in the historical records (Schoenbrun, 1998). During the Iron Age in East Africa, the Nilotes migrated into the various regions that would later be called South Sudan, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, and, of course, Kenya. Eventually, the Nilotes differentiated into three main subfamilies: the Southern Nilotes, the Eastern Nilotes, and the Western Nilotes. With the Nilotic migrations came their culture, and this they bequeathed to future generations. Across the various Nilotic subgroups, pastoralism was a common lifestyle and found throughout East Africa in geographic zones with variable water supplies. The age sets that characterized all Nilotic societies were, in certain ways, an outgrowth of the pastoralist lifestyle. The Nilotic transient lifestyle was also conducive to the development and spread of political innovations that led to the proliferation of kingship. But the Nilotes, like their Cushitic neighbors, were never purely pastoralist. Unlike the proto-Bantu, whose agricultural system was predicated on wet root crops like yams, the various Nilotic groups also developed agricultural systems of production utilizing domesticated grains. Although the Nilotes left an indelible cultural mark in Kenyan history, their actions were, for the most part, not recorded on paper. The story of the migration of the Nilotes is, therefore, also an account of the efficacy of linguistics and oral tradition as tools for the reconstruction of early African history.

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Cushitic Migration and Settlement in Kenya

Maurice N. Amutabi

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the migration and settlement of Cushites who occupy vast parts of northern and parts of southern Kenya. Cushites belong to the cattle complex corridor of Africa, which stretches from Somalia in the East to Senegal in the West. The Cushites have not received adequate attention among historians. There are very few studies on the Cushitic political, social, economic, and cultural aspects. Many historians tend to focus on the Bantu and Nilotic migrations (Were & Wilson, 1972). The reasons for this are many.

First, the colonial state privileged farmers and ignored herders. The farmers were consistent with the ideals of Britain, which did not understand nomadic pastoralism. Second, northern Kenya, which is occupied by Cushites, had already been penetrated by Islam and it was very hard for Christianity to penetrate (Were, 1967). It was hard for the ‘crown to follow the cross’ in northern Kenya. Unlike other parts of Kenya, where missionaries did much of the writings of the early history of people in Kenya and even allowed locals to write their own stories in local languages, northern Kenya was ignored (Hollis, 1909). Third, the area occupied by Cushites was a remote and unforgiving terrain which few outsiders were willing to risk visiting for elongated days of missionary work (Amutabi, 2009). No schools were established in these areas, hence the lack of a native intelligentsia to document their own history.

Fourth, much of the oral history of northern Kenya, where Cushites are dominantly settled, remained undocumented due to a lack of education and schools for natives. The history of other parts of Kenya was written by native scholars such as B. A. Ogot (Luo), Gideon S. Were (Luhya), Godfrey Muriuki

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(Kikuyu), etc., while northern regions of the country lacked such pioneer historians. Fifth, few texts document the history of the Cushites authoritatively, making it hard to create a homogenous and continuous history. The area paid higher fidelity to Islamic studies than local histories. Finally, the clan system made it hard to have a meta or mega history of Cushites because much of the historical narratives were kept under clan oral traditions (Ogot, 1967). It is for the above reasons that this chapter seeks to provide an outline history of the Cushites while paying attention to existing narratives documented by other scholars, such as Gideon Saulo Were, among others, on the migration and settlement of Cushites.

BACKGROUND TO MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT OF CUSHITES

The Cushites are part and parcel of what Ochieng (1972) has described as the ‘Misri’ legends of origin in African history. Cushites, or Cushitic people, reside in the arid and semi-arid eastern and northeastern parts of Kenya, known for their extreme weather and climatic conditions (Were & Wilson, 1972). They are found along a very large area of land that runs from the east of Lake Turkana, stretches to the north of Kenya, and embraces the Indian Ocean in the east. Cushites include Somali, Rendille, Borana, and Oromo ethnic groups. Cushites speak Afro-Asiatic languages and are believed to have originally come from Ethiopia and Somalia in Northeast Africa. The account of their migration pattern has been aided by linguistic reconstruction as well as settlement patterns of recent migrations. Historians have reenacted Cushitic migration based on water scarcity, pasture, and insecurity due to cattle rustling. Cushitic people live in harsh terrain and have created strong attributes of endurance.

Until the arrival of the Nilotes, some five hundred years ago, the ancestors of both the Southern and Eastern Cushites occupied a much larger part of East Africa than they do today, extending into the area from Lake Turkana to the Indian Ocean as well as central and southern Kenya (Were & Wilson, 1972). However, the arrival of both the Bantu and especially the Nilotic-speaking peoples scattered the Cushitic populations in four directions and halted or changed the direction of their southward movement. Some groups headed south into Tanzania, while others headed west into the Rift Valley, where they were eventually assimilated by the ancestors of the Maasai and other Nilotic ethnic groups like the Kalenjin and Turkana (Ambrose, 1984). But the majority retreated northwards into the more marginal lands they occupy today. These groups were exposed to a prolonged and profound interaction with their new Nilotic neighbors, including cultural exchange and intermarriage, to the extent that there is nowadays very little to distinguish the supposedly Cushitic Rendille from their Nilotic Samburu neighbors. More recently, perhaps some three hundred years ago, the ‘Oromo Expansion’, which originated in southern Ethiopia, reclaimed some of the lands that had been lost, mainly at the expense of the Bantu, who were forced south into the much more fertile highland areas of Kenya, where they remain today.

TWO WAVES OF MIGRATION: THE SOUTHERN CUSHITES AND EASTERN CUSHITES

In Kenya, historians have identified two waves or strands of Cushites. The Southern Cushites are also known as Dahaloan-speakers who include the Boni of Tana River and Lamu counties as well as the Dahallo or Sanye (Tana River, Lamu and Kilifi). The Eastern Cushites include the Borana (in Marsabit and Isiolo), Somali (in Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera), Oromo (in Isiolo and Marsabit), Gabra (in Marsabit and Isiolo), Rendille (in Marsabit, Isiolo, and Samburu), Burji (in Marsabit and Isiolo), Ormia (Tana River), and Wardei (Tana River). The Eastern Cushites are the majority within the Cushitic migratory and settlement history in Kenya because they remain demographically significant (Amutabi, 2009).

Southern Cushites

Historians believe that Southern Cushites (Dahaloan-speakers) might have entered present-day Kenya through northern Kenya and seem to have originated from the Ethiopian highlands (Lewis, 1965). Since they practiced mixed economy—hunter-gatherers, farmers, and pastoralists, they must have been looking for areas full of game and food crops, better pasture, and water sources for their livestock. Some historical accounts suggest that Southern Cushites were the second earliest inhabitants in the Kenyan (and East African) region after the indigenous hunter-gatherer groups such as El Molo and Okiek (Ogot, 1967).

Historical accounts show that they moved in search of pasture and water for their livestock. There was drought and famine and outbreaks of diseases and epidemics in their original homeland. They moved in search of land for settlements as their population had increased. Around 2000 and 2500 years ago, they were already occupying the grasslands of the Kenya highlands cultivating food crops such as sorghum, millet, and rearing long-horned cattle without humps. Historical accounts place them in parts of Tanzania such as Iraqwu, Ngomwia, and Burungi. In Kenya, they include the Boni of Lamu and Tana River and the Dahallo or Sanye of the lower Tana (who are the remaining southern Cushites in Kenya). Many southern Cushites were later assimilated by eastern Cushites and Bantu groups, who changed their identity. Also called Dahaloan-speakers, they continued to exist as separate but small ethnic groups but were increasingly threatened by assimilation by much bigger and dominant groups. Due to instability in neighboring Somalia, they have moved away from their original lands, long associated with clan wars and conflicts. Boni forest, which is home to the Boni people, has become a war theater, little more than a reflection of Somalia's internal conflicts, with heavily armed raiders, bandits, and massacres prevalent throughout the area, making meaningful livelihoods almost impossible.

Eastern Cushites

The Eastern Cushites include the Borana, Somali, Oromo, Gabra, Rendille, and Burji. They are believed to have originated either from Ethiopia or Somalia, moving and settling into Kenya around 2000 and 1000 years ago due to many reasons. Historians believe that they might have migrated in search of pasture and water as well as ethnic, clan, or family disputes and conflicts. The vast majority of Kenyan Cushites are from the Eastern branch, with only a few pockets of numerically tiny Southern Cushites surviving, mainly near the coast (Ogot, 1967).

Within the history of migration and settlement of Eastern Cushites are two main distinctions. First, there are those from the east, bordering Somalia, and regarded as the Somali-speaking people (also called Somaloid or Garre). Second are those to the north, bordering Ethiopia and indeed occupying a good part of southern Ethiopia. These are the Oromo-speakers (formerly and pejoratively called Galla) who migrated into Kenya from the lowland areas south of the Ethiopian highlands (Leys, 1975). This latter group includes the Borana (by far the largest group numerically), the Gabra, and the ancestors of the Rendille and Burji. The Orma, who occupy a small enclave around Garsen and the Tana River near the Kenyan coast, are also Oromo-speaking (Were, 1967). In any case, many more migrations occurred after the first and second arrivals, the latest in the mid-1900s (the Burji from Ethiopia), which makes tracing the exact ancestry of any of these peoples a confusing and tricky activity. The Wardei are the last in this migration trajectory of the Cushites. The Wardei (Tana River) and the Gashes (Isiolo, Wajir, and Garissa) are sometimes regarded as acephalous, emerging out of intermarriage between many other disparate groups.

THE 'MISRI' LEGEND AMONG CUSHITIC MIGRATION NARRATIVES

The Cushites have 'Misri' legend in their origins, which sometimes brings about confusion in the history of migration. Many ethnic groups in Kenya claim that their ancestors came from 'Misri', which is a mystical place in the 'north' often hard to define. Cushites claim to have come from areas north of Ethiopia without much archaeological or other forms of historical support. The Misri legend is an origin myth common to a number of East African communities (Ochieng, 1972). Ochieng wrote extensively about this issue in many of the accounts of the origins of the peoples of East Africa. In many of the accounts he analyzed, Ochieng established that many people claimed that their ancestors originated in a land called 'Misri' located in the north (perhaps Egypt, Ethiopia, Kush, Mediterranean Coast, etc.). Archaeological findings on iron-working and pottery remains in places such as Meroe tended to support the migration from North to South. Ochieng (1972) researched the migration and settlement of the Abagusii, who also claimed that before they migrated to Mt Elgon, they lived in a country called 'Misri' that was located north of Mt

Elgon. G. S. Were also noted the presence of 'Misri' in the origins of many Luhya clans (Were, 1967), which suggests common ancestry. The Misri legend appears in the origin stories of Abagusii, Kuria, Maragoli, Bukusu, Meru, Baganda, Basoga, Haya, Alur, Kipsigis, and Marakwet.

Many accounts of the origins of the Cushites have identified three major waves or strands of movement. The idea of waves or strands is common in the migration and settlement history of many peoples of East Africa who share points of dispersal, such as Shungwaya, which is the most common. Were has argued that after indigenous communities such as Okiek and El Molo, the Cushites were among the early arrivals in the country. Using historical sources, archaeological sources and conjecture, Were says that of Kenya's three major migrant ethnolinguistic groups (Bantu, Nilotes, and Cushites), the Cushites were the first to arrive. They are believed to have entered Kenya from the north, from southern Ethiopia. He believes that they arrived sometime between the Second and First Millennium BC (Lewis, 1965), which gives them almost 2000 years of settlement in the area. There have been accounts of an earlier arrival of Cushites (Seligman, 1966), but they are not backed with facts. The problem is that there is little or no material proof of early arrival, nor much likelihood of finding any. This is because the material culture of nomadic peoples is generally perishable, as items such as bone tools, ropes, sandals, and so on are made of natural materials such as fiber, wood, gourds, and animal products that do not last long. Burnt pots and iron tools associated with Bantu and Nilotic migrations often last longer.

The arrival of the first wave of Cushites must have been on the margins of good arable land, as indigenous populations had already claimed areas rich in hunting and gathering. It is also possible that in some parts, their arrival may have coincided with waves of other people like Plain Nilotes such as the Maasai, who prevented their southward movement and confined them to northern Kenya. There are accounts that suggest a second wave as having taken place between 500 and 1000 AD due to the expansion of various Ethiopian empires as well as tensions accompanying Islamic penetration and conquest. The third wave must have taken place between 1100 and 1600 AD, while the last wave took place between 1700 and 1900. The waves have generated four strands of Northern Cushites who came first, followed by Southern Cushites and Eastern Cushites.

LINGUISTIC SUPPORT IN DESCRIBING CUSHITIC MIGRATION

Linguistics has been used in tracing the origins of people and their migration patterns (Guthrie, 1948). The assumption is usually that the closer groups are to their origins, the less different their linguistic fraternity is, and the more dispersed they have been, the less difference in their language. Largely due to this linguistic theory popularized by Guthrie's research among the Bantu (Guthrie, 1948, 1967), linguists have made several distinctions among Cushitic-speaking peoples based on perceived language roots, although, as

usual, nothing has yet been proved beyond doubt (Bechhaus-Gerst, 2000). For example, Marianne Bechhaus-Gerst (2000) has shown how linguistics has been used to reconstruct the domestication of livestock. Roland Kießling and Mous Maarten (2003) have identified streams or groups of Cushites based on language. First, they have identified Northern Cushites (mainly in Sudan and Eritrea, which may or may not have elements of North African Berber). Second, they have identified the Central Cushites (also called the Agau group; mainly in Ethiopia and bearing strong Ethiopic and Amharic influence) and the Western Cushites (or Omotic; spoken along the western border of Ethiopia near Kenya). Third, they have identified Southern Cushites (mainly in Tanzania, including the Iraqw, Asa, and Ngomwia). Fourth and finally, the two scholars have identified Eastern Cushites who include Borana, Somali, Oromo, Gabra, Rendille, and Burji. The Eastern Cushites are most widespread in Kenya (Wako, 2011).

The Cushitic languages are a branch of the Afroasiatic language family (Lewis, 2002). They are spoken primarily in the Horn of Africa, with minorities speaking Cushitic languages to the north in Egypt and Sudan and to the south in Kenya and Tanzania (Güldemann, 2018). As of 2012, the Cushitic languages with over one million speakers were Oromo, Somali, Beja, Afar, Hadiyya, Kambaata, Saho, and Sidama (Wako, 2013). The Cushitic languages with the greatest number of total speakers are Oromo (37 million), Somali (22 million), Beja (3.2 million), Sidamo (3 million), and Afar (2 million) (Güldemann, 2018). Oromo, which is also spoken by the Borana of Kenya, serves as one of the official working languages of Ethiopia and is also the working language of several of the states within the Ethiopian federal system, including Oromia, Harari, and Dire Dawa regional states and the Oromia Zone in the Amhara Region.

Currently, Cushitic-speaking peoples are dispersed over a large portion of the arid north and northeast of Kenya and comprise the majority in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Despite covering about 25% of the Kenya land surface, Cushites presently account for no more than 4% of the total population in Kenya. They live almost exclusively by herding camels, although cattle are sometimes also kept where climatic conditions allow. Drought, famine, and desertification are recurrent features of their lives and allow only limited farming through irrigation along rivers such as the Dawa River, Ewaso Nyiro River, and Isiolo River (Amutabi, 2009).

EXAMPLES OF CUSHITES IN KENYA

Many examples discussed here are taken from the Eastern Cushites and Southern Cushites of Kenya due to the availability of materials gathered by historians in the recent past (Wako, 2011). For this chapter, I have used Ormia (Tana River), Borana (Isiolo and Marsabit), and Somali (Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera) as representative groups because one cannot discuss all the groups in a limited space such as this.

THE ORMA OF KENYA

The Orma arrived in Kenya in the sixteenth century from Ethiopia through grazing journeys. Many of these grazing trips started by going and coming back to what were their home zones. Later, they became permanent when they saw no threat to the land around them. This is because they occupied a stretch of land that put them in a buffer zone between the Somali and their Pokomo neighbors. The Ormia initially settled on the eastern shores of Lake Turkana, where they were displaced by the expanding Turkana, Nyangatom, and Dasanneth. They later moved south, pushing the Mijikenda and the Pokomo out of Shungwaya to occupy Malindi and Kilifi areas. Today the Ormia occupy the southern part of Tana River, where they pursued mixed economy dominated by herding. They are neighbors to the Pokomo.

Many factors contributed to the migration of Orma into present-day Kenya. They moved in search of pasture and fresh water, which is perhaps why they are confined around Tana River. They also moved to run away from bigger and stronger states such as the Ethiopian empires. Besides their migration, they intermarried with the people they came into contact with, for example, Somali, Pokomo, and Borana, creating hybrids in their culture. The Ormia traded with neighboring groups exchanging various products leading to trade opportunities. They settled in an area along the Tana River, which was on the path of nomadic herders, and this often brought them into conflict with fellow nomads such as the Somali and Wardei people. Their settlement led to increased conflict between communities over resources, e.g., pasture and water, which remains to this day. The Orma were interested in pasture, while the Pokomo, who are Bantu, were interested in farming and fishing. They created symbiotic trade relations from the 1800s in exchange of cereals and meat products. They therefore opted to live side by side and sometimes forged coalitions against the Somali invaders. The Ormia pushed the Bantu, such as Pokomo and Giriama, from the Shungwaya region of dispersal due to constant raids. Over the years, the Ormia interacted with Somali and coastal peoples and adopted Islam. In the recent past, settlement in high agricultural potential areas along Tana River has encouraged some of the Ormia to practice crop farming. They form part of the minority groups in Tana River County.

The Borana of Kenya

The Borana are Oromo-speaking people whose origin is in southern Ethiopia. Many scholars, such as Fugich Wako, have documented the history of the Borana and how they are related to the Oromo of Ethiopia through the Gadaa system, where they share social, cultural, and political organization (Wako, 2013). The Borana belong to the large Oromo ethnic formation known for its remarkable indigenous democratic socio-political system known as the Gadaa system, which they have kept working for the last five centuries. Legesse (2000) has discussed the naming of the age-sets in the Gada system (Gogessa), which varies from place to place. The Borana are among many Oromo sub-ethnic

groups among whom the Gada system has remained intact, and, in this locality, the people name these classes as: Fullas, Derw-a, Makulla, Moggisa, and Sabaka (Legesse, 2000). The Gada system is complicated. It is not simply an age system but carries other parameters other than age-sets. As a governance system, Gadaa guides the life course of individuals and regulates political, economic, social, and religious activities of the community. According to Asmarom Legesse, the Oromo Gadaa is “a system of gada classes (luba) that succeeded each other every eight years in assuming political, military, judicial, legislative, and ritual responsibilities” (Legesse, 2000, p. 31).

The power of the Gadaa general assembly is to exercise supreme legislative authority. Its functions include (but are not limited to) reviewing laws at work, proclaiming new laws, impeaching the men in power, and settling major disputes that could not have been resolved at the lower levels of its judicial organ(s). The head of the Gada system is known as Abba Gada and the position is rotational (Legesse, 2000). This is the reason why the Gada system is sometimes looked at as a form of African indigenous democracy.

The Borana migration into Kenya is a more recent one. It resulted from the need to escape the Menelik Wars of Conquest and expansion in 1897. Menelik had also imposed heavy taxes on the Borana. The Borana represent some of the most recent migrations into Kenya, which occurred as late as 1900 when more Borana groups fled into Kenya from Somalia, running away from the war between the Somali nationalists and the British. Today the Borana occupy vast parts of Isiolo and Marsabit counties.

The Somali of Kenya

Many historical accounts show that the Somali originated from Mogadishu or the Afar Triangle, where they lived by the tenth century AD (Diriye, 2001). They started moving southwards into Kenya between 1500 and 1600 due to the Oromo threat, or they were looking for pasture and water for their livestock (Ahmed, 1995). The Somali represent the largest single group of eastern Cushites in Kenya, where they occupy three counties of Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera. Before 1800, there was massive warfare during the migrations leading to the killing of many people in the process (Ahmed, 1995). For example, there was constant warfare between the Somali and the Borana (subset of the larger Oromo) in the 1800s leading to the emergence of the Gashe, who live in the border area of Garissa, Wajir, and Isiolo, who speak both Somali and Borana languages. The conflict displaced some Somali and Borana clans in AD 1500 and 1800 (Lewis, 1965). The Somali people developed trade relations with neighboring groups such as the Samburu, Borana, Kamba, Meru, and the Maasai. There was cultural exchange between them, especially with Bantu and Nilotic neighbors, where some Bantu took to herding while some Somali engaged in some farming along rivers, the age-set system, and circumcision. Many historians believe that circumcision was passed through Cushites from Ethiopia to Bantu groups (Lewis, 1965). The political and social organization of the Somali people centers around the clan and family.

Since 1400 AD, the Somali people have remained largely Muslims which has created a lot of affiliation to events in the Middle East (Diriye, 2001). Under Siad Barre, Somalia was a member of the Arab League through religious connection. After independence, the government of Kenya spent almost ten years trying to put down a nationalist uprising of Somali nationalism in the Shifta war. There was a feeling among some Somali that all Somali groups in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia should be united under one Somalia state. The crack-down led to the Wagalla massacre, which brought the resistance to an end. Garissa and Eastleigh in Nairobi are regarded as the centers of Somali activities in Kenya. Garissa County is dominated by three Ogaden sub-clans: Aulihan, Abudwaq, and Abdalla. Other accounts list them as Abuduak, Auliyahan, and Samawadhal. What is important to note is that the Somali put their first loyalty on family, clan, and religion. The Abudwaq clan dominates Garissa township and Fafi constituency; the Abdalla has primacy in the southern part of the county, while the areas around Dadaab, Lagdeera, and Balambala fall to the Auliyahan. There are also alliances and coalitions formed between clans organized by clan elders.

In Wajir, the main clans that dominate the county's economic and political affairs are Ajuuraan, Degodia, and Ogaden pastoral clans. In the past, the county has seen new areas of power created by recent immigrants from Somalia who arrived in Kenya after the collapse of the regime of Siad Barre in Somalia. Some of the influencers live in the diaspora in North America but have created bases in Wajir and influence local events due to economic power.

Mandera is dominated by the Garre, Degodia, and Murule clans. The Degodia and Garre clans have a long history of conflict. The Garre clan, the majority clan in Mandera, has always controlled the political affairs of the county due to numbers, but the trend has changed in the recent past through alliances of minority or 'corner' clans in the county. The elders' decisions on negotiated democracy have been ignored by those seeking elective office under devolution.

CONCLUSION

The Cushitic migration has not ended. It is still taking place in Kenya and is responsible for the emergence of 'Kambi Somali' in Kenya's urban spaces such as Eldoret, Kakamega, and Kisumu, among others. The emergence of Eastleigh as 'Little Mogadishu' speaks to the movement of the Somali people. The allegiance of the Borana to the Gada system, which dictates their voting patterns in Kenya and Ethiopia, speaks to the presence of movement, of going, coming back, and returning in a complex scenario of having dual citizenship among Cushitic groups in Somalia and Ethiopia. The emergence of pastoralist counties as important actors in Kenya's development has helped erode colonial marginalization of the region. There are now many development activities igniting new interest in areas occupied by Cushites in Kenya. The hostile terrain is being tamed through irrigation and 'green' and 'blue' revolutions in the

region. Diaspora money from Somali immigrants abroad in places such as Minneapolis and St. Paul's Minnesota cannot be gainsaid, for it is responsible for the thriving of Eastleigh in Nairobi and other parts of Kenya.

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The Arrival of Arabs and Asians in Kenya

Julius Simiyu Nabende

INTRODUCTION

Kenya is a multi-cultural state with three races and over forty-two African ethnic groups. The races are European, Asian/Arab and African. Asians and Arabs are perceived as foreigners in Kenya who control large commercial enterprises. The Asians and Arabs regard themselves as minorities in Kenya. Yet historical evidence indicates that they migrated into Kenya much earlier than some of the predominant African ethnic groups such as the Gikuyu, Luo, and Luhya, to name a few. Asians and Arabs interacted with Africans on the Kenya coast as early as the period prior to the birth of Christianity. The arrival and settlement of Asians and Arabs in Kenya span over the last two millennia; however, it was in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries AD that massive penetration and settlement of Asians and Arabs in Kenya was realized. In the existing historical literature on Asians, there has been adoption of different terminologies such as south Asians and Indians. In this chapter, we will adopt Asians in general to refer to immigrants from the Indian subcontinent into Kenya and Arabs to refer to immigrants from the Arabian Peninsula.

ASIANS

There is no consensus on what point in time Asians and Arabs first arrived in Kenya's coastal region. There is evidence that as early as 3000 BC, seafaring people from the West Coast of India were trading between the ports of Kenya and India. The *Periplus of the Erythrean Sea*, a document written by a Greek merchant, described Indian dhows carrying wheat, honey, cotton, and glass to

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the East African Coast and taking away ivory and rhinoceros horns from the East African coast (Jones, 2007, p. 17). Indians from the region of Gujerat in the provinces of Kachchh, Kathiawar, and Sind (Pakistan) boarded dhows from the ports of Mandui, Porbander, and Diu in western India and came to Zanzibar, Mombasa, and Tanga in great numbers (Tejpar, 1971). Asians had already arrived and settled in Mombasa and other coastal towns by the time the Portuguese began establishing their presence in Eastern Africa. When Vasco da Gama arrived in Mombasa, he noted Asian commercial enterprises and the permanent Indian settlement in coastal East Africa. The Asians were familiar with the sea route to India, and one of the Asian sailors named Kanji Malaam guided Vasco Da Gama's crew from Malindi to Kalikat in India.

The period 1784–1800 was significant in the Asian immigration into Kenya because of the locust pestilence in India, which devastated farms of Indian communities, and thus they moved out to look for alternative sources of survival. Push factors were the major reasons for Asian migration into Kenya. In 1890 there was a plague in Bombay that claimed a huge population, and in 1899–1901 there was a famine that affected many people and triggered emigration. One can classify Asian immigration into East Africa in general and Kenya in particular into five phases: pre-Zanzibar era, Zanzibar period, onset of British colonialism to the First World War, inter-world war period and the post-Second World War era. In the first phase, Asians came in small groups as traders and settled in Mombasa, Malindi, and Lamu on a seasonal basis. Thus they had permanent residence in South Asia. They were engaged in a triangular trade between India, the Persian Gulf, and East Africa. Once the Omani Sultanate established its headquarters in Zanzibar at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Asian commercial activities on the East African coast increased. However, it was in the third to fifth stages that Asian immigration into Kenya became massive, and the community had a major impact on the political economy of Kenya (Zarwin, 1977, pp. 29–38).

The Asian communities that came into East Africa were the Khoja Muslims from Cutch, Gujerat, and Bombay. There was also the Bohras community who came from Cutch and Kathiawar. Then there was the Mumans from Sind. The other community was the Baluchi, who were mostly soldiers from Western India. Lastly, we had the Hindus from Gujerat, who constituted a great part of the non-indentured laborers (Maganda, 2012, p. 48). The Bohras predominantly settled in Mombasa and other smaller towns in the interior of Kenya. These were skilled craftsmen, ironworkers, tinsmiths, watch repairers, and dealers in marine goods. The Bohra, just like the Khoja, have their own mosques and burial grounds. The Karimjee Jivanjee family belong to the Bohra sect (Zaidi, 1967, pp. 39–40).

The period 1850–1920 witnessed the growth of the Asian population in East Africa from 6000 to 54,000. These included Hindus such as the Bhatias, Patels, Lohanas, and Shahs. The Hindus are divided into four formal castes and a fifth non-formal caste. They are the Brahmin (priests), Kshatriya (nobles—rulers and warriors), Vaishya (merchants and house owners), and Sudra (service

class). The untouchables constitute the fifth caste. There were also Muslim Asians that included the Ithnasheries, Bohras, and Ismailis. Other Asian sects that settled in East Africa were Sikhs, Jains, and Goans (Oonk, 2013, pp. 59–81). The Patels initially ventured into farming once they arrived and settled in Kenya. They had interests in growing sisal, tea, coffee, and sugar cane. But the colonial state pushed them out of the farming sectors of tea, coffee, and sisal, and so they remained with sugar cane plantations in western Kenya, Nyanza, and coastal regions. The majority of the Hindus settled in Nairobi estates of Westlands, Karen, Kileleshwa, Parklands, Nairobi West, Muthaiga, Lavington, and Pangani (Kinanga, 2015, p. 119).

Asians coming into Kenya towards the beginning of the twentieth century are associated with the establishment of British colonialism in the country. Britain had already colonized India and decided to employ some of the colonial troops in India to serve in Kenya. Punjab troops were recruited to serve in the British colonial army called the East African Rifles up to 1913.

However, it was not until the construction of the Kenya-Uganda railway that a massive influx of Asians was seen in Kenya. In the period between 1896 and 1923 about 39,771 Asians arrived in East Africa (Kinanga, 2015, p. 2). Indian laborers, commonly described as coolies, were imported into Kenya to build the Kenya-Uganda railway line because African labor was inadequate and unreliable. The coolies were given three-year contracts with paid return tickets on expiry of the contracts. They had the option of remaining in Kenya after the contract period or flying back to India.

The recruitment of indentured Asian labor began with hiring 350 workers from Punjab in 1896, and by 1900 the number of coolies had risen to 19,742. In total, 32,000 Asian indentured laborers participated in constructing the Kenya-Uganda railway line. These workers were both skilled and unskilled. The skilled ones included masons, craftsmen, and clerks. The majority provided unskilled labor. These Asian workers worked in a difficult environment and successfully lay 582 miles of the Kenya-Uganda railway. Approximately 2493 Asian laborers died in the construction of the railway line. On completion of the railway line in 1901, the Kenya-Uganda Railway and Harbors Corporation retained some of the Asian indentured laborers and deployed them as drivers, signalmen, station masters, and maintenance and office clerks. About 10% of the coolies remained in Kenya and worked as artisans and supervisors of African workers in European establishments. Others chose to set up shops and other small businesses (Zaidi, 1967, pp. 18–19).

The population of Asians in East Africa gradually increased from 6000 in 1900 to 25,000 in 1913, and by 1948 it rose to 168,000. By the time of independence in 1963, the Asian population stood at 177,000 (Zaidi, 1967, p. 28).

ASIAN IN THE INTERIOR OF KENYA

Asians spread all over urban centers and towns in Kenya, both in the coastal region and the interior. In Machakos, two Asian businessmen had begun their enterprises much earlier before the construction of the Kenya-Uganda railway line. These were Adamjee Ahikhoy and M.G. Puri. As the railway advanced into the interior, the Asian traders followed and set up their shops where they sold canned food, candy, enamelware, women's kangas, cotton blankets, and household items to the Africans who lived where the railway stations were set up. They also sold these merchandise to the coolies and other railway staff. Nairobi town was one of the stations that attracted Asian settlements. The Kenya-Uganda railway line helped in the penetration and spread of the Asian commercial activities in the emerging urban and town centers along the line, which included Voi, Makindu, Sultan Hamud, Athi River, Nairobi, Naivasha, Gilgil, Nakuru, Eldoret, and Kisumu. As the Railway and Harbors Corporation expanded its railway branches to Nyeri, Nyahururu, Nanyuki, and Kitale, so did Asian traders also penetrate the new towns (Maganda, 2012, p. 53).

In western Kenya, the first Asian formal settlement was set up at Kibos and Mando in the Nyanza regions. Here the Asian communities experimented with farming activities. The colonial government allocated 900 hectares of land to 250 Asian farmers. Later on, more land in Muhoroni, Chemelil, and Singhor was alienated and allocated to Asian settlements. The British encouraged Asian settlement in the interior so that they could introduce a monetary economy that would gradually assimilate Africans into the international capitalist economy. The colonial government also relied on Asian manpower for colonial infrastructural developments, such as the Kenya-Uganda Railway line that was constructed between 1896 and 1901. As early as 1893 the Chief Engineer who had been given the mandate of designing the Kenya-Uganda railway line had noted that Indian laborers were the ones to provide labor and even went further to state that Asians from South India were to construct the railway line between Mombasa and Kibwezi, while Asians from Punjab and northern India were to construct the line from Kibwezi into central Kenya. The rationale was that the Asians from Punjab would survive the high altitude in the highlands of Kenya. While those from South India were accustomed to low altitudes. By 1902 about 32,000 Asian artisans and unskilled laborers had been recruited by the British colonial government to construct the railway line. The colonial government also brought in a troop of about 300 Indian soldiers to provide security for the colonial administration. There were other Asian immigrants who were not laborers who immigrated to Kenya to set up retail shops and stores to provide necessary supplies to the laborers who were constructing the railway line. It is estimated that 30,000 of these Asian laborers went back to India, but a few remained behind and took up small-scale trading activities (Omenya, 2016, pp. 60–82; Osamba, 1996).

The Kilindini port was also built by Indian indentured labor. Indian labor was also recruited by Indian firms, particularly after the Second World War. For

example, Kenya Aluminium and Industrial Works Company, owned by the Oshwal Asian community, brought skilled workers from India to manage their industrial machinery and manufacturing processes. The Visa Oshwal community arrived in Kenya as from 1895 when Shah Hirji Kara settled in Mombasa from Cutch (Zarwin, 1977, pp. 46–47). Other Asian entrepreneurs such as Allidna Visram facilitated Asian settlement in Kenya. In 1904 he opened business stores in Kisumu and Mombasa. He then sponsored many Ismailis to work in his businesses in Kenya and other parts of East Africa. He encouraged Asian immigration into Homabay, Mumias, and Sio port.

ARABS AT THE COAST

Arabs came to the Kenyan coast from different regions in the Middle East. The Arabs who came from Yemen were referred to as the Yemen Arabs and were associated with their occupation in the army and trade. They were basically soldiers, shopkeepers, and laborers. The Yemen Arabs traded with the Zinj people on the East African coast and intermarried between the first and second century AD. The reign of the Busaidi Sultanate in East Africa witnessed the increased settlement of the Yemen Arabs in Lamu, Mombasa, and Zanzibar. They worked as soldiers/Akidās for the Busaidi sultanate. Others worked as laborers in ports, loading and off-loading ships. They formed a considerable section of the Arab population in Kenya by the end of the nineteenth century. These Yemen Arabs were actively involved in the spread of Islam in Kenya.

The *Periplus* describes the commercial transactions between the Arabs in the Middle East and the people on the East African coast. It is noted that ships from western India sailed to East African ports, and they carried cotton cloth, grain oil, sugar, and ghee. The ships from the Middle East brought to East Africa dyed cloaks, tunics, copper, tin, and silver. In exchange, the traders got cinnamon, frankincense, ivory, and tortoise shells (Salim, 1983, p. 22). The *Chronicle of Kilwa* gave a detailed description of the arrival of Arabs on the East African coast. In the Chronicle, seven princes who emigrated from Shiraz established the towns on the East African coast. Shiraz was the name given to the Persian Gulf region. Another historical document that provides evidence of the arrival of Arabs on the Kenyan coast is the *Pate Chronicle*. The Chronicle details that the first Arabs to arrive at Lamu were refugees who escaped after the leader of the Shia Islamic sect, Mr. Zaid, was executed in 122 AD.

The Arabs who came to the East African coast are said to have been the followers of the Shia leader Zaid who was executed around 754 AD, and thus they came to take refuge in the coastal region of East Africa, specifically at Manda, Shanga, and Berbera (Salim, 1983, p. 22). The Arabs referred to the East African coast as the Sawahil even before the development of Islam. The first wave of Muslims/Arabs came to the coast of East Africa in 700 AD. They were basically fleeing from the anti-Shia Ummayyad dynasty. This wave of Arab immigrants was led by two chiefs, namely Suleiman and Said of Oman in Southeast Arabia. These two leaders had declined to submit to the authority of

the Caliph of the Ummayyad dynasty, Abdul Malik, whose seat of power was in Damascus (Ayubi & Mohyuddin, 1994, p. 144). They settled in Pate and later spread to the rest of the Kenyan coast and other parts of East Africa (Ayubi & Mohyuddin, 1994, p. 144).

The second wave of Arab immigrants arrived on the East African coast in the tenth century AD. The Hadramawt group of Arabs migrated from the al-Hasa region in East Arabia and arrived on the northern Kenya coast in 908 AD. Some of these immigrants settled on the Benadir coast in Somalia. Though most of the Arabs from Hadramawt migrated into East Africa in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries AD, they came in groups of clans, and their identity was because of being descendants of Prophet Muhammad. These clans were forced to migrate to East Africa due to climatic changes that resulted in drought and floods, which led to widespread famine. The clans also left Hadramawt as a result of political pressure. In 975, another group of Arabs from Shiraz (Persia/Iran) came to settle in Kilwa, Mombasa, Zanzibar, Pemba, and the Comoro Islands. These Persian immigrants were called Shirazi. The Arabs and the Shiraz intermarried with the Bantu indigenous societies in coastal Kenya and produced a new community called the Waswahili people (Ayubi & Mohyuddin, 1994). Most of the Arab communities who migrated into the East African region right from the ninth century AD became Africanized and adopted African dances, diet, and even the Kiswahili language. For example, the nine ethnic societies of Mombasa, referred to as Swahili, were descendants of the pioneer Persian-Arabian immigrants (Harries, 1964, p. 225).

Once the Oman Arabs drove out the Portuguese from the coastal regions of Kenya, Somalia, and Tanzania in 1729, local leaders in the towns along the East African coast invited the Arabs to take over administration of the region. The Omani set their direct rule in East Africa from 1821, and by 1840 they transferred their capital city from Muscat to Zanzibar from where they ruled Mombasa, Malindi, Lamu, and other coastal towns under the leadership of Seyyid Said. During the reign of Seyyid Said, the Arabs migrated and settled on the Kenyan coast. Most of the Zanzibar Sultanate soldiers were Hadhrami Arabs who were elevated to the position of Akida. For example, in 1842, a Hadhrami Arab Abdallah bin Mbarak was appointed Akida of Mombasa and was given the mandate of conquering the Mazrui ruling class of Mombasa that was opposed to the leadership of Seyyid Said, the Sultan of Zanzibar. Abdallah recruited Hadhrami Arab soldiers from Duan to fight the Mazrui rulers of Mombasa. During the rule of the Busaidi Sultanate, most of the Arabs established permanent residences in Lamu, Mombasa, and Malindi. There were still many Arabs who were temporary residents in coastal Kenya, who came there to purchase merchandise, and would then travel back to Southern Arabia (Lodhi, 1994, pp. 88–89).

The Arabs in Lamu, Malindi, and Mombasa coastal towns established large-scale agricultural plantations in the last half of the nineteenth century. In 1859, the Arabs in the coastal towns of Kenya exported eight million pounds of simsim, valued at 20,000 British pounds. There were also plantations of rice in

Mokowe in Lamu. It was estimated that these Arab plantations extended about 20 kilometers into the interior (Chaidan, 1974, pp. 31–32).

ARABS IN THE INTERIOR OF KENYA

The first Arabs to arrive in western Kenya, particularly in Mumias town, included Sherif Hasan Abdulla al Mahdally, who set up businesses by the early 1890s. They were engaged in trading ivory and slaves. Sharif Omar came to Mumias in the early twentieth century. The Arabs who initially settled in Mumias were Hadhrami from the Kenya coast. The pioneer Arabs who arrived in Mumias town came in four groups. The first was led by Mwinyi Mshima and his brother Sudi Mshima who were instrumental in converting Nabongo Mumia, King of the Abawanga community, to Islam. The second group was associated with Idi Rajab, who stayed in Mumias for a short while and then proceeded into the Turkana region and went further to Ethiopia. Another group was led by Mwinyi Kombo, who had kinship relations with the Hadhrami Ulema in Lamu. From Mumias, this third group dispatched its followers to Kisumu. Akida Jashi initially spread Islam in Kisumu, while Sharif Abu Bakri proceeded to western Kenya in Bungoma where he opened a mosque. In Kakamega, Arab settlement led to the growth of Islam, and by 1940 the first Mosque was built in the town. It was the Sunni sect that was dominant in Kakamega.

In the seventeenth century, Arab traders had already begun participating in trade with the Pokomo. Arab traders came to the popular Chera market in Pokomo land, where they sold cloth, sugar, salt, and beads to the local people, and in return they purchased rice, maize, and beans. A number of the Arab traders in Pokomo, such as Fumo Luti al-Nabhan and Maalim Awadhi Nasib, also embarked on spreading Islam in the area.

In Kitui, the first Arabs arrived in 1898 and were associated with the Wachangamwe, Wa Jomvu, and Comorians. The Arabs who came into the interior of Kenya began their trade caravans from the Mrima Coast opposite Zanzibar and went to the Lake Victoria region from where they spread into western Rift Valley and Central Kenya (Nkirote, 1987, pp. 75–77). Africans themselves established the trade routes used by Swahili-Arab traders in the nineteenth century. For example, the Akamba traders had traded in ivory for many centuries before the Arabs monopolized these routes in the 1860s. Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, the Akamba traders controlled trade between central and coastal Kenya.

Arab immigrants did not have a strong impact on the indigenous communities in Kenya because they had a closed social organization based on Jumiya. The Jumiya worked as welfare associations that enhanced ethnic cohesion and acted as barriers to interaction with other African and Asian societies. However, their linguistic influence has been manifested in the Kiswahili language whose vocabulary has borrowed heavily from the Arabic language.

CONCLUSION

The establishment of British colonialism in the first decade of the twentieth century limited the expansionist activities of the Asians and Arabs in Colonial Kenya. The Asians and Arabs were essentially traders; thus British colonialism disrupted the growth of free trade, which had been nurtured in Kenya in the nineteenth century. The treaty signed between Britain and the Sultan of Zanzibar in 1895 officially ended Arab political dominance in Coastal Kenya. The ten-mile coastal strip that had been part of the Busaidi sultanate became a protectorate of Britain. In return, the Sultan was paid 17,000 pounds per annum and another 11,000 pounds in rent (Brennan, 2008, p. 828). After 1895 the economic and political influence of Arabs declined, but the British colonialists assimilated them into the emerging colonial administration, where they were employed as junior officers who were called Liwalis.

In 1906 the British secretary of State, Lord Elgin, pronounced that Asians should not be given land in the Kenya highlands. It was the racial prejudice of European settlers against Asians that prompted the British government to stop Asian settlement in the Kenyan Highlands. This affected immigration of Asians into Kenya (Ndalila, 2012, p. 285). The dominance of the Asian community in Kenya was further legally undermined by the Devonshire White Paper of 1923, which laid a policy and legal framework for limiting the immigration of Asians into Kenya. The Paper stated that Kenya was primarily an African country, and thus Asians had to accept that they did not have equal rights to citizenship as the Africans. In 1943 the Colonial Secretary of State reiterated the stand of the Devonshire White Paper by stating that Asians were foreigners in Kenya, a country that essentially belonged to Africans and European settlers. At the turn of the twentieth century, the British colonial government encouraged Asian immigration into Kenya and even had a dream of turning Kenya into the America of the Hindu. However, with the development of the European settler economy, Asians were treated as aliens intruding into the colonial political economy of Kenya (Jones, 2007, p. 18).

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Kingdoms, Politics, and State Formation in Pre-colonial Kenya

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INTRODUCTION

The problem of state formation in African history is one that remains difficult to contextualize. Eurocentric historiography has often postulated the argument that state formation is “un-African” in the sense that in pre-colonial Africa there were no societies that developed advanced institutions and structures to qualify to be recognized as states as understood in Western society (Swai, 1984, p. 15). Such arguments are often based on the erroneous view that African societies have always been static and unchanging until external agencies in the form of Arab and European intervention provided the momentum for change. The question of whether state formation took place in pre-colonial Africa is a subject that has attracted increased attention with the growth of nationalist and post-colonial historiography. Post-colonial historiography has embarked on the project of the indigenization of African history, and one aspect of this endeavor is to legitimize the existence of pre-colonial states in Africa. The outcome of these endeavors has been the production of extensive literature across Africa on the existence of complex social, economic, and political formations that were the product of African agency. Although this approach, as Swai (1984, p. 15) notes, may have the tendency to glorify the African past at the expense of objective and authentic history, it has provided a rich body of knowledge about African societies that were previously glossed over by Eurocentric historiography.

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The purpose of this chapter is mainly to analyze the nature of states that emerged among pre-colonial societies in Kenya in particular and the rest of East Africa generally. The popular contention is that pre-colonial societies in Kenya were largely decentralized in terms of their political organization, and the evolution of centralized states is usually depicted as a rare occurrence. The chapter compares and contrasts these two models of state formation and provides examples from various societies across Kenya to demonstrate whether such political formations emerged or not. The major focus is not necessarily to discuss the origins and growth of these states but rather to examine what factors led to such formations and what was the impact of state formation on relations among societies in pre-colonial Kenya.

THE STATE IN PRE-COLONIAL KENYA

The state can be defined as an entity that comprises individuals who lay claim to some territory and at the same time share common interests and values in terms of historical heritage, language, culture, economy, sovereignty, among other identity markers (Salim, 1984, p. 2). Such a definition is founded on the argument that human beings must necessarily reside within communities as it is within such an environment that they can achieve self-preservation and their optimum potential. Indeed, it is for this reason that early thinkers such as Aristotle postulated that man is a social animal who must live in a community for his own good (Olumwullah, 1990, p. 91). The state is usually perceived as a set of structures and institutions that emerge in communities to regularize relations between members of the community. Such institutions and structures include the ruling elite, military, police, and workers, among others. The state thus plays an important role in ensuring stability and equitable access and use of resources among community members.

Given such a scenario, it can be argued that the idea of the state did exist in pre-colonial Kenya in different forms, as it is apparent that even in primitive societies, some form of institution must exist to regulate relations among members of a community. In pre-colonial Kenya, the most important social and political structure with which individuals identified was the ethnic community. Hence, the idea of the state is best conceptualized based on the ethnic group as it is within the confines of the ethnic community that individuals were socialized, built their governments, and lay claim to territory and land, among other resources. Other institutions within these ethnic groupings, such as the family, clans, and lineage and kinship structures were subordinate to the ethnic community. Pre-colonial Kenya comprised dozens of ethnic communities that controlled a specific portion of landmass and often competed for dominance and access to resources. The ethnic community therefore provided a set of structures and institutions that operated almost at a comparable level with modern states.

One of the common practices among pre-colonial Kenyan societies was that most ethnic communities did not evolve state institutions and structures that

brought the entire ethnic community together. Instead, the ethnic communities were constantly infighting among themselves and in the process some clans and other kinship groups gained the upper hand on such matters as claims to land and security. It was common for different clans within the same ethnic community to wage war against each other and claim their territory. Under such circumstances, the most important decisions were usually made at the clan level by a council of elders and other clan leaders such as magicians and religious leaders. Such political systems were the most dominant model in pre-colonial Kenya, and these have been described as decentralized or stateless or acephalous societies.

In most Kenyan communities, there were no clearly defined institutions such as the military or systems of revenue collection and distribution of resources. The military was mainly composed of youth recruited voluntarily as there was no universal conscription or remuneration system. Among the pastoralist Nandi or the Maasai, recruitment to the military was usually carried out based on the age-set system whereby young boys, *morans* (warriors) who had undergone initiation, automatically took up the responsibility of participating in the military upon the end of the period of initiation. Such a military force was not permanent and therefore could not be relied on to undertake a large-scale and protracted war against neighboring communities. Among the Gusii of Western Kenya, participation in the military was often seasonal, with young men or warriors volunteering to participate in the military as scouts and fighters as the need arose, such as in case of war with a neighboring community or clan. The Gusii often went to war against their neighbors such as the Kipsigis, Maasai, and Luo over issues such as livestock theft and conflict over grazing lands. Leadership for such military organization was often voluntary and did not require specific skills for one to qualify to lead a military outfit (Akama, 2006a, pp. 36–37; 2006b, pp. 19–29)

Similarly, in the decentralized states, a distinct class of rulers did not exist who derived authority and resources from an exploited underclass within these societies. Prominent leaders in decentralized societies were not specifically distinguished from the rest of society in terms of their wealth and access to critical factors of production such as land and labor. Indeed, among the Maasai, for example, the *Laibon* claimed authority based on their religious and magical powers and not based on their wealth. Leaders in decentralized societies were not able to mobilize resources on a large-scale basis and thereby enhance their authority as there were no structures for tax and revenue collection to pool resources for their use. Such leaders were not in a position to mobilize resources to dominate or wage protracted war on their competitors and therefore did not wield as much authority as was the case in centralized states.

Due to their decentralized political structures, most pre-colonial Kenyan communities did not engage in large-scale wars of expansion as they did not possess sufficient resources to engage in such undertakings. As a result, most pre-colonial Kenyan societies did not expand to conquer and assimilate neighboring communities and impose their own system of government over these

subdued societies, as was the case among societies in western Uganda. Leaders in decentralized societies did not expand to control important sources of revenue such as the caravan routes and cheap labor from their subjects. It is apparent that in decentralized societies, the institutions and structures that could guarantee the growth of the state in its proper terms did not entirely exist. This explains the emergence of the notion among Western scholars that state organization did not exist among pre-colonial societies in Africa, but this is one assertion that was the product of Western scholars not having a keen eye for the nature of pre-colonial societies that they encountered.

The development of centralized states in East Africa and the rest of Africa was a feature that gained currency during the nineteenth century. The growth of an Arab and European merchant economy that mainly thrived on the slave trade and other tropical merchandise led to the rise of a powerful local class of middlemen who accumulated wealth from these activities. In West Africa, the large states of the Sudan belt and the Atlantic coastline grew rapidly by controlling the lucrative slave trade that thrived in the region. In East Africa, the Zanzibar sultanate expanded its hold over the coast of East Africa as well as regions deep into the interior due to its command of the slave trade and the plantation economy. The Sultan in Zanzibar emerged as a powerful entity due to access to the resources of the East African coast and was able to establish a strong centralized state with its base in Zanzibar. The Sultan had agents residing deep into the interior of East Africa who collected tributes on his behalf. Bonaventure Swai (1984, pp. 15–35) supports this view in his discussion of states that emerged along the East African coastline and mainland Tanzania and Malawi, such as the Nyamwezi, Ngoni, and Unyanyembe. The emerging states in these regions were essentially a product of the growth of the capitalist system of production, which provided resources to these states to engage in expansion.

In other parts of East Africa, the development of centralized states was the product of human migration and settlement, which peaked by the nineteenth century. In western Uganda and the Lake Victoria region, the migration and settlement of Luo speakers into the region led to a power struggle that pitted the Nilotic invaders and the Bantu, who had already settled in the region by the fifteenth century (see Chap. 2 in this volume). As Ogot (1984, pp. 126–161) observes, when the Luo invaders defeated the Bantu communities, they proceeded to establish hegemonic centralized states in the region that thrived through obtaining tributes from their subjects. These states also expanded by controlling long-distance trade to the Indian coastline. The centralized states of western Uganda grew through the process of assimilation and introduction of new belief systems and languages. The leaders of these states were able to command support due to their assurance of security over their subjects and their ability to present the image of supernatural beings. The leaders of Bunyoro Kitara, one of these emergent kingdoms in western Uganda, claimed a close association with the gods and great ancestors of their subjects.

Therefore, the growth and stability of centralized states in East Africa was mainly achieved through accumulating wealth and establishing an efficient ruling class and military that could secure land and establish alliances with neighbors and other friendly states. The Nyamwezi state grew due to their control of the coastal trade and the alliances established with the Arab-Swahili traders, who collaborated with the Nyamwezi to acquire resources such as slaves and ivory from these regions and later sold most of the proceeds to the coast. Similarly, the Kabaka in Buganda gained prominence due to his association with Arab-Swahili traders who brought him guns and other resources that he utilized to subdue hostile neighbors such as the Bunyoro and Toro kingdoms. Our discussion aims at establishing whether such patterns of state formation developed in Kenya. In other words, did centralized states emerge in pre-colonial Kenya? The subsequent analysis provides case studies of state formation to substantiate this idea. The overall perception is that state formation did not characterize pre-colonial societies in Kenya, which explains why this subject has not gained much currency in Kenyan historiography. However, there is evidence that centralized states emerged in parts of western Kenya among the Wanga section of the Luhya and among sections of the Luo and Gusii communities. Similar trends were also witnessed at the coast. These are discussed in the subsequent sections.

THE WITU SULTANATE AND THE SWAHILI CITY STATES

The Witu sultanate typifies the kind of Swahili city states that emerged along the Kenyan coast during the nineteenth century. Witu was an Arab settlement established some miles from the coast in a thickly forested area near river Tana (at the time known as Ozi River). During the nineteenth century, with the increased influence of the Zanzibar Sultanate along the coast, which led to increased conflict over land and other resources, several influential Arab families decided to avoid this conflict and migrated into the interior, where they established independent states (see Chap. 4 in this volume). Such was the case of Sultan Ahmed, nicknamed “Simba” who, upon his expulsion by Zanzibar armies from Kau, another Arab settlement nearer the coast on the banks of River Tana, decided in 1862 to move further inland, where he established himself in Witu. This area was inhabited by several African communities that included the hunter-gatherer Boni people who lived in the forest, as well as the pastoralist Oromo and agriculturalist Pokomo. The local communities welcomed the new Arab settlers as they saw them (the Arabs) as potential allies in the ever-increasing disputes over land and other resources.

Sultan Ahmed’s choice of Witu as a settlement was quite unusual, as Vere Allen (1984, p. 227) observes. Typically, Arab-Swahili settlements along the coast of East Africa took place on islands on the Indian Ocean that were some distance from the mainland. This was due to the Arab’s fear of African rebellions, therefore the Arabs usually lived in stone houses built on the islands and established plantations on the mainland which they regularly visited to

supervise their cultivation. However, with increased Arab populations in the coastal island townships, wrangles over land and political succession led to increased conflict between the various Arab families that ruled these towns. This explains Sultan Ahmed's choice of Witu as it was in an area that was isolated and difficult to access from either the Tana River or the Indian Ocean.

Though located in a virgin area with very poor means of communication, the Witu settlement rapidly expanded in population and influence and with time took the character of a centralized state. According to estimates, by 1867, the population in Witu increased to 45,000 residents, a number that surpassed most coastal settlements at the time. By comparison, Mombasa's population, considered one of the most advanced urban centers along the coast, was only 25,000 by the 1890s (Allen, 1984, p. 219). The rapid expansion of Witu was mainly due to its location and the security it offered, unlike other Arab settlements on the coast. Located in the hinterland, the settlement was an island of peace in a sea of turbulence that characterized Arab settlements along the coast during the nineteenth century. With its relative peace, the settlement attracted settlers, both Arab and African, from other Arab settlements such as Manda Island, Lamu, and Pate. African groups such as the Sanye, Pokomo, Oromo, and Bajun, who resided just outside the Witu settlement, also found refuge in the town.

Sultan Ahmed's influence was further enhanced through the exploitation of the resources of the area for economic gain. The area was located in a region with plenty of land, good soils, and plenty of rainfall and this enabled the establishment of large crop plantations cultivated by the readily available African labor. Cattle keeping also became an important economic activity of the Arab settlers. Apart from the local African communities, cheap labor was also provided by the *watoro* or *watumwa*, who were runaway slaves who sought refuge in the settlement. Runaway slaves were openly welcomed in Witu and well treated as they were considered an important source of labor that needed to be closely guarded (Allen, 1984, p. 233).

Thus, with a stable economy, Sultan Ahmed was able to set aside sufficient resources to build a large army to protect the Witu settlement from any external invasion. This enhanced stability in the settlement led to continued prosperity. Sultan Ahmed's influence extended beyond the boundary of the Witu settlement as the surrounding Oromo, Pokomo, and other African communities relied on his protection in case of hostility from any neighboring community. Local African groups often sought his intervention in case of any dispute over land and other issues. In the eyes of the local African communities, Sultan Ahmed was perceived as a neutral arbitrator in case of any disputes. This enhanced his authority over the local communities. Further, to enhance their authority and presence, the Arab settlers in Witu, as was the case elsewhere along the coast, emphasized the building of stone houses as a sign of permanency. Islam and Arabic language were introduced to transform local societies into communities of *waungwana* (civilized people). These developments led to

the growth of the Swahili culture within the community, thus enhancing the acceptance of the Arab settlers among the local communities.

The history of the Witu Sultanate was quite short as it collapsed beginning mid-1880s due to the Somali invasion from the north as well as the growing influence of the Germans and the British in the area. First, the Germans arrived in the area and signed treaties of protection with the Sultan, who was now ailing and not in a position to effectively protect the settlement and its dominions. Eventually, during the scramble and partition of East Africa, the region fell under the British. Yet, despite its decline by the end of the 1880s, the Sultanate of Witu presents a case of the process of the establishment of centralized states in pre-colonial Kenya. The growth of Witu, as was the case of other coastal city states, was due to the growth of slave trade and other activities controlled by the existing ruling elite that appropriated resources from the community to enhance its authority. The Swahili coastal city states provided an ideal environment that promoted the growth of a dominant ruling aristocracy that enhanced its authority by promoting a dominant social, economic, and political ideology over the local communities. This trend can also be observed in a few other areas in Kenya during the pre-colonial period.

THE KADIMO CHIEFDOM IN YIMBO

The Kadimo chiefdom was established by a section of the Joka-Owiny subtribe of the Southern Luo who established a settlement in the Yimbo area on the northern shores of Lake Victoria as from 1680 AD (Ochieng', 1975, p. 30). Before the arrival of the Luo speakers, the area was inhabited by Bantu speakers, most of whom had arrived from the direction of eastern Uganda. The Bantu communities, who included sections of the Luhya such as the Samia, the Banyala, the Gusii, the Wasawa from Busoga, the Walowa, and the Wasenge, among others, had settled on the foothills of Ramogi Hill in Yimbo as early as the beginning of the fifteenth century (see Chap. 3 in this volume). The Bantu, with their knowledge of iron technology, transformed the area into an agricultural zone. The Luo, under the leadership of Dimo, from whose name the name Kadimo (the people of Dimo) is derived, waged a successful war against the Bantu and subsequently established the Kadimo Chiefdom. Large sections of the Bantu, such as the Gusii and Logoli were forced to migrate out of the area to find new settlements elsewhere, but several of the Bantu people, such as the Basuba, were assimilated by the Luo invaders and even adopted the language and culture of the Luo people.

The rise of the Kadimo Chiefdom, which Ochieng' (1975) observes was largely a centralized state, was due to many factors. First, the political system introduced by Dimo established an effective administration system that provided an environment of stability, cohesiveness, and economic prosperity. Dimo, as the most dominant individual, became the *ruoth* or chief and below him was a council of leaders known as *buch piny*, which included representatives from various Luo and Bantu clans, who had come out willingly to support

him. The *buch piny* were usually outstanding senior elders who had distinguished themselves in the community in such areas as the military. This council advised the *ruoth* and made decisions on important matters that affected the *ruothdom* such as murders, cattle thefts, boundary disputes, famines, invasions, pestilences, and inter-clan conflict.

Other important political units included the *Buch Oganda Ruoth*, which was more of an inner cabinet appointed from the *buch piny*. This council which incorporated important leaders and experts from the community such as the *jobilo*, diviner, and the *jajimbkoth*, rainmaker, played an important role in the appointment of leaders and political succession and provided advice that could avert imminent disasters such as disease, famine, and death among others. In addition, a smaller council known as the *gweng* or *dobo* played the role of assistant *ruoths*. These were individuals directly appointed by the *ruoth* in the regions (*dobo*) or clans to take charge of the maintenance of law and order throughout the *ruothdom*. Such a political structure built on a clearly defined hierarchy of power enhanced cohesiveness in the chiefdom as political power was well distributed at different levels in society, right from the *ruoth* himself, to the clan and sub-clan levels. The *ruoth*, as Ochieng observes, did not govern the *ruothdom* singlehandedly as a dictator but widely consulted other sections of society and therefore played more of the role of a leader rather than a ruler. He was more of a peacemaker and arbitrator than a law administrator.

The success of the Kadimo chiefdom can also be attributed to the establishment of a stable economy of crop cultivation, mainly millet, sorghum, and other cereals, as well as fishing and livestock keeping. Trading activities along the shores of Lake Victoria were also an important economic activity. More revenue was also raised through the imposition of tributes on the subjects of the chiefdom, such as the people of Sakwa, Alego, and Samia. The stability of the chiefdom was also attributed to the willingness of the *ruoth* to accommodate his subjects, such as the Bantu, who were given leadership positions. The spread of the Luo language and culture within the *ruothdom* and the area surrounding the chiefdom also contributed to its rapid expansion and stability by the late nineteenth century. The influence of the Kadimo *ruoths* continued well into the colonial era as the first colonial chief appointed for Yimbo by the British colonial administration was from the Kadimo clan. By the late nineteenth century, the political and economic stability of the Kadimo chiefdom had generally declined due to incessant inter-clan conflict over succession, famine, and food shortages and diseases that decimated most of the livestock, which was an important economic resource. Therefore, the transfer to British colonial authority did not experience much resistance from the Kadimo chiefdom. The Kadimo leaders saw the incoming British administration as possible allies who could assist them continue their hegemony over other clans in the chiefdom.

THE KITUTU CHIEFTAINCY

The Kitutu chieftaincy was established by the Kitutu (or Abagetutu) section of the Abagusii community, a Bantu community that resides in the Gusii Highlands of southwestern Kenya. By the nineteenth century, the Gusii had experienced a prolonged period of conflict with neighboring Nilotic communities, mainly the Kipsigis, Maasai, and Luo, who had dislodged them from their initial settlements initially in Kisumu and Kano plains and later from Kabianga in Kericho and the Trans-Mara region (Ochieng', 1984, p. 208). When the Gusii finally settled on the Gusii highlands during the nineteenth century, they were entirely surrounded by these hostile communities who would take any slight opportunity to take more of their land and livestock. To protect themselves against their hostile neighbors, the Gusii built strong fortified village settlements and kept their livestock in defensive fortifications (*ebisarate*) that were guarded by young men at night. Entire villages kept their livestock in these fortifications and every household was required to contribute young men to take care of the cattle. In these fortifications, it was difficult for the neighboring communities to take their cattle. The *ebisarate* over time became an important training ground for warriors among the Gusii people.

When the Gusii arrived in their initial settlement in the Manga Hills after their dislodgment by the Maasai from the Trans-Mara region, they were led by Oisera from whom the Kitutu subgroup emerged. Oisera's clan was the most populous and therefore emerged as the most dominant. Having secured the settlement in Manga Hills, other clans not related to Oisera's clan (from the Abasweta section of the Gusii people) also joined. These were clans from other Gusii subgroups and clans such as Bonchari, Bobasi, Bomachoge, Botabori, Bochura, Bosigisa, Bogirango, and others. As a founder clan, Oisera's clan automatically claimed leadership over other clans in their new settlement. Oisera became the undisputed leader of the Gusii people in their new settlement. He made important decisions regarding important issues such as war and also led the community in important ceremonies such as communal sacrifices and social and political activities. Oisera and other succeeding Kitutu chiefs were held in high esteem in the community as they were regarded as living representatives of the original lineage founder. Leaders among the Gusii were also highly respected because it was believed that they had some divine powers to make decisions for the community.

As Ochieng' (1984, pp. 210–214) and Shadle (2006, pp. 2–19) observe, one of the major factors that transformed the Kitutu into a centralized society was security. The constant harassment of the Gusii during their migration and settlement compelled them to invest a lot of resources in security and good leadership, such as the one provided by Oisera. The Manga settlement finally allowed the Gusii to experience peace and began to prosper in agricultural activities such as crop cultivation and livestock keeping, and also their population began to grow. Historically, the various Gusii subgroups and clans such as the Ababasi, Abagusero, Abageka, Abanyaribari, Abamachoge, Abagirango,

and others were never united and constantly fought each other over land, livestock, and other resources. With several of the non-Abasweta clans now being hosted by Oisera and his clansmen, this was a unique outcome that allowed the Gusii people for the first time to experience unity that went beyond the immediate clan.

The evolution of the Kitutu into a centralized state was further enhanced during the tenure of Nyakundi, who succeeded Oisera in 1830. Nyakundi, Oisera's youngest son, succeeded his father when the Kitutu faced internal wrangles over succession. One of Oisera's younger brothers, known as Onyangore wanted to succeed Oisera, who was now too old, but the elders preferred Nyakundi, who assumed leadership over the Kitutu after expelling Onyangore, who went on to establish a new settlement in Nyabururu Hill next to modern Kisi town. Nyakundi's reign ended in 1850 and is considered "the golden age" of Kitutu history. By the time he died in 1850, the Kitutu had expanded their settlements as far as Marani and Bogusero areas (Moindi, 1997, p. 66).

The growing prosperity and stability of the Kitutu can be attributed to several factors. The military, mainly composed of young men trained in the cattle bomas, *ebisarate*, increased in number, and they were very loyal to Nyakundi. Secondly, Nyakundi as the leader of the Kitutu did not rule single-handedly but also got support and advice from the council of elders, *abagaka be'gesaku*. The council of elders presided over matters of concern to the community, such as cattle thefts, war, murder, clan feuds, boundary disputes, and rape, among others. In addition to the council of elders, other leaders in the villages, known as *etureti*, acted as administrators on matters concerning each of the villages that made up the different clans. Again, the presence of several tenant clans amongst the Kitutu boosted the economy as they provided labor and tributes that helped run the affairs of the society. The tenant clans usually contributed warriors who provided security to the community.

The most memorable event that demonstrated the growing stability and influence of the Kitutu during the late nineteenth century was the successful organization of the battle of Osao Sao against the Kipsigis, who had constantly raided the Gusii for their livestock. The successful battle of Osao Sao seems to be the last major episode of the realization of Gusii unity. After the death of Nyakundi, the Kitutu once again became more and more divided. The succeeding Kitutu leaders, such as Barare, Kibagendi, Bogonko, and Gichana, did not have as much support as Nyakundi had enjoyed. By the end of the nineteenth century, when the British established colonial rule in Gusiiland, the Kitutu were much weakened but still the most dominant Gusii subgroup. Therefore, it was not a surprise that Angwenyi, one of the direct descendants of Nyakundi and Oisera, was appointed the Chief of Kitutu by the colonial administration. Angwenyi was also recognized as the senior-most colonial chief in Gusiiland during the early colonial period. When the British began to implement colonial policies such as collecting taxes and choosing the area to build Kisi town, they consulted Angwenyi. It's clear that if the unity realized by

Nyakundi had continued, the Kitutu could have grown to a bigger state by the end of the nineteenth century. The economy and military prowess of the Kitutu and other Gusii subgroups was also undermined by the absence of a large population and the absence of sufficient sources of revenue from trade and other activities. The Gusii appear to be located in an enclosed area on the highlands far away from the major trading routes that traversed the interior from the coast (Ochieng', 1974a, 1974b).

THE WANGA KINGDOM

The establishment of the Wanga Kingdom shares many similarities with the Kadimo chiefdom. The Wanga kingdom was established by a section of the Luhya community who began to settle in the area around Mumias at the beginning of the seventeenth century. The early settlers into this region though later claiming to be Luhya were not a uniform group as they were composed of a mixture of elements, among them being the Kalenjin, Maasai, Baganda, Basoga, and Bagisu all of whom were migrating in search of good land to settle (Were, 1984, pp. 39–41). Among these early settlers, most of whom arrived from the direction of eastern Uganda and Mount Elgon, the Bantu sections were more predominant, and this explains the growth of Bantu culture and languages in the area. When the Wanga arrived in the area, other settlers in the region were not well organized to defend themselves. With time, the Wanga were able to impose a hereditary chieftaincy that brought the Wanga clans together and incorporated other communities into the kingdom. Under Shiundu, who is considered the most successful Wanga ruler during the late nineteenth century, the Wanga kingdom grew to incorporate several other Luhya sub-ethnic groups such as Idakho, Isukha, Marama, Kabras, Kisa, Banyore, Banyala, Tachoni, Bakhayo, Marachi, Maragoli, and Bukusu, as well as other non-Luhya groups such as the Luo of Ugenya, Alego, and Gem and the Teso of the Mount Elgon area. Wanga influence was further extended during the period of British conquest of western Kenya during the late nineteenth century, when Wanga chiefs and agents were appointed by the colonial administration to govern regions in western Kenya where the British had failed to incorporate a local class of allies. Mumia, who was the leader of the Wanga at the time after succeeding Shiundu, allowed the British to utilize Mumias, his seat of power, as a base to expand their influence in western Kenya. This new status allowed Mumia to accumulate resources and influence, though as colonial influence expanded into western Kenya and the rest of the country, the legendary power and authority of the Wanga disappeared with time.

The growth of the Wanga kingdom, as Gideon Were (1984, p. 39) observes, replicated a pattern experienced among the other interlacustrine states of western Uganda and the lake regions. The common trend in the region was the imposition of an alien class of minority leaders over a more populous society through both military and magical powers. The Wanga kings enjoyed similar status and it is for this reason that most historians who have written on Kenyan

history have acknowledged the kingdom as the only one that was centralized in pre-colonial Kenya (Were, 1984, p. 39). The Wanga rulers, who adopted the title of *Nabongo*, or hereditary ruler, presided over a political and social structure that was highly regularized and controlled. In traditional Luhyia society, political power rested on the clans which were divided into age groups, *likhula*, and villages, *olukongo*. Every individual within the community belonged to a specific age group whose membership was recruited through circumcision. Members of an age group, under the guidance of selected leaders from among its ranks, performed most social and cultural duties such as training as warriors together. The villages or *olukongo* were governed by administrators known as *abami*, who directly represented the *Nabongo* within their administrative units. These leaders were perceived to possess both magical and religious powers as they could predict calamity and even the coming of the rains.

The *Nabongo* as the leader of the Wanga people, did not govern alone. He consulted widely among the elders, military, religious, and magical leaders. Within this highly centralized structure of political authority, the *Nabongo* was assisted by a prime minister, *omwikhasiya*; an army commander, *omusesia*; and the village and district administrators, *abami*. Under such a structure of administration the *Nabongo* could not be perceived as being dictatorial in the decisions made regarding the community's affairs. This enhanced his authority and legitimacy among the Wanga and client communities. With a well-organized political structure, the *Nabongo* accumulated a lot of resources that enhanced his authority. By the end of the nineteenth century the economic growth of the Wanga was enhanced through the control of the Indian Ocean trade. Nabongo Mumia, welcomed Arab and Swahili traders into his kingdom. Apart from supplying him with regular merchandise such as clothes, chinaware, and iron tools and weapons, the Arab-Swahili traders also provided guns which the Wanga king utilized to extend his authority and influence. Thus, the growth of the Wanga state can be attributed to the growing influence of a political elite that was able to claim authority and influence through the imposition of structures of political, social-cultural, and economic control that not only united immediate Wanga clans but also the neighboring subject communities. The onset of British colonial rule was initially a blessing to Wanga rule as it allowed the Wanga leaders to extend their authority further but also ultimately led to the decline of the kingdom as colonial authority gained root in western Kenya and other parts of the country.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has argued that the political history of pre-colonial Kenyan societies was mainly characterized by the emergence of both decentralized and centralized states. The most dominant political model that existed in pre-colonial Kenya was the decentralized states where political authority did not extend beyond the clan and lineages. Rarely did political power extend beyond the clans, which were led by councils of elders who took charge of the day-to-day

affairs of the clan such as resolving disputes, declaring war, and performing important cultural and religious ceremonies, among others. The elders did not act alone as they widely consulted with other community leaders such as diviners, warriors, magicians, and others. Given their limited access to resources and military technology, these decentralized states did not evolve into powerful centralized states. However, in a few instances as discussed in this chapter, centralized states emerged due to a number of factors ranging from security needs to growth of the military and the economy. Centralization was a clear strategy that these societies devised to guarantee their survival within an environment that was often hostile and difficult, as the case of the Kitutu, Wanga, and Witu states demonstrates.

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Traditional Families and Social Networks in Kenya

Tom G. Ondicho

INTRODUCTION

The family is regarded as the most basic unit of social organization and the foundation of society. The family as an institution is often said to be universal, meaning that it is found in every human society around the world (Lowie, 1961; Kayongo & Onyango, 1991). The term ‘family’ is used to describe diverse social arrangements that occur in different relationships in human societies. The concept of family is narrowly used to refer to a group of people related either by marriage (affinity) or birth (consanguinity) or other relationship, who live together, undertake various joint activities, and contribute to the acquisition of resources necessary for their livelihood and continued existence (Kilbride & Kilbride, 1990). The primary function of the family in all human societies is to ensure the survival and continuation of society, biologically through procreation, socially through personality formation and socialization of children, and economically through production and consumption (Kayongo & Onyango, 1991; Mburugu & Adams, 2005). The purpose of the family is to sustain the safety and well-being of its members and society by meeting their basic needs and providing a sense of structure and boundaries for performing different tasks in a secure environment (McGoldrick et al., 2015). According to Mbiti (1975, p. 175), ‘each person in African traditional life lives in or as part of a family’. Ideally, families not only nurtured and molded their members into functional adults but also transmitted culture and safeguarded the

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continuity of humanity with precedents of knowledge. In Africa generally and Kenya specifically, the family as an institution determined how and where its members lived, how they interacted with each other and the people around them, and whom they married. Living together and the sense of 'community of brothers and sisters' guaranteed social security to all family members, including the poor, orphaned, and widowed (Foster et al., 1997). Generally, in most traditional African societies, family was not limited to time and space as it cut across generations linking relatives living near or far, the living and dead, and the ancestors who continued to play a role in the lives of the living (Lugira, 2009).

In Kenya, the family is not only one of the most important social institutions in society but also a priority and source of pride for every individual in the community. Traditionally, family was formed and extended through the institution of marriage, with members held together by bonds of kinship. In all traditional African societies, all family and community members were expected and are still expected to marry and raise a family (Kayongo & Onyango, 1991). It was within the institution of the family where normative roles, rules, duties, rights, and obligations formed the basis of social interaction and economic cooperation as well as the psychological consciousness of its members, including husband and wife, mother and father, son and daughter, and sister and brother. While the social organization of the family unit, marriage, descent, and structure of kinship relations existed in all communities, there were notable variations from one society to the other and through time (Mburugu & Adams, 2001). In pre-colonial times, the institution of the family was central to the well-being of traditional Kenyan societies. As Foster et al. (1997) have observed, in most African societies, traditional life was characterized by brotherhood, a sense of belonging to a larger family and by groups rather than individuals. This mirrored an inclusive family system in which members were not only hooked into interdependent social support networks inherent but also in which individual obligations to the wider kin group, familial solidarity, and social cohesion in relationships were interpreted and applied, especially in times of crisis such as funerals and life cycle events such as marriage (Lugira, 2009).

It is important to note that each tribe had its traditions, beliefs, rituals, symbols, customs, and customary laws regulating the institutions of marriage and family and their subsistence, including dissolution and dispute resolution. While the basic functions of the family remain the same all over the world, traditional African families have undergone significant transformations attributed to an interplay of factors, including Christianity, industrialization, educational expansion, population growth, monetization of the economy, migration, civilization, and now globalization. These forces of change have either singularly or cumulatively altered the structure of the traditional African family relationships in fundamental ways (Kilbride & Kilbride, 1990; Therborn, 2006; Mafumbate, 2019). Some of the most notable changes include a growing number of single-parent families, especially female-headed households, new forms of marriage such as same-sex unions, the disintegration of the extended family, the emergence of nuclear families as the norm, changing modes of

marriage and mate selection patterns, as well as changing kinship networks and family relations. It is important to note that while considerable research has focused on the effects of these changes, relatively little research has focused on traditional African families. Research on traditional families and social networks especially within the context of Kenya and from a cultural perspective is sparse.


This chapter draws on the experience in Kenya and presents a cross-cultural reflection of some salient features of traditional families and social networks. The deliberations therein are partly informed by desktop research and therefore reflect the perspectives of different scholars. I discuss the following areas: definition and types of families; definition and different forms of marriage; kinship systems including descent and networks. While emphasizing the significance of traditional families and social networks in different Kenyan communities, I demonstrate that the institution of the family played and continues to play an important role in the everyday sociocultural, political, and economic life of many people in Kenya. This chapter therefore contributes to the body of knowledge aimed at providing a better understanding of traditional families and social support networks which *remain* a common practice in extended families in Kenya, especially during times of crises such as funerals, death, and sickness. It brings to light several insights that could foster a better understanding of how traditional families and social networks in Kenya have changed over time. The core thesis of this paper is that the family was an important social institution in the formation of relationships and kinship networks in most traditional Kenyan societies.

CONTEXT

The Republic of Kenya is in the Eastern part of Africa, straddling the equator between latitudes 4oN and 4oS and longitudes 34oE and 41o E; bordered in the east by Somalia and the Indian Ocean, in the north by Ethiopia and Sudan, on the west by Uganda, and the south by Tanzania. Covering a total surface area of 582, 646 square kilometers (224, 960 miles) and divided administratively into 46 counties and one city county, Kenya had a population of approximately 48 million people in 2019 (KNBS, 2019), made up of three ethnolinguistic and racial groups: Bantus, Nilotes, and Cushites and small minorities of Asian, Arab, and European migrants. The Bantus, Nilotes, and Cushites are further divided into 43 ethnic communities covering wide geographical areas with distinct borders (Adams & Mburugu, 1994) (Fig. 7.1).

The Bantu people, who are predominantly farmers, constitute about 60% of the population. They include the Akamba, Embu, Gusii, Kikuyu, Luhya, Meru, Mijikenda, and Swahili. Nilotic ethnic groups who make up 30% of the population include the Kalenjin, Luo, Masai, Samburu, and Turkana. Cushitic people who comprise a small minority of Kenya's population include the Boni, Boran, Burji, Daholo, Dassenich, El Molo, Gabbra, Galla, Orma, Rendille, Sakuye, Somali, Wata, and Yaaka. Each of these ethnic communities has its language, cultural beliefs, customary traditions, religion, orientations, and

Fig. 7.1 Map of Kenya showing location of major ethnic groups



Source: images.nationmaster.com

different aspects of life and means of livelihood. There are also great disparities in terms of geographical, ecological, and climatic conditions and social structures, political systems, and economic conditions (Table 7.1).

Given the great diversity in terms of culture, religious beliefs, and language between and even within the different ethnic communities, it is practically impossible to write in general terms about traditional families and social networks in Kenya. Whereas the definition of the family remains basically the same, scholars have noted variations among different Kenyan societies across time and place. In contemporary times, there are many family formations, living arrangements, and definitions of the concept of family in African family charters, which include both the traditional African family and emerging family forms (Kayongo & Onyango, 1991; Bigombe & Khadiagala, 2003). The terms “family” and “household” are sometimes used interchangeably. Nevertheless, in most African societies, they may not necessarily imply the same social unit. The two can be sharply distinguished because households may be made up of individuals with no kinship ties and/or members of a nuclear or extended family that functions as a close unit can straddle over two or more households (Mokiwane & Kaunda, 2018). While there are many similarities and differences in the social structures, political systems, economic conditions, and cultural practices in traditional African families and kinship networks, the magnitude and intensity of these differences and similarities remain undocumented and therefore unclear. Because of the heterogeneity across ethnic groups, it is therefore exceedingly difficult to make sweeping generalizations about traditional families and social networks in Kenya. This difficulty was also noted by early scholars of traditional African family (see Mair, 1953; Goode, 1963). This chapter, therefore, takes cognizance of the complexity, heterogeneity, and uniqueness of traditional families and social networks in different ethnic communities in Kenya. In this chapter, every effort will be made to identify and highlight some commonalities and differences in traditional families and social networks.

Table 7.1 Kenyan ethnic communities and their homelands

<i>Bantu Groups</i>	<i>Homelands</i>	<i>Population as of 2019</i>
Kikuyu	Slopes of Mount Kenya—(Muranga, Nyeri, Kirinyaga and Kiambu counties)	8,148,668
Meru	Northeastern slopes of Mount Kenya (Meru and Tharaka-Nithi counties)	1,975,869
Kisii	Gusii Highlands (Nyamira and Kisii counties)	2,703,235
Embu	Foothills of Mt Kenya (Embu County)	2,195,884
Kamba	Makueni, Kitui, and Machakos counties	5,066,966
Luhya (Include Bukusu, Maragoli, Wanga, Ava-Nyore, Marama, Idakho, Kisa, Isukha, Tsotso, Tiriki, Khabras, Ava-Nyala, Tachoni, Khayo, Marachi, and Samia)	Western Kenya—Kakamega, Bungoma, Trans Nzoia, Busia, and Vihiga Counties	6,823,842
Swahili	Coastal region—Mombasa, Kwale, Tana River, Lamu, and Kilifi counties	1,328,000
Mijikenda (Include Giriama, Digo, Chonyi, Duruma, Jibana, Kambe, Kauma, Rabai, and Ribe sub-tribes)	coastal region, between Rivers Sabaki and Uмба, in the region extending from the border with Tanzania in the south to the border near Somalia in the north	2,488,691
Taita	Taita-Taveta County	340,671
Pokomo	Along the Tana River in Tana River County	112,075
Kuria	Migori County—east of Migori River on the east and the Mara River estuary	305,385
NILOTES		
Luo	Around the Lake Victoria basin in Kisumu, Homa Bay, Siaya, Migori and Kajiado and Narok counties	4,663,910
Maasai	Turkana County	1,189,522
Turkana	Samburu County	1,016,174
Samburu	Trans-Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, Elgeyo	310,327
Kalenjin Cherengani, Kipsigis, Marakwet, Nandi, Sabaot, and Tugen	Marakwet, Nandi, Baringo, Laikipia, Nakuru, Kericho, and Bomet	6,358,113
Pokot	West Pokot County	621,241
Teso	Busia county	578,000
CUSHITES		
Somali , El Molo, Boran , Burji Dassenich, Gabbra Orma, Sakuye, Boni, Wata Yaaka, Daholo, Rendille	Mandera County	2,780,502

Source: Compiled by author

THE NOTION OF THE FAMILY

The term “family” is used narrowly to describe the smallest identifiable social unit, which in its simplest form comprises a married couple and their children or basically an aggregation of at least two individuals of the opposite sex who are generally expected to produce children (Mburugu & Adams, [2005](#)). Some

people use the term “family” to refer to a social group comprising two or more adults of both sexes united by ties of marriage, blood, ancestry, or adoption who normally live together in a single household and engage in economic activities (Mair, 1953; Shorter, 1975). However, many definitions of family describe diverse social and biological relationships and living arrangements in human societies. George Murdock (1949) defined “family” as a social group that includes adults of both sexes, at least two of whom maintain socially approved sexual relationships, and one or more children, own or adopted. It is considered a social group because the husband and the wife or wives live in a common residence and engage in socially approved sexual relations, certain economic cooperation, reproduction, and in the socialization (rearing/educating) of children borne by the female members of the group or who have been adopted (Mair, 1953, Kayongo & Onyango, 1991). However, these are not the only reasons for the establishment and maintenance of families. In Kenya, the concept of “family” conveys many different meanings and images that vary from time to time and from culture to culture. In traditional Kenyan societies, families operated and lived in households with decision-making autonomy about production and consumption. Basically, family encompassed a group of people related by blood (or who share common ancestor/s), by birth (consanguinity), marriage (affinity), adoption, partnership, and/or friendship, living in different forms of arrangements, including single parent, same-sex, nuclear, and extended family forms (Ocholla-Ayayo, 1997; Knuttila, 2005).

Despite significant changes, the institution of the family remains a pillar and prominent nexus in the socioeconomic and political life of many societies in Kenya today. Significant value is attached to the institution of the family and deference to the elders and ancestors. Traditionally, the family provided individuals with a sense of identity and belonging, as collectivism was the norm rather than the exception. Most traditional Kenyan families were typically rural, patriarchal, hierarchical, and polygynous, and they attached great significance to kinship networks and lineage continuation. The social organization of most traditional families was rooted in a patriarchal and hierarchical system that excluded women, who enjoyed lower status than men both in the family and society. Generally, women were powerless and voiceless. These elements were important determinants of the roles, responsibilities, obligations, and duties expected of everyone in society.

FORMS OF FAMILIES

Anthropologists and sociologists have identified various kinds and forms of families regarding the cultural peculiarities in different societies over time. Classification of families in precolonial Kenya was based on the leadership or power/authority holders in the family group and the number and generations of people involved in the group. Most people in traditional Kenyan societies

operated in nuclear families made up of a husband, wife or wives, and unmarried children living in the same household. According to Kottak (2004), a distinction can be made between two broad types of nuclear families that were also prevalent in many traditional Kenyan societies, for example, the natal family or the family of procreation where one is born and grow up and the conjugal family or family of procreation—that is the family where one is married and has children. However, when individuals in many traditional Kenyan communities talked of family, they invariably meant their extended family, including parents, grandparents, several children, cousins, aunts, and uncles. The nuclear family was typically the building block through which members became integrated with the larger extended family. In most Bantu, Nilotic, and Cushitic communities, nuclear families often lived in separate compounds and sometimes invited distant relatives to live with them; however, these guest members usually enjoyed lower status than their hosts. An extended family is comprised of three or more generations of people living in a single dwelling or proximity. In a nutshell, an extended family was a constituent of several persons related by marriage, descent, and adoption, such as a husband and his wife (wives), their children, and at least one set of parents, uncles, aunts, nephews, and nieces. The extended family provided the individual with a sense of belonging and corporeal identity and assigned its members with distinct roles at various stages in life based on age, gender, and social status.

While membership in extended families varied in different communities from adopted to fostered children, servants, slaves, and their children, a sense of respect for the authority of the elders was an essential tool for soldering and smothering social relations amongst members. According to Philomena Mwaura (2015, p. 15), “The social, cultural, and moral norms of the community applied within the extended family helped the individual grow into a productive and respected member of the community.” For example, parenting was shared across different individuals in the extended family, which reflected a strong sense of kinship and tribal bonds. Adults were deeply concerned about and cared for the young in the community as much as members of their own families. In traditional society, the extended family was the primary space within which individuals exercised their freedom. The extended family in particular was the basis of all social cooperation and responsibility. The individual existed in connection to the larger group, including his or her family, as the extended family was treated like a body corporate, and harmony among its individuals was rated as the most important value for all its members.

One other form of family prevalent in traditional Kenyan families was the perversity of the patriarchal family in which the father was considered the head of the household regardless of whether the mother was the breadwinner. In this kind of family structure, authority, power, and control were vested in the hands of the man, be it in a nuclear or extended family, and in the absence of the man, the eldest son or a male relative was appointed in situations where there was no son, became the leader of the household. The extended family was often led by its senior member, typically a grandfather or great grandfather.

Members of the extended family were born and raised within it and married into it. However, some members, such as adopted children or adults, had lower status. In most Bantu communities, distant relatives were sometimes invited to settle with the nuclear family, but they usually had a lower status than their hosts (Siegel, 1996).

MARRIAGE

Marriage is an institution that often results in creating an institution called family. The institutions of marriage and family are intimately related in many human societies, and one cannot find a family without marriage. As Gillin and Gillian aptly observe, “marriage is a socially approved way of establishing a family and procreation. It is considered that marriage gives mating a reliable basis and grants each spouse special, though not always exclusive, sexual conjugal rights in the other. In most traditional African societies, a family established outside marriage is considered ‘illegitimate.’” Marriage, like the family, is one of the oldest and universal sociocultural institutions among human groups. Westermarck (2009) avers that marriage is rooted in the family rather than the family in the marriage. George Murdock (1949) has defined marriage as the socially approved union of a sexual cohabiting pair called husband and wife through which off-spring derive their legitimacy. In many Kenyan communities, marriage was traditionally conceptualized as a socially and culturally accepted union between two consenting male and female adults with the express approval and support of their immediate families. Marriage marked the creation of a family and the beginning of long-lasting relationships between two families, clans, and, by extension, communities. Amongst most Bantu, Nilotic, and Cushitic groups, marriage was viewed as a covenant between two (extended) families, kindred, and villages. Marriage was linked by customs governing property exchange between and within kin groups. Bridewealth was the most common form of such exchange. It was essentially a gift from the groom or his family to the bride’s family, often in livestock but sometimes in money or other forms of wealth. Some hunter-gatherer societies follow the custom of bride service, which involves the groom moving to the home of his wife’s family and hunting or working for his parents-in-law (<https://geography.name/kinship/>).

While marriage differed from one tribe to another, there were also some common features. In all Bantu, Cushitic, and Nilotic communities, marriage was accorded a high value, and both men and women had a legal right to enter a marriage contract as long as they had attained the rightfully acceptable age. However, each tribe recognized a different age of marriage. Amongst Bantu tribes, persons become legally capable of entering marriage after circumcision for boys and clitoridectomy for girls or among the Nilotic group’s removal of some teeth, a form of initiation indicating that a person had become adult or entered adulthood, which normally took place after puberty. Most marriages were usually arranged by parents who also took up the responsibility of

selecting marriage partners for their children, especially their daughters. At marriage, women generally had a lower status than all members of the husband's family. In most Bantu, Nilotic and Cushitic groups people were not allowed to marry within their lineages or their wider clan groups (exogamy). However, people were expected to marry within their wider kinship and ethnic groups (endogamy). Under exceptional circumstances, some individuals could marry outside their ethnic or wider kinship group. Tradition required family elders to arrange the marriages of their dependents since marriage was not just a relationship between two persons. It linked two families or groups of kin, which, even before the union was confirmed and most certainly afterward, had mutual obligations and responsibilities, including the groom's family paying the bride price at the time of or after the marriage.

TYPES OF MARRIAGE

One of the most common types of marriage that existed in traditional Kenyan societies was monogamy, a dyadic relationship in which a man or woman has one marriage partner during their lifetime. Generally, there were two types of monogamy: straight monogamy, in which remarriage was not allowed, especially in the case of women, and serial monogamy, in which a man could marry after the death of a wife or after divorce but cannot have more than one spouse at any one or same time. However, women were not allowed to remarry after divorce or the death of a spouse if the bridewealth had been paid and children had been born. The other form of marriage commonly practiced in most Bantu, Nilotic, and Cushitic groups was polygyny, offering an entirely different family pattern. Polygyny is a form of marriage in which a man marries more than one wife at the same or given time. Generally, two types of polygyny were traditionally practiced in Kenya: sororal polygyny, in which a man married two sisters simultaneously, as was the case among the Luo people and non-sororal polygyny, in which a man married two or more women who are not related or sisters. While polygyny was prevalent, often, men who married more than one spouse were typically wealthier than monogamous men. Polygyny was not just a type of marriage but also part of the social system, which was socially acceptable for several reasons, including increased prestige and power, economic security, a solution to barren women and satisfaction of the desire for a large family. Polygynous marriages also contributed to the extension of family relationships in connection to the larger group, including their family. The wider family was the primary place where the individual not only exercised their freedom but also formed the basis of all social cooperation and responsibility.

The other type of marriage prevalent in traditional Kenyan families was *levirate*, where a younger brother was expected to raise the children of his deceased brother by marrying the widow. Any children of this union are regarded as children of the dead brother. In other words, the living brother was the "Genitor" or the "Biological Father" and the deceased brother the "Social Father" or "Pater." This form of marriage guarded against the widow

relocating with or without children to another family through remarriage. This kind of marriage was found among the Meru, Nandi, Kikuyu, Kamba, Kisii, and Taita. The other common form of marriage was *widow inheritance*, where a younger brother, son, or close male relative of a deceased husband inherited the widow for the same reasons as levirate marriage. Unlike levirate marriage, the children born out of this marriage belonged to the younger brother. This kind of marriage was common among the Luos, Marakwet, Teso, Tugen, Pokot, Narok, and Masaai.

In a few traditional Kenyan families, *sororate marriages* were commonly practiced. In this type of marriage, the family of a deceased wife was culturally obligated to give the husband one of her younger sisters as a replacement (Gluckman, 1975). This is the direct opposite of levirate marriage. The children born out of such a marriage are said to belong to the man. This form of marriage was found among Bantu communities, especially the Kikuyu and Kisii. Another notable form of marriage in traditional Kenyan families was *woman-to-woman marriage*, wherein a barren woman formally married another woman by performing all the traditional marriage rites, including the payment of bridewealth. The female husband then chose for her a male “genitor” with whom she sired children (*biological father*). Such children belonged to the woman-husband who is the *Pater* (*social father*). This form of marriage was common among Bantu groups, including the Kisii, Kamba, and Kikuyu.

Among the Kamba was another kind of marriage not common elsewhere in Kenya. This was child-to-child marriage where children between 5 and 7 years were formally married by their parents and allowed to grow under the watch of their parents. Closely related to child-to-child marriage was charity or gift marriage. Herein, parents give out one of their young daughters as a gift to their friends or patrons without any other consideration except the consideration of friendship, honor, and total loyalty. In some Kenyan societies, medicine men, chiefs, and rich men enjoyed this honor, especially among the Kisii, Luo, and Maasai.

KINSHIP AND SOCIAL NETWORKS

In Kenya, kinship was an integral part of the traditional societies’ total social organization and structure. Anthropologically, kinship refers to a network of social relationships that constitute an important aspect of the lives of all humans in all societies, even though its exact meanings are often debated. These social relationships are considered to extend to individuals related either by birth and marriage or a common ancestry in a family or household and have political or economic ties with each other or other forms of social connections. According to Kanu (2014), traditional African kinship and social networks basically refer to collaborative relationships shared by people of common origins and attitudes, a relationship with its meaning not in precepts but in a life lived in common between household members or members of a single, nuclear family to members of the larger lineage group including tribal or intertribal

relationships. Mbiti (1971, p. 104 cited in Kanu, 2014, p. 1) understands kinship as a vast network. He wrote,

Kinship system is like a vast network stretching laterally in every direction, to embrace everybody in any given local group. This means that everyone is a brother in-law, uncle or aunt, or something else, and there are many kinship terms to express the precise kind of kinship pertaining between two individuals. When two strangers meet in a village, one of the first duties is to sort out how they may be related to each other according to the accepted behaviour set down by the society.

Kinship relationships therefore form an important part of the lives of people in any society. Kinship ties involve a set of social obligations and expectations that ensure that no one faces tragedy alone. Westermann (1949, p. 65) succinctly declared that the African society is characterized by the prevalence of the idea of community, “The whole of existence for the African is organically embodied in a series of associations and life appears to have full value only in those close ties” (Westermann, 1949, p. 65). The kinship system therefore creates a social network that gives its members not only a sense of identity and belonging but also defines the rights, obligations, duties, and boundaries of socioeconomic and political interaction among kin group members (Mburugu & Adams, 2005; Kanu, 2014). These are some of the most vital features of the African kinship system. Reflecting on the dividend of African kinship, Achebe (1949, p. 155 cited in Kanu, 2014, p. 1) writes,

A man who calls his kinsman to feast does not do so to save them from starving. They all have food in their homes. When we gather in the moonlight village ground it is not because of the moon. Everyman can see it in his own compound. We come together because it is good for kinsmen to do so.

This captures the African concept of kinship as a relationship. In traditional Kenyan societies, the kinship system of a tribe controlled the network of interpersonal relationships by guiding social interactions with other kinsmen who included fathers, mothers, aunties, uncles, sisters, brothers, and cousins. “Kin relations pervaded every aspect of social organization and structure, thus, creating an enduring network of relationships between individuals and groups expressed in ties of obligations, claims to resources, statuses, property rights, duties, power, privileges, authority and obedience, social security, mutual assistance, and sexual behavior” (Ewuruigwe, 1994, p. 85). In precolonial societies, kinship ties not only played important roles in the everyday lives of many people but also determined relationships between individuals and to others and the universe. Kinship ties were not only at the heart of social interactions and the web of relationships woven by family and marriage but also defined the network of responsibilities, privileges, obligations, and rights that individuals not only enjoyed but were expected to fulfill within the family and the wider

society. For example, kinship relations dictated what land individuals could farm, whom they could marry, and their status in their communities.

Kinship and marriage were intricately related in several ways. On the one hand, kinship rules were used to determine marriage partners. On the other hand, many Kenyan communities traditionally discouraged marriage within a kinship group. Ideally, marriage was allowed within the larger linguistic group (ethnic endogamy) but outside the lineage/clan (clan exogamy). Most lineage groups in Kenya favored marriage outside the group. As a result, kinship was not limited strictly to lineage. An individual had important ties with two different kin groups, the father's and mother's sides. Such ties often extended outside the community, offering certain advantages. For example, if there was [drought](#), war, disease, food shortages, or other disasters, members went to live with kin in other areas. In Kenya's pre-colonial societies, kinship was derived from four principles: marriage (affinity), blood (consanguinity), adoption, and ritual or fiction, what anthropologists usually refer to as fictitious or pseudo-kinship, which includes ritual kinship and fictive kinship (<https://geography.name/kinship/>).

In most Bantu, Nilotic, and Cushitic communities, as persons moved out from the immediate/extended family to the local group (clan) and the overall linguistic group, they were able to identify all other members of the groups by the same relationship terms that apply in the family. For example, terms used on lineal relatives were also used for collateral relatives. In this respect, a child not only considered their biological father as *father* but also applied the term *father* to the father's brother. The same principle applied to two sisters, with both being *mother* to each other's children. In the same vein, children of sisters/brothers referred to each other as sisters and brothers rather than cousins. Thus, a person had several fathers and mothers and many sisters and brothers. However, a father's sister was identified as aunt and a mother's brother as uncle. Names were rarely used as people with whom one interacted were classified and addressed by their appropriate kinship-name or relationship term, for example, mother, father, aunt, uncle, or older or younger sister/brother and the behaviors of two kinsmen to each other were expected to follow what was considered appropriate between kin so related. Individuals were expected to show deference and respect to all kin of the first ascending generation (i.e., mothers, fathers, uncles, and aunts), and all members of the generation below, that is, nieces, nephews, sons, and daughters, were expected to show the same respect. Thus, kinship terms provided every individual with a ready-made guide to expected behaviors, indicating, for example, the expectation of sexual familiarity, a joking relationship, restraint, or complete avoidance ([Brittanica.com](#)).

For most Bantu, Cushitic, and Nilotic groups' kinship ties, beliefs, values, identity, and language were maintained by the family, and societal continuity was dependent on maintaining stronger families and kinship ties. Traditional kinship was a cooperative relationship between household members and the larger lineage group members. It involved a set of social obligations and expectations that ensured that no one individual suffered tragedy alone. Kinship

relations served important welfare functions and provided a “safety net” for orphans, widows, the elderly, the disabled, and divorced women who did not have an immediate household to care for them. For example, kinsmen could support a woman and children while the husband was away, perhaps by helping with food and necessities.

In pre-colonial Kenyan societies, families took many different forms, and family, or kinship ties were traced in different ways. Most Kenyans were raised in extended families that often lived together and could easily spell out their precise genealogical links. Most traditional Bantu, Nilotic, and Cushitic communities were patrilineal, and kinship/genealogy was traced through the male line. Patrilineal descent emphasizes the male side of the family, tracing lineage through the generations from fathers to their children. Patrilineal descent was common among nearly all Kenyan societies. In retrospect, male children were more valued than females in inheriting a father’s property. This and other aspects of patrilineal social organization are found among the Bantu groups, Cushites, and Nilotes. Within this unilineal descent system were larger kinship groups called lineage and clan. The difference between a clan and lineage was largely one of genealogical depth and size. In Bantu, Nilotic, and Cushitic groups, kinship was often based on relationships of descent in which kin groups defined themselves as descendants of a common ancestor even though they were not always able to track all the connections from their lineages to that ancestor.

Nonetheless, all members in a lineage understood their precise relationships to one another. Lineages were joined to form a larger grouping called a clan, in which members often did not know how they were related to each other but considered themselves relatives and therefore could not intermarry. Members of a clan had a mutual responsibility to support each other, both materially and emotionally.

CONCLUSION

The institutions of family and marriage in Kenya are undergoing stupendous transformations due to the challenges and pressures between traditional and modern family values and kinship structures. While most communities in Kenya are increasingly abandoning their traditional practices in favor of modern ones, the twin institutions of marriage and family patterns are increasingly merging traditional practices and norms with modern ones. This chapter has presented a short description of traditional families and social networks in Kenya. Different types of families and marriages that existed in traditional Bantu, Nilotic, and Cushitic groups in Kenya have also been discussed. It can be concluded that from the information presented in this chapter, the institutions of marriage and family, as well as kinship and descent systems, were traditionally the building blocks that linked individuals to a common social unit or ethnic group.

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Pre-colonial Economic Activities: Crafts, Industry, and Trade

Kennedy M. Moindi

INTRODUCTION

In pre-colonial Kenya, resource accumulation was dependent on whether a community group was agrarian or pastoral. The agriculturalists depended very much on tilling the land for crop production while the pastoralists believed that all livestock was given to them by God. However, there were many important economic activities among pre-colonial communities in Kenya, simply because of the adequate food production from the agricultural sector. These economic activities included handcrafts and manufacturing industries which produced goods that were important to the society, supplementing and complementing agricultural and pastoral activities. Craft is defined as the art of using one's skills and hands to design and fashion things.

In pre-colonial Kenya, different craft industries emerged as specialization took place beyond agricultural activities. These crafts included pottery, basketry, cloth making, house building, carving, and canoe making just to mention a few. While on the other hand, manufacturing industries included iron and copper industries. More significantly, iron was a very crucial tool to both pastoralists and farmers. While the pastoralists needed iron weapons to accumulate and protect their stock, the farmers needed iron implements for clearing their farms as well as harvesting their products. The development of crafts and other industries usually served the purpose of agriculture, hunting and gathering, warfare, and ornaments for beauty and aesthetics. The demand of

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these commodities led to various forms of trade and exchange in Kenya and other parts of East Africa. The growth of mercantilism first through the Arab and European influence systematically undermined the development of local craft industries as cheaper versions obtained externally replaced the locally produced goods by the end of the nineteenth century.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRAFTS AND INDUSTRY

The development of crafts and other industries are technologies which progressively developed in Kenya and the rest of East Africa since the Stone Age and the Iron Age periods. During the Stone Age period, technology was simple and most of the tools were made of clay and wooden objects. These items served the needs of Stone Age hunting and gathering communities in various purposes such as food harvesting and storage as well as hunting and digging root crops that formed part of their diet. With the onset of iron and iron technology, the varieties of tools used improved in terms of usage and efficiency. Most of the iron tools included tools used in land cultivation, hunting, and gathering, as well as clothing and other aesthetical objects such as bangles, anklets, and beads, among others. However, even with the adoption of iron tools, clay tools such as pottery and basketry continued to occupy an important segment of the technologies of societies in Kenya up to the nineteenth century. The most significant of these industries are discussed below.

Clay Work/Pottery

The making of pots was a very important craft industry among the many communities in pre-colonial Kenya. Except for very few communities, all others made and used pots in one way or another. The making of pots was generally a woman's job, though very few communities appear to have both male and female artisans such as the Bukusu and Kabras subtribes of the Luhyia people (Wandiba, 1992, p. 21). Clay was not only used in pottery but also in making smoking pipes and other items. The pots made were put to several uses in the household such as fetching and storing water, cooking as experienced among the Kalenjin, Maasai, Dorobo, Rendille, and Samburu among other communities in Kenya. They were also used in brewing and serving sorghum beer, and storage of grain. Small pots were made for storing butter. Ritual pots used by rainmakers or those associated with birth of twins had higher price as compared to other pots. Pots also played an important role in marriage ceremonies.

Nevertheless, some communities such as the Gusii and Kuria purchased pots from their Luo neighbors since they did not make pots in their history. In coastal Kenya, pots were used by the Mijikenda, Swahili, and Somali. The first stage in the process of making pots was the acquisition of clay from either riverbanks or in swamps. However, the Ilchamus and Pokot obtained it from termite mounds. Once this was done, the clay was carried home in basket panniers, and then it was prepared for potting by removing any observable foreign

particles. Afterwards the clay was thoroughly kneaded until it acquired the desired consistency. Then it was ready for potting, and this was done either under a shady tree or in a banana grove. During the manufacture, pots had to be kept away from any ritual impurity.

Basketry

Baskets were widely used in pre-colonial Kenya by almost all the communities. Baskets and mats were made by both men and women by weaving papyrus, reeds, twigs, cords, or long grass while *kiondo* was made by women. The baskets made were used as containers, for winnowing and measuring grain, for serving food, while other forms of basketry involved the production of wicker doors, granaries, strainers which were used for straining beer or coconut milk, bird cages for keeping quails in captivity, and fish traps. Among the Maasai and pastoral communities they made containers from gourds and leather. Baskets were also made from vegetable fibers, pliable plants, and creepers or palm fronds. Baskets were given different names based on their shape, size, and purpose served. Basketry products were generally exchanged for foodstuffs. The Luo of western Kenya sold most of their basketry products such as food containers to their neighbors such as Gusii and Luhya (Ochieng', 1974, pp. 61–70).

Cloth Making (Weaving and Spinning)

The climate of Kenya during the pre-colonial era seemed to be a very warm and pleasant climate such that many of the young people enjoyed it. The adult men and women wore clothes made from animal skins such as goats, calves, and certain leaves and plant fibers. The more valuable colobus monkey and leopard skins were also made into clothes for leaders and wealthy men for use on ceremonial occasions. The cloth making industries were developed in areas where cloth materials were available. Sewing needles were made from animal or fish bones, iron, or wood. Whilst for thread, strips of animal skin or plaited strips of bark of certain trees were used. The skin clothes were worn for many years before people took to wearing imported clothes from other countries such as Europe, Japan, and America during the colonial era.

Leatherwork

The leather industry can be said to have been a very important industry in the economies of various communities in Kenya since it produced items of bedding, clothing, and weaponry. The leatherwork was the work of the men during this period. Bedding items could be produced by anyone who needed them, but clothes and shields could only be made by specialists. Skin dressing and other kinds of leather work were an important pre-colonial industry. Most of the items were made from skins of both domestic and wild animals or fur.

Examples include scraps, shields, sheaths, cloaks, caps, and bags. The first step in making these items was skin dressing and once the skin was dry it was used to manufacture the particular article it was made for to either bedding or garment worn by men. To turn the skin into leather, the dried skin was scrapped both sides and rubbed between the hands until it became soft. This process was aided by a little oil. This soft leather was used to make garments worn by women. Shields used in battle were made of tough hides obtained from ox, buffalo, or giraffe. However, each community had a way of making their own shields. Ceremonial shields were also made. Sword sheaths were made from ox hide. Cloaks and caps were worn by elders and medicine men. They were generally made of skins of wild animals such as gray monkey, colobus monkey, some antelopes, and hyrax.

Woodworking

Pre-colonial Kenyan communities made a large variety of articles from wood. The articles needed comparatively little skill and therefore were made by anyone who needed them. Examples included walking sticks, handles for hoes or knives, ordinary tools, spears, shafts, ear, or lip plugs, bows and arrows, digging sticks, and wooden arrow points. The more elaborate products were the work of the specialists such as the making of beehives, carved doors, bowls, paddles, and troughs among others. The toolkits needed by specialists were axes, hatchets, adzes, various kinds of knives, awls, and chisels. Stools were also made especially among the Turkana and pastoral Pokot. Stools were made in different forms, either one-legged or three-legged stools. Such kinds of stools were used by old men, wire drawers, and medicine men amongst various communities such as the Mijikenda, Akamba, Kikuyu, and Embu communities.

Under woodworking, there was also canoe making which was exercised by the communities living near water masses, for instance the Luo, some sections of Luhya, Turkana, Pokomo of Tana River, and some coastal communities. Canoes were made from big logs of special trees and were hollowed out using chisels and adzes. Carved doors were made by the inhabitants of Lamu. This was done by carpenters by using a mixture of tracing and freehand to produce a pattern and then a long process of chiseling and finishing off to produce an elaborate design.

House Building

In pre-colonial Kenya, the construction of houses was a crucial craft practiced among the people in the communities. The type of shelters built varied from one area to another in response to the mode of production and climatic conditions. Thus, pastoral nomads tended to build simple houses as was the case among the Turkana, Oromo, Borana, and Gabbra, while sedentary farmers constructed permanent structures, for example, among the Akamba, Kikuyu, and Luhya. In putting up a house, the communities relied on the assistance of

their neighbors, friends, and relatives. Men collected the building materials and also put up the framework while women cut the grass and did the thatching, most especially as witnessed among the Akamba. Moreover, the houses built by Luhya were like those built by their neighboring communities, that is the Luo, Kuria, Gusii, Abasuba, and various Kalenjin-speaking communities that practiced agriculture. In all cases, however, house building was a cooperative craft but, in most communities, there were expert house builders who were often hired for the purpose. House building usually served different purposes such as the building of family dwellings as well as cattle pens and *bomas* where the warriors resided at night to take care of cattle. The Maasai *Manyattas* and the Gusii *ebisarate* were built for young men to take care of cattle at night. The cattle pens were usually protected by ditches and fences built around these settlements (Akama, 2006, p. 37).

Iron Working Industries

Iron working industries were essential skills to the life of pre-colonial communities in Kenya. Iron and iron working technology was prevalent among the Bantu communities in Kenya. Most of the iron tools such as hoes, machetes, spears, and arrows were used both for agriculture and hunting purposes. The raw material from which iron was extracted was found in a few areas such as Malindi, the Sironga valley in Kisii, the Digo hills near Mombasa, Samia hills in Busia, and in other areas with smaller deposits. The iron ore deposits were found in rough stones in sand and rocks of riverbeds or as particles in the earth's surface. Blacksmith services were essential to both agricultural and pastoral communities. Before being used, the ore was firstly placed in a specially constructed clay furnace in which the heat source was charcoal. In the furnace a blast of air was blown by means of a pair of bellows worked up and down to regulate the temperature. (Wandiba, 1992, pp. 18–20)

The red-hot iron melted and was separated from the unwanted rock-waste. After solidifying and cooling, the metal was ready for forging by the smiths into tools and weapons using the soft iron. They produced many articles which were in demand for various aspects of life. These included agricultural implements, and various implements for domestic use such as knives, hoes, sickles, needles, bells, and axe heads. The weapons were used in raiding livestock, while on the other hand agricultural tools made crop farming more efficient, thus leading to more food production. The iron objects were exchanged for both agricultural products and livestock. The Samia of Busia were famous iron smiths whose skills were depended by the people in Lake Victoria region and the Walowa of Yimbo who obtained the iron ore from them. Other iron workers in pre-colonial Kenya were Akamba, Meru, and the Gusii of Sironga Valley. The iron making industry was very important and it was a very highly guarded skill because people made profit out of it and communities who had this skill felt better armed than those who did not.

Salt Industry

The production of salt was an important item in the diet of some Kenyan communities except for the Maasai and agricultural communities of western Kenya. Salt is an essential item for humans and animals, a preservative of food, and also used for medicinal treatments. Therefore, to satisfy their need for salt, most communities strained it from the ashes of certain vegetable materials such as reeds, grass, leaves of trees, peels of green bananas, and Eleusine husks. Most of the materials were burned while fresh, but banana peels and Eleusine husks had to be dried. The salt obtained this way was meant for domestic use. It was not traded, but whenever the need arose it was exchanged through the gift system. This was the work of women.

The second way of obtaining salt was by leaching saliferous soil. This method was not commonly used but it was practiced by the Akamba and Luo. The Swahili obtained salt from the sea inland. The largest deposits were found at Lake Magadi and numerous salt lakes in Rift valley. The salt from these lakes was either cut out in blocks or the salt water was boiled to evaporate off the water and leave the salt. The salt from Kaksingiri area in Nyanza found its way into the salt trade of the Lake Victoria region of both Uganda and Tanzania. The Gusii people also obtained salt for their cattle and for human consumption from the Kaksingiri salt workers. The salt deposits in Lake Magadi were highly guarded by the Maasai of the Rift Valley region (Wandiba, 1992, p. 24).

TRADE IN PRE-COLONIAL KENYA

Trade is one of the most essential cultural behaviors that promoted contact and exchange of ideas, commodities, and services between individuals and communities and variously transformed African societies of different regions and time periods. Trade is the exchange, or movement of materials or goods through peaceful human agency. Initially, trade and exchange facilitated the direct or indirect transfer of ownership of goods or services from one individual, group, or community to another in exchange for other commodities (Ndege, 1990, pp. 117–118). During the Stone Age period trade and exchange was largely limited due to the simple hunting and gathering lifestyles of Stone Age communities that did not encourage the production of any surpluses. Stone Age societies in East Africa developed simple technologies which produced such tools as pottery, grinding stones, stone bowls, and stone axes. Most of these tools were not produced in sufficient quantities to lead to extensive trade and exchange (Ndege, 1990, pp. 118–119).

As Ndege (1990, p. 119) has observed, the expansion of trading activities began with the onset of the Neolithic age whereby tools were improved for the purpose of land cultivation. The onset of iron tools as from the first century A.D. led to greater specialization among Kenyan communities into land cultivation and pastoralist societies. The Bantu cultivators who entered Kenya by the first century A.D. introduced advanced techniques in agricultural

production mainly due to their possession of iron tools. With iron tools, the Bantu cultivated a variety of cereals such as millet and sorghum as well as root crops and tubers such as sweet potatoes, arrowroots, and yams, among others. By the nineteenth century, many Bantu communities had adopted livestock keeping to supplement their range of foods. Similarly, the Cushitic and Nilotic communities such as the Somali, Oromo, Maasai, Turkana, Kalenjin, and others introduced livestock throughout Kenya by the nineteenth century (Sutton, 1974, pp. 71–76). As population expanded in Kenya by the nineteenth century, trading activities expanded among Kenyan communities. These trading activities were further augmented with the opening of relations with societies in other parts of East Africa as well as the Indian Ocean. By the nineteenth century, areas neighboring the coast of Kenya, such as Ukambani, had felt a significant impact of these contacts. The development of these trading networks is discussed in the subsequent sections.

Local Trade in Pre-colonial Kenya

Local trade in pre-colonial Kenya developed to satisfy complementary needs for food, livestock, and livestock products, implements for agricultural production from iron and wood, and other items (Ochieng', 1993, pp. 36–37). As Ochieng' (1993, p. 36) has further noted, the development of trade reflected the diversities in economic activities among pre-colonial Kenyan communities and different ecological zones occupied by these communities. For instance, the Bantu, who were historically grain cultivators, had by the nineteenth century adopted a mixed economy that produced surpluses in cereals, root crops, vegetables, and livestock which could be traded with their neighboring Nilotic communities such as the Maasai and Kalenjin among others. Such exchanges took the form of barter trade whereby the Nilotic pastoralist communities sold livestock and livestock products such as milk and butter in exchange for Bantu commodities that also included iron tools and weapons.

In the absence of well-established structures and networks of exchange, trade was sporadic and irregular, reflecting the unreliability of climatic conditions, the uncertainty of crop production and livestock keeping, and the periods of abundance and scarcity (Ochieng', 1985, pp. 38–41). People traded mostly during dry seasons and famine when there was most need for it. Often, the need to trade arose from the fact that nature has at no time endowed all groups and areas with similar facilities and resources and therefore people traded to acquire from their vital neighbors what they did not produce, either for their livelihood or for pleasure. Mostly trade was not for profit but for the immediate needs of households. But trade in livestock and grains was also a means of acquiring and accumulating wealth. Such transactions simply involved the maintenance of a stable household or friendly relations between the communities involved, and by deliberately relegating certain commodities to an important productivity (Ochieng, 1993, pp. 36–37).

Occupying the more geographically favored regions and equipped with iron technology, the communities in western Kenya established trading relations with the people of the western shores of Lake Victoria and those of Rift Valley such as the Maasai, Kalenjin, and Okiek. In this trade the Gusii and the Luo were the major trading partners. The Gusii, who were predominantly agriculturalists, sold grain and iron commodities, such as spears, axes, needles, and arrowheads to their Nilotic Luo neighbors. They also exported leopard, monkey, and baboon skins; hardwood; and soap stone to the Luo. The Luo and Gusii also exchanged livestock and livestock products such as hides, ghee, and milk. The Gusii also depended on their Luo neighbors for fish, ostrich feathers, salt, baskets, pots, and drums. By the end of the nineteenth century, the people of western Kenya, mainly the Luo, Gusii, and Luhya, had established a regular “common market” in which they traded such commodities as livestock, food crops, and a variety of goods and services. Trading activities tended to pick up during periods of famine and general scarcity (Ochieng, 1974, pp. 55–70; Hay, 1975, pp. 7–12). Trading activities in western Kenya expanded across Lake Victoria into neighboring Uganda and Tanzania. The most important trading activities in Lake Victoria involved fishing and the selling of bananas, salt, cereals, and animal products such as hides and skins (Okoth, 2002, pp. 284–286).

On the other hand, the Maasai depended on their neighbors for vegetable food, grain, iron goods, pots, and tobacco in exchange for livestock, ornaments, ghee, milk, leather sandals, and animal skins. The Maasai traded with as diverse peoples as the Luhya, Luo, Gusii, Ameru, Akamba, Okiek, and Kalenjin. The Maasai, like the Nandi and Kipsigis, were often forced into exchange relations with their neighbors because of the uncertainty that characterized pastoralism. Rinderpest epidemics and prolonged drought sometimes decimated their livestock or depleted the supplies of animal products such as milk, skins, and blood. The farmers valued the Maasai livestock because of the value it played in their own economy as a store of value and in their social organization as a symbol of wealth and status. Livestock was also used to accumulate grain and as brideprice in marriage. .

The Okiek, who were proficient in the making of swords, sheaths, necklaces, shields, arrowheads, and leather sandals, sold their goods to their neighbors in exchange for agricultural and livestock products. The Nandi and the Kipsigis exchanged livestock products for forest products like honey, game meat, fruits, and leopard and monkey skins collected by the Ogiek. In time, because of these trading relations with their neighbors, the Ogiek (Ndorobo) ceased to be hunters and gatherers and became either pastoralists or cultivators.

In eastern Kenya, an area inhabited by the Kikuyu, Meru, Akamba, Mbeere, Mijikenda, and Swahili, the Swahili and Mijikenda were the first to be sucked into the vortex of international trade that stretches back to the period of the *periplus* (Ochieng, 1993, p. 41). The Kikuyu, having inhabited a region with favorable climate, engaged themselves in intra-ethnic trade. The Kikuyu people got buffalo hides, animal horns and skins, and animal ligaments from Kirinyaga and Nyandarua forests. The Kikuyu received cowrie shells, beads, salt, and

herbal poison from the Akamba. The most remembered Kikuyu markets were east of Kiambu and in the central areas of Murang'a and the northern Nyeri region, but the traders sometimes visited the Ndia, Chuka, and Tharaka. The Akamba traders here expected to obtain staples such as beans, yams, bananas, maize, and arrowroots. In response to this the Akamba gave animal skins and a certain type of beer (*uki*) that was fermented longer than that of other nationalities. By the middle of the first half of the nineteenth century, the Akamba traders had been already succeeded by the Akamba warriors and hunters, due to the outbreak of banditry and raids on the traders. They traded in iron-rich soil with the Kikuyu; in bows, quivers, and arrow shafts with Mbeere, Embu and Akamba hardwood called *mpingo*. Trade among the Akamba themselves developed during their settlement in Mbooni hills between 1650 and 1775 A.D.

Long-Distance and External Trade in the Pre-colonial Period

The long-distance trade was the exchange of trade goods between communities over long distances. The communities that participated in this trade included the Akamba, Yao, Nyamwezi, Swahili, Mijikenda, and Baganda. The trade developed because of the demand for ivory in Asia, Europe, and the United States. The ivory in the interior was exchanged for clothes, utensils, ironware, zinc, and beads at the coast. The Akamba also organized caravans that were used at the coast to sell ivory, gum copra, honey, beeswax, and rhinoceros' horns and skin. The Akamba had prosperous traders such as chief Kivoi who is remembered for organizing the trade.

By 1870, the Akamba control of the trade declined because of competition from the Arab and Swahili traders who began penetrating the interior to get goods (Were & Wilson, 1972, pp. 74–75). The trade routes became insecure due to the Oromo and the Maasai raids. The abolition of slave trade affected the trade. While the Swahili ran caravans into the interior, the Banyans usually organized and financed those caravans from the coast. Slaves were caught or bought to provide labor for plantation agriculture, such as grain and clove plantations, while others were exported abroad, particularly to the French Indian ocean sugar islands of Bourbon and Île-de-France (now referred to as Reunion sugar plantations and Mauritius) (Ochieng, 1993, p. 46).

In Tanganyika, the Yao, Nyamwezi, Arabs, and Swahili were great traders. The Yao exchanged tobacco, hoes, and animal skins at Kilwa with imported goods like cloth and beads. They were also the principal suppliers of ivory and slaves to Kilwa. The Yao were the most active long-distance traders in East Africa. The Arabs and Swahili traders organized caravans into the interior and set up markets and trade routes. They were given security by Seyyid Said who signed treaties with Chief Fundikira of the Nyamwezi to allow the Arab traders to pass through his territory. They established interior Arab settlements at Tabora, which became the center of Arab culture.

The Nyamwezi organized trading expeditions under their chiefs up to the coast with ivory, copper, slaves, wax hoes, salt, and copra. They returned with cloths, beads, and mirrors. They established trade routes such as the route from Ujiji via Tabora to Bagamoyo. They travelled to Katanga in the Congo for iron, salt, and copper. By 1850, Nyamwezi merchants such as Msiri and leaders like Nyungu ya Mawe and Mirambo played a key role in trade development. There is evidence, as Margaret Hay (1975, p. 7) has noted, that Nyamwezi traders penetrated as far as Lake Victoria and Nyanza region in search of commodities that they sold to the coast. When the Arab and Swahili traders arrived in Buganda, the Kabaka welcomed them because he needed their goods such as beads, cloths, and guns. He also wanted assistance in raiding his neighbors such as the invasion of Busoga in 1848, which was assisted by the Arab traders. From the raids to Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole, and the Buvuma and Ukerewe islands, the Baganda acquired cattle, ivory, slaves, and grains, which they sold to the Arabs.

Long-distance and international trade affected the Kenyan economy and society in several ways. The trade led to the development of towns and urban settlements such as Mombasa, Lamu, Kilwa, Pemba, and Zanzibar. In the interior, border market centers such Mbale, Busia, Sondu in western Kenya, and Kijabe, Dagoreti, and Emali in Eastern and central Kenya developed as important centers of exchange. Long-distance trade also increased the volume of local and regional trade as varieties of new goods were introduced. There was the emergence of a class of wealthy Africans along the coast and the interior as Arab, African, and Swahili merchants acquired a lot of wealth, such as Kivoi of Ukambani, Ngonyo of Mijikenda, Nyungu ya Mawe of Nyamwezi, and Mwakikonga of the Digo, among others. International trade also led to the introduction of foreign goods such as beads, cloth, and plates to the peoples of East Africa. The trade led to the introduction of new crops to the coast such as bananas, rice, sugarcane, and mangoes.

Arab and Swahili traders introduced Islam and Islamic culture to the East African coast. The development of plantation agriculture in Malindi and Mombasa is also attributed to the expansion of slave trade. Long-distance trade also led to the development of caravan trading routes which traversed the entire region of East Africa from the coast into the interior. Along the entire stretch of the caravan routes, several trading centers such as Bagamoyo, Tanga, and Tabora in Tanzania as well as Takaungu, Voi, and Sultan Hamud in Kenya emerged to serve Arab-Swahili traders travelling into the interior. The caravan routes emerged as a critical artery for the spread of Islam, Christianity, and other external influences into Kenya and the rest of East Africa. The trading routes later became important highways during the colonial rule, and still are today. Traders gave reports about the coast, its strategic and commercial stability, leading to the colonization of East Africa. It led to the development of a money economy that replaced barter trade. The trade facilitated the colonization of East Africa as the interior was exposed to the outside world.

In summary, trade developed because of the peoples' interdependence, a situation which was brought about by the varied distribution of human skills and natural resources. The peoples of Kenya were engaged in trade to meet their complementary needs. The exchange system of trade developed from village to region among the communities of Kenya and finally as part of the international capitalist system of production. Communities traded with each other to mitigate the vagaries of nature such as drought and famine, which depleted food resources necessitating exchange with neighboring communities. Communities such as the Akamba experienced prolonged periods of drought and food shortages and this compelled them to trade with their Kikuyu and Mbeere neighbors, increasing their participation in long-distance trade to obtain basic necessities. By the nineteenth century, Kenya and the rest of East Africa were firmly integrated into the expanding networks of international capitalism. The introduction of the money economy and especially the Indian rupee which was introduced in Zanzibar and later spread to other parts of East Africa during the nineteenth century (see Chap. 10), led to the expansion of the volume of trading activities. By the end of the nineteenth century, East African trade was dominated by slave trade, ivory, cloves, hides, and skins among other goods. The abolition of slave trade by the end of the nineteenth century led to the decline of long-distance trade in East Africa. The patterns of trade introduced by the colonial governments subsequently took over the conduct of trade and exchange systems in Kenya and the rest of East Africa.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has outlined the development of pre-colonial economies in Kenya with respect to the growth of local craft industries and trade. It is observed that pre-colonial societies in Kenya developed technologies that were dynamic and transformative as they served the needs of the communities and in some cases produced sufficient surpluses that led to the growth of local, regional, and international trade. The people of Kenya produced a variety of resources that met the complementary needs of society. Although, as noted, trade was minimal during the Stone Age period, the onset of iron technology led to the expansion of the production of commodities from local industries, which in turn promoted the growth of trade. The expansion of Arab and European influence from the coast of East Africa had a complex impact on local industries and trade. The influx of mercantilist commodities from the coast had a very negative impact on local industries as most of the locally produced goods could not compete with cheap merchandise from outside the country. Societies in Kenya were subjected to new forms of exploitation such as the slave and ivory trade. Although local trade did not die, the growing integration into international commerce continued the process of the marginalization and exploitation of local economies that continued throughout the colonial period and after.

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PART II

Colonial Encounters



CHAPTER 9

The Colonial Political Economy in Kenya

Kennedy M. Moindi

INTRODUCTION

The colonial conquest of Kenya at the end of the nineteenth century followed many centuries of the exploitation of the country's resources by external interests. The conquest effectively ushered in the penetration of capitalist systems of production into the country. Capitalist penetration of Kenya dates to the period of Arab mercantilist activities along the Indian ocean dating back to the ninth century onward and later succeeded by modern western European intervention from the fifteenth century onward. The Indian Ocean trade mainly involved the acquisition of slaves, gold, ivory, and other tropical products whose demand was expanding rapidly in Asia, Europe, and elsewhere. By the nineteenth century, Arab influence had generally declined as it was mainly confined to the coast, but conversely, European influence had penetrated deep into the interior facilitated by the activities of Christian missionaries, traders and explorers who were keen to tap resources of the interior for the benefit of western capitalist interests. The establishment of colonial rule at the end of the nineteenth century was therefore the inevitable outcome of centuries of interaction between societies in Kenya and external forces whose major interest was the economic exploitation of the country. The establishment of British colonial rule radically restructured indigenous modes of production for the purpose of expanding capitalism. The colonial economy in Kenya was generally characterized by the desire of the colonial regime to transform the country into an enclave of capitalist production. This led to the encouragement of settler production, while African systems of production generally suffered neglect by the

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state. However, the growth of colonial capitalism was a process that was enmeshed in numerous contradictions as settler production that was perceived to be the backbone of the economy never lived up to the expectations of the colonial state and other western capitalist agencies.

The major focus of this chapter is to discuss the process of the expansion of the capitalist system of production in Kenya and the impact of this process on the transformation of the colonial economy in the country. The chapter argues that the introduction of western capitalism in Kenya with the onset of colonial rule restructured existing pre-capitalist systems of production, which to a certain degree, suffered destruction but at another level experienced a process of reconfiguration to survive within the emerging capitalist system. The colonial experience in Kenya, as in other African colonies, ushered in a new era characterized by the preponderance of western capitalist institutions at the expense of indigenous institutions of production. The chapter is divided into five parts. The first part is a brief theoretical consideration that discusses the origins and expansion of the capitalist mode of production and its varied impacts on the production systems of indigenous society. The rest of the chapter discusses the evolution of the colonial economy with a specific focus on the British conquest of Kenya and the attempts of the colonial state to transform the colony into a European settler capitalist system of production. The transformation of Kenya into a settler economy exerted new demands on African production in the form of land alienation, forced labor, and forced taxation, among other measures. This led to a decline in African production but more critically, the settler sector that was the focus of state support experienced many challenges of growth and advance. These emerging contradictions within the colonial economy form the core of the discussions in this chapter.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

According to the Marxist theory of historical materialism, the growth of capitalism occurs through appropriation and primitive accumulation of resources by one segment of society, which gradually gains a more dominant role over other segments of society. Ultimately, the process leads to differentiation and conflict within society. (Hopkins, 1973, p. 135) Western capitalism originated in Europe during the era of the industrial revolution and was systematically exported to the rest of the world through slavery and colonialism, among other developments. The European conquest of Africa necessitated the export of capitalist structures into the fledgling African societies. European imperial expansion into Africa provided a fertile ground for the appropriation of African resources for the purpose of western capitalist expansion. The process of capitalist expansion was achieved through the process of articulation between western capitalism, which was more dominant, and African pre-capitalist structures of production, which increasingly played a peripheral role in the emerging colonial economy.

The process of articulation and integration of African economies was achieved through such measures as forceful appropriation of African lands, forced labor, and taxation, as well as through military intervention. Hence articulation was not a process initiated through consensus but violence and coercion became a common practice in much of Africa during the era of conquest (Maxon, 1992; Zeleza, 1989a). The overall outcome of the process of articulation was the destruction, dependency, and underdevelopment of traditional systems of production, as the case of Kenya demonstrates.

The integration of African societies into international capitalism was midwifed by the colonial state. The colonial state has been described as an agent of western merchant capital in the colonial environment. Through the colonial state, Western capitalist expansion was achieved in Kenya and other colonial societies through such means as coercion of African labor and appropriation of other resources for the benefit of western capitalist expansion. The colonial state was often the object of hate and suspicion, and this explains the resistance witnessed among African communities toward its initiatives (Lonsdale & Berman, 1979, p. 487). In Kenya, the peak of African rebellion against the colonial state were the events of the State of emergency and the Mau from the late 1940s to the 1950s. This demonstrates that the colonial political economy was enmeshed in a complicated web of contradictions as the colonial state and other agents of western capitalist expansion perceived their programs in Kenya as being transformative, while on the reverse, the African peasant societies reacted with disdain toward colonial development policy.

BRITISH CONQUEST AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COLONIAL ECONOMY

The British conquest of Kenya commenced in 1895 with the declaration of a protectorate over the territory between the coast and Lake Victoria. Before this date, British imperial expansion in Kenya and the rest of East Africa was in the hands of the Imperial British East African Company (IBEAC Co.), which was chartered in 1888 to run the affairs of British East Africa on behalf of Britain. Initially, British imperial interests in East Africa were guided by its interests in Uganda, which was considered critical for its (British) strategic interests over the Nile Basin that stretched from East Africa to Egypt. Indeed, as John Lonsdale has observed, the territory between the coast and Uganda on the shores of Lake Victoria was considered a “wasteland”, of no economic value compared to Uganda. At the time, a survey carried out by officials of the IBEAC Co. had revealed that much of what later became the East African Protectorate (Kenya) had no significant natural resources such as minerals which could have warranted the British to take a keen interest in the area (Middleton, 1965, p. 346).

In 1896, a year after the declaration of the protectorate, the British began the construction of the Uganda railway from Mombasa to Kisumu, where it

terminated in 1901. This was necessitated by the desire to hasten the movement of British officials and supplies from the coast into Uganda. The successful completion of the railway brought to the attention of imperial authorities the huge agricultural potential of the highland region East and west of the Rift valley. One of the major tasks facing the British at the time was how to recoup the huge costs incurred in the construction of the railway and put in place overhead infrastructure for the effective administration of the colony. The popular idea within imperial circles was that the East African colonies should be prepared to produce sufficient resources and revenue to run their affairs without relying on taxpayers in Britain for support. In the absence of significant mineral resources to exploit, the British turned to agriculture as the mainstay of the economy.

In other colonies such as Northern Nigeria, India, or even Uganda, where local African participation was encouraged to produce resources to run the colony, the case of Kenya was different. The initial British encounters with local communities that were characterized by violent encounters, as in the case of the Nandi and the Ogaden Somali at the coast, discouraged the British from integrating indigenous economies into the mainstream economy. Instead, much of British economic policy revolved around encouraging European settlement and agricultural production as the foundation of the economy. The idea of encouraging European settlement was also influenced by the beliefs that African societies lacked adequate knowledge to produce sufficient resources for the export market, which the British were keen to tap into. Despite the lack of a clear policy on the African population's role in the colony's economic transformation, the British nevertheless were keen to integrate the African societies into the colonial economy. This was achieved through the encouragement of African subsistence production as well as the use of more coercive measures such as forced taxation, forced labor, and massive land alienation to encourage wage labor migration from the African areas into European settler areas where the Africans were to serve as a source of cheap labor.

Hence, the emerging colonial economy was dualistic in character. As Maxon (1992, pp. 68–69) has observed, such a development was a common trend in many settler colonies such as Kenya and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). On the one hand, there was a developing European and Asian financed money economy heavily dependent on external investment, exports, and African labor. On the other hand were African economies where the technologies of production were relatively backward, productivity and incomes were low, and they specifically produced for subsistence, although it also served the export market. However, as Maxon notes, the idea of a dual economy does not mean two separate compartments with no interaction. The weak European settler economy could not survive on its own without African and state support, and on the other hand, despite the lack of incentives, the Africans continued to produce the bulk of the colony's products and exports, and these were mainly from the agricultural sector. This was the case at least up to the 1930s when settler production gained some stability and produced the bulk of the export market in particular. This is the subject of discussion in the subsequent sections.

EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT AND EMERGING COMMERCIALIZATION OF THE ECONOMY

Right from the inception of colonial rule, Kenya was conceived of as a European settler economy. European settlement and state expansion began during the era of the IBEA Co., when land was set aside for the establishment of administrative centers throughout the corridor from the coast to Lake Victoria, and more land was alienated to allow for the construction of the railway as from 1896. However, the greatest portion of land alienation was implemented by setting aside land on the so-called “White Highlands” that traversed both the eastern and western arms of the Rift Valley to allow for European settlement and the development of European large-scale agricultural production. By 1960, the White Highlands comprised 17,000 square miles or 15% of the colony and comprised seven and a half million acres of the best farmlands in the colony (Kenyanchui, 1992, p. 113).

European settlement was a process that was well coordinated and implemented by the metropolitan and the colonial states. Through various legal promulgations, land was alienated to achieve this goal. The most notable was the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902, which declared that all land in the colony belonged to the British imperial government and it therefore could appropriate land for any use the imperial government saw fit. Under this law, European settler farmers were given land at very low concessionary leasehold rates of up to 99 years, equivalent to getting land free of charge. The brainchild of this legislation was Sir Charles Eliot, the Chief Commissioner from 1899 to 1904. His idea was that to encourage European settlement, land in the colony must be made attractive through the reduction of the costs of land acquisition. Under this law, Sir Charles Eliot forcefully evacuated the Maasai from large swathes of land north of the railway in Laikipia and Uasin Gishu and, subsequently, the Maasai were relocated to the southern lowlands of Ngong, Kajiado, and Narok. Apart from the Maasai, other African communities that lost land for European settlement included the Kikuyu in the central highlands, the Kalenjin in western Kenya, and parts of the Akamba people in the Konza and Athi River areas. In 1915, the permanence of European settlement was further guaranteed through the promulgation of a new Crown Lands Ordinance, which extended the European settler land leases from 99 to 999 years, which inevitably transformed the indigenous African communities into unwilling tenants of the crown. This effectively meant that the African people had no right whatsoever to land ownership in the colony.

With the promulgation of these laws, there was a huge influx of European settlers into the colony from England as well as other British settlements such as South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. This was particularly the case after

World War I, when apart from the central highlands, land was also alienated in Uasin Gishu and the Sotik Highlands to allow for the settlement of war veterans. Given the relatively temperate climate over the highland areas, European settler agriculture mainly focused on the cultivation of cereals such as maize and wheat, as well as coffee, tea, pyrethrum, and livestock production, but in the lowland regions of the coast and eastern Kenya, sisal, cotton, sugar cane, rice, and rubber cultivation were experimented with. Keen to support the expansion of settler production, the colonial state provided support through the establishment of the Department of Agriculture in 1903, which was tasked with providing extension services to the settler farmers in the form of provision of equipment, seeds, fertilizer, improved breeds, and other necessary inputs (Zezeza, 1989b, p. 42). In addition, the transport network in settler areas was improved through the construction of railway extensions to facilitate easy access to external markets. These extensions included the Nakuru-Solai-Nyahururu, Thika-Nyeri-Nanyuki, and Voi-Taveta extensions. Feeder roads in settler areas were also graveled to facilitate easy movement of produce for the market (Kenyanchui, 1992, p. 116).

However, despite state support in financial and tax subsidies as well as easy access to land, settler production remained in a very precarious situation mainly due to a lack of commitment on the part of settlers, fluctuating external markets, poor infrastructure, labor shortage, and diseases, among other challenges. For example, in 1928 there was a major locust invasion that decimated crops and grasslands, and a major drought soon followed this in the early 1930s. The slump in the prices of coffee, sisal, and maize in the global markets adversely affected production, and the global economic recession followed this from 1929 to the late 1930s. All these developments adversely affected settler production. Therefore, it was not by coincidence that by the start of World War I in 1914, settler agriculture contributed less than 30% to the export market despite this state support.

The state, determined to support the growth of settler production, took several measures to achieve this objective, as was demonstrated especially in the post-World War I period. One of the major challenges facing settler production was access to cheap and reliable sources of labor. Before the outbreak of World War I, the state imposed the Hut Tax (1901) and Poll Tax (1910) to compel able-bodied African men to seek employment (mainly in the European settler areas) to raise funds to pay taxes (Zwanenberg, 1975, pp. 76–77). However, such measures often did not yield much result as the Africans devised new tactics such as selling their livestock to pay taxes instead of seeking wage employment. In such a scenario, the state was compelled to engage in more coercive measures to obtain African labor. Before and during World War I, the state compelled local African chiefs to recruit able-bodied individuals in their areas of jurisdiction to provide labor for public projects, and this increased when the war broke out in 1914. During the war, Africans were recruited for the war effort as carrier corps and other forms of manual labor for the military.

However, after the war and with increased settler demands for labor, Governor Northey in 1919 issued the famous “Northey Circulars” under which African chiefs and other colonial functionaries were compelled to take up all measures to “encourage” Africans to provide labor to the expanding public sector and European settler farms. In essence, the African population was required to participate in providing cheap labor at all costs as the Northey Circulars were implemented through the enforcement of the Native Registration Ordinance of 1916. Under this ordinance, all African males above the age of sixteen were required to carry a pass or *Kipande*, and in addition, they were also required to engage in wage employment outside the reserves for a specific period during the calendar year. In essence, this legislation was meant to regularize the supply of cheap African labor to the settler sector and other areas (Zezeza, 1989a, pp. 50–52). In addition to the use of coercive measures, labor for the settler areas was also obtained through the system of resident labor or squatter system, in which African households facing land shortage in the reserves were encouraged to reside on the land of the European settlers and in return will cultivate a portion of the settler farm to obtain basic necessities such as food while providing unpaid labor to their hosts. Such an arrangement was convenient to the European settlers as they could obtain reliable and cheap labor without incurring huge costs.

Despite the hiccups experienced in settler agricultural production during the interwar period, sufficient recovery was experienced, particularly after World War II in 1945. In the period leading to the late 1950s and early 1960s, settler production contributed the bulk of the exports from the colony in such sectors as coffee, wattle bark, wheat, maize, livestock, and other sectors. The expansion of the settler sector was augmented by increased subsidies to settler production in the form of tax concessions in such areas as railway transport of settler produce to the ports for the export market (Kanogo, 1989, p. 118). In addition, the colonial state also established better infrastructure for the purchase of agricultural implements, processing, and marketing of settler produce, such as the Kenya Meat Commission (KMC) in Athi River that processed beef for the export market, Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC) in Nakuru for the processing of milk and milk products, Kenya Farmers Association (KFA) in Nakuru that acted as a settler agency to obtain agricultural implements and assist the settlers to access better prices and markets of their produce. Other marketing agencies were also established in other sectors such as coffee, tea, sisal, pyrethrum, passion fruit, pig and poultry production, maize, and cereals, among others (Kenyanchui, 1992, p. 125). In addition, to support marketing, European settler production also received a major boost in financial assistance in the form of loans from commercial banks and the state through The Land and Agricultural Bank that was established in 1931.

Therefore, it is clear that settler production in colonial Kenya was part of official policy that aimed to transform the colony into a white settler colony. By the time of the outbreak of the Mau and State of emergency in 1952, European settler production had surpassed all earlier estimations to become the chief

producer for the export market. These developments as noted were achieved through the exploitation of African communities whose traditional economies suffered major setbacks as it was exposed to western capitalism that was inherently exploitative. To meet the demands of western capitalist production, traditional African institutions were restructured to produce for the colonial market. This was achieved through increased commercialization and monetization of the colonial economy to meet the demands of the emerging market forces. Toward the independence era from the late 1950s, the accelerated land transfer to the Africans, and support from the state through financial, technical, and credit facilities, African production increased in leaps and bounds and played a critical role in economic transformation after independence in 1963.

THE AFRICAN ECONOMY AND GROWTH OF THE PEASANT ECONOMY

Although, as noted earlier, colonial economic development was based on the promotion of a settler economy that heavily depended on the alienation of African lands and the discrimination of African production in favor of settler production, yet African peasant production was not “destroyed” as Zeleza (1989, p. 44) observes. The African peasant economy remained an integral component of colonial capitalist transformation in such key areas as commodity production from the agricultural sector, provision of labor mainly to the settler community, and revenue in the form of taxes. This therefore demonstrates that African systems of production, though dismissed by the colonial authorities as unresponsive to the forces of modern capitalism, proved otherwise. At the onset of colonial conquest by the end of the nineteenth century, African pre-capitalist systems of production mainly thrived on a communal mode of production that combined hunting, gathering, and pastoralism and mixed farming (combine livestock keeping and farming) in several areas. Pre-colonial systems of production mainly served the domestic economy, and a segment of the surpluses could be utilized for local and regional exchange in the form of barter trade. This, for instance, was the case in western Kenya where local and regional trade thrived among the Gusii, Luo, and Luhya who resided in the region (Hay, 1975, pp. 7–12). By the time of colonial conquest, these networks of exchange had expanded to incorporate the Indian Ocean trade that was then in the hands of the Arab ivory and slave traders operating from Zanzibar.

The imposition of colonial capitalism provided an environment that contributed to the expansion of the African economy as it became integrated into the capitalist economy. The African economies became increasingly commercialized and monetized as they adjusted to participate in the western market economy. This transformation was the result of many forces operating within the colonial economy. First, the establishment of European settlement was followed by land alienation, and the imposition of forced labor and taxation compelled the African population to adjust their systems of production to respond

to the new demands. Again, the role of the colonial state through the encouragement of African peasant production, improvement of infrastructures, such as the building of feeder roads and building market centers, encouraged the African communities to produce for the market. Lastly, the emergence of a class of merchants, especially the Asians, who were willing to buy African peasant produce to sell to external markets encouraged African production (Maxon, 1992, pp. 64–66).

The expansion of African peasant commodity production was not uniform throughout the colony. It has been observed that pastoralist communities such as the Maasai were slow to respond to the expansion of capitalist production compared to the agriculturalist communities such as the Kikuyu of central Kenya (Zezeza, 1989, p. 44). The Maasai, who inhabited large parts of the Rift Valley, experienced the most aggressive form of land alienation, losing more than one-third of their grazing lands and water points. Now confined to the most uninhabitable wastelands in the southern parts of the colony with little or no chance to move to replenish their grazing lands, the Maasai economy was destroyed under the weight of colonial capitalism. Other pastoralist communities such as the Somali in Northeastern Kenya were somehow lucky as they did not experience extensive land alienation, and given their location outside the axis of imperial expansion, the Somali economy continued to thrive under the lucrative livestock trade that had existed before the colonial era.

Elsewhere in Western Kenya, communities residing here were quick to respond to western capitalism. The Nandi, Kipsigis, and Luo, who were previously cattle keepers, readily adjusted to commodity production to serve the expanding markets. By the end of World War II, the Kipsigis had effectively entered into small-scale farming, which was mixed with livestock keeping, and this compelled colonial officials to describe them as the most “progressive” of all African farmers in Kenya at the time (Middleton, 1965, p. 344). The Luo of the Nyanza region of western Kenya became major producers of sesame, maize, beans, peas, groundnuts, and cotton, which was introduced as an experimental cash crop but largely failed due to high labor demands and low market prices (Fearn, 1961, p. 68). In central Kenya, the Kikuyu emerged as one of the most progressive commodity producers during the colonial era. Although the Kikuyu lost much land to European settlement and hence suffered from acute landlessness, this did not prevent them from devising new strategies to cope with the demands of the capitalist economy. Given their proximity to Nairobi and other urban areas, the immediate response of the Kikuyu was migration in large numbers to Nairobi to seek wage employment. However, a large segment of the Kikuyu who remained in the reserves converted their small plots into efficient “factories” that produced commodities such as vegetables, beans, onions, potatoes, and livestock that were in high demand among the expanding settlements in urban areas such as Nairobi and Thika. With time this process opened avenues for capitalist accumulation and differentiation among the Kikuyu and other African communities.

In the coastal region of Kenya, capitalist penetration was generally slower compared to central and western Kenya despite the proximity of the region to major urban centers such as Mombasa and the Indian Ocean, which was historically the gateway to Kenya. As Zeleza (1989a, pp. 48–49) has observed, the main problem in the region was the land problem. At the onset of British colonial rule, much of the land at the coast was in the hands of an Arab-Swahili aristocracy that was abandoning the nineteenth century plantation economy and was now retreating into the emerging urban centers, such as Mombasa. Instead of turning this land to local African peasants, the Swahili-Arab landowners had sold part of their land to Indian and European buyers, and the rest of the land now remained idle as they were unable to draw free labor from the Africans as was the case during the nineteenth century. Therefore, the Mijikenda and other local African populations at the coast remained landless and could not effectively participate in the emerging system of commodity production. Indeed, as Zeleza (1989a, p. 49) has further observed, exports from the region such as the grains and cereals such as sesame and millet generally declined in the period up to the 1920s. The colonial state itself did not make matters any better by projecting the negative stereotype that Africans were generally indolent and therefore there was no need to invest much in the improvement of their economies.

It is therefore clear that by the 1920s, despite the colonial state's propensity to support settler agriculture at the expense of the African economy, the latter experienced considerable growth. As noted earlier, the African peasant farmers produced the bulk of the domestic and export products by the outbreak of World War I. At the end of the war, the colonial state continued its tactics of further stifling African production through further land alienation and coercion of African labor. This precipitated a major crisis in the African sector, as witnessed in the increase in landlessness and the squatter problem in the settler areas. In response to this crisis, the colonial state appointed the Morris Carter Land Commission in 1929, to study the land problem in the African areas and make necessary recommendations. The commission in its report issued in 1932 instead of addressing the African land crisis, only ended up affirming the White Highlands as a preserve of European settlement and ordered that all Africans be forcefully evicted from the White Highlands through the abolition of the squatter system. Hence the land problem remained critical and only contributed to the rise of African agitation in the 1930s to 1950s (Kanogo, 1989, p. 144).

During World War II and the subsequent emergency period from the early 1950s, there was increased demand for basic commodities for both the domestic and export markets. In the process, the colonial state was compelled to abandon its traditional policy of only supporting settler agriculture and began to support African peasant farmers to produce more commodities for the market. The clearest indication of this new turn of events was the implementation of the Swynnerton Plan in 1954. Africans were now encouraged to enter cash crop production in even greater numbers. The process had begun earlier in

selected areas such as Kisii, Kiambu, Kakamega, and Machakos, where a few Africans, especially the chiefs and the elites, were allowed to grow coffee under close state supervision. By the 1950s, more African areas were allowed to engage in coffee production. Apart from coffee, the cultivation of tea and pyrethrum and the rearing of improved livestock were allowed in areas bordering the settler areas where the climate was more conducive. The Swynnerton Plan also recommended that African peasant farmers be allowed to own title deeds for their plots of land. This enhanced security of land ownership, and the African farmers could now use the land titles as collateral to obtain bank loans and other credit to buy better implements and inputs for farming. In central Kenya, the liberalization of the system of land ownership encouraged African farmers to abandon cash crops such as wattle trees and cotton and instead take up coffee, pyrethrum, tea, and dairy farming. These new endeavors were more profitable as the market was guaranteed (Talbot, 1992, pp. 83–88).

IMPACT OF COMMODITY PRODUCTION ON AFRICAN SOCIETIES

As already noted, the introduction of commodity production contributed to the restructuring and modification of African systems and relations of production to meet the demands of the expanding capitalist system. Commodity production transformed African households into producers of surplus produce to serve the export markets. Traditional crops such as *simsim*, millet, and the newly introduced maize were now produced not just for domestic consumption but also for the export market. The African population, now under increased pressure to produce more surpluses within the household, faced the difficult task of dividing their labor time between the domestic economy and the settler sector. In many African areas, commodity production was undertaken by women and children in most cases, while most of the adult male population engaged in labor migration to urban centers and settler areas. Over time, the domestic economy suffered from an acute labor shortage, which inevitably led to declined production, increased food shortage, growing poverty, and the emergence of a largely dysfunctional society. In traditional African society, male adult members had a bigger role in managing household affairs but with increased labor migration out of the African reserves, many of the households were now headed by women. This inevitably emerged as one of the realities of the growth of colonial capitalism.

The analysis of the transformation of the African household can demonstrate this point. As Orvis (1997, pp. 12–18) has observed, with the onset of commodity production, four categories of household structures emerged in colonial Kenya: the pre-capitalist communal households, the peasant household, the peasant worker household, and the straddling households. The pre-capitalist communal household was the standard household system in traditional societies in Kenya. This household structure thrived in land- and labor-abundant environments. In these households, men performed important roles in decision-making activities while the women provided a larger portion of the

labor force. It is also important to note that the communal households were not under any pressure to produce any surplus as there was no immediate demand for the produce outside the household and immediate members.

With the onset of commodity production, the pre-capitalist communal households were transformed into peasant households. The peasant households shared many aspects with the communal households as much of the production mainly focused on subsistence agriculture and labor was divided along gender lines, but the major difference was the greater focus of peasant households on production for the market. This was mainly due to the need to produce more surpluses to pay taxes and other demands such as buying merchandise brought in by the capitalist system. The third category of the emerging households was the peasant worker household, which typically combined agricultural and nonagricultural activities such as labor migration to raise incomes. These developments were mainly the result of the ongoing land alienation from African areas to pave the way for European settler areas and the demands for taxes. With the increased land shortage in African reserves, other income-generating activities were sought outside the reserves.

The last category of the African households were the straddling households which, according to Orvis (1997, pp. 14–15), became quite prevalent in colonial Kenya. The straddling households typically combined agricultural and off-farm or nonagricultural activities such as transport businesses, retail shops, buying of milk separators, among others, to raise incomes. The majority of straddling households were derived from amongst the educated and influential Africans, such as the chiefs, teachers, and clerks, who had gained access to colonial education and training and, with this advantage, could acquire more land and invest in better technology for agricultural production. Although the colonial state discouraged the general African peasant farmer from engaging in cash crop production, a few selected individuals in selected areas were over time allowed to engage in the production of profitable crops such as tea, coffee, and dairy farming. This was the case in selected areas in central and western Kenya. The emergence of the straddling households led to increased capital accumulation and social differentiation in African areas, especially during the 1930s to the 1950s (Ndege, 1987, pp. 169–185; Kitching, 1980).

Social differentiation was witnessed at the household level and among the different regions of Kenya. This was particularly obvious in the areas that experienced the highest intensity of capitalist penetration, stretching from the coast into the central highlands and western Kenya. Areas of central Kenya and parts of western Kenya which experienced the highest intensity of commodity production and had access to market their produce in urban centers and settler areas have been classified as the agrarian revolution zone. These regions, though they experienced massive land alienation as in the case of the Kikuyu, rapidly adjusted to commodity production and other off-farm activities by investing better in technology and other inputs on their farms. The surpluses from their farms found a ready market in nearby urban centers such as Nairobi and Thika. The agrarian revolution zones produced most of the straddling

households, which engaged in a variety of activities ranging from the production of cash crops and engaging in off-farm endeavors such as selling produce in the urban centers, which added to their incomes (Orvis, 1997, pp. 135–136).

On the other hand, the labor exporting zones were the regions of parts of western Kenya and Nyanza and parts of eastern Kenya and the coast. These regions did not experience a major “agrarian revolution” as in the previous zone due to lower potential of land, poor access to the markets, and the growing problems of overpopulation of human and livestock populations. These areas were generally characterized by such problems as increased land subdivisions due to population pressure, soil erosion, and overgrazing. The development of modern methods of agriculture as well as the adoption of cash crops did not quickly pick up in these areas, and, instead, these regions were inhabited by communities such as the Luo and Luhyia, and Kisii in western Kenya, the Akamba in the eastern region, and the coastal people such as the Mijikenda offloaded excess labor through labor migration to the nearby settler plantations and urban areas. In the labor export zones, crop production remained under the small-scale African peasant worker households, and straddling households were largely rare in these areas. The labor-exporting zones were largely poorer compared to the agrarian revolution zones.

Lastly, the land-abundant zones were areas mainly in the rift valley, the epicenter of European settlement. In these areas, the land was fertile and abundant. Although a lot of land in these areas was alienated for European settlement, the African communities residing in such districts as Nandi, Kericho, Bungoma, Uasin Gishu, and Trans Nzoia had access to larger portions of land and therefore engaged in profitable crops (maize and other cereals) and animal production and therefore did not see the necessity to migrate outside these areas. In Kericho and Bungoma, African farmers adopted modern farming methods, including the plow, and produced sufficient surpluses such as maize and livestock, which were sold to laborers in European settler areas (Kitching, 1980, pp. 50–53). Over time, the land-abundant zones were transformed into labor import zones as they experienced an influx of African labor to work mainly for the European settlers.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MERCHANT CAPITAL, URBANIZATION, AND INDUSTRIALIZATION

The growth of capitalist production transformed colonial Kenya in various other ways. Commodity production led to the emergence of new networks of trade and exchange. This in many areas was pioneered by Asian (Indian) and European traders who were later joined by the straddling households. As early as the 1920s, Hugh Fearn (1961, pp. 112–113) has noted that Indian traders had penetrated many parts of Nyanza where they bought cereals such as maize and millet as well as hides and skins from African farmers, and these were later shipped to Kisumu onward to the international markets. Over time, African

farmers realized that they were being exploited by the Indian traders and the more innovative amongst the African population straddled into a class of merchants. However, African traders faced many challenges because of competition from Indian and European traders, who often offered better prices to the African farmers and also had access to better transport systems in the form of lorries and the railway system.

The penetration of the colonial economy compelled many African communities to abandon traditional exchange and trade patterns to serve the emerging capitalist economy. For example, the Akamba and Somali abandoned the long-distance caravan trade they had participated in since the nineteenth century and now turned to serve the colonial establishment as lorry drivers, clerks, house servants, body guides, and shopkeepers, among other activities (Zezeza, 1989a, pp. 55–58). The new class of African merchants demonstrated a high degree of resilience and survival in the face of competition and a lack of support from the colonial government. Apart from engaging in retail trade, African traders also built posho (maize) mills, which proved to be a very lucrative business in the African reserves (Moindi, 2008, pp. 138–148; Moindi, 1997, pp. 175–193). The establishment of the Local Native Councils (LNCs) in 1924 positively impacted the development of merchant trade among the African population. The LNCs had the mandate of registering and establishing trading centers and licensing traders in the African districts.

Although Indian and African merchants played a significant role in the economic transformation of colonial Kenya, the European large-scale and expatriate sectors have a bigger role to play in this respect. Due to support from the colonial state, the growth of the networks of commerce such as the roads, railway, financial, and technical inputs favored European merchant capital. (Masao, 1984, p. 19). The most important merchant companies such as Smith Mackenzie Limited, Broke Bond, Unilever East Africa, East African Breweries, East African Industries, British American Tobacco (BAT), and Magadi Soda Company, among others, were all state supported and produced commodities for the international market. The expansion of settler and corporate agriculture gained momentum in the period from 1945 onward (Zezeza, 1989a, pp. 158–159). The development of large-scale merchant and industrial production took place at the expense of the small-scale African commercial sector. The major urban areas such as Mombasa, Nairobi, Kisumu, and Nakuru were mainly built as conduit centers for the expansion of western merchant capital. African traders and other producers were restricted to the African market centers in the African reserves (Ndege, 1993, pp. 124–136).

By the 1950s, the pressure of decolonization facing the colonial state compelled the authorities to restructure the economy to embrace the growth of indigenous capital. The reforms occasioned by the Swynnerton Plan in the early 1950s allowed the African farmers to improve agricultural production by adopting cash crops and better techniques. Similarly, African farmers could now access credit facilities from the land bank established in 1945 to improve production on their farms as well as engage in other off-farm activities such as

the retail and transport trade. These developments enabled the rise of an African elite capitalist class, which accumulated capital from both on-farm and off-farm activities. Thus, the growth of colonial capitalism, though initially marginalizing African producers, gradually led to increased capital accumulation and differentiation among the African and other segments of the population in colonial Kenya. This, therefore, demonstrates that although capitalist expansion was exploitative, especially in pre-capitalist societies, segments of this population remained resilient enough to profit and thrive from the proceeds of the expanding capitalist system.

CONCLUSION

The colonial political economy in Kenya was founded on a capitalist system characterized by crisis and contradictions. Kenya was colonized at the end of the nineteenth century, and the development of the economy was conceived of as taking place with the European settlers taking up the role of “engines” of economic transformation. The colonial state took up the mandate of establishing networks to facilitate the expansion of settlers and the modern sectors. This was achieved through instituting systems of alienation, forced labor, and taxation, as well as constructing rail and road networks to support the settlers. The African traditional small-scale sector did not enjoy any significant state support, and production from the African sector generally declined but did not collapse completely. African producers still produced the bulk of exports and incomes for the colony. The measures taken by the state to support large-scale European and corporate sectors ironically faced many contradictions. Hence, the colonial state was compelled to support the growth of a dual economy in which the large-scale European sector and the African sector thrived side by side.

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The Kenyan Shilling: History of an East African Currency

Isaac Tarus

INTRODUCTION

The Kenyan shilling has remained a ubiquitous colonial legacy. This chapter aims to examine the origin, meanings, and metamorphosis of the Kenyan currency into the shilling. Robert Maxon (1992) and Van Zwanenberg (1975) have established a scholarly grounding for understanding how the financial system in Kenya materialized. For many societies, nations, and individuals, currencies have been used to express sublime feelings for the past, present, and indefinite future. Kenya has been part of this historical process and the saga of its currency shows the many characteristics of images, colors, attributes, and patterns that have taken many forms of subtle maneuverings. But two of the most important images that have adorned the Kenyan currency are the coat of arms and the portraits of Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi that reflect the country's historical landscape and the 'big man' image of Africa's political economy.

A WORD ON GLOBAL CURRENCY

Kuroda (2020) and Iwahi (2001) have explored how currencies have evolved since antiquity and how society has advanced from barter to digital exchange. Few obsessions have indeed been more important in the development of politics than the functionality of money. Within this space belong diverse

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currencies that have performed central roles in the development of the modern state. Historically, the various currencies in the form of money have evolved from barter, commodification, coinage, paper, credit, and the current electronic transactions. The historiography of money can be gleaned from, among many others, the writings of Aristotle, John Stuart Mill (1848), Adam Smith (2005), Karl Polanyi (1968), Karl Marx (1867), and Georg Simmel (2004). Each epoch and mode of production developed its medium of exchange. Similarly, the uses and meanings associated with money have evolved and shifted throughout history. Money is nuanced from various perspectives as a store of value, a unit of account, a medium of exchange, and a ‘social lubricant’, with gold being the standard currency (Graeber, 2011).

Launched in South Africa and Ghana, gold provided the motive and motivation for the European colonization of Africa (Rodney 2012, pp. 135–145, 161–172). John Lonsdale (1985, pp. 6–29) has graphically shown how Kenya was conquered, colonized, and brought into a world hegemony of “oppressive and corrosive tendencies of propertied capitalism” (ibid., p. 7). Like Walter Rodney, Claude Ake (1981) has amplified how the African pre-colonial monetary system was made integral to a capitalist mode of production. Pre-capitalist African societies had commodities such as livestock, grains, beads, salt, cowrie shells, Magadi soda, iron tools, hides and skins, and even slaves as commodities of exchange. Each mode of production had its own medium of exchange, whether hunting and gathering, fishing, pastoralism, agriculture, or traditional industries. Challenges were, however, abound since it was problematic to gauge the exact value since there was no standard unit of measurement. Claude Ake (Ibid., pp. 32–35) has shown how pre-colonial Africa used gold, dinars, cloth money, copper rods, and manilas as currency.

COLONIAL EVOLUTION OF THE KENYAN SHILLING

Between 1800 and 1850, the Maria Theresa Thaler was used along the Kenyan Coast but was not acceptable as a medium of exchange in the interior (Van Zwanenberg 1975, p. 276). In 1897 Harry Jackson, the leader of the East African Protectorate, introduced a new currency called ‘specie’ and ‘spice’ (ibid.). This lasted for only a year. Following the railway construction and most laborers being sourced from India, the Rupee (Rs.) that had limited circulation on the Kenyan coast was eventually made the standard currency in Kenya from 1898 to 1921 (ibid.). The introduction of the Indian Rupee was an epoch-making process and articulated two important social formations: pre-colonial and colonial (McGregor, 1927, p. 199). But the wide distribution of the currency was slow until 1901, when African taxation was officially institutionalized, and the colonial government stipulated that all taxes were to be paid in cash. To achieve that, the colonial state promulgated the East Africa and Uganda (Currency) Order-in-Council of June 1905 to regulate the operation of the Rupee and the minting of coins. The Rupee remained the standard

currency of the colonial state until 1922, when the East African Currency Board replaced it with the British shilling (Maxon, 1989, pp. 323–348).

A major decision that was made by the nascent East African Protectorate in 1902 was the issuance of what was called ‘the Government paper currency’, based on the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890 (KNA/AG/11/48, 1902–1932). Through the advice of the British Privy Council in London, it was ordered that an Order to be cited as “The East Africa Currency Order in Council of 1903” was to be enacted to create various currencies and coins as legal tender. To oversee this new discretion, a currency board under the office of a Deputy Commissioner and Treasurer was set up in Mombasa. Nairobi then was a small railway station and of no consequence. Various responsibilities were assigned to the board. First was to issue, from time to time, either a current coin or notes, which were all to be referred to as “currency notes”. Second, the currency note, as was indicated, was a promise on the part of the protectorate government to pay a bearer on demand the amount named. This was to be a charge on the “moneys and securities” in the hands of the currency board and on the general revenue of the protectorate. Third, holders of currency notes were entitled to obtain on-demand during office hours payment in current coins, the same amount as expressed in the note. Fourth, the denominations of the currency notes were to be in bundles of 5 rupees, 10 rupees, 50 rupees, and multiples of 50 rupees. In addition, the currency board was responsible for fixing the denomination of the rupees with the approval of the British government secretary of state. Fifth, and importantly, the currency board had the responsibility of designing the shape and appearance of the notes and their printing and authentication through the signatures of the notes. Sixth, the board had to ensure that the currency notes were safe from fraud and improper use by safekeeping of the currency plates and cancellation of the plates and notes that were no longer in use. Seventh, the board had to gazette the whole amount of currency notes in circulation during any given month. Eighth, the members of the currency board were made aware of the penalties they would face if they issued any currency contrary to the board rules or participated in any misdemeanor. Equally important, the board had to ensure that the currency users were made aware of the liability of imprisonment of up to ten years in case of improper use of currency for fraud, forgery, or any alteration. In addition, any possession of a currency that had negated the above processes made the holder liable for imprisonment for a period up to five years. Finally, individuals would be liable for imprisonment for unlawful possession of instruments for printing currency. These included engraving a name, word, number, any devise, character, ornament, or signature that resembled a legal tender currency (KNA/AG/11/48).

These structures that were set up in the early days of colonial rule effectively placed all types of currency, coinage, and money at the center of the exchange and market system in the East African protectorate. By 1920 when Kenya transitioned from a protectorate to a colony, the process of engendering the shilling as the standard-bearer of legal tender in the country had been confirmed. Thus,

one of the major consequences of British colonialism in Kenya was the revolutionary introduction of the shilling as the unit of currency. Money, because of its unlimited usage, transformed the market system in Kenya to a level that was unimaginable in the pre-colonial past. But currency policy in colonial Kenya was determined by London, which was then considered the financial capital of the world. For a start, twenty shillings were pegged at one British pound, and this became embedded in everyone's mind to date. Indeed, the British pound, especially among white settlers, remained one of the key currencies for the entire colonial period. The Kenyan shilling (Kshs) was equivalent to 100 cents and valued at one-twentieth of the pound sterling (Maxon, 1989, p. 253). To date, the Kenyan shilling has been a hard currency, meaning it can be re-converted in most East African countries.

Following the demonetization process, the shilling equivalent to the Rupee was introduced in all the three East African countries between January 1, 1922, and by June 1923. This firmly established the East African shilling as the official currency in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika. Subsequently, the Indian Rupee was no longer to play the role of a legal tender. Correspondence between the Governor of the colony, Sir Edward Northey, and Buckingham Palace, ostensibly through the Secretary of State and the entire British government in London, helped to hasten the introduction of the shilling as the legal tender of the colony. A proclamation on August 10, 1921, described as an 'Order-in-Council', regulated the use of the shilling as the standard legal tender. The order set out several conditions and the procedure for the shilling to operate as a legal tender. This was significant because, after that and until the present, the shilling has remained the only legal tender in Kenya. Consequently, several requisites were set up to guide the operationalization of the Kenya Shilling.

First was that the minting of the shilling in the form of a coin was to be under the direction of the 'Master of the Mint', who was headquartered in London. This new currency was to be known as the British East Africa shilling and was supposed to be of an approved weight and composition. Second, the British East Africa shilling had to be of an approved design and impression. Third, every contract, sale, payment, bill, note, instrument, and any form of security, payment, or liability to payment was assumed to have been transacted in the British East Africa shilling according to the standard coin. Importantly, the order required that the coins be minted under the direction of the 'Master of the Mint' for use in the colony and which should adhere to the various denominations, composition, and weights. Further to that, all subsidiary coins had to bear an indication of the value of the coin in cents, or hundredths of a shilling, and should be of an approved design and impression (Maxon, 1989; Krus & Schuler, 2014). Since the coin's value depended on its weight, any sign of tear, impairment, lightening, defacement, stamping of a number and engraving would make a coin cease as a legal tender. Also confirmed was the order issued on February 11, 1920, by the then-acting Governor, Sir Charles Calvert Bowring. Through his initiative, the Legislative Council passed an ordinance that prohibited individuals from melting down or breaking up the gold and

silver coins. In contravention of the above, a person was liable for imprisonment for six months or a fine of Rs. 3000 (KNA/AG/48/27: Gold and Silver Currency Protection Ordinance, 1919–1929).

AFRICAN DEFICITS OVER DEMONETIZED CURRENCY

Apart from supervising the monetary system in East Africa, the East African Currency Board was also charged with the organization of the change from the Rupee-based currency to the shilling-based currency by ‘buying up’ all the rupees in circulation (Van Zwanenberg, 1975, p. 286). Africans were allowed to redeem the withdrawn coins from the offices of the District Commissioners, while Africans in the so-called ‘non-native’ areas were to redeem their Rupee coins at the Resident Commissioners’ offices. Both were expected to keep clear records of the redeemed Rupee coins (KNA/The Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Treasurer Circular, No 17 of 11th April 1921). Colonial policy allowed Europeans and Asians to have redeemed their Rupees by May 31, 1921.

On the other hand, Africans were allowed to redeem their Rupees up to October 31, 1921. Caution was also taken so that smuggled coins from Uganda were not redeemed in Kenya. That is, the exchange officers were to ‘satisfy themselves that the coins brought for redemption are the accumulated savings of the individual bringing them, and that, owing to his having been working under contract at a distance from the place where he kept his coins or to illness, or to some satisfactory cause, he has not had a reasonable opportunity of obtaining redemption’ (Ibid.). The redemption process was also used to corner Africans to pay their Hut and Poll Tax. Another catch was that Africans who needed to redeem currency of more than Rs. 500 required special authority from the Currency Board in London.

McGregor (1927, pp. 139–46) has captured the impact on Africans of the whole demonetization process. Suffice to note that demonetization created confusion and a whole gamut of difficulties among Africans. The actual value of the old rupee coinage was double the face value of the new shilling coins. This made Africans redeem at a loss since the Rupee currency had become one note that African people had made part of their everyday exchange process. In February 1921 and without any warning, the colonial administration invalidated the Indian currency notes to stop the smuggling of Indian coins and notes into Kenya. Conversely, African migrant laborers had been paid their wages using the Indian Rupee, thus depriving Africans of substantial wages. The government rescued Africans by declaring that any employer who paid wages using demonetized rupees would be liable for prosecution. But in a racially charged environment, the Africans had very limited options except instant flight from wage employment. Indeed, several Africans had mistakenly retained the notes, which would later become valueless, while others were domiciled in very remote areas and had no information that the rupee currency had been demonetized and was being redeemed (Ibid., p. 143). Notably, G.A.S Northcote, the Acting Chief Secretary on June 30, 1920, wrote a

circular that, ‘the Acting Governor’s wish that the native population should be brought to appreciate the value of currency notes and particularly of the new One Rupee notes’, ensured that Africans had no recourse but to stoically bear their losses (KNA/PC/JUB/1/6/3 East Africa Currency Notes and Rupees Correspondence, 1915–1920). Another persistent uncertainty that Africans faced was the ambiguity over which currency was the legal tender. In retrospect, the withdrawal of the Rupee note as the currency to be replaced by the florin and later the shilling silver coin partly confused the African people as to which was the legal tender. In all, the shilling silver coin gradually became the acceptable mode of exchange. The colonial government, under pressure, gave ample time to Africans to redeem their demonetized currencies up to December 1931. The notice required Africans to exchange their currencies by 31 December 1931 at the District Officers’ office or designated banks, the National Bank of India, the Standard Bank of South Africa, and the Barclays Bank (KNA/AG/11/49, East Africa, and Uganda Currency Order in Council, 1921–1958).

But the 1931 deadline for demonetizing both the Rupee and florin currency in favor of the shilling among Africans remained a major headache for the colonial administration. Africans neither saved their currencies in the banks nor had the courage to visit the District Commissioners for fear of being detained for lack of a tax receipt or accused of labor desertion. Whatever currency the Africans had saved was well secured in a leather pouch often carried by men around their shoulders as they went on with their daily chores. For the women, it was easy to secure their savings within their bodies, especially under a leather pouch of whatever form. With this money well secured, in whatever form, Africans never actually spent their savings until their demise when their savings would be exposed, well secured within their cadavers. To encourage Africans to redeem their well-secured Rupees, the colonial government used the varying media available to them. One method was to use the colonial Administrative Officers. Though limited in resources, these officers used circulars posted in offices and, with the help of local traders, employers, and tax collectors helped to ease the misunderstanding caused by the 1920s currency mix-up. These officers were required to alert and educate Africans, particularly those in employment, on the importance of currency redemption. Another popular method used was publishing the notices in the common languages mostly spoken by Africans. These were Swahili, Kavirondo (Luo and Luhya), and Kikuyu (KNA/PC/NZA/2/19/108/, Currency, Demonetization, 1945).

RESPONSE OF AFRICANS TO THE SHILLING CURRENCY

Following the complex process of demonetizing the Rupee and the florin, the Shilling notes and coinage had, from January 8, 1932, become the only legal tender in Kenya (Demonetization of Currency Notes and Coins, 1920–1931). This process was helped by tax collection among African people. And one way in which the colonial state introduced the shilling-taxation nexus in Kenya was

that it was generally very easy to get cents which could be used as exchange for notes. Getting cents in rural areas for exchange purposes from Nairobi was considered an expensive affair, and this process of using cents from tax collection simplified the entire process. This was because, in 1932 and 1933, there was a huge demand for Ten Cent and Five Cent Coins. While demand was seasonal, the circulation of the Ten Cent coins was three-quarters of a million pieces, while the Five Cent Coins was approximately one million pieces. While speculation was rife that this was possibly because of hoarding, the main reason was that Africans were actively engaged in entrepreneurship and trade. This meant a high turnover of the Ten Cent and Five Cent copper coins mostly used by Africans for trading purposes and a payment mode for those who worked on settlers' farms (KNA/PC/NZA/2//19/13, 1932). This would have the effect of increasing the circulation of the five and ten cent pieces whilst probably affecting a slight decrease in the number of one cent pieces in circulation. Another possible reason was the low prices of produce, so that payment was made in cents rather than shillings. The shortage of these One Cent coins was the likelihood of Africans keeping them at home until they made up the Shs.12 when they were paid in as tax. For instance, it was possible to collect Shs. 2000 in One Cent denominations, particularly during the maize selling season (Ibid.).

Equally important was the fact that by the mid-1930s, Africans had become accustomed to 'thinking and dealing' with money. During the early stages of the introduction of the shilling, Africans demanded change in denominations they understood, especially the one cent pieces. But with African societies being monetized, especially among the Kikuyu people, they were satisfied to accept the larger denominations, which they called, *Manoti na mbia ici*. Among the Luo, the currency name given was *Rupia* or *Wach pesa*. For the Kamba it was – *lulia*; Luhyia – *Sirupia/chirupia* or *tsirupia*; the Maasai—*iropiyani*; Pokot—*robyen*; Teso—*irupia*; Kisii—*chirupi*; Embu—*mbia*; Galla—*besa*; Rendille—*besa/silinkini*; Turkana—*aropiyae*; Somali *laq*; and Kalenjin—*chepkondet* or *Tongilo*. (www.centralbank.go.ke). The keyword in everyday conversation had become *Pesa* which is a Kiswahili term for money.

During the same period of the 1930s, various miscellaneous changes were made to currency regulations in colonial Kenya. First, foreign currencies were for the time allowed to be exchanged by designated institutions, notably the banks, appointed by the Governor. Second, there was fear that lithographed notes of five-, ten-, and twenty-shilling denominations used in 'occupied territories', thanks to the Second World War, would be in circulation within the Kenya colony. The solution offered was to redeem the notes for plate-printed notes. Third, a majority of Africans trusted the efficacy of the coin as a form of currency as opposed to the currency note. Regrettably, this gave birth to the charging of commissions to exchange notes for coins. Both silver coins and copper cents were popular for exchange, and the changers of these coins made huge profits through the charging of commissions. In particular, Indian shopkeepers based in rural areas made huge profits by charging commissions to

Africans who wanted to exchange notes for coins. Within the reserves, Africans were charged two cents for every shilling submitted for exchange and this constituted a major financial loss for Africans. Finally, these high commissions were charged when Africans were grappling with a serious famine that occurred in 1943 and which seriously affected their purchasing power (KNA/AG/11/49).

Furthermore, a primary problem arose where there was a shortage of swap change and when dealing with higher denominational notes. A purchaser with a note was forced to take goods up to the full value of the note. For example, an African who spent 3 shillings from a 5-shilling note, rather than being returned the actual change, would be forced to take up goods like sugar or salt up to the full value of the balance, and which he did not particularly want at that time (KNA/PC/NZA/2/19/13, *n.d.-a*). This fear was heightened at the end of 1943 when there was introduced a new issue of one shilling currency note. This currency, which was to be in circulation from February 15, 1944, within the British colonies of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, and Zanzibar, created fear that Africans would reject it in favor of the more popular one-shilling coin. Lack of confidence in the new note led to the hoarding of the shilling coin, with disastrous effects. The new shilling note was being exchanged at a discount compared with the existing currency. Asian traders benefited the most. Inevitably, Africans became reluctant to market their crops for fear of being paid with the unpopular one-shilling note. This further led to dissatisfaction among wage earners and caused African reluctance to join the labor force. The only recourse open to Africans was to use the one shilling note in the payment of poll tax (*Ibid.*).

With the outbreak of the Mau revolt (1952–1956), currency matters took a back seat, with the collection of poll tax occupying the money mindset of the British colonial power. African response to the declaration of the emergency was to mint counterfeit coins. These coins were used to pay poll tax, and it was not easy for the tax collectors to spot the well-made coins. Basically, tax was collected daily from many tax collectors who could not easily recognize counterfeit coins. The National Bank of India, based in Kisumu, was able to intercept forty-five counterfeit shilling coins in 1956. The fear of the Secretary to the Treasury was provoked to order that colonial employees who accepted the counterfeit currencies were to be surcharged for the loss. In 1959, a new ten-shilling East African currency note was issued, but by this time, currency values had become embedded in the African consciousness (KNA/PC/NZA/2/19/13, *n.d.-b*).

CONCLUSION

London determined the currency policy in colonial Kenya, which was then considered the world's financial capital. Throughout its history, Kenya has had varied forms of currency. Before the shilling became fixed as a medium of exchange in the 1920s, other currencies had been in use. These were the Maria Theresa, the Anna, the Florin, and the Rupee. These were an enhancement

from the pre-colonial era, where trade was basically symbiotic and reciprocal in most cases. Nonmonetary societies operated for the most part with the principles of 'gift economics'. Whenever barter occurred, it was generally between complete strangers or would-be enemies among neighboring communities, for example, the Luo, the Luhya, and the Nandi or between the Maasai and the Kikuyu. The price of one item was fixed in terms of a certain number or quantity of some other goods.

In this way, a pot might be exchanged for foodstuffs it would hold. Other essential commodities used for exchange were honey, weaponry, pestles and mortars, basketry, livestock, salt, Magadi soda, beads, bracelets, arrow poison, and cereals. Grain millet was originally one of the most important units of currency. From the nineteenth century, cowrie shells and beads began to be widely used along with the major trade routes as a form of currency. The cowrie shells were brought to the coast by dhows. Cowrie shells could be exchanged for a cow around Lake Victoria, but as more and more cowries were imported, they lost their value and depreciated. But despite this weakness, cowrie shells made transactions easier because they were easy to carry and supply faster. The cowrie shell as a tool of trade and exchange paved the way for the Indian Rupee and the shilling that was essentially a product of an urban-based economy. Thus, one of the major consequences of British colonialism in Kenya was the revolutionary introduction of the shilling as the unit of currency. Because of its unlimited usage, money transformed the market system in Kenya to a level that was unimaginable in the pre-colonial past.

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Colonial Agricultural Development

Martin S. Shanguhya

INTRODUCTION

Leading up to the inauguration of colonialism in the early 1890s, communities in what became Kenya were industrious at cultivating the land to meet their needs. Bantu communities spread across the productive highlands in the precincts of the Victoria Basin, the highlands of central Kenya, and coastal plains and hills were ardent farmers cultivating varieties of grains and vegetables. Some Nilotic communities such as the Luo and Kalenjin produced millets and other food crops to supplement fishing and livestock keeping. However, livestock raising as a major land-use economic activity was restricted to communities such as Somali, Samburu, Borana, and Turkana inhabiting the drier rangelands of northern and northeastern Kenya. Among major livestock keepers, only the Maasai inhabited the luxurious pasturelands of central-southern Kenya. Other communities, notably the Pokot, Nandi, Tugen, and Kipsigis were ardent mixed farmers who kept large herds and also made a living from limited forms of land cultivation (Elliot, 1966). Thus, these precolonial modes of production provided an ideal setup upon which agricultural transformation propelled by colonial forces was established.

Following the establishment of colonial rule in the 1890s, the agricultural sector in Kenya was marked by change and persistence. Western science and technology were tailored towards subsistence in the form of food security and export. Most important was its environmental and socioeconomic impact, not the least its ability to usher socioeconomic structural differentiation between and amongst various communities. Thus, the history of agricultural

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development in colonial Kenya is multidimensional. In its almost seventy-year tenure, colonial rule was a relatively short period but was one that transformed local agriculture in many but related ways. Local conditions—especially geography and demography—colonial politics, and regional and international market conditions were important factors in shaping agricultural trends over the span of colonial rule that commenced in the 1890s. Even global conflicts, particularly the two world wars, crucially helped transform Kenya's agriculture.

ASCENDANCE OF COMMERCIAL ESTATE FARMING

One of the most prominent changes in Kenya's agricultural sector was the introduction of estate farming, made possible through government encouragement of European settlement. In doing so, early British colonial administrations in the emerging colony aimed to create what Roger van Zwanenberg described as an "export enclave" economy (1972, p. 6). European settlers would be accorded the requisite support to establish commercial cash crop and livestock farming for export, thereby generating revenue that would enable the protectorate to be self-sufficient. Senior officials opined that this approach to farming would offer the young protectorate a dynamic basis that would spur overall economic development.

Unfortunately, this commercial vision was for a long time antithetical to African participation in the agricultural development process. If Africans engaged with the sector at all, that engagement took place on an unequal term with the proposed settler farming. Thus, although African communities had previously been successful farmers before colonial rule, top colonial officials doubted Africans' ability to contribute to Kenya's "modern" agricultural economy. By this they meant large-scale commercial farming mainly to meet the demand for agricultural raw materials and food supplies in industrial countries. This skepticism arose from earlier European encounters with East African communities during the last twenty years of the nineteenth century. European colonial expansion into Kenya and the rest of East Africa in the late nineteenth century coincided with ecological collapse and natural disasters. Civil strife resulting from the slave trade and demographic expansion into certain ecologies were also common. All these factors undermined precolonial farming activities amongst some communities, thereby occasioning incidences of hunger and starvation.

Although many of these challenges had virtually dissipated at the onset of colonization in the 1890s, the desolateness that they had created were still fresh in the minds of most British colonial officials charged with establishing the early colonial administration in Kenya and who were eager to establish a sound economic foundation for the young protectorate. However, images of ecological and economic collapse in local communities influenced early colonial policy that cast Africans as inept users of land and pasturelands. Officials pointed to famines of the last quarter of the nineteenth century to deceptively portray Africans as averse to meaningful agricultural production, even the

production of most basic subsistence crops to fend for themselves. In fact, what had served as communal lands for cultivation, hunting, and grazing were “empty dead spaces”. The emerging official view was that only European-type commercial farming could best utilize these fertile areas for imperial benefit (Huxely, 1956). Such convoluted thinking laid the foundations for large-scale alienation of African land for European settlement, thereby marking a transformational moment in the future of the territory’s agricultural sector.

Plans for developing settler farming were preceded by infrastructural developments. The most prominent of these was the construction of the Uganda Railway (1896–1901) which stretched east from Mombasa on the Indian Ocean coast to Kisumu on the shores of Lake Victoria in the west (Hill, 1949). The iron rail cut across the highlands of central Kenya as well as the Rift Valley, the two regions that contained the country’s richest farmlands that also became the bastions of settler farming. Communities in the vicinity of the railroad that lived off these lucrative areas—notably the Nandi and the Maasai—were forced to relocate, ensuring that the now-vacant land was targeted for large-scale European farming. This type of production, not African farming, was considered economically viable for maintaining the railroad.

Alienation of African land near the railway and its hinterlands was gradual, often facilitated by colonial legal provisions. The provisions were laid by the 1901 East Africa Lands Order-in-Council that legally allowed the colonial government to control all land in areas under its jurisdiction. The 1902 Crown Lands Ordinance considered all land as belonging to the British Crown. The Ordinance allowed the administration to sell African land to potential European settlers on a free-hold basis, in sizes ranging from 1000 acres to 400 square miles (Mungeam, 1969). The 1915 Ordinance superseded the terms of the earlier ordinances, particularly by altering the tenure of leases for Crown land from 99 to 999 years. Consequently, communities between Kiu and Fort Ternan lost land under the provisions of this ordinance, most of which went to European agricultural and forest syndicates, as well as wealthy and poor European settlers. The most prominent of these were Lord Delamere and Ewart Grogan, who attained large tracts of land in the Rift Valley (Cone & Lipscomb, 1972, p. 54). Drawn from Western Europe, North America, and the British Empire—particularly South Africa—these settlers were accessed land on generous purchase and leasing terms.

By the early 1920s, much of Taita Hills, central Kenya, central and north Rift Valley—notably Naivasha, Nakuru, Laikipia, Uasin Gishu, and Trans Nzoia had been converted into European settler farmlands. During that decade, railway branches connected these regions to maximize their agricultural potential by offering cheap means of transportation for the export of crops and importation of machinery and other highly needed farm inputs (Report of the East Africa Commission, 1925, pp. 161–162). In these regions, a revolution that shaped Kenya’s agriculture emerged with considerable support from the colonial government. Here, early settler enterprise sought to thrive on new strains

of crops. Major agricultural experiments were pioneered by the wealthiest of the settlers, notably Lord Delamare.

On his vast estate stretching between the Mau escarpment and the Aberdares, Delamere initiated ambitious agricultural activities in crop trials that also marked the need to apply scientific research in Kenya's agricultural sector. Between 1902 and 1910, he experimented on everything from rearing exotic livestock to cultivating new crops. Efforts were made to create paddocks in the expansive plains of his Equator ranch and improving the pastures by planting imported seeds for clover and Lucerne. Almost immediately, inadequate knowledge of local tropical conditions decimated these early efforts. Imported New Zealand merinos failed to cope with the damp conditions in the new pasturelands, and many died from foot rot. English sheep suffered from worms likely due to infection from the wild game that populated Rift Valley landscapes. Shorthorns on his Njoro farm were killed by Redwater (Huxely, 1935, p. 163). Imported Herefords succumbed to pleuro-pneumonia. Livestock diseases were checked in Kenya much later, following the establishment of a veterinary research center at Kabete near Nairobi. By 1908, a report from the government livestock farm at Naivasha indicated positive progress in the health and increase in imported cattle and sheep. This was true for half-bred heifers sired by Guernsey, Shorthorn, Hereford, and Ayrshire bulls. The quality of Merino sheep had also improved, and its wool was exported to London markets (Department of Agriculture Annual Report, 1907–1908, pp. 51–59).

Setbacks in livestock “engineering” turned Delamere’s attention to exotic crops, particularly oats and wheat. Aside from ravages from wild animals, the crops fared no better than the livestock enterprise. Wheat on his Njoro farm suffered from stem rust. Only the Italian Rieti variety survived but took longer than the normal temperate wheat to mature. Although the crop recovered due to support from the establishment of a plant-breeding station, the rust problem was not eliminated. By the mid-1920s, wheat production continued to draw interest from settler farmers, particularly in the more productive districts of Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia (Huxely, 1935, pp. 163–164; Report of the East Africa Commission, 1925, p. 151). However, it failed to supplant maize and coffee as leading exports from the colony. Maize, already traditionally cultivated by many Africans, fared much better initially in Delamere’s Rongai Valley, so much that by 1908 the farm produced 70,000 bags (Huxely, 1935, p. 164). Settler and later African commercial production of the crop ensured that this crop became the all-time leading agricultural export in colonial Kenya. Just like wheat, maize benefited from expansion in acreages for the crop in Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia Districts. Coffee emerged as a major crop by the early 1920s after its introduction by the Roman Catholic Fathers in the late 1890s (Report of the East Africa Commission, 1925, p. 152). Together with wheat, coffee remained a preserve of settler agriculture until the 1950s. Given coffee’s high returns in European consumption markets, settlers prevented Africans from cultivating the crop by conveniently arguing that the latter would lower the grade of the crop, thereby driving down the demand.

Besides coffee, tea dominated the highlands of Limuru and Kericho, all with processing factories owned by the European commercial company Messrs. Brooke Bond. Sugar cane also emerged as a major plantation crop in the lowlands of Nyanza Province, particularly in Muhoroni, as well as the coastal region. The crop was processed in local factories but supplied to local and export markets. The commercial sugar cane sector came to be dominated by Asian investors after these Asian migrants were locked out of owning land in the White Highlands through colonial legislation, following polarizing politics over land between them and European settlers in the 1910s. Asians also played a vital role as middlemen in marketing African produce. Often, the colonial government sought to have a stranglehold on production and marketing and promulgated strict rules for African producers and Asian traders to ensure the high quality of the produce. Settlers influenced the passing and enforcement of these rules to prevent competition from African producers and Asian traders.

Other than food crops, estate farming founded during the early years of Kenya's agricultural development focused on industrial fiber crops, notably sisal and flax. Sisal was favorable in areas with poor soils and a low rainfall. This was mainly the case in the hinterlands of the south Indian Ocean coast, especially Rabai and Taita Taveta. A labor-intensive activity, sisal cultivation required large supplies of African labor that was met by recruiting upcountry migrant laborers and squatters. On the other hand, flax thrived in the highlands of central Kenya, especially after the First World War. Flax received much attention as a less-labor-intensive cash crop and its high demand on global markets.

The Economic Plant Division of the Department of Agriculture was by 1908 running several experimental or research centers spread across the territory to boost crop production. These included Mehirini and Mazeras at the Coast, Kibos in Nyanza, and Kabete in Nairobi (Department of Agriculture Report, 1908, pp. 4–5). Over time, especially after the First World War, more research and training centers were established in many parts of Kenya deemed with agricultural potential. Initially, these centers served to advance research to aid the adaptation of settler farming to the tropical environment. Gradually, they would be charged with supporting African agriculture, particularly in distributing new seeds and technologies. This, however, was a gradual development because of low government commitment to the African sector.

By the First World War, settler farming enjoyed pride of place in government policy. The outbreak of the war cemented settler political and their economic influence in government by extension. This was the case notwithstanding the fact that some settlers were drafted for military combat, thereby abandoning their farms, many of them reverting to bushland. Those that remained on their farms struggled to access African labor while the railroad was reserved mainly for transporting military personnel and equipment. Importation of farm machinery and other agricultural inputs took a heavy hit. Consequently, with help from Governor Sir Henry Belfield, a War Council was created with significant settler representation. Through the council, they helped restore some advantages to settler agriculture by forcing critical decisions on military

recruitment and export of livestock and crop products. They also turned their attention to the supply of African labor for settler agriculture, often a contentious issue in government-African relations. They succeeded at having the Masters and Servants Ordinance amended in 1916 to make possible the issuance of police arrests without warrants of African desertion of labor obligations. This helped retain African labor on settler farms, which, together with pro-settler policies of the War Council, pumped up settler coffee and sisal exports mid-way through the war (Bell, 1964, p. 12; Maxon, 1993, pp. 88–102). They also succeeded in endorsing proposals for postwar settlement of European veterans, which meant further alienation of African land and subsequent expansion in settler commercial farming. Although settler and African agricultural sectors encountered setbacks during the war, the former emerged relatively stronger than the latter at the end of the war. Settler agricultural enterprise continued to receive closer government attention during the tenure of pro-settler governor Sir Edward Northey (1919–1922), particularly regarding implementing the Soldier Settlement Scheme and availing African labor.

The 1923 Devonshire Declaration undermined tendencies towards settler political and economic dominance. The Declaration regarded African interests as paramount in an increasingly polarized multi-racial colonial state in which settlers jostled for domination at the expense of Africans and Asians. Up until then, settler farming enjoyed enviable support from the administration. This included access to land, a resource that remained the fulcrum of the colonial economy throughout the colonial period. The Declaration implied a recognition of the value and role of Africans in colonial affairs of the state and therefore, government assurance of security of Africans' access to land against counterclaims from settlers and other non-African agencies. Yet the Declaration only succeeded in preventing further expansion of the boundaries of the White highlands (Cone & Lipscomb, 1972, p. 24). Thus, it did little to push government's strong commitment to promoting African agriculture in the Reserves. Meantime, European agriculture rebounded from any war-time hiccups and the depression of the early 1920s. Production of grains—maize, wheat, barley, and oats—livestock farming and estate plantation that included wattle cultivation remained the fulcrum of the settler economy. As the decade ended, this prosperity, like that enjoyed by Asian and African farmers, was hit by the Great Depression.

AFRICAN AGRICULTURE IN PRE-DEPRESSION YEARS

The role of the Kenya African farmer in colonial agricultural development was initially determined by racial stereotypes and priorities of imperial capitalist interests. This implied a slow recognition by colonial officials of the value of local communities to the immediate and future needs of the colonial economy. As already noted, official notions portrayed the African cultivator as averse to surplus production, one to be relegated to providing a pool of labor for settler

and government economic enterprises and as consumers of imported products. Forced to relocate beyond the limits of railroad grids, African farmers and herders were considered incapable of producing products to make the railway economic in its operations (Elliot, 1966). Yet, although not accorded considerable support in official policy, it was ironic that agricultural production in African reserves thrived due to local initiatives aided by an expanding colonial market.

This reality was acknowledged by some senior officials within the Department of Agriculture (Department of Agriculture Annual Report, 1908–1909, p. 1). Though congested and experiencing land shortages, Kavirondo, Nandi, Kisii, Kericho, and Kikuyu districts enjoyed high rainfall and fertile soils, qualities that became the basis for urging a pro-African agricultural government policy, especially after the First World War. Instead of spurring up African production for export, the outbreak of the war halted any progress so far achieved. Only the production of food crops for local markets and military support did much better. Otherwise, by 1916, the proportion of African exports declined from about sixty-eight percent three years earlier to forty percent. This was partly due to policies adopted by the War Council and thousands of rural Africans recruited to serve in the Carrier Corps service. Many others were persuaded away from the low pay and poor health conditions characterizing the Carrier Corps into settler employment. Heavy rainfall interspersed with failed rains during planting seasons between 1917 and 1918 combined to undermine cultivation, resulting in famine as the war receded (Maxon, 1993, pp. 98, 108). These developments disrupted export production on African farms while boosting settler agriculture. At the beginning of the 1920s, African exports had dropped considerably to an all-time low of 11 percent, compared to settler's 86 percent (Maxon, 1993, p. 131).

As far as crops were concerned, maize emerged as a leading farm product for most African households in central and western Kenya. With gradual encouragement from the colonial administration, there was a gradual local shift from *mtama* (millet) to maize, which African consumers considered more palatable than the former. The shift was also due to the farmers' realization that maize matured within four to five months, compared to seven for *mtama* (Department of Agriculture Annual Report, 1908–1909, p. 13). In the years that followed, the crop would benefit from production twice a year, especially in highly populated districts of Nyanza Province, where land became scarce, but the crop continued to dominate the rural landscapes.

Cotton was promoted in the wet and drier parts of northern coastlands and in the Kavirondo districts bordering Lake Victoria. Earlier struggles: wet conditions as well as local reluctance and focus on food crops by African households. By 1914, maize had clearly become the top staple and export crop amongst African cultivators. This was made possible through reduction in railway rates for export maize, as well as settler and government insistence on better processing and storage of African maize (Department of Agriculture Annual Report, 1913–1914, p. 19). Though cultivated by Africans, these early cotton

initiatives were pushed on farms owned by the British Cotton Growers Association (Department of Agriculture Annual Report, 1913–1914, pp. 17–18).

Furthermore, some African and European farmers planted varieties of imported beans. Notable ones included the Rose Coco, Russian white round Coco, Braila flat white beans, and the Moldavia round white beans (Department of Agriculture Annual Report, 1913–1914, pp. 14–15). Shortly before the First World War, the department of agriculture sought to prioritize bean production by exploring markets for the produce in Hamburg and Marseille, especially for the Rococos and the Canadian Wonder (Department of Agriculture Annual Report, 1910–1911, p. 13). Together with maize and sim, beans became a major food crop produced by African farmers, consumed locally and exported to world markets.

Sim, an indigenous crop grown mainly in the Kavirondo districts of Nyanza, became major African export produce. By 1910, almost a surplus worth 232, 037 rupees was exported (Department of Agriculture Annual Report, 1909–1910, p. 17). Its prominence within African agricultural production was largely the efforts of John Ainsworth, the Nyanza Provincial Commissioner (Maxon, 1980). Sim sim was initially cultivated locally by African communities for subsistence, but Ainsworth sought to encourage surplus production for export with much success. This oil-producing crop became popular only next to maize amongst many households in Nyanza Province. Its cultivation was pushed over maize in locations far from Kisumu port to save farmers expensive freight charges via railroad transportation. More than any other colonial official, Ainsworth pushed for greater government recognition of and support for African peasant production to prop up the colonial economy in the years before and during the First World War. Shortly before the First World War, agricultural development led to a healthy government budget that ended the dependence on the imperial grant-in-aid. Sim Sim, cotton, and maize from Nyanza greatly contributed to this positive economic situation (Maxon, 1993, pp. 32–33).

As in crop cultivation, developments in the African livestock sector drew little government interest. Yet early government experiments with commercial animal husbandry tapped into local African cattle breeds. Oxen from Kavirondo provided early settlers in the Rift Valley with draught and plowing services until the outbreak of livestock diseases discouraged reliance on those beasts of burden. Early scientific experiments on the government's farm in Naivasha involved upgrading indigenous cattle through crossbreeding with imported livestock (Department of Agriculture Report, 1910, p. 75). Generally, though, traditional herding was initially treated with government and settler intolerance. This was due to perceived health threats of African livestock to imported settler exotic herds. A further threat was what settlers considered as African herding in pasturelands that had been converted into European paddocks. This was criminalized as “trespassing” on settler property (Anderson, 2002). Fears arose that these herders might reclaim what was once their traditional grazing areas.

Ecology, human health, and agricultural development were often intertwined. This was best illustrated in the development of the African livestock sector. From the turn of the century to 1915 and after, eliminating Tsetse fly colonies in areas such as Kibwezi and the Lake Victoria lowlands was a major government undertaking. Tsetse presented both medical and economic challenges to humans and livestock. Measures aimed at protecting human populations from infection and clearing bushes to secure cattle pastures were undertaken (Department of Agriculture Annual Report, 1910–1911, pp. 151–154). Frequent outbreaks of the East Coast Fever, rinderpest, and other highly infectious cattle livestock diseases offered the administration reason to curtail previous transhumant activities of herders, especially the Maasai, Nandi, and Somali. In doing so, such policy aimed at securing settler livestock from infection emanating from African reserves (Department of Agriculture Annual Report, 1910–1911, pp. 31–34, 60–76; Department of Agriculture Report, 1911–1912, pp. 18–25). Consequently, this policy also gave the colonial administration considerable powers to regulate livestock trade between African reserves and commercial beef markets. African herders therefore were denied a vent for disposal of surplus livestock. This became a point of conflict between the administration and African communities after the 1930s as the congested reserves experienced rapid environmental deterioration.

POST-DEPRESSION TRENDS

The Great Depression hit Kenya's agricultural sector hard. This was due to a combination of factors, particularly lopsided massive government investment in the settler sector that was most impacted following the global agricultural market crash. African and settler production was also hampered by natural disasters, particularly locust infestations of 1928 through 1932, and exacerbated by a prolonged drought from 1931 to 1934. All this rendered the entire agricultural sector vulnerable. African producers also lost, but not as hard as settlers, given the low capital outlay in African agriculture. However, many African migrant laborers were rendered unemployed by plantation owners.

Not only did the depression wreak havoc on agricultural gains of the 1920s, but it also caused most farmers, with the administration's blessing, to increase acreages and crop production to make up for low market prices. The discovery of gold in North Kavirondo district in the early 1930s provided a reprieve for some settlers who flocked to Kakamega to prospect for the mineral. Many failed to realize the Eldorado they hoped for; instead, only viable mining companies from South Africa, Tanganyika, and Australia made relative progress through monopolies, but any profits from mining dissipated by the 1940s (Shilaro, 2008). On the upside, the demand for food in the gold mines boosted agricultural production in North Kavirondo. The downside of this venture was the alienation of African land for the prospecting of gold deposits. Local and colony-wide concerns regarding land insecurity amongst African communities prompted the appointment of the 1932 Kenya Land commission to inquire

into the question. Rapid population increase in African agricultural districts and the resulting scarcity of land prompted the inquiry. The Commission failed to satisfy the restoration of full claims to traditional lands demanded by African communities. Instead, it confirmed much of the existing boundaries of African reserves on an ethnic basis—African Land Units—and defined European settled areas as “Scheduled Areas”. These designations formed the basis of land legislation and agricultural development throughout the remainder of colonial rule (Cone & Lipscomb, 1972, p. 75).

Meantime, intensive cultivation and increased production and population pressure in the 1930s occasioned ecological degradation in the form of soil erosion across African areas, but especially in Nyanza and Central Provinces, as well as some settler farms. Inadequate grazing land exacerbated the problem in areas such as Baringo, Ukambani, and the Maasai Reserve (Shanguhya, 2015; Anderson, 2002; Munro, 1975). The outbreak of the second war created an economic boom for African and settler agricultural production between 1939 and 1944. However, this was achieved at the expense of continued land degradation, particularly in African reserves. Enforcement of soil conservation measures in the reserves occasioned widespread local resistance against land management solutions to a problem that colonial officials considered an African one caused by poor land management. Concerns over environmental decline also informed the strict government intervention in African pastoralist activities by enforcing culling of “uneconomic” stock. During the 1920s, the administration had failed to promote a robust meat industry by encouraging pastoralists to dispose of surplus stock at proposed meat factories (Report of the East Africa Commission, 1925, p. 157). Soil erosion in the reserves in the 1930s and after forced the government to revisit and execute enforced culling, leading to rural backlash against those policies. Ecological degradation was symptomatic of the problem of land scarcity in African reserves, one that the 1932 Kenya Land Commission left unresolved. A key institutional development during the war was the formation of a Production Board that became the Board of Agriculture that coordinated production of key cereals and supply of capital-intensive farm inputs (Cone & Lipscomb, 1972, pp. 84–85).

Despite fears of ecological destabilization in major agricultural regions, expansion in the agricultural sector brought a measure of relative prosperity for many farmers, thanks to favorable markets that outlasted the war years in the early 1940s. Commercialization of agriculture accentuated socioeconomic differences between rural farmers and rural areas. In Nyanza and Central provinces, for example, well-to-do households with adequate access to land prospered even more at the expense of those that did not. Even so, both groups continued to cultivate maize, the most commercialized crop for export and subsistence, respectively. Subsistence producers gravitated towards migrant labor activities in cities and settler plantations for additional household income (Maxon, 2003; Kitching, 1980). But the prevalence of a rigorous soil conservation program and land shortages by African households combined with political and social transformation after 1945 cultivated various forms of African

anticolonial movements that eventually paved the way for decolonization. Rapid agricultural developments marked this process and formed the basis for establishing postcolonial Kenyan society.

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENTALISM AND DECOLONIZATION

After the Second World War, agricultural development in Kenya was undertaken based on planned programs. This required the need for planning and financial input. One area of focus was to create networks of rural feeder roads connecting African cash crop areas to main roads and the railways. The other involved the creation of maize cesses and district betterment funds (Cone & Lipscomb, 1972, pp. 89–90). This involved withholding proceeds from surplus African production for capital improvements on land, a section channeled into African betterment agricultural programs such as soil conservation in the late 1940s into the 1950s.

However, the creation of the African Land Development Organization (ALDEV) in 1945 had the most important impact on both land administration and agricultural development for the remainder of colonial rule. It marked the beginning of development planning in Kenya as part of the ten-year Development plan of 1946–1955. Partly funded by the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, the plan aimed at developing agricultural-related resources—land, crops, livestock, water, and pastures (ALDEV, 1962). Renamed the Central Agriculture Board in 1963, this institution assumed financial planning and control of agricultural-related programs pertaining to African settlement in newly opened areas, ranching schemes, water supplies and irrigation in areas rehabilitated for agriculture and livestock-keeping, relief supplies, and disbursement of loans to African farmers and cooperatives. Many parts of the colony, from the farming regions to the drylands of Northern Kenya, were targeted by ALDEV programs. On the other hand, agricultural developments in European-settled areas were managed by the European Agricultural Settlement Board established in 1946.

To add value to cash crops and improve their marketing, the industrial processing of crops such as tea, coffee, and wheat was stepped up in the 1950s. This complemented efforts in flour milling that were commenced earlier. This proceeded in dual ways, whereby the state allowed for competition between some of the industries while tolerating monopolies. Increasingly, African producers were now allowed to sell produce—tea and fruits—to factories that initially catered only to non-African plantation estates (Clayton, 1964, pp. 108–112).

Despite these seemingly positive developments, decades of African disaffection with socioeconomic challenges occasioned by earlier land problems spiraled into anticolonial sentiments in the 1950s. These were highlighted by the Mau Mau uprising, which, amongst other grievances, sought to force the colonial government to permanently address systemic land issues amongst the Kikuyu. As a counter-insurgency measure, the administration devised the 1954

Swynnerton Plan, which ushered into Kenya a “revolution” in the African agricultural sector that lasted past independence in 1963. The plan’s recommendations and implementations represented every measure of planned agricultural development that also became the basis for the decolonization of the agricultural sector. Key elements of the plan involved an endorsement of individual land tenure to supplant communal tenure; issuance of land title deeds for individual households; allowing African farmers to cultivate cash crops reserved only for European farmers; and, most importantly, land consolidation (Swynnerton, 1954). These changes transformed land ownership in rural areas by guaranteeing the security of land but also caused disaffection for those who lost family land in the process. Those with titles used them as collateral to acquire loans from the Land Board and other financial institutions to improve their farms. Generally, decolonization of the White Highlands allowed the Land Development and Settlement Board to commence the settlement of thousands of Africans under different schemes crafted for that purpose. On the other hand, the inadequacy of the settlement program left thousands of others without access to the resource, ensuring that the independence government inherited the squatter problem. Land tenure changes became difficult to implement in strictly pastoral communities such as the Maasai, Samburu, and Somali. There, grazing patterns tended to proceed more on a clan or communal basis despite efforts to impose extensive grazing blocks where the herders could graze livestock on a rotational basis (Cone & Lipscomb, 1972, p. 113). In a sense, by the end of colonial rule, the agricultural sector in Kenya had been transformed to meet modern economic needs, oriented towards surplus production for local and global markets, and harnessed into a unified national system regulated by state control of land and related resources. These changes were inherited and preserved wholesale by the postcolonial government after 1963.

CONCLUSION

The agricultural sector emerged as an important component of Kenya from its foundation as a Protectorate in the 1890s. While the sector preexisted before colonial rule, given the industrious farming activities of many local communities, its growth into prominence was accidental. Thus, early administrators were keen on propping up Uganda’s, not Kenya’s, economic potential, hence the construction of the Uganda Railway. Yet the railroad led to a keen interest in the fertile sections of the territory that eventually became the bastions of colonial capital investment propagated by European settlement. While this settlement inaugurated plantation farming that became the administration’s focus in economic development during the first twenty years, African production proved resilient, thereby attracting government support after about 1920. Changes in the sector were both structural and institutional. Structurally, agricultural relations favored the settler sector that relied on African labor and alienated land. The resilience of African production rested on the ability of

Africans to meet surplus and subsistence needs despite lack of access to adequate land, farm inputs, and state support. Agricultural institutions were initially tailored to serve settler commercial farming before being redirected to support African farming and herding, especially after the Great Depression exposed the vulnerability of the settler sector. This was aided by dual government policies of the 1920s through 1950s that no longer ignored African agriculture, which contributed significantly to the export market of Kenya. By the end of the colonial period, Kenya's agricultural sector, especially cash crop production, had been developed to meet global demands while provisioning food to local communities.

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The Impact of the First and Second World Wars on Kenya

Samuel A. Nyanchoga

INTRODUCTION

The First and Second World Wars were fought in almost every corner of the world. The First World War was from 1914 to 1918, and the Second World War from 1939 to 1945. The wars affected the African continent directly and indirectly. In some instances, the battles were fought on the African continent and in other instances, both human and nonhuman resources were mobilized to support the war effort. The aftermath of the wars also affected the continent in different ways. This chapter focuses on the effects of the two world wars on Kenya. The First World War was also fought on Kenyan soil. Between 1914 and 1918, the East Africa campaign engulfed parts of Kenya, involving battles between British and German troops in Taita Taveta bordering the then German East African territory in Tanganyika. During the Second World War, some British troops fought with Italian forces in Kenya between June 1940 and February 1941.

THE MOBILIZATION FOR THE WAR EFFORT: CARRIER CORPS AND KENYA AFRICAN RIFLES

The Carrier Corps

The carrier corps mobilization began in August of 1914 under Lt. Col. O.F. Watkins and J.M. Pearson of the British East African Civil Service. The two were mandated to constitute logistical strategies for raising the carrier

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corps for the war effort (Rosberg & Nottingham, 1966). The compulsory recruitment order of 1915 stated that all African males aged between 15 and 45 were liable for military service. Consequently, local officials, including native chiefs, began to enroll large contingents of carrier corps in their localities. By September of 1914, five thousand local carrier corps had been recruited and placed in the civil department under the command of Lt Col. O.F. Watkins. The main recruitment areas were the Kikuyu and Kamba reserves, Kisumu, and Mombasa.

By 1917, 160,000 men had been enlisted in the carrier corps. The methods of recruitment included raids in the African reserves. The inadequacies of mechanized transport made the British rely on animal transport and locally recruited porters. Of these numbers, about 23,689 died, and 13,748 were unaccounted for (Rosberg & Nottingham, 1966). These were attributed to poor sanitary conditions and the outbreak of diseases such as the influenza epidemic immediately after the war. There was no proper framework for compensation of their kin due to inadequate records, and about sixty to seventy thousand sterling pounds of the modest compensation due to the dependents was not effected due to insufficient records. It was not until the 1930s, after the Carter Land Commission, that the monies were utilized for boundary demarcation in the African Land Units. What stands as an unembellished reality is the War Memorial in Nairobi, a bronze monument of one K.A.R. rifleman, a private from the Arab Rifles, and the last a porter representing members of the Carrier Corps that suffered substantial casualties. They were shot at, ignored, not provided with uniforms, and didn't receive recognition for their efforts and heroism (Giffard, 1945).

The King's African Rifles (K.A.R.)

The K.A.R. was drawn from the indigenous population to serve in the initial colonial pacification and the war effort. The K.A.R. performed military campaigns in East Africa and abroad during the First World War, the Second World War, and the Mau Mau emergency. From inception, their mission was to pacify the local populations and comply with colonial policies. The K.A.R. carried out "punitive" expeditions against various indigenous communities between 1902 and 1914. This was intended to get the communities to pay taxes or otherwise submit to colonial authority. In 1905, Parsons (1964) notes, the Colonial Office took overall command of the K.A.R. but gave responsibility for the individual battalions to the East African colonial governments. With the outcome of the world wars, they were enlisted into British military operations (Parsons, 1964). They were often ill-equipped in their numerous expeditions (Giffard, 1945). The First World War brought dramatic changes in the K.A.R., particularly in terms of recruitment. The British East African colonial governments began to rely on the K.A.R. and thus increased the size of the force by recruiting indigenous Africans from their colonial territories (Moyse-Barlett, 1956). In the Second World War, the Kenya colony became a recruiting ground for

the British Army in Africa. During the Second World War, approximately 98,240 Kenyans were recruited into the King's African Rifles, accounting for thirty percent of the unit strength (Killingray & Plaut, 2010).

THE ECONOMIC HARDSHIPS

Extensive famine and epidemics of influenza followed the war. John Arthur, in charge of the mission carrier corps, said that the combined death toll of the Kikuyu from the First World War and epidemics stood at 137,000 in 1919 (Rosberg & Nottingham, 1966). The economic hardships brought about by the war, together with the famine of early 1920, resulted in an economic depression, wage cuts for African workers, and an increase in the price of imported goods. The financial hardships associated with the war also affected Africans. As Rosberg and Nottingham (1966) note, the declaration of the war brought considerable economic disruption. The prices of primary products plummeted while the imported goods were in short supply leading to a rise in their prices. In addition to such demands, the subsistence farmer in territories in which campaigns were fought, particularly in East Africa, was subject to the exactions of armies that, because of supply problems, could not but live off the land (Rosberg & Nottingham, 1966).

The onset of the Second World War affected gender relations and labor input in food production. Through the 1940 Defence (Native Personnel) Regulations, African men were conscripted into the military and provided labor for the construction of airfields, roads, harbors, and military training camps. Consequently, women were left not only to care for the dependent population but also to produce foodstuffs for the army and other urban dwellers. The punitive war policies, including the compulsory requisition of livestock for beef and grain supply to the soldiers, strained the local colonial economy. The severe famine in 1942 and 1943 contributed to food decline and further compounded economic challenges (Ndeda, 1991, p. 190).

Agricultural policies introduced after 1945 had a significant impact on food crop production. The reorganization of land tenure transformed production among Africans. The colonial government introduced individual ownership legalized by a title deed (Staudt, 1976, p. 11). Since the land was registered under the household head, the male gender became the automatic owners of land in almost all instances.

The Second World War also affected British domestic economy. Kenya colony became an important source of agricultural products in the British Empire, such as tea and tobacco. The demand for agricultural products during the war increased the demand for African labor in the white highlands to meet the supply demand for agricultural products. At the end of the Second World War, more than two hundred thousand Africans had been forcibly conscripted to work in the white highland (Killingray & Plaut, 2010). The consequences of the war also compelled the British government to shift its investment priorities to African peasant production to sustain colonial operations and provide

materials for its local industries. African peasants were allowed to grow cash crops like coffee and sisal. The African Land Development Programme (ALDEV) and the Swynnerton Plans were initiated to promote African agriculture. The colonial government established a research and extension service to improve soil fertility and diversify farming activities and the livestock industry through pest control and farming technology innovation.

On the other hand, the Swynnerton Plan provided significant increases in African cash crop acreage and extension services, land consolidation, and viable farm planning and utilization services. The Troup Report of 1953 recommended the expansion of field and research services for European farmers. The 1960s marked a rapid development of the agrarian sector. Land consolidation was affected on a large scale, while cash crop production increased. The government's Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1959/60 outlined measures to promote industrial manufacturing and the processing of agricultural produce for the export market (Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 1959). These measures enabled several local entrepreneurs to enter manufacturing activities.

There was also a significant government policy shift from the settler priorities to Africans, with more capital injected into the manufacturing sector as tax concessions were given to investors in the manufacturing and tourist sectors (Sessional Paper No.4 of 1959/60, Kitching 1980; Ogonda, 1992). Despite the marked rise in food and cash crop production in the 1950s and 1960s, not all Africans involved in agriculture benefited. Most poor peasants could not afford fertilizer and other inputs (Bernstien, 1977; Swainson, 1980; Njonjo, 1981; Kaplinsky, 1978). The settlers, on the other hand, continued witnessing expansion and improvements. As more multinational companies came in and more funds were availed, the settlers planned and built irrigation dams, roads, and fences and formed cooperatives. On the other hand, the African peasantry was increasingly being proletarianized, lacked access to land, capital, and skills to be capable food producers.

REVOLTS AND THE RISE OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM

The privileges accorded to the White community, especially in respect to access to land, sparked a collective reaction among the African population expressed in the form of anticolonial nationalism. Consequently, several associations were formed as the focal point of mobilization and articulation of African interests against the colonial state. One such association was the Kikuyu Association, formed by chiefs in 1920 to defend Kikuyu land interests. Another was the Young Kikuyu Association, founded by Harry Thuku in 1921 that aimed at the defense of both land and labor. There were also several African revolts across the protectorate from as early as 1914 against the mobilization for the war efforts. The Kikuyu Association, founded in 1920 and the Young Kikuyu Association in 1921 by Harry Thuku were protesting against land alienation and forced conscription of African labor. As early as 1914, the Gusii revolted following the German attack on the British stockade in Kisii town. About 150

Abagusii were killed to suppress the revolt led by Sakawa and Bonareri. In Nyanza, the Mumbo Cult was spreading during the war years to resist the forced recruitment of African labor for the war effort. The returning porters also added to the growing revolt against colonialism as they became more assertive owing to their grievances against the colonial government (Rosberg & Nottingham, 1966).

Bethwel Ogot (1973) writes that African political consciousness grew as the ex-servicemen became more aware of themselves as a distinct racial group; they discovered the weakness and divisions among the white people and even more crucial, they learned the importance of organized resistance. Service in the King's African Rifles or the Carrier Corps during 1914–1918 inclined African veterans to become active nationalists; they became agents of political mobilization and activism. The ex-askari and carrier corps did not receive the pensions they believed they had been promised (Ogot, 1973).

The early colonial governors were apprehensive that Africans returning from the war effort were more likely to turn their efforts to nationalist activities. Colonial Governors Henry Belfield and Charles Bowring were fearful of the returning ex-servicemen and their possible role in political activism against the colonial establishment. Similarly, John Ainsworth, the Chief Native Commissioner, observed that the mobilization of the natives for the war effort had changed their world outlook, which was more likely to be critical of the colonial establishment. It was to be observed that many of the leaders of the post-First World War associational life in Kenya had served in the K.A.R. or the Carrier Corps. Among them was Joseph Kang'ethe, who later became the president of the Kikuyu Central Association and served as a sergeant in the Carrier Corps. Philip James Karanja, who afterward was appointed a colonial chief, became the secretary of the Kikuyu Association. He had served as a headman in the Kikuyu Mission Volunteer Carrier Corps. Similarly, Jonathan Okwiri was a headman in the Carrier Corps and had served at Tanga. Okwiri was later to become the first president of the Young Kavirondo Taxpayer's Association (Report of the Chief Native Commissioner, 1918). G. Nganga Ngoro had served in the Church of Scotland Mission contingent of carrier corps and later became the Chairman of Kikuyu Land Board Association; Marius Nganga Karatu had in 1914 joined the Catholic labor corps and he later became a member of the Kikuyu Central Association, and leader of the Tigon lands recovery struggle in Kiambu (Nottingham & Rosberg, 1966). The economic and political changes of the post-First World War period precipitated the growth of African protests and associational life, among them the East African Association by Harry Thuku formed in 1921 (Moyse-Bartlet, 1956).

The interwar period witnessed the rise of African and Indian protests against alleged racial discrimination, economic hardships, and the European hegemony in politics and the economy. In 1922 Manilal Ambalal Desai of the East African National Congress used media platforms such as the *East Africa Chronicle* to castigate the European and colonial government's racial segregation against Asians and Africans. They petitioned the colonial government

against discrimination, lack of adequate representation in the Legislative Council, and access to land. Desai and Alibhai Mulla Jeevanjee, being the first Indians in the legislative Council, worked with African political activists such as Harry Thuku of the East African Association to advance African interests. Among the grievances were the Kipande system, harsh labor conditions, taxation, and land alienation (Rosberg & Nottingham, 1966).

After the Second World War, African politics took a new twist with the formation of trade unions, Kenya African Union, and the rise of Mau Mau. The organization began to articulate African grievances and agitation for independence, the return of African lands, African direct representation in the Legislative Council, the abolition of the Kipande system, and free education for Africans (Okoth, 2006, pp. 75–78). Returning ex-servicemen from the Second World War began to question marked racial segregation and the African treatment as lesser of citizens. Among them were Bildad Kaggia, Fred Kubai, Dedan Kimathi, Stanley Mathenge, and Waruhiu Itote. They gave a fresh impetus to the rise of African nationalism in the postwar era. Bildad Kaggia joined the Clerks and Commercial Workers Union. In contrast, Fred Kubai joined the Transport and Allied Workers Union and became the focal point of militant and revolutionary politics (Okoth, 2006, p. 78). The ex-servicemen faced several challenges upon return to the country. They were unable to secure employment, and those who managed to secure jobs were paid lower wages compared to what they earned before. Coupled with racial segregation, some ex-servicemen joined the Kenya African Union. Some formed the Forty Group (Kiama 40), referring in the Kikuyu language as those initiated in the 1940s. They used the organizations to articulate their grievances against the colonial government. From 1952, several ex-servicemen joined the Mau Mau uprising.

Among them were Stanley Mathenge, Waruhiu Itote, Dedan Kimathi, and Paul Mahehu (Okoth, 2006, p. 80). The end of the Mau Mau witnessed two constitutional changes; the first was the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 that created a multiracial government incorporating three Europeans, two Asians, and one African representation in the Legislative Council. The second was the Lennox Boyd Constitution of 1958, which further increased African representation in the Legislative Council (Mazrui & Tidy, 1984, p. 120). The ex-servicemen General China Waruhiu Itote and Dedan Kimathi played key roles in the nationalist struggle for independence. They applied the guerrilla tactics learned in Burma to the forest fighting around Mt. Kenya during the Mau Mau war (Schleh, 1968). The War veterans of 1939–1945 joined the existing organizations and made their voices heard. This was in contrast to the situation following the First World War, where many native soldiers and carrier corps did not have much exposure.

THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR

The social consequences of the War on Africans were enormous. The war changed the deep-rooted attitudes, structures, institutions, and traditions of Kenyan societies. The war uprooted soldiers, carrier corps, and laborers from the village setup and sometimes sent them to far-off lands and even to the war front. The African soldiers and carrier corps experienced the psychological trauma of war and injuries, and witnessed massive deaths and open display of the weaknesses of the White man on the battlefield. The shared wartime experience of African and European soldiers revealed the inadequacies of the Europeans to their counterparts. Some of the African soldiers gained more knowledge out of the war and were given the responsibility of instructing European volunteers in the technique of modern warfare. This assured them that the Europeans did not know everything. The returning servicemen spread the new views of the white man and were more confident and assertive of the new knowledge gained. Some also traveled by airplane and steamship for the first time.

The African soldiers also became accustomed to new foods and consumer goods such as bread, margarine, corned beef, and tea. They also became accustomed to using chairs and tables, frame beds, toilet paper, cigarettes, showers, and soap. African servicemen also saw picture magazines and cinema films, were photographed, heard the radio broadcast, read newspapers, and were exposed to the army education corps (Killingray, 1982; Killingray & Paut, 2010). The war experience may have been the catalyst for change due to the army experience, training, and education. After demobilization, many of the skills they had been introduced to, such as driving, may have become redundant simply because there were few new vehicles in colonial Kenya. The majority returned to their prewar life and lifestyles and were fairly quickly reabsorbed into their traditional societies. John Ainsworth, the Chief Native Commissioner in the 1920s, noted that many thousands of natives who had been demobilized returned to their homes and settled down to a comparative life of ease. He continued to argue that nothing demonstrated in the life of the native that he had undergone a life-changing experience (Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the period I April 1918 to 31 March 1919).

Greenstein (1978), in the study of the Nandi war veterans, observed that several belonged to the *Nyongi* age-set preceding the First World War. Upon return, they assimilated into the traditional lifestyle without difficulties. They took wives almost immediately after their return and readjusted to traditional governance and its methods of assigning rank, authority, and privilege based on age. Those who had not acquired the status of elders reverted to the traditional junior ranks. The Nandi war veterans did not enduringly adopt European culture except for the uniforms they adorned upon returning home. "The only army item which appealed to the veterans was the woolen overcoat, a useful substitute for the blankets that had begun to replace animal skins as the main

clothing for Nandi men” (Greenstein, 1978, p. 6). Rarely did matters of sanitation impress them, and hardly did many of them construct pit latrines as a preventive measure against the spread of diseases (Greenstein, 1978).

THE RISE OF SETTLER DOMINANCE

In Kenya, Ogot (1995) writes, the white settlers used the war to make significant political advances vis-à-vis the colonial government. In 1901, the East African Land Ordinance-in-Council conferred upon the Commissioner of the Protectorate the powers to dispose of all public areas as he deemed fit. The Order-in-Council defined crown land as all public lands within the East African Protectorate under the control of His Majesty. The Crown Land Ordinance of 1902 gave the Commissioner the authority to sell freeholds in crown land up to 1000 acres or grant leases of ninety-nine years. The 1902 Crown Lands Ordinance provided that empty land or any land vacated by a native could be sold or rented to Europeans. Accordingly, 1904 saw massive land dispossession from Africans for purposes of European settlement.

The 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance facilitated the expropriation of the Africans of their land. In 1915, the Crown Land Ordinance repealed the 1902 Ordinance and declared all land as Crown land, including land occupied and reserved for Africans. Therefore, effectively after 1915, Africans were said to be mere “tenants at will” of the state and thus beneficiaries of a trust established by the state to administer the land they occupied (Okoth-Ogendo, 1991). The effect of the 1902, 1908, and 1915 ordinances was that by 1914 nearly five million acres (2 million hectares) of land had been taken away from Kenyan Africans. This increased to 7.2 million acres (2,880,000 hectares) by 1924 (Okoth-Ogendo, 1991). The Native Trust Bill of 1926 declared reserve areas for exclusive use by Africans. In 1932, the Carter Commission fixed the boundaries of the White Highlands and removed Africans from there. However, land reserved for Africans’ use remained “Crown Land”, hence available for alienation at any time (Okoth-Ogendo, 1991).

According to McGregor (2012), the Crown Lands Ordinance entrenched racial segregation in the White Highlands and accelerated the Soldier Settlement Scheme with a large portion of native land after the war. The settlers also secured the right to be represented in the Legislative Council and Executive Council. The Legislative Council Ordinance of 1919 expanded the Council to seventeen official members, including eleven European members elected by the white settlers (McGregor, 2012). The settlers remained in a dominant position in Kenya up to the 1950s. The settlers pushed for local autonomy and direct rule of the colony from the colonial office to inhibit African political advance. Sir Philip Mitchell, Governor of Kenya from 1944 to 1952, advocated for multiracialism as a means of containing settler dominance and African agitation for political representation. Multiracialism, Mitchell wrote, would develop a new political community of civilized men with which the British government

should maintain gradually lessening links “for generations to come” (Rosberg & Nottingham, 1966, pp. 198–200).

In 1951 when James Griffith, the Colonial Secretary, visited Kenya, the settlers indicated that any changes imposed on them would be resisted even to the extent of unconstitutional means (Blundell, 1966). Nevertheless, the settler dominance began to wane after the Mau Mau uprising. The Lyttleton constitutional reforms of 1954 ushered in a multiracial government. The Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 created a multiracial council of ministers leading to the appointment of B.A. Ohanga as Minister for Community. In 1957 several African political associations were formed; Mombasa African Democratic Union (MADU); Nairobi District Council (N.D.C.); and Nairobi Peoples’ Convention Party (NPCP). The 1957 first direct African elections were held with Odinga, Mboya, Moi, Muliro, Oguda, Muimi, Ngala, and Mate elected to the Legislative Council (Odinga, 1967, p. 141; Nyanhoga, 2014). The elected African members formed the African Elected Members Organization (AEMO), and elected Odinga as Chairman and Mboya as General Secretary. The Lennox Boyd constitution of 1958 increased African representation to fourteen. The Lancaster constitution reforms of the early 1960s turned out to be a political calamity for the settler dominance in Kenyan politics as it ushered in politics of transition to African majority rule (Odinga, 1967; Mboya, 1986).

CONCLUSION

From the preceding discussion, the two world wars shaped the colonial history of Kenya and its transition to independence. The wars took an enormous toll on the indigenous population in terms of labor mobilization, economic hardships, and social disruption of the traditional setup. They propelled African political consciousness, the growth of militant politics, and decolonization politics. The wars not only caused the colony to undergo changes that were never anticipated but also brought up issues that had previously been ignored: the settler dominance, a shift in the colonial economy to African priorities, and the transition to African self-rule.

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Politics and Social Life in White Settler Towns

Maurice N. Amutabi and Linnet Hamasi

INTRODUCTION

This chapter seeks to examine the socialization of White Settlers in colonial Kenya. The chapter demonstrates that the Rift Valley was the epicenter of white activities in the so-called White Highlands. There were all kinds of events that shaped the colonial project. The dominant characters in the project resided in the Rift Valley, where they engaged in farming, hunting, raising livestock, and conducting business. The chapter provides a synopsis of the social dynamics witnessed in white homes, members clubs, golf courses, workplaces, and other formal and informal spaces. The chapter shows that white hegemony was supported largely by the white project, which gave them protection, financial support, and other services. They were given good roads, water supply, electricity, hospitals, schools, and other amenities that made their life bearable. The colonial policy of segregation and the creation of whites-only area of socialization cushioned whites from excesses suffered by the Africans.

The white man made himself superior, and both written and oral literature reveals the level of violence suffered by Africans. Accounts in the Happy Valley demonstrate the promiscuous and luxurious life of whites in colonial Kenya. There was chaos about divorce, alcoholism, drug use, hunting parties, safaris, and reckless beating of Africans, showing an overzealous, protected, and careless settler population who enjoyed themselves at the expense of the Africans. This chapter provides a trajectory that gives a cross section of the major areas of white socialization in colonial Kenya. The chapter lays out one layer after

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another on how whites related among themselves and with Africans. What emerges from those relations is clear evidence of hierarchy where whites regarded themselves as superior and Africans as inferior. We see a situation in which the White male was regarded as the representative of the empire and used the advantage to make his life comfortable at the expense of Africans. These are the accounts that this chapter will attempt to give.

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Gideon S. Were and Derek Wilson (1967), in their book *East Africa Through a Thousand Years*, argued persuasively that East Africa was an organized ecosystem with many societies existing side by side as stateless chiefdoms, kingdoms, and empires. Life on the plains, valleys, and hills was disrupted by the penetration of foreigners into the interior. The arrival of the invaders had a tremendous number of effects on local African inhabitants whose social, economic, and political structures and institutions were rudely disrupted. The disruption, Gideon Were argues, disadvantaged Africans because their institutions and structures were dismissed as weak, inferior, atavistic, primitive, backward, and savage. These negative descriptions were used to justify the colonial occupation.

The colonial project was at its worst during land aggrandizement, which fueled the colonial activities. This chapter examines the socialization of whites in colonial Kenya, where they took advantage of White Highlands which were taken from Africans for their own enjoyment. We argue that white socialization served three major purposes. The first was to create exclusive institutions where they shared their white culture, tastes, cuisines, music, drinks, fashion, aspirations, hopes, and fears. The exclusive spaces became centers of indoctrination of white supremacy and the promotion of whiteness. Secondly, they served the purpose of entrance into white dominance and hegemony by ensuring the perpetuation of institutional and structural dominance by whites in the colony. They used schools, institutions of control of violence, such as the military and police, to subjugate Africans. This is a point that has been written about by scholars such as Carotenuto and Shadle (2012) in their article *Toward a History of Violence in Colonial Kenya*. The violence took many forms that were both physical and psychological, the result of which was the traumatization of natives who were scared and intimidated by the supremacy of the whites. The third took the form of institutionalization of cultural oppression through language, control by the colonial chief, recruitment into the civil service and use of Christianity. The Africans were expected to respect and obey the Whiteman's orders, and those who refused were dealt with violently.

The interface between settlement and proper colonization ensured that Africans were made subordinate through conquest, persuasion, and amalgamation into white social and political structures. The consequences of resistance to forces of subjugation were severe. The socialization of white settlers became a point of admiration for Africans because educated and elite Africans started to admire the privileges of whites. Socialization of whites involved music,

drinking, social indulgence and hunting, and playing golf and other sports such as football, hockey, among others. White socialization became a center of admiration, envy, and aspiration by Africans.

The socialization project created African Anglophiles who wanted to drink alcohol like whites, smoke like whites, take tea and coffee like whites, dance like whites, and become hegemonic like whites in the spheres they dominated. White socialization negatively influenced Africans, although it succeeded in the labor of Africans. The white rule depended on the settler colonies to win Africans to the colonial project, yet it alienated them through forced labor, appropriation of land, and so on. It is this social dilemma that this chapter deals with. How did whites relate socially in colonial Kenya? Where did they meet? What are some of the areas of convergence and conflict? Why were the members clubs a common denominator in all settler towns in Kenya? These are some of the questions this chapter addresses.

WHITE SOCIALIZATION IN COLONIAL SETTLER TOWNS

The socialization of white settlers in Kenya had a devastating effect on Africans. The Africans were forced to provide much labor, which made this possible. Africans became vehicles of satisfaction of white excesses because they were forced to work long hours to satisfy white appetite. African men suffered violence and African women were raped; others were impregnated and abandoned. The white socialization therefore caused trauma and tribulation among Africans. Understanding this socialization will enable us to understand the origins of some of the problems that afflict Kenya today, such as the land question and the origins of mixed-blood families in Kenya.

White socialization created dependency because it was through members clubs that many of the schemes to exploit Africans were hatched. Members clubs became spaces of scheming and planning against the Africans. It became the avenue of discourses on “othering”, marginalizing, and peripheralizing the Africans. It was through these clubs that African victimhood was created and perfected. The exclusion of Africans from these clubs as members created a racialized and biased hierarchy from which they never recovered. Literature on colonial-settler towns in Kenya is scarce. Many of the books on colonial Kenya have been written by whites and they exist in white diaries, memoirs, and travel logs. The most referred to is a narrative on Lord Delamere by Elspeth Huxley (1935) in her book *The White Man's Country: Lord Delamere and the Making of Kenya*. Lord Delamere, who is the subject of this book, was one of the chief actors in the settler towns of Naivasha and Nakuru. He owned vast tracts of land and ruled his workers with an iron fist. Workers in Delamere farms talked about oppression and violence under whites and African supervisors.

The colonial state respected and feared Delamere largely because of his massive wealth and often gave him the benefit of the doubt. This book demonstrates that Rift Valley Settler Towns were full of romantic engagements among whites as well as tensions in the sharing of land and other resources. Lord

Delamere's dominant position allowed him to dominate the social scene. He was a member of almost all the white clubs in Kenya, which gave him a lot of privilege and massive support and networks to dominate settler politics.

Lord Delamere was one of the architects of settlers' unwritten social and cultural codes of Whites which were used to dominate poorer Whites, Asians, Arabs, and Africans who worked on many of his estates. There are many accounts of Delamere's violence against these groups, especially those who worked on his farms, whom he often caned from his horse's back for no apparent reason. He spent most of his free time hunting, golfing, and drinking and was known to have a roving eye not only for White women but also African women. His hunting expedition made him cross many parts of the settler towns. He loved the Rift Valley largely because of its breathtaking picturesque hills, mountains, and valleys.

Delamere set the standard of white settlement in colonial Kenya and, as the leading farmer, often assembled fellow white farmers for grievance articulation against the government and Africans. His power and influence allowed him to interact with the rich and the political elite in the colony. He allowed the new arrivals in the colony to get skills in farming on his vast Naivasha estate. He invested in a wide array of farming activities covering crops and animal husbandry, making him fairly stable. In 1929 during the Great Depression, Delamere remained one of the most stable economic enterprises in the colony, and he is known to have patronized some of the other White settlers. Delamere lived for thirty years in Kenya and was one of its central colonial figures. He died in 1931, but his children remained dominant for the entire duration of the colonial period as a result of the massive wealth that their father left behind. Lord Delamere was among the white settlers who instituted the Marriage Bar that prohibited married women from serving in the civil service in colonial Kenya in order to focus their energies on the farms.

The narrative on Lord Delamere informs us of the hegemony of white males in colonial Kenya in which male actors had the upper hand. This narrative also informs us about the appropriation of African land by whites and the effects of trauma it brought to Africans.

Based on the above book on Lord Delamere, Elspeth Huxley (1959), one of the most well-known writers on settler socialization and political life in colonial Kenya, introduces us to her other book *The Flame Trees of Thika*. In this book, she demonstrates how the colonial space was dominated by white men. The book is based on her life as a child growing up on coffee farms in British Kenya. She demonstrates how the white settlers amassed massive land for the purposes of growing coffee, sisal, and other cash crops. As a daughter of Major Josceline Grant of Njoro where she spent most of her childhood, she recounts how Africans were discriminated against by Europeans when they worked on their farms. She shows how European activities tried to mimic life back home in Britain.

Huxley's eyewitness accounts give us lively snapshots of why Kenya's colonial-settler towns were full of European intrigues, rivalries, plots and counterplots,

sex stories, alcohol, adultery, and engagement in building the empire. Her accounts reveal the importance of boarding schools as an important marker of socialization among white children. White children were sent to boarding schools in Britain to experience acculturation. Huxley remembers her conflicted life in colonial Kenya and Britain. The two worlds never quite reconciled because whites in colonial Kenya abandoned all semblances of civility and indulged recklessly in drinking sprees, sex orgies, fights, and murder.

In the *Flame Trees of Thika*, we encounter memories of an African childhood in which we see conflicts of thinking, action, and involvement. We encounter a sympathetic Huxley who tries to disassociate herself from the colonial project she is part of. She describes prescribed white mannerisms when she traveled through Kenya. For example, we learn from her that whites could not go out in the African sun without hats, believing that the African sun and its ultraviolet rays were dangerous. Wearing the helmet became common among whites as a sign of difference. To them, the helmet represented protection not only from the African sun but also from other elements in the tropics. Elspeth's experiences indicate that she often broke away from the convention of white settlers and could easily be regarded as a rebel of the white order. From her writings, we learn that she was restless, energetic, and peripatetic, very similar to the wild animals of Africa with whom she spent a great deal of her childhood.

Huxley's narrative sheds light on the dynamics of socialization and politics in colonial Kenya. We also get to learn that colonial Kenya was male dominated, where wives and daughters existed on the fringes of colonial Kenya. However, she gives glimpses of why Kenya was regarded as a white man's country.

Charles Hobley (1970) lays the groundwork for how Kenya was occupied by White Settlers. The settling was a systematic endeavor that was meant to benefit the British Empire. Hobley was one of the first European administrative officers in British East Africa and understood the operations of the colonial system. He points out that the settling of the White Islands was a carefully crafted scheme to ensure that the empire was supplied with enough food and satisfy other European tastes. Having worked in Kenya and Uganda, he knew that the colonial project was meant to be a profitable entity. This explains the construction of the Kenya-Uganda railway from Mombasa in 1896 to Kisumu in 1901. From Hobley's explanation, the construction of the 66-mile railway line was intended to extract resources from the interior to Mombasa for shipment to Britain. The railway was a major British investment in East Africa, and it was meant to pay for itself, hence the aggressive expansion of white settlements in Kenya between 1901 and 1920.

There were so many white papers issued in Kenya controlling white settlement between 1902 to 1930 in order to maximize the benefits of the railway. Hobley's book is important because it discusses the foundation of the colonial towns in Kenya, most of which were born along the railway called The Lunatic Express. All towns along the railway line received significant European influence. These towns included Mombasa, Voi, Machakos, Nairobi, Naivasha,

Gilgil, Nakuru, Kericho, Londiani, Muhoroni, and Kisumu on the western line. On the Nakuru Malaba line, towns such as Timbora, Eldoret, and Webuye enjoyed significant white influence. The eastern line from Nairobi to Nanyuki had significant white influence, such as Nyeri, Naro Moru, Nanyuki, among others. Other towns that enjoyed significant white presence included Kitale and Isiolo, among others.

Hobley explains a very elaborate socialization activity that took place in colonial Kenya. The complications, anxieties, and possibilities brought about by the railway increased settler mobility and control of the colony. It made mobilization to quell rebellion much easier. It also allowed the movement of families across the territory and there are so many travel stories by whites such as Huxley (1990) on how the railway made movement better. The Kenya-Uganda Railway made socialization in British colonial Kenya much easier and faster but at the same time created dependent economic activities. Whites started to diversify their activities from farming, animal husbandry and hunting big game to other enterprises such as mining. Minerals such as soda ash in Magadi and diatomite mining in Kariandusi and other areas were exploited for mineral riches.

There was also interest in the extraction of gold in Kakamega, West Pokot, and Macalder in Migori. The settler towns grew in bounds as a result of the railway, and other developments started to follow, such as schools, hospitals, business enterprises, police stations, and other social activities that made life bearable. The colonial government added infrastructure such as roads, water, and electricity to make life bearable in these settler towns. By the 1950s, evidence suggests that what was laid out by the railway were thriving entities enjoying full social flavors accompanied by members clubs, golf courses, and other amenities.

What Hobley does not mention, and which took place, were tensions among white people in colonial Kenya. The arrival of Dutch farmers (Boers) from apartheid South Africa with racist attitudes that British settlers found disturbing is not mentioned. There are many archival records which discuss tensions between British and Dutch Settlers in Kenya, especially in the office of the Chief Native Commissioner. The Chief Native Commissioner handled many cases of disputes between whites and Africans, especially those touching on legal ownership and user rights against customary land ownership by Africans. One example is the Devonshire White Paper of 1923 by the colonial secretary, Victor Cavendish. The White Paper addressed the status of settlers and natives in Kenya Colony (1928–1945) and East Africa and declared, among others, that whenever the interests of the Native Africans clashed with those of whites, those of natives will prevail. The issues handled by Hobley were taken up in the book by Colin Leys who says that White papers were instrumental in creating demarcations on the rights of Africans and Whites. Another White paper of 1927 proclaimed more rights for African natives in Kenya and East Africa.

Colin Leys (1975), in his book *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neocolonialism* argues that although the white papers were meant

to safeguard African interests, they did little to safeguard the same. Leys is of the opinion that the colonial policies underdeveloped Africans. He says that the colonial system turned Africans into peasants because the white socialization in Kenya was done at the expense of Africans. The whites' comfort and safety were predicated on the African labor as drivers, guards, cooks, chefs, butlers, stewards, and, in some cases, comfort women. It was a system based on hierarchy in which Africans were at the bottom.

The African populations, according to Leys, were reduced to subsistence survival as peasant farmers or laborers in white farms and enterprises. Africans worked to ensure that white lives were comfortable but at the same time earning income for the state through the production of cash crops. He suggests that life would have been difficult and complicated in colonial Kenya without Africans. The areas of socialization were controlled by racial categorizations, with many areas set aside for white-only activities. Although he does not delve into the intricacies of individual white towns, Colin Leys makes significant claims which warrant mentioning. He says that whites exploited Africans, thereby causing their underdevelopment by paying them low wages and appropriating their land. He also argues that the colonial project created dependent structures in colonial Kenya, which disadvantaged Africans.

Tabitha Kanogo (1987) argues that colonial Kenya was exploitative, manipulative, and detrimental to African interests because of land appropriation. Without land, Africans were vulnerable and left to their own devices. Due to the vulnerability of Africans, whites exploited them by taking away their rights to fair compensation for their labor. The European project in Kenya survived largely as a result of African labor. Tabitha Kanogo chronicles events from 1905 to 1963. She lays the groundwork for our understanding of the economic and social origins of Mau Mau, which was a response to White supremacy and domination of Africans.

The white segregationist occupation is at the center of Kanogo's analysis. Africans were excluded from economic enterprises and were socially marginalized. They were placed in inferior schools equipped with inferior skills, which were meant to ensure their domination by white settlers. The colonial structure took away rights from Africans while privileging white enjoyment. They ensured that their social life was very comfortable through forceful land acquisition while Africans' lives were made hard. They ensured that their social amenities, such as roads, water, schools were at their best while Africans were on the periphery. Socialization in colonial Kenya ensured that European settlers enjoyed all the great opportunities in the White Highlands, which they made comfortable and a place they could feel at home.

Kanogo says one way the white hegemony spread was through the wholesale transfer of cultural and political institutions such as the Catholic Church and the Anglican and Reformed Churches, which were used for cultural imperialism in which Africans were at the receiving end. Kanogo's project is therefore one that blames the tensions in colonial Kenya on white extremism and institutional violence against Africans, where land alienation was the biggest cause of

African suffering. She suggests that white men enjoyed luxuries in the white highlands in their clubs and luxurious homes while Africans suffered on their farms doing hard labor and receiving very little return.

The emergence of landless people and squatters made the life of settlers uncomfortable. According to Kanogo, contrary to settler and colonial government intentions, the squatter phenomenon was created as a response to the difficulties of settlers in securing labor power and of Africans in gaining access to arable and grazing land. We can therefore suggest that the land question disrupted the socialization of whites in colonial Kenya because their settlements became the target of Mau Mau attacks, such as Timau, Naro Moru, Nanyuki, Nyeri, Nyahururu, Gilgil, Nakuru, among others.

The views of Kanogo concur with those of Elisha Atieno-Odhiambo (1972), who argued persuasively that the nationalist uprising by Africans was largely as a result of social, economic, and political exclusion. Africans witnessed whites indulging in the consumption of alcohol and other beverages in their exclusive clubs while Africans worked hard. Whites owned cars and luxury homes with battalions of African workers. They enjoyed the protection of the state and many privileges while Africans existed on the margins of society.

White socialization was exclusive in schools and white-only members clubs in which Africans were barred. Whites could date African women, but African men were barred from dating white women. White-only schools such as Prince of Wales, Duke of York in Kenya, where Africans were excluded, had the best facilities. There was also job segregation where Africans with similar education were paid lower salaries compared to their white counterparts.

In the economic realm, Atieno Odhiambo argues that Africans were not allowed to grow cash crops such as tea and coffee because they brought farmers high income. The Africans were allowed to grow only subsistence crops which earned very little on the market. There were very few opportunities for Africans to explore in colonial Kenya, and they were reduced to peasant production and working as laborers on white plantations where there was no hope of making any meaningful savings. The economic marginalization was the cause for agitation by Africans for labor rights, such as the Young Kavirondo Association, the Kavirondo Taxpayers Association, and the Young Kikuyu Association, among others.

The early nationalist movements formed the cradle for nationalism in Kenya, which coalesced into a political association articulating for more freedom, and afterward for independence. The nationalists contested the marginalization of Africans, forced acculturation, discontinuation of African cultural practices, land appropriation, and forced labor, which were at the core of writing of the time. African writers were interested in conserving their cultures and started to write about their societies. One such writer was Jomo Kenyatta (1938), who, in his book *Facing Mount Kenya*, captured and articulated Kikuyu customs and practices, preserving them from the white onslaught. He argued that Kikuyu cultural practices were on the verge of suffering annihilation from white supremacy. One of the areas of great concern was white socialization, which

seemed to suggest that Africans did not have a coherent past. Kenyatta's project was supported by other writers, such as Mwangi wa Githumo, who pointed out that there was a need for Africans to preserve their culture in order to know and learn about their past. He argued that people without a culture were lost.

IMPLICATIONS OF WHITE SETTLER SOCIALIZATION

This research project has revealed that socialization among whites in colonial Kenya was guided by activities in private and public spaces. In private spaces, white wives who were brought to colonial Kenya were loyal, meek, and obedient and put family interests first. Male colonial officers posted to Kenya and elsewhere in Africa were encouraged by their families to marry before going on colonial duty overseas. The white women became matriarchs and controlled every social sphere in their homes. Colonial literature reveals that white women were unwilling to travel around the colony with their husbands when not accompanied by their children. Due to this focus on the family as prescribed in Victorian family values, many male colonial employees went on tour without their wives and this opened an avenue for mistresses among settlers in Kenya. Interviews have revealed that many European settlers kept mistresses on the farms, and they often accompany them on safari. An interview with the grandson of a former colonial settler revealed:

We were told that when families converged for social events such as birthday parties children were locked in one central location and placed under maids while adults danced to music from back home and indulged in all manner of social excesses such as wining, taking alcohol and love making. We were told that some marriages ended up breaking up as a result of liaisons established in these parties because there were very few white women to go around, and many men found themselves converging on one White woman or African women. (Interviewee 4)

The above quote provides a convenient summary of socialization in settler lifestyles in colonial Kenya. The Victorian lifestyle ensured that the wife was always at home, and almost 80% of them were housewives. The husband roamed the colonial space and indulged with single White women and African women. These relations between whites and African women made white wives hate their African maids. They started to see them as threats because some of the relations resulted in children of mixed parentage. One Interviewee who witnessed evidence of such liaisons pointed to the large number of mixed-blood individuals in the Rift Valley and Nairobi. She said:

There were many cases where white settlers impregnated African girls in the employment. As soon as they discovered that the woman was pregnant, they often found employment for them elsewhere or helped them establish a business as a way of making them keep the secret. Some were supported secretly, and the children ended up attending good schools and succeeding in life. Many of the children were given African names and related to the ethnic group where the

mother came from. There are many prominent Kenyans of such heritage and whose names have not been shared here. (Interviewee 16)

The romantic relations between white men and African women were widespread. There are even cases where white men abandoned their white wives and took off with their African girlfriends. It became a major point of discussion in social circles on who had taken off with an African woman and how many children they had. It became almost part of the folklore of white conquest in colonial Kenya. Some settlers will even boast about how many children they had sired with African women.

Public spaces promote socialization in a protected manner. This was done mainly in members clubs where codes controlled behavior and confidential issues among members. The common code among all clubs in colonial Kenya was that what you saw in the club remained in the club. The clubs had rooms for accommodation and gave opportunities for white men to indulge in all manner of romantic liaisons, knowing well that their activities were protected. The clubs were for men only and women were not allowed unless permission was sought well in advance from the officials of the clubs. If and when permission was granted, the male patrons were warned in advance about female visitors, especially spouses, and would protect secrets about concubines, mistresses, or girlfriends away from wives. A member of a former colonial club said:

A member's club was like a sanctuary where each member was allocated an official room where he did whatever he wanted to do from there. He could take alcohol, bring friends and even spend nights. It was forbidden to share any information from a member's club. If any member was suspected to leak information, it often led to expulsion. White settlers were like comrades in arms and did everything possible to protect themselves, their status as whites and pride as rulers. (Interviewee 9)

The white hegemony is visible in such testimonies, revealing how secretive and organized white settlers were. They kept their socialization private but some of their secrets often came out and are well documented. For example, the multiple marriages of Baroness Karen Blixen are well documented. She had multiple partners and marriages and indulged freely in colonial Kenya. She was very influential in colonial Kenya but was reported to have broken many marriages.

White settlers disregarded Africans who worked in their homes and did not care that they were witnesses to their poor socialization habits. Africans witnessed firsthand the socialization habits of whites with excessive drinking and romantic relations. For example, some of the accounts of Karen Blixen and her relations with other white men were later reported by Africans. When Karen left Blixen, she married Bror and after married Denys Finch Hatton. The serial marriages were witnessed and reported by Africans. Africans also witnessed

Whites indulging in clubs where they served as waiters, cooks, and stewards, among others. One former house help in a colonial home had this to say:

Many white men loved to drink and often got drunk to the point of not being able to walk. We used to carry some of them to their cars to be driven home by their drivers. Many had rooms in the members clubs where they booked themselves in with their girlfriends. They had white girlfriends and also African girlfriends. They tipped us handsomely in order to keep their secrets. To work in a member's club, you had to swear that you will keep the secrets of the club and that you will not divulge them. We even witnessed fights over women and many of these were regarded as private matters and were heavily protected. (Interviewee 11)

Africans were also witnesses to the colonial socialization that took place in colonial homes. There are many accounts by Africans who saw liaisons between colonial masters and their maids as well as their African workers. Many white men had relations with their workers and often got children through them. The fact that Africans were prevented from sharing information about such relations and issues may have made it possible to protect the information. Many Africans who worked in such spaces were afraid, fearful, intimidated, and vulnerable. Many of them were illiterate and did not record the events. However, through oral testimonies, there are many accounts they have revealed long after the end of the colonial project. It is evident that the settler home, the members clubs, luxurious hotels, and workplaces were all avenues of socialization by white settlers in Kenya.

The work of authors such as Elspeth Huxley and Karen Blixen, among others, reveals a complex and protected socialization space that very few could access. Oral testimonies, diaries, records, and reports in the colonial press provide glimpses into the socialization cycles. The history of white socialization in Kenya is just starting to be written, and we believe that as more research is conducted, we will get to know more about Happy Valley, as Kenya's Rift Valley was known. There were tensions in colonial Kenya that limited white socialization because they were aware that they were occupying Africans' land. They looked at Africans suspiciously, fearing an uprising due to the land question. Some white settlers lived in towns but worked on their farms during the day. The nationalist uprising led by Harry Thuku in 1922 made the land question the center of white and African tensions. One African former employee of a white farm said:

The whites were aware that they had taken our land and they did everything possible to protect it. Most of them were armed in fear of revenge from us. They used a lot of force by building forts, military barracks, and police posts throughout areas where they had settled to protect the land they had stolen from us. We Africans value land and because of this it was easy for Mua Mau to receive a lot of support because they were fighting for our land. Early political parties like KANU

also received a lot of support because they made a return of our land their number one agenda. (Interviewee 16)

There is no doubt that the land question was an important factor in colonial Kenya. Like Interviewee 16 has said, it was a matter of life and death in the colonial state because Africans were pushed to small, congested reserves and the Whites were given their land. The heavy taxation imposed meant that Africans could not sustain themselves through peasant farming to which they were confined. Those who worked on white farms and were employed by the government were paid low wages and salaries that could not sustain them without land. For this reason, land became a rallying cry for nationalism in Kenya and the rise of Mau Mau. This has been well documented by scholars such as Kanogo (1987) and Mwangi wa Githumo (1981), among others. This is why land remains sensitive in Kenya even after independence.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined the political and social activities of White settlers in settler towns such as Nairobi, Nakuru, Elburgon, Molo, Nyahururu (Thomson Falls), Kitale, Thika, Nanyuki, Kericho, Londiani, Muhoroni, Fort Tenen, Koru Timboroa, and Gilgil, among others. The chapter has established that these towns have given a veritable prism through which we have viewed life in colonial Kenya. The chapter has established that members clubs were a common feature in all towns in colonial Kenya. The chapter has established that the by-laws governing settler towns privileged whites who enjoyed many advantages over Africans. We have established that Africans who worked in the colonial towns witnessed what happened in the spaces.

They intermingled among themselves, bringing out reports of infidelity, serial monogamy, and indulgence with their African workers and their white maids. Rivalries over women and men often led to fights and sometimes death. Many of the cases went beyond local white arbitration and ended up in courts, and they are well documented in many colonial courts. Using secondary and primary data, this chapter provides a critical analysis of how the activities of white settlers shaped political and social life in colonial Kenya. Findings revealed that their socialization led to conflicts, that children of mixed racial origin were born, and that many of these towns still retain the white identity left by the legacy of white settlers. We recommend more studies of these settler towns in order to unearth some of the deeper dynamics that were at play during this time.

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The Environment Under Colonialism

Martin S. Shanguhya

INTRODUCTION

Kenya's natural environment is one of the most diverse in Eastern Africa. It ranges from the deserts and semi-deserts that cut across its entire northern portion, stretching from Turkana in the west to Wajir and Mandera to the east. The central portions of the Rift Valley and the Nyika plateau are largely savanna plains that are frequently drier than wet throughout the year. It is only the highland areas on either side of the Rift Valley, as well as the volcanic mountains, Mt. Kenya and Mt. Elgon, that receive considerable precipitation all year round. While grasslands dominate the plateaus, indigenous and exotic forests cover the highlands. Mangroves line the Indian coastal shelves, particularly in the northern districts of the coastal region. Permanent and seasonal watercourses slice these landscapes, with the Tana, Athi, Ewaso Nyiro, and Nzoia standing out as the most significant.

Colonial interaction with these environments in the late nineteenth century produced one of the most dramatic transformations in Africa. This was because colonial states were always predatorial in nature, often driven by industrial capitalism bred by the Industrial Revolution, first in Western Europe, then in North America. Consequently, the story regarding colonialism and the environment in Kenya—as is the case with other parts of Africa—revolved around the colonial state's quest to monopolize natural resources mainly for economic reasons. Centralization, access, use, preservation, protection, and regulation are terms that summarize the repertoire of colonial involvement with African environments. In this repertoire, African communities that were prior users of

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products from these environments virtually became subjects, and therefore dependents, of British monopolistic tendencies in environmental management. This chapter demonstrates how colonial environmental policies provide a lens for understanding the quintessential role of the natural environment in African communities and highlighting the nature of the colonial mindset. That mindset always ran counter to African interaction with the environment.

COMMUNITY-ENVIRONMENT RELATIONS IN PRECOLONIAL TIMES

Before colonial rule, these environments supported various ethnic communities through mutual interactions. The environment contributed to the evolution of the social and economic identities of these communities. The diverse environments ensured the cultivation into existence of various social relations of production of material products revolving around farming, pastoralism, hunting, and gathering. For instance, the Maasai excelled at pastoralism in their savanna habitats, so did the Turkana, Somali, and Borana in their arid and semi-arid areas (Spear & Waller, 1993). The Kamba are known for their precolonial hunting and livestock keeping. The Mount Kenya cluster, notably the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru, avidly tapped into the fertile soils of the region to cultivate food crops and also hunted game for subsistence and to extract ivory and other game trophies for local and regional “exchange” (Muriuki, 1974; Ambler, 1988, pp. 11–12; Steinhart, 2006, pp. 17–41). The Lake Victoria Basin and the surrounding highlands into the Mount Elgon areas supported dense agropastoral and fishing communities (Ogot, 1967; Were, 1967). Despite their disparate nature, these environment-based economic systems were complementary as they encouraged local, regional, and even global exchange of locally produced commodities. For instance, during the mid-nineteenth century, if not earlier, these environments and their occupants were connected to local markets across East Africa, the coastal markets, and beyond the Indian Ocean. From the Lake Victoria Basin to the foothills of Mount Kilimanjaro, through Maasailand, central Rift Valley, Mount Kenya region, and the Nyika plateau, Kenyan communities extracted plant and animal commodities from their environment and sold them to these markets (Beachey, 1967, pp. viii, 271–272; Ambler, 1988, p. 73).

COLONIAL INTRUSION AND DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

During the second half of the nineteenth century, particularly in the few decades before formal colonization in the 1890s, European harbingers of colonialism confirmed the cultural and economic importance of Kenya’s natural environment. European traders, hunters, and explorers observed or reaped the economic benefits of products extracted from these diverse environments. European hunting expeditions and individual traders derived ivory and rhino

and buffalo horns from the expansive frontiers of northern and western Kenya. For instance, the Hungarian Count Samuel Teleki and the Austrian Ludwig von Höhnel encountered and hauled large stocks of ivory from the Lake Turkana basin in the 1880s (von Höhnel, 1968, pp. 185–186). Even for early geographical scholars of the British Empire like J.W. Gregory, the Great Rift Valley was an intriguing natural phenomenon that required to be studied (Gregory, 1896). His seminal work on this imposing geographical system that slices through central Kenya may have proved practical in producing ecological knowledge critical to Britain's imperial designs in the greater East African region. His was an important contribution to a collection of natural history literature vital to nineteenth-century imperial culture and power.

Environmental catastrophes undermined the human-ecological stability that had existed for much of the nineteenth century in the early 1890s. A rinderpest epidemic decimated livestock and wild animals alike. This implied economic and social hardships for communities such as the Maasai, whose ecologies bore the brunt of the epidemic. Locust invasions and drought made matters worse for farmers who lost crops and faced famine and mortalities. Affected areas experienced population decline, expansion in bush and parasites, and retreat of some communities to safer areas (Waller, 1976, p. 530). The existence of disease-prone ecologies would later have ramifications for colonial intervention, which sometimes created more problems for local communities than it solved them.

Immediately following official British political interest in the whole area that evolved into the Kenya Colony, environment-based resources were vital to the imperial men-on-the-spot. These precursors of the colonial administration relied on the environment and local communities for food and fuel supplies as well as securing a financial base for the merging colonial administration. For instance, during the administrative tenure of the Imperial British East African Company (IBEAC, 1888–1894), early colonial officials relied on wildlife products, especially ivory and other game products, for individual gain and to generate revenue for the administration. These individuals were often avid hunters who conducted hunting expeditions in the early 1890s in the game-rich areas of the coastal hinterlands, Ukambani, and the southeastern lower reaches of Mount Kenya (Letters of Sir Francis George Hall, 1894, p. 182). The lucrative nature of the wildlife sector was evident long before the formalization of colonial rule, so much so that the company competed with individual African traders and European companies for a share of the pie in the business. The company launched unsuccessful campaigns to monopolize the ivory trade in coastal and hinterland markets beyond Mombasa (Ofcansky, 2002, pp. 3–4).

While these resources were key to the successful beginnings of the British East Africa Protectorate (later, Kenya Colony), initial efforts to exploit them by early colonial officials portended two important developments. First, they offered colonial administrators confidence that this territory was rich in natural resources that would satisfy the thirst for economic imperialism in this part of Africa. Secondly, and perhaps more important, those efforts elicited backlash

from local African communities in terms of conflict with these and other messengers of colonialism who projected a sense of resource entitlement to local resources in ways that threatened local livelihoods. This set up the basis for a new radical colonial approach to the management and use of African environmental resources through policies that sought to curtail precolonial access to and use of those resources. The result was tensions and contradictions within the Colony, a development which, as will be seen later, contributed to the demise of British rule over Kenya in the late 1950s.

Following the transition of the administration of Kenya from the IBEA Company to the British government in 1895, early High Commissioners (later, Governors) realized more than before that the economic growth of the emerging Colony was predicated on other resources beyond wildlife. A series of ordinances were enacted to bring land, forests, wildlife, and other key sectors under the control of the colonial government. Land was arguably the most attractive to colonial designs. Consequently, the entire area between Kiu (Ukambani) and Fort Ternan (Kericho) was earmarked for annexation. This vast area, which cut through the central Rift Valley and much of Kikuyuland, was extremely fertile with huge agricultural and grazing potential. This, and its cool weather of the temperate kind, made the area very attractive to European settlement and commercial farming of the kind promoted by imperial capitalism. The 1902 Crownlands Ordinance declared much of this area as “public land”, which was subsequently alienated for European settlers on cheap terms (Mungeam, 1978, pp. 323–327). Between 1902 and 1920, some of the best agricultural land in Kenya hitherto inhabited by the Taita, Kamba, Kikuyu, Maasai, Nandi, and Kipsigis had been alienated.

By alienating these lands, early colonial officials were ignorantly convinced that these lands were “empty” and free for European occupation. For instance, in the early years of the Colony, High Commissioner Charles Elliot insisted that “The Athi Plains right down to Sultan Hamud and Shimba [Hills] are practically uninhabited and could be taken up freely by Europeans” (Elliot, 1966, p. 170). Furthermore, they erroneously insisted that African agricultural and pastoralist systems were inadequate for the kind of “modern economies” fronted by late nineteenth and early twentieth-century colonial economies. Only European-style large-scale agricultural plantations and ranches were the most effective way to bring African land to productive potential. No one was beheld from this thinking more than Elliot, who dismissed Maasai pastoralism as an unproductive livelihood and branded the agricultural pursuits of Bantu and Kalenjin communities in the Rift Valley and its vicinities as lacking in economic sophistication. Elliot offered a competing vision to utilize land in the Rift Valley in Western terms that was dissonant to traditional land uses amongst African farming and pastoralist communities. African farming, especially pastoralist systems, was demonized and viewed as antiquated (Anderson & Broch-Due, 1999). A benevolent intervention from colonial management along Western lines was therefore considered an urgent necessity.

As far as wildlife resources were concerned, the IBEA Company launched the earliest policies to preserve wild animals from what top officials in Kenya and London saw as destructive hunting policies by both African communities and European itinerant hunters. However, such measures were quite fiscal in nature, usually involving imposing licenses on hunting, guns, and ivory sales, policies that aimed at consolidating the precarious financial base of the young Protectorate (Ofcansky, 2002, pp. 1–4). After the British government's takeover of the territory in 1895, Sir Arthur Hardinge (1895–1900), the High Commissioner, commenced elaborate schemes to preserve game by declaring certain animal-endowed areas as game sanctuaries in Kenya. These policies usually had the blessing of London's Foreign Office and later, the Colonial Office if they helped reduce the dependence of the Protectorate on London for its budgetary deficits. These efforts led to the creation of the Southern Reserve in 1897, which was later expanded in 1900 by bringing parts of Kikuyuland, Kamba, Maasai, and Taita areas into its limits. At about the same time, the Northern Game Reserve was also established, covering the game-inhabited parts of the Northern Frontier District (Buxton, 1902, pp. 4–15).

Game preservation was more of an economic enterprise than it was for protecting endangered animal species. It is true that animals such as elephants increased in number due to these policies in the period before 1930; it is also true that economic gains from this enterprise accrued to both the colonial state and the individual European hunter. For instance, by 1906, Kenya was earning £173,009 from ivory exports, which was second only to agriculture, the main economic sector (East Africa Protectorate Annual Report, 1907, p. 14). This fortune fluctuated after the First World War until the demand for East African ivory in major Western industrial centers plummeted after the Great Depression in the early 1930s. The decline was also due to increased protection of the elephant populations in Game Reserves. At the same time, the late 1930s witnessed the transition from Game Reserves to National Parks, a move that was facilitated by Governor Sir Robert Brooke-Popham at the bidding of the Nairobi European community. It was not until after the Second World War that national parks were established: first the Nairobi National Park in 1946, then Tsavo in 1948 (Steinhart, 2006, pp. 189–195). The idea was to create animal protection sanctuaries in perpetuity so that only legislation would undermine such parks. National Parks served the twin purpose of preserving fauna and flora and being used for public recreation (Mackenzie, 1988, pp. 264–265). In Kenya, these parks inaugurated nature-based tourism, whereby tourists from Europe and North America traveled to the Colony to see game in proximity.

Colonial alienation of Kenya's major forest regimes proceeded almost along the same paths as did land and wildlife. Like land and wildlife, forests were considered to play a critical role in the Colony's economic sector. The reasons for their alienation and move to "preserve" these forests were predicated on the misguided notion that African communities were destroying them. "In the past", the Chief Commissioner lamented in 1926, "there has been wholesale

destruction of forests owing to the ignorance and improvidence of natives who have cut down and burnt trees in search of virgin soil for agriculture" (Native Affairs Department Annual Report, 1926, p. 41). Colonial officials also voiced climatic considerations as reason for preserving the forests. Yet "preservation" was pursued while government commercial exploitation of these forests was found necessary. By 1910, almost two million acres of indigenous forests in Kenya had been alienated as "Government timber forest", equal in area to woodlands of England or the Olive-yards of Spain (Report of the Forest Department, 1909–1910, p. 1). Long leases were also granted to private commercial exploitation, prominent of these the concession to Lingham and Grogan to exploit a forest covering 94,944 acres spread from Maji Mazuri in Uasin Gishu, to Elgeyo. By 1931, there were about nineteen sawmilling firms spread all over Forest Reserves, not counting those operated privately by settlers on their farms (Forest Department Annual Report, 1932, p. 5). "Scientific forestry", a concept widely applied in the colonial management of forests in India, was introduced in Kenya. Through this process, deliberate focus on certain species led to the reforestation of areas decimated of indigenous trees. Millions of trees were also introduced in new locations, mostly for commercial purposes.

Kenya was not well endowed with mineral resources worth imperial needs. In fact, by around 1933, mining in Kenya was still in the infancy stage, limited to prospecting and development. Any mining of commercial value was restricted to alluvial panning in large rivers and flood plains by small-scale entrepreneurs, mostly Africans. Sir Albert Kitson's Report of 1933 on the state of mining in Kenya recommended opening large areas of African Reserves in western Kenya to mineral prospecting (Mining and Geological Department Report, 1933, pp. 3–5). These efforts coincided with the discovery of gold deposits in Macalder in South Kavirondo and Kakamega in North Kavirondo in the early 1930s. These became the only major gold discoveries of any worth in colonial Kenya (Shilaro, 2008). Before their exhaustion almost twenty years later, their proceeds accrued towards government income through exploitation by both local and international mining concessions. Aside from gold, soda ash mining and processing was an important undertaking in Magadi and endured into one of the major income-generating enterprises for the colonial government. By 1945, soda ash earned the Colony a higher income at £453,236 than any other mineral (Annual Report, Commissioner for Lands and Mines, 1946, p. 19). This mining industry has survived and thrived into the postcolonial period.

Aside from intervention in rural resource regimes, the British colonial government was also concerned about the health status of rural areas. In a territory where urbanization was restricted to the Indian littoral locations up until the emergence of Nairobi in 1899, upcountry populations were concentrated in rural locations. Rural areas became the center of colonial action for most of the colonial period, so much that settlers, government officials, and even Christian missionaries frequently interacted with rural populations and local environments. Since the eighteenth century, European migrants in tropical

environments of the southern hemisphere, particularly in the Caribbean, Indian Ocean Islands, equatorial islands of the Atlantic Ocean, and the Indian subcontinent, had become preoccupied with accumulating knowledge about the health of these environments (Grove, 1995). These concerns followed the British into Kenya so much that one of the key tasks of early colonial officials was to map out the health patterns across Kenya's different regions. Previously thought to be therapeutic to European health, tropical climate and environments were soon discovered not to be the "Edens" imagined in European social and medical circles due to the prevalence of virulent pathogens. Diseases new to the Europeans were sure to present health challenges to them as they often did. Africans had either become immune to most of these diseases or had fashioned traditional ways of checking against their extreme effects. Overall, colonial officials viewed these environmentally induced health challenges as a problem to European and non-European populations alike and a likely drag on the economic and social welfare of the Colony.

Consequently, extensive "scientific", social, and cultural knowledge about tropical diseases in the Colony were major entries in official annual reports. Knowledge regarding malaria, cholera, bubonic plague, and smallpox, among others, expanded. Research and production of knowledge on these diseases were often done to ensure the health of Europeans but also to aid in the social control of Kenyan communities. Aside from mosquitoes and malaria, the other set of health dilemma that British colonial authorities faced in the Colony was tsetse flies and sleeping sickness in humans, and nagana, its livestock version. The warm and humid woodlands and grasslands adjoining the Lake Victoria Basin and Maasailand made them natural habitats of these flies. Narok and Lambwe Valley were notoriously inhabited by the *Glossina palpalis* strain of these flies, which in turn deterred human settlement and economic activities for a long time. Between 1902 and the mid-1950s, Lambwe was targeted by the colonial administration for unrelenting campaigns to eradicate the vectors and the health problems it caused to humans and livestock (Hoppe, 2003; Ndege, 2001).

Rapid urbanization followed rapid colonial administrative advances into the interior parts of Kenya. Old towns along the Indian Ocean coast expanded and became busier than ever. This was because of increased local and international commercial and human transit. For instance, Mombasa's economic importance expanded to rival Zanzibar, a long-standing Port of importance. Its role as an early colonial administrative center for the British ensured an increased presence of the European population on top of the local African, Arab, and Indian populations. The extension of the Kenya-Uganda Railway from Mombasa to Kisumu between 1896 and 1901 spurred up new towns along the gridline. Consequently, Nairobi, Nakuru, and Kisumu emerged as principal towns that attracted large European and Asian (Indian) populations keen on large-scale agriculture and retail business. Africans became an unintended presence in these areas into which they were involuntarily forced by colonial demands for

taxes and cheap labor. Thus, colonial towns provided Africans with avenues to find employment to raise cash for family and state obligations.

Yet these towns produced new environmental challenges for the governments and the populations that lived in them. The built environment cracked under the pressure of congestion with limited programs to expand the existing water and housing infrastructure. Sanitation problems soon became a source of outbreak of highly infectious diseases. Between 1900 and 1920, Mombasa, Nairobi, and Kisumu, the three largest urban areas, were at one time or the other afflicted by epidemics ranging from cholera, dysentery, and plague. Government efforts to contain them resulted in one of the most obvious inverted forms of social engineering, whereby administration and medical officials blamed Asians and Africans for these epidemics (Ndege, 2001). This was based on the unfounded belief that these communities were inherently “dirty” and therefore agents for the spread of cholera and plague. This provided the government reason to step up racial segregation in these towns.

IMPACT OF COLONIAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES ON LANDSCAPES AND COMMUNITIES

Colonial officials engineered the alienation of land, forests, and wildlife sanctuaries and proscribed African access to them by perpetuating ecological and economic stereotypes of African interactions with these environments. This led to outright colonial dispossession of these regimes from African communities that previously depended on them for economic and cultural purposes. A wide array of ordinances ensured the exclusion of African communities from freely accessing and using land, forests, and wildlife resources for material and spiritual sustenance. These three ecological entities were usually related or linked to each other. Therefore, colonial interference with one usually affected the others, directly or indirectly.

Generally, land alienation had the most far-reaching impact on African communities. Alienation of fertile lands across central and parts of the coastal region rendered the Arabs, Taita, Kikuyu, Kamba, Nandi, Kipsigis, and Maasai landless (Mungeam, 1966). This occasioned myriad of changes that were detrimental to these communities’ welfare. Alienation led to landlessness and the emergence of a restless squatter class in areas reserved for European settlement. It also led to the dislocation of existing settlement patterns through the creation of Native Reserves along ethnic lines. The boundaries to these reserves were rigid and perpetually enforced, thereby enabling the colonial state to fully lay claim to alienated areas. Due to congestion resulting from population growth, land for farming shrank within the reserves. Pastoralist communities like the Maasai and the Kalenjin fared no better. Driven into marginal lands, their seasonal grazing areas were hemmed in by settler farms. “Tress pass” became a common term in the colonial legal lexicon for preventing these communities from reclaiming their pasturelands whenever they drove their

livestock into those farms (Anderson, 2002; Hughes, 2006). Some, like the Maasai, were driven into tsetse-infested areas where they were exposed to nagana and trypanosomiasis. Human and livestock congestion, coupled with farming and grazing the available land all year round, produced an ecological crisis in the form of land degradation beginning in the 1920s. In a contradictory fashion, colonial officials blamed the dispossessed communities for “overworking” the land in their reserves as a leading cause of land degradation. Incidences of soil erosion in African Reserves were used to justify colonial alienation of African land, or at least as a defense against African demand that their land alienated for European settlement be returned to its rightful owners (The Native Lands Commission Report, 1932; Anderson, 2002).

As a result, between 1930 and 1950, the British colonial government executed large-scale soil conservation measures in agricultural and pastoralist communities across Kenya. These measures ranged from mechanical (terracing, ridging), biological (planting of grasses and trees), and culling of livestock to reconditioning large areas by closing them to African cultivation and grazing (Anderson, 2002). Restrictions were also imposed against cultivation in areas considered ecologically fragile from human activities, such as hilly landscapes and river courses. Grass burning, long utilized by farming communities to help clear land for cultivation and by pastoralism to aid in the regeneration of grass, was strictly curtailed through legislation. The methods were burdensome to African communities, as the government expected them to split their invaluable time between soil conservation, farming, and wage employment outside the reserves. Enforcement of these measures in the 1940s and 1950s induced resistance in the reserves. The political backlash of these policies contributed to the emergence of anticolonial nationalism, epitomized in the Mau Mau uprising in central Kenya (Throup, 1988).

Alienation of forests had almost similar impacts as did the dispossession of land. The ecological impacts of colonial commercial forestry were as severe to the environment as they were on human populations. In the initial years of operation of the railway engine on the Kenya-Uganda Railway, large swathes of indigenous trees between the Coast and the central Rift Valley were felled as fuel energy. By 1910, the railway department utilized about 3.2 million cubic feet of wood per year, mostly for fuel purposes (Forest Department Annual Report, 1909-1910, p. 14). Wood fuel was considered cheaper than imported coal, despite the disastrous demands of the former on forests. To ensure sustained fuelwood supplies, the Forestry Department introduced massive planting of Eucalyptus and wattle trees. Through afforestation, indigenous forests were replaced by exotic ones. Dependence on fuelwood by the Railway Department was finally ended in 1953 when oil and coal became the main sources of energy for powering the railroad engines (Report for the Forest Department, 1951-1953, p. 33). Government and private commercial monopolies over forests dispossessed local communities who were curtailed by legislation from accessing them for fuel, cultivation, hunting, and gathering. The Okiek and Sabao were denied hunting and honey gathering in their respective

forests. To ensure this, colonial management of forests relied on some of the strictest rules ever promulgated in Kenya. Fires traditionally used for gathering honey in forest locations were banned.

Agricultural communities were directly impacted as well. In Western Kenya, Luhya farmers living next to forests, particularly the greater Kakamega Forest, hardly accessed arable land in those forests even as population pressure reduced arable land within the North Kavirondo Reserve. Efforts by African communities to access and use forests were interpreted as theft and illicit. As a result, forest “offences” included theft of forest produce—such as firewood—illicit grazing, honey hunting, and damage to trees, all of which were punishable by court prosecutions and fines. In the bid to “co-opt” local communities into forest management, the colonial administration ceded the management of forests within Native Reserves to Local Native Councils. These Councils, usually dominated by chiefs, headmen, and “progressive” Africans, helped enforce rules pertaining to the protection of land and forests. Despite this measure, the Councils were responsible to the government through the Forest Department. Still, land that contained these forests belonged to the government, which held it in trust of the local communities as per the 1930 Native Trust Lands Ordinance.

The cultural consequences of colonial regulation of forests were also significant. Across Kenya, forests provided sacred sites for the spiritual practices of several communities. For the Kikuyu, Mount Kenya Forest contained the core of their sacred groves. In precolonial times, the groves provided a unifying element for the community, drawing them closer to nature and their spiritual world (Kenyatta, 1938, p. 250). This spiritual connection was severed by colonial intrusion into Kikuyu land. Two major colonial forces facilitated the assault on those sacred groves. The first was the colonial government which alienated major forests in the Mount Kenya region and its environs that housed these sacred areas. Some colonial officials viewed them as ethnographic curiosities. Secondly, Christian missionaries working amongst the Kikuyu since the early 1900s considered them symbols of savagery and darkness. Missionary and government assault on ceremonies and rituals associated with these groves also threatened native cultural practices. On the extreme, the loss of sacred groves aided in eroding traditional authority and generation sets (Castro, 1995, pp. 114–117).

Wildlife preservation policies also undermined African interaction with game habitats. Like forests, strict rules were enacted to preclude African hunting in game-protected sanctuaries. This dislocated the subsistence of communities such as the Kamba and Okiek, who relied on hunting as a source of livelihood. Even following the introduction of legalized hunting as a sport, Africans were excluded, and their hunting tools were banned by the 1928 Game Amendment Ordinance for their “decimation” of game (Mackenzie, 1988, p. 209). The contradiction in this development was that guns were increasingly allowed for hunting by Europeans at a fee. Cut off from extracting material products from protected fauna, some communities such as the Somali

and Kamba resorted to what the colonial administration in hindsight characterized as “poaching”. Ivory and products acquired by such means were lucrative on regional and global “black markets”. This, more than any other reason, led the government to strengthen its wildlife laws to protect large game such as elephants, buffaloes, and rhinoceros. Colonial wildlife ordinances reinforced the racial hierarchy in Kenya by privileging the white population as legitimate hunters while positioning African hunting activities as “poaching”. In this hierarchy, Africans were relegated to lower echelons of wildlife management as rangers and guides. Even so, reliance on African knowledge by white hunters was inevitable (Steinhart, 2006, pp. 187–205).

Colonial regulation of rural and urban built environments also had wide-ranging effects on Africans and other non-European communities. Campaigns against tsetse flies and sleeping sickness closed off infested areas, and communities were cordoned off from those areas. In Lambwe, it took years before the area was opened for settlement. Aside from their negative impact on both humans and the environment, colonial tsetse campaigns helped stem the breeding and spread of these insects. Human and livestock mortalities resulting from them were also checked. On the other hand, while anti-Malaria campaigns in rural areas resulted in the retreat of mosquito breeding environments, some “modernization” programs such as wetland rice cultivation in parts of Nyanza created conditions conducive to these vectors. Sometimes success at combating mosquitoes was accomplished at the expense of restricting African entrepreneurial initiatives such as the building of watermills that colonial officials perceived to create mosquito ecologies. African communities were also successfully mobilized in efforts aimed at eliminating hosts or vectors of virulent pathogens. Such was the case in Nyanza, where the Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association launched rural campaigns against rats in the 1920s to help combat the bubonic plague. In urban areas, the quest for public health focused on improved sanitation and better housing racialized human relations in Nairobi and Kisumu. As far as colonial authorities were concerned, cleaner cities implied residential segregation so that Africans, Asians, and Europeans lived in separate quarters. This was based on the erroneous belief that non-European communities were the source of public health concerns because of their propensity for poor hygiene habits (Ndege, 2001). However, beyond such convoluted colonial stereotypes, the administration was forced into recognizing the need to develop social infrastructure in towns as these areas continued to grow after 1945 due to increased rural-urban migration and economic growth.

CONCLUSION

The advent of British colonialism in Kenya at the turn of the twentieth century occasioned dramatic changes that altered human-environmental relations. Given that the colonial state was founded on the impulses of economic imperialism, Kenya’s natural environment proved essential to fulfilling those impulses. Almost immediately, starting in the mid-1890s, the colonial administration

embarked on alienating and monopolizing key environmental sectors, notably land, forests, and fauna for economic purposes. Ecological, climatic, and economic justifications were usually floated for colonial intervention in these sectors. The government believed that such measures were for the African public good and that it was managing these resources in trust of local communities that were considered irresponsible, wasteful, and lacking in sophistication to manage and use these resources. Thus, time-tested African economic systems that relied on the natural environment to thrive were now as deficient, needing guidance. Policies aimed at preserving forests and fauna, and used to alienate African land, became overly exclusive as they curtailed prior user and holder rights. Colonial regulation of urban environments was equally patronizing. Generally, those policies inaugurated the modern state that has survived as the most imposing agent in the regulation of important environmental sectors, doing so within the colonial blueprint that it inherited after independence.

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The Mass Media and Cultural Change

Kibiwott Kurgat and Caren Jerop

INTRODUCTION

The power of the media in society cannot be underestimated and the demand for new information, especially in the twenty-first century, has given the media more supremacy. Peoples' need to have and access information is vital and as such, mass media play a tremendous role in satisfying it. Mehraj et al. (2014), on the one hand, argue that media occupy a high proportion of importance in an individual's life and, thence, media information influences the behavior and decisions made by society. On the other hand, Singh and Pandey (2017) argue that society influences the media to the extent that it is perceived as society's voice. With all these in mind, it is clear that to a larger extent, media reflect society and that it plays a major role in bringing about cultural change and socioeconomic and political development. For instance, Nyabuga and Booker (2013) argue that the media is an important actor that shapes how society operates. The media does this by articulating ideas and influencing perceptions and attitudes. In democratic societies, according to Nyabuga and Booker (2013), mass media and journalism act as vehicles that reflect public opinion by highlighting public concerns and informing people about state policies and important cross-cultural events and viewpoints. For instance, in Kenya, local stations that broadcast in vernacular tend to focus on discussions around areas of interest to a particular community.

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The earliest debates about the impact of cultural narratives on daily life date from the ancient Greeks. In *The Republic*, for example, Plato developed the classical view of art. To Plato, art should aim to instruct and uplift. He worried that some staged performances glorified evil and that common folk watching might not be able to distinguish between art and reality (Plato, 2007, pp. 335–349). Since the time of the early Greeks, issues and concerns about the impact of culture have continued to be addressed. For example, it is Plato's concerns on how new media influences culture that still continues to influence the present debates on modern media, especially the influence of the internet and of social media (Wolf, 2000).

Today, the stakes have become higher with technology greatly influencing media activities by increasing the speed and accessibility of information. To this end, the myriad mutations of social media now play an increasingly controversial role in society. Individuals were used to sharing their common interests with radio or TV personalities, and major news stories in the backyards, bar-rooms, and coffee shops, but the dramatic increase in specialized publications and personalized channels has drastically fragmented the media audience. The downturn of these is that many media consumers have become increasingly critical of the lack of quality in so much contemporary culture as well as being concerned about information overload. Even the computer, once touted as an educational resource for children, has created confusion. Today, when kids announce that they are on the computer, parents may wonder whether they are writing a term paper, playing a video game, talking to cyberspace strangers, shopping for sneakers, or peeking at pornography.

MASS MEDIA, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, AND CULTURAL IMPERIALISM

The mass media in Africa has played a key role in promoting social development through public enlightenment and sensitization, and its performance has gone beyond earlier expectations. Currently, communities in general and individuals in particular are bombarded constantly with messages from many sources, including the TV, billboards, newspapers, magazines, and social media, to name but a few. These messages primarily promote products; but in addition, they also promote, attitudes, moods, and a sense of what is and/or is not important.

Although mass media is acknowledged for its positive impact, it is also blamed for what is being seen as cultural imperialism. The major aspect of cultural imperialism is the information flow issue. As with international news flow, developing countries have often criticized western industrialized states, particularly the United States, for their domination of media cultural products and the implications of that dominance on their own cultural values. The argument here is that the culture of everyday life in Africa has become intertwined with the media to the extent that African culture has been diluted by westernization.

Although Africans have been freed from colonialism, they are not ready to embrace freedom to the extent of wholly appreciating their culture. When Africa was colonized, they were made to believe that their culture was primitive and backward. Africans started adopting western culture to appear civilized, dropping most African values and norms. And through the media, western cultural values are being passed on and emulated in Africa. This implies that the developed countries still influence the behavior of the developing countries.

Cultural Imperialism Theory further argues that humans do not have free will to choose how they feel, act, think, and live and this is echoed by the Agenda Setting Theory (Saliven, 1991). These two theories agree that people react to what they see or hear on media because there is nothing else to compare it to besides their own lives, which is usually portrayed as less than what they should be (Boyd, 1977). In addition, the media will play a major part in behavior change since the audience lacks the capacity to filter the information they consume. More often than not, when we listen to or watch both Kenyan and international media, it is difficult to discern the differences in their agenda. In other words, there is an uncanny similarity in most items. For example, when not discussing politics, crime stories take center stage. This tells us that the media has made everybody in the world think in a certain way, as stated in Agenda Setting Theory (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Moreover, the media has tended to portray western culture as high culture while African culture is seen as low or popular culture. And this is not the case with Kenya alone but with all developing countries.

Furthermore, according to Cultural Imperialism theorist Schiller (1973), western nations dominate the media around the world, which in return has a powerful effect on the cultures of developing countries like Kenya through the imposition of western viewpoints, which gradually erode native cultures. These viewpoints are manifested in the movies we watch, such as the Mexican soap operas, which have become common in Kenya hence influencing dating patterns, dress code, and values that influence relationships. The recent move by local TV channels to introduce singing competitions and reality shows can be related to ideas borrowed from the western media that runs reality shows that may not align with mainstream Kenyan culture, but just because it is foreign, it is considered superior. (For instance, the formats of these competitions bear an uncanny resemblance to *America's Got Talent*, *Britain's Got Talent*, and *Big Brother* reality shows.)

In addition, the theory points out that because of its economic capacity, Western Civilization produces the majority of the media (film, news, comics, and so on). As a result, the rest of the world purchases those productions because it is cheaper for them to do so rather than produce their own. Thus, developing countries watch media filled with Western ways of living, believing, thinking, and knowing. The developing world then starts to want and do the same things in their countries and thus erode their own culture (Schiller, 1973).

Mushi (1966, p. 13) notes that "one could hardly visualize the existence of a nation without culture or, if such a nation were to exist, it would merely be a

disunited group of people living together simply because there existed geographical boundaries and some political authority to control them from above" (Quoted in Fortner, 1993). At the onset of colonization, European colonialists created many present African countries by imposing arbitrary geographical boundaries. After independence, the consequence of these arbitrary borders was often severe difficulty in building potent political institutions, implementing sound economic development projects, and developing relevant national cultural policies because of tribal animosities, linguistic differences, and socio-cultural dynamics that interfere with these processes (Schiller, 1973).

As stated in Fortner (1993), one cultural manifesto adopted in Africa acknowledged that "culture starts with the people as creators of themselves and transformers of their environment. Culture, in its widest and most complete sense, enables men (sic) to give shape to their lives" (quoted in Dumila, 1976, p. 2). The leaders of developing countries, however, had difficulty seeing how culture, in the sense outlined by this manifesto, could develop in nations swamped with Western cultural imports: films, television programs, music, newspapers, and magazines.

To confound this, the Western industrial powers, especially the United States, have dominated the production and distribution channels for media materials, cultural materials that have become increasingly popular worldwide. For example, most people talk about *Hollywood* when it comes to feature films and television programs, yet we have *Nollywood* from Nigeria. Furthermore, other than South Africa, which tries to promote local music, the major music source for the youth today in Kenya is MTV, the Music TV channel from the United States. As a result, the youth have sometimes adopted delinquent behavior from such sites as they try to ape their favorite celebrities, who most of the time come from different social settings. This has changed the norms and values of various developing countries like Kenya. It is also evident that 80 percent of the magazines on the streets of Nairobi are from the Western world and a similar percentage of the information on the internet is from developed countries. On the other hand, the flow of information from developing countries to developed is minimal.

The effects of the above bring us to the conclusion that through the mass media and communication technologies, Western and other developed countries' cultures have infiltrated the African cultural context to the extent that, for instance, most Kenyans have given up their traditional dressing codes to embrace foreign modes of dressing. The advertisements on TV and the internet impose western values on the Kenyan audience. For example, beauty products like *Nivea* are advertised by models who push the western idea of beauty. The models are skinny, light-skinned, and tall, as opposed to the African concept of a beautiful woman: dark, medium height, even short and plump in some cultures. The consequence of this is that today women in Kenya go to great lengths to starve themselves to be slim or use dangerous chemicals to have lighter skin.

The flow of hegemonic information from the West has also had a significant impact on religious identity for Kenyans. Today, African traditional religions have been largely abandoned and most Kenyans profess Christianity in a myriad of forms (denominations). This is not just because of the effects of earlier European missionaries who came to Africa and convinced natives to abandon their traditional religions claiming it was barbaric and devilish. Today's Christianity adherents, particularly Pentecostal and evangelical persuasion, can be attributed to media influence through various religious channels in the West. For example, TBN, a gospel media channel in the US, can broadcast worldwide via satellite, and Kenya's Family Media is a product of TBN, indicating that religious channels can also wire their materials that advocate the western religious viewpoints to affiliated local religious channels. Moreover, anyone doing shopping in the capital city of Kenya can see that the Kenyan religious market is filled with books, CDs, magazines, and gospel music from the West.

Another means through which cultural imperialism can be discussed is in the Kenyan education system. Education itself is a cultural imperialism product thanks to colonization and western missionaries. A clear example is seen in adopting the alternative education systems characterized by Western culture. Moreover, examples abound where middle-class Kenyans see western education systems as better than the national one. For instance, schools like Braeburn, Braeside, Potter's house, Brookehouse, and Khalsa have adopted the IGCE and IGCSE systems of learning from the outset. This is a recipe for creating inequalities in cultural identity in an already troubled education system grappling with resource scarcity in the majority of the public education system. Even if it can be argued that this is freedom of choice, this perspective in itself can be argued as an assault on the tenets of African culture, which had a communal element.

Another example in the educational sector is the source of knowledge. Even before Google, a search engine developed in the West and now used by the majority of Kenyan researchers and students, it is still clear that when one goes to our Kenyan national or institutional libraries, one finds that many books are from developed countries and very few from the developing countries. This is so because of the perception of the developing countries that the knowledge harvested from the West is the best. It is noteworthy that South African Universities are currently advocating for theory decolonization. For a long time, we have never had Africans criticizing the ancient philosophers. Apart from the West imposing their cultures on the east, cultural imperialism has taken another turn, with dominant African countries imposing their cultures on other Africans, as seen in the domination of feature films, TV programs, and music by South Africa and Nigeria.

Genner and Süß (2017) define socialization as a process through which individuals acquire and interact with values and social standards of a specific society and culture across the individual's lifespan. In addition, the mass media is currently considered the most powerful agent of shaping culture. In the older days, families, schools, and religious institutions were the major agents of

socialization. In Kenyan society, for example, the time spent with these agents is now limited and requires sacrifice, thus giving more power to the media to shape one's behavior because the media has now become a human companion for Kenyans. People spend much of their time getting in touch with the world than the people around them through the media. Moreover, interactions between individuals, unlike in the olden days, have been enhanced by the development of social media, one of the new channels of communication that have been opened between people in the last thirty years. The internet facilitates interconnectivity among individuals and its other uses such as e-mail, chatrooms, etc. As a result, the media has changed Kenyans' social orientation where their mode of communication is dependent on media gadgets rather than the traditional face-to-face encounter.

As Kenyan society, like others globally, embraces technology as today's indispensable means of communication, its effects have been experienced. For example, western soap operas, internet movies, TV series, and music have influenced how Africans socialize. In the traditional African setting, family, as well as community time, was essential. Women used to stay at home to take care of the children and other family members' needs, but with the advent of feminist ideologies from the West, women have become more empowered and have become as competitive as men. Furthermore, they are becoming more independent and can fend for themselves. In addition, change through media influence is seen in entertainment. For instance, instead of sitting together as a family and talking about issues that affect us as in the olden days, each family member sometimes turns to their gadgets for entertainment. One will find a Kenyan father watching football on *Supersport*, a foreign channel, while the mother will be glued to the latest soap opera, the teenagers on Facebook or WhatsApp, and the young boy playing video games, all part of the gadgets from the western advancement in technology.

One other cultural issue that has been affected by the mass media are the ideologies of marriage. Perhaps, as a consequence of the change in perspectives of personal identity engendered by western education, the influence of media representation of individuality, and modern lifestyles, as again shown through representations in western-influenced mass media, the environment of personal relations such as marriage is facing a dramatic change such that divorce is now more common, something that was the exception rather than the rule in the African community setting.

Another effect of mass media on Kenyan culture is globalization. As predicted by McLuhan, the world has now become one community and this is due to the impact mass media has on cultures so that societies change their own perspectives of/and attitudes towards the world they live in together with what is within that world. What this has meant is that individuals, as well as society itself, can access other cultures. In Kenya, like in other developing countries, globalization also includes the mass media in which local media houses have given considerable space for foreign channels like CNN in the United States and Deutsche Welle in Germany, to mention but a few, to air what may be seen as

western perspectives on issues considered global. The effect for Kenyan society, like other developing countries, again is that it has become part of the global village where one can know what is happening across the borders at “the touch of a button”, as it were. Computers and the internet, as well as other electronic devices, have engendered social media so that information can be received before media houses can disseminate it. These have become part and parcel of Kenya’s culture to the extent that they have revolutionized Kenyans’ social lives as they can interact anywhere, anytime, as they go about other tasks in their lives.

It has been argued that one of the cultural changes that is a creature of mass media in developing countries is the nature of crime. It has also been observed that due to its subtle nature, some aspects of criminal activity have evolved as the above changes themselves take root in society. For example, one of the most popular cyber-crimes is the sex industry, which uses the internet. These comprise anything from pornography in its various forms —using film stars, escorts, mail order brides, and prostitutes (DeCurtis, 2005). Most clients of these prostitutes are tourists from the Western world. These tourists get hooked up on the internet when they seek information regarding travel location or destination (Barrack & Fisher, 2005). They are either misdirected to websites that advertise sex tours or practically offered these baits as travel incentives (www.worldsexguide.org).

The use of the internet for sexual abuse is an important area of research interest. Scholars have investigated the involvement of youths and children in such online sexual activities. These researchers use the time spent online viewing sexual activities as a yardstick for measuring susceptibility to violent sexual conduct. The findings of the research indicate that excessive usage positively correlates with sexual sensation and stress among youths (Cooper et al., 2000; Brown & Eisenberg, 1995).

Goodson et al. (2000), replicate the above findings. In their study, participants’ attitudes towards seeking sex information and sexual entertainment showed variations based on the frequency of their internet usage. Other scholars have also found positive correlations between an individuals’ exposure to spurious web content and their sexual beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors (Young & Rogers, 1998; Kraut et al., 1998). The data on the numbers of trafficked children from developing countries who are thought to be destined for commercial sexual exploitation in the West is limited. This is because of the covert nature of the activity and the fact that social services have just recently started to note these cases, but a report by UNICEF suggests there are approximately 250 children known to have been trafficked into the UK in a five-year period (UNICEF, 2003).

The last issue to be discussed here is the effect of mass media on gender roles in Kenya.

Generally, in Africa, before the onset and culture change through westernization, men were expected to embrace masculine traits such as strength, power, bravery, insensitivity to pain and aggressiveness, while women are supposed to be compassionate, kind, sensitive, empathetic, and cooperative. With

westernization, these traits have become outdated. Men are no longer the sole providers of the family, just like women who no longer do house chores only. These changes can be attributed to the media through the information consumed, which has shaped how different genders perceive the world. Although the media industry is still male-dominated and males still largely make decisions on what is to be aired, this does not hinder women who are aggressive from attaining higher positions in this field.

CONCLUSION

Modern societies are continuously engaged in a struggle to increase their capabilities and influential power because of the inherently selfish nature of human beings to gain more for their own advantage. Therefore, as long as individuals and societies exist, cultural hegemony using mass media will always be an issue. As much as powerful societies may exist, exploitation of the weaker nations in the political, cultural, economic, or social spheres will always be a problematic issue for powerful and weaker societies and the world. For African societies, in particular, most African coalitions like the African Union (AU), the Economic Commission for West African States (ECOWAS), and the East African Community (EAC) have failed to achieve their mandates because of weaknesses in leadership among them. Despite some countries like Libya and Nigeria trying to take the lead, they have not been successful.

It must be acknowledged that Western society, partly through media, has helped eliminate some derogatory African cultural practices like early marriages and female genital mutilation, and Western religion has done away with human sacrifice and taboos based on unfounded premises of bad omens. For example, disabled children and twins were thrown away into forests in some Kenyan communities as they were considered a bad omen. In addition, there is a feeling of social responsibility among countries that have more power. This is why countries like the United States have an African Policy, which it uses to help developing African nations. For instance, through AGOA, African nations, including Kenya, benefit from trading with the United States. Like other African nations, Kenya also benefits from aid given by the United States through agencies such as USAID. However, this can be abused, as was seen in the United States, where media was used to justify the invasion of Iraq by claiming they had weapons of mass destruction that have not been found to date. The major reason for the invasion was to control the oil-rich country for the United States' benefit.

In conclusion, it can be noted that, as long as Kenya, as an example of a developing country, continues to air western civilization's programs, then the society, as Schiller notes (1973), will always believe it should act, feel, think, and live as western civilizations act, feel, think, and live. And mass media will always remain the vehicle through which cultural imperialism will be propagated. And this is inimical to the attempts at positive development of African cultures in general and Kenyan culture in particular.

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The Influence of Pioneer Schools and Makerere University on Kenya's Post-Colonial Development

Peter O. Ojiambo and Margaret W. Njeru

INTRODUCTION

There is a dearth of scholarship on the influence of pioneer schools in Africa despite their impact on the formation of colonial and postcolonial subjectivities. Terri Ochiagha notes that “many of the pioneer schools have remained the preserve of life-writing, school stories and commemorative volumes” (2015, p. 10). Elaborating this point further, Adam Howard and Ruben Gaztambide-Fernandez observe that elite education of Africa’s pioneer schools and their influence on African countries in the colonial and postcolonial periods “has remained virtually unmapped terrain and largely outside the scholarly gaze” (2010, p. 9). Some of the scant work that has been done in this area in recent years has been in the domain of biographical chapters and literary trivia. This chapter seeks to fill this scholarly void by examining various alumni from Alliance High School (AHS) and Alliance Girls High School (AGHS) and their impact on the Kenyan nation.

It is significant to note that the existence of the early East African secondary schools such as Budo and Kisubi in Uganda, Tabora and Minage in Tanzania, the AHS and AGHS in Kenya, among others, with one center for higher

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education—Makerere College in Uganda—to serve them all during the colonial period must be considered one of the most significant factors in the making of an East African elite which at independence could be relied upon to take over from the departing colonial bureaucracy the reins of social, political, and economic power. The making of this elite from these pioneer schools lay more in the secondary school than in college as in each territory. It was there that the narrow gate—the way to higher education—and, with it, the attaining of their elite status and later influence in society resided.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ALLIANCE HIGH SCHOOL

The development of secondary education in Kenya during the colonial period was painfully slow. The Alliance High School (AHS) was the first African secondary school in Kenya. In recording the history of the founding of AHS, James Smith (1973, p. 2) observes, “it is difficult to place one finger on a particular incident and say it all began on that day, at that time and in that place. Many different streams of human endeavor over many years contributed to the conception and founding of the school.” The school was formed by the Alliance Movement (AM), which consisted of the Church Missionary Society (CMS), the African Inland Mission (AIM), the United Methodist Mission (UMM), and the Church of Scotland Mission (CSM).

Alliance High School was started in 1926, the year of the La Zoute conference, at which, according to Sorobea Bongo, the Protestant missions “formally agreed to co-operate with the British Government in a new education policy for African territories” (1992, p. 99). As early as 1915, the CSM in Kenya had considered establishing a central training institution at Kikuyu with educational, medical, and industrial branches. In 1918, the AM took up the matter and proposed building a central institute to this effect. After World War I, a surplus of 5600 pounds from the East African Welfare War Relief Fund was donated towards the project to be used as a memorial to the Africans who lost their lives in that war. Coincidentally, at this time, the CSM had assigned to the AM 100 acres of land at Kikuyu to establish an African college. It was, therefore, agreed that this college should be initiated as a medical school utilizing these funds. The Alliance Medical College, however, had a false start. Daniel Sifuna notes that after the college's failure, the AM wanted to turn the buildings “into an institution, which would give higher training, theological, medical, agriculture and technical work” (1980, p. 52). The result was a compromise agreement in 1925 that the buildings be used for a high school. Benjamin Kipkorir (1980) observes that the suggestion that this conception is given expression in a high school came from the educational expertise of Dr. John Arthur, the Protestant missionaries, and J. H. Oldham.

The founding of Alliance High School (AHS) was accelerated further by the findings of Phelps-Stokes Commission Report of 1925. The report recommended that any plan for higher education for Africans must consider the substantial buildings that had already been erected at Kikuyu by the AM. It also

reminded the government of Ernest Carr's offer of 10,000 pounds towards the establishment of Alliance College, provided the government met certain capital expenditures.

The school was begun in March 1926 with George Grieve as its first headmaster. Grieve remained headmaster for 17 years, and his character was an important influence on the school's growth. Its opening as a secondary school was a historic advance in African education in Kenya, and the scramble for students to be admitted to the school in the colonial period showed the great desire that Africans had for secondary education at the time. The standards of the new entrants to the school rose quickly and by 1935, only *crème de la crème* of the applicants were admitted. Kenneth Matiba writes that "in the early years the intake was only 25 students per year" (2000, p. 30). Thus, according to James Roelker (1976), the institution had the unique responsibility of educating the great majority of the African intelligentsia in the colonial years.

Grieve had pioneered the new venture in African education for twelve years at a time when it was unpopular and when education policy had not been defined. Carey Francis, the school's second headmaster, built on this foundation and set high standards. Campbell, the third headmaster, cemented the excellence and indicated its future. These first three talented headmasters of AHS ran a central theme—training first-class students who could serve society, were strong in academics, morals, and athletics. This aim was built firmly into the school prayer and motto, "*Strong to Serve*". Regarding academics, Bethwell Ogot observes that between 1926 and 1953, "AHS sent 222 students to Makerere College; Mangu sent 57 and Maseno 27" (2011, p. 60).

Of the three founding headmasters of AHS, the impact of AHS on Kenyan society cannot be discussed without examining Carey Francis's 26-year's leadership of the school. Carey Francis drummed into the receptive minds of his students a spirit of scholarship and service. Summing up the influence of AHS during Carey Francis' years, Benjamin Kipkorir states, "he warned us that we were elites in the making. He wanted us to be committed to the highest ideals of academics, character, and service" (2009, p. 133). Predicting the future influence, he thought AHS would have on the Kenyan state, James Smith, in 1961, noted "the school will be needed in the new Kenya. Our job is to train men who will serve it well" (1973, p. 224). Affirming Smith's views on the influence of AHS on the Kenyan nation in the late colonial period and early independence years, Sorobea Bogonko writes:

8 of the first 14 African elected Members of Parliament in 1958 had attended Alliance, as had 15 of the 33 Africans elected in 1961. In the first Cabinet, 10 of the 17 Ministers were Alliance alumni. In civil service, the first Africans to hold posts of Assistant Secretary and Crown Counsel were from Alliance. By 1965, 18 of the 26 Permanent Secretaries, 4 of Kenya's ambassadors, were from Alliance. (1992, p. 98)

But there were also other products of AHS as early as 1959, of which the school was justly proud. At that time, AHS alumni headed all the major Protestant Churches in Kenya. For instance, Tom Lung'aho was the Executive Secretary of the East Africa Yearly Meeting of Friends; Crispus Kiongo served as the Moderator of the Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA); Andrew Wambari, W. E. Mulwa, and Benjamin Ngaira were Chairmen and President of the Africa Inland Church; Ronald Mng'ong'o was the President of the Methodist Church while Festus Olang and Obadiah Kariuki were Bishops of the Anglican Church.

Selected AHS Alumni

The influence of Alliance High School (AHS) alumni dates back to October 1944, when Eliud Mathu was appointed the first African to represent African interests in the Legislative Council (LEGCO). He was followed by Wanyutu Waweru, who was appointed Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Education in 1954. In the fields of African advancement, particularly politics, AHS alumni constituted the majority of star players in pre-independence years. For instance, when for the first time, Africans were allowed to elect their representatives to the LEGCO in 1957 and 1958, the AHS alumni dominance was evident. Of the first eight elected members in 1957, six were AHS alumni. In 1960, the formation of the "caretaker government" that followed the Lancaster Constitutional Conference included three AHS alumni, namely: Dr. Gikonyo Kiano, Minister for Commerce and Industry, James Muimi, Minister for Health and Welfare, and Ronald Ngala, Minister for Labor, Social Security, and Adult Education. In the 1961 post-election Kenyan government, three AHS alumni held ministerial posts. They included: Ronald Ngala, Leader of LEGCO and Minister without Portfolio, Bernard Mate, Minister for Health and Social Affairs, and Taita Towett, Minister for Labor and Housing. On 1st June 1963, when Jomo Kenyatta became Prime Minister, eight AHS alumni were in his cabinet. They included: James Gichuru, Daniel Otiende, Oginga-Odinga, Mbiyu Koinange, Dr. Gikonyo Kiano, Daniel Mwanjumba, Eliud Mwendwa and Dr. Njoroge Mungai. Affirming this, Benjamin Kipkorir states, "in 1963, more than $\frac{3}{4}$ of the Cabinet, senior civil servants, permanent secretaries, Attorney-General, Commissioners of Police and Prisons were from Alliance. The 1966 Cabinet reshuffle brought Alliance representation in the Cabinet of twenty-two to twelve" (1980, p. 2).

Some of the notable alumni that have emerged from AHS in the political realm include: Eliud Mathu, discussed earlier, who after independence, served as President Jomo Kenyatta's Private Secretary. Other influential alumni from AHS in political circles during this period were B. A. Ohanga, the first African Minister of State, and Wanyutu Waweru, the Parliamentary Secretary. Another influential AHS alumnus during this period was Dr. Gikonyo Kiano. He served as a Minister in various ministries. Other influential political alumni that have come from AHS include Dr. Njoroge Mungai who served as an MP and

Minister; Dr. Munyua Waiyaki, who served as an MP, Assistant Minister, and Minister; Henry Muli who served as an MP and ambassador; Kyale Mwendwa who served as an MP; Robert Matano who served in the LEGCO, an MP and Minister; James Gichuru who served as an MP and Minister; Daniel Otiende who served as an MP and Minister; Jackson Angaine who served as an MP and Minister; Oginga Odinga who served as an MP, Minister, Vice-President, and opposition leader; Charles Njonjo who served as Attorney General and MP; and Jeremiah Nyagah who served as Minister.

The list also includes Bernard Mate who served as an MP, Minister and Speaker of Parliament; Paul Ngei who served as MP; Jeanne Marie Seroney who served as MP; Nathan Munoko who was MP and served as Assistant Minister, Minister, and KANU Organizing Secretary; John Keen who served as MP and Assistant Minister; Darius Mbela who served as MP and Minister; David Mwiraria who served as a PS, MP, and Minister; Joab Omino who served as a PS, MP, and Deputy Speaker of Parliament; and Kenneth Matiba who served as a PS, MP, Minister, and opposition leader.

Other notable alumni that have emerged from AHS in other fields that have left their mark on the Kenyan state include Professor David Wasawo who served at various administrative levels at the Universities of Makerere, Nairobi, and Kenyatta; Professor Simeon Ominde who served in several administrative positions at the University of Nairobi and chaired the 1964 Education Commission. Others include Duncan Ndegwa who served as Governor of Central Bank of Kenya; Kitili Mwendwa who served as Chief Justice; Jeremiah Kiereini who served as PS; John Mbiti, renowned professor of religion and theology; Phillip Ndegwa who served as PS; George Wanjau who served as Moderator of PCEA; Bernard Hinga who served as Commissioner of Police; James Kamunge who served as PS; Professor Thomas Ogada who served as Director of Medical Services; John Khaminwa, a renowned lawyer; Bethuel Kiplagat who served as PS and diplomat; Philip Ochieng, a prominent journalist; and Professors Ngugi wa Thiong'o and Francis Imbuga, eminent scholars.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ALLIANCE GIRLS HIGH SCHOOL

The Alliance of Protestant Missions established Alliance Girls High School in 1948. Up to the time of independence, the school was known as African Girls School. In the absence of secondary schools for girls, the first few girls to attend secondary school in Kenya between 1938 and 1952 joined AHS. But numbers remained small throughout this period. In 1937, John Smith, the then acting headmaster at AHS took the first step of admitting the first two girls, Zibia Ngatho and Lois Koinange and boarded them at the neighboring Kikuyu Mission. Efforts to admit girls into the boys' school were almost overturned when Carey Francis, was appointed the head of the school in 1940. The new efforts to see girls acquire secondary school were however unstoppable, and despite Carey Francis' opposition, more girls continued to be admitted to AHS.

Between 1938 and 1948, at most only five girls were in AHS at any one time. By the end of 1943, a committee consisting of Carey Francis, L. B. Greaves, W. Blaikie and L. Warobi was appointed to consider, in consultation with the Director of Education, the lines along which future development at AHS was desirable for girls' education with special reference to three possibilities: having a co-educational school at AHS; establishing a separate school for girls; having a school partly separate, partly co-educational. As a result of these discussions, the board recommended that a separate school would be in the best interest of the girls.

Plans for starting a girls' school were slow in taking shape and it was not until 1948 that the AGHS was officially opened in a temporary building on the CSM land at Kikuyu. James Smith observes that in 1948, Rev. R. G. M. Calderwood of CSM Kikuyu, bought an Army hut from Army Disposals. This was rebuilt at Kikuyu and was officially opened in February 1948 as the first African girls' secondary school. The school began with an enrolment of eleven girls. This marked the acceleration of secondary education for African girls in Kenya. By the beginning of 1950, new buildings had been erected and the girls moved into their new school.

The first headmistress of the school was Jean Wilkinson who served from 1948 to 1954. In 1955, Mary Bruce arrived as the second headmistress of the school. The rapid expansion of the school took place during her tenure. In 1969, Joan Waithaka, one of the school's first alumni, took over the leadership as the first African headmistress and successfully led the institution until her retirement in 1984.

Selected AGHS Alumni

Alliance Girls High School has, over the years, continued to be an academic giant and has produced several alumni who have influenced the Kenyan nation in various fields such as politics, education, finance, public service, literature, among others. One of its leading alumnae in the political field was Margaret Kenyatta, a leading woman activist who served in various women's organizations. She was elected councilor for Dagoretti in 1963. She was re-elected for the position for four successive terms. In 1969, Kenyatta was elected Deputy Mayor of Nairobi. She became Mayor in 1970, making her the first African woman mayor of the capital city. During her tenure, several development programs were initiated. She served as Kenya's Permanent Representative to the United Nations and as a Commissioner to the Kenyan Electoral Commission.

Another leading politician and academician from AGHS is Dr. Julia Ojiambo. Ojiambo was the first female lecturer at the University of Nairobi and was among the first women elected to Parliament in 1974 and 1979. She was the first woman to be appointed Assistant Minister and was nominated twice to Parliament. For decades, Ojiambo has been involved in various women movements. She served as the Director for KANU Youth and Women Affairs,

founder of the Labor Party of Kenya and Chair, University of Nairobi Council (UNC).

Winfred Nyiva Mwendwa is another notable AGHS alumna in the political arena. Mwendwa was among the first women to vie for a parliamentary seat. She was elected MP in 1974 and 1995, she became the first female Cabinet Minister in Kenya. She is remembered for her long-time involvement in various women organizations and advocacy for equal gender representation in leadership. Mwendwa served as an MP for three terms. In 2013, she won the Kitui County Woman Representative seat.

Charity Ngilu is another influential alumna from AGHS who has had a remarkable presence in Kenyan politics. Ngilu is remembered as the first woman to run for Kenya's presidency in 1997 and to lead a political party. She served as an MP for Kitui Central for two decades. She has held various ministerial posts and initiated progressive policy changes. She was elected Governor for Kitui County in 2017, becoming one of the three first female governors in the devolved Kenyan system of governance.

Dr. Sally Kosgei is another alumna from AGHS that has influenced Kenyan public service. She was the first woman to be appointed Cabinet Secretary and Head of Public Service. She began her tenure as a lecturer at the University of Nairobi. She served as the Permanent Representative of the Kenya Mission to HABITAT and UNEP; Kenya High Commissioner to Zimbabwe, United Kingdom, Ireland, and Switzerland; PS, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During her tenure as PS, she enhanced Kenya's international diplomacy. She was elected MP for Aldai Constituency in 2007. During her tenure as an MP, she was appointed Cabinet Minister in various ministries and was instrumental in streamlining their policies. In 2016, she was appointed Chancellor of Taita Taveta University.

Alliance Girls High School alumnae have also left their mark in education. Some of the leading alumnae in this area include Joan Waithaka. Waithaka, mentioned earlier, was one of the first African girls to attend AHS, the first Kenyan woman to attend Makerere College and to serve as Principal of AGHS. She is remembered for having led the school to great academic heights and her strong advocacy of promoting girls' education.

Professor Eddah Gachukia is one of the leading Kenyan educationists and is an alumna of both AGHS and Makerere. She was among the first female MPs. She was nominated to Parliament between 1974 and 1983. She served as an academic at the University of Nairobi for two decades and is a founder member of many women organizations. Further, she has served on various educational task forces, chaired Moi University Council and Starehe Girls Centre board of trustees. Gachukia is also a leading educational entrepreneur. Together with her husband, Daniel Gachukia, they founded the Riara Group of Schools and Riara University.

Another leading academician from AGHS who has left a mark on Kenyan education is Professor Olive Mugenda. Mugenda has served as a lecturer and headed various units at Kenyatta University (KU) before serving as

Vice-Chancellor (VC). Mugenda is known for the expanded programs and physical transformation she brought to KU. During her reign, KU began various income-generating projects and built strong partnerships with the private sector. Through her partnership with the latter, KU was able to build Chandaria Business Incubation and Innovation Centre. Through a partial government loan and funding from the Chinese government, KU built Kenyatta University's Medical, Research, and Referral Hospital under Mugenda's leadership. Mugenda has served as Chairperson, Kenyatta University Hospital Board, a member of the Judicial Service Commission, and Chancellor, Kenya College of Accountancy.

Professor Mabel Imbuga is another prominent educationist from AGHS. She is a former VC of Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (JKUAT). Susan Wakhungu-Githuku notes that under her leadership, "JKUAT strived to become a leading university in research, innovation, science, and technology" (2010, p. 339). Additionally, the university introduced programs that aligned with Kenya's developmental agenda. Imbuga is a strong advocate for women training in scientific fields.

Another area in which the AGHS alumnae have left a mark is literature. Some of its key alumnae in this field include Rebeka Njau, Asenath Odaga, and Dr. Margaret Ogola. Rebeka Njau, one of the first girls to go to AHS and among its first alumni to attend Makerere, is an educator, a poet, and a novelist. After Makerere, she joined AGHS as a teacher. She was one of the founders of Moi Girls High School, Nairobi, where she served as headmistress. She belongs to women pioneers who "mothered" postcolonial Kenya in varied ways (Odhiambo, 2019).

Asenath Bole Odaga was a leading teacher, writer, publisher, and activist. She was the founder of Kenya Writers Association and Kenya Oral Literature Association, a sub-editor with East African Standard, and a Research Fellow at the Institute of African Studies, University of Nairobi. Additionally, she was the founder of Lake Publishers, the first indigenous publishing firm in Kenya. A champion for women's empowerment, she founded Kenya Literature Women's Group and the Gender and Development Centre. She is credited for introducing African oral literature in Kenyan schools.

Another leading literary alumna of AGHS is Dr. Margaret Ogola. Ogola dedicated her life to advocating for the rights of women, unborn children, HIV/AIDS orphans, and street children. She served as Medical Director of Cottolengo Hospice for HIV/AIDS orphans. She helped establish the SOS HIV/AIDS clinic, which serves low-income communities. She served in various other positions, including as Director of the Family Life Counselling Association of Kenya and Executive Secretary for Health and Family Life. Ogola's passion for bettering human life inspired many of her writings (Kenya Yearbook, 2019).

Another sphere where AGHS alumnae have had an impact is finance, where several names stand out, including Dr. Mary Okelo and Susan Mudhune. Okelo is recognized as the woman who made it possible for women in Kenya

and Africa to access banking facilities and hold managerial positions. While working at Barclays, she founded the Barclays Bank Women's Association to mentor young women bankers. Later, she founded the Kenya Women's Finance Trust to enable women access financial facilities. She became the first African representative to Women's World Banking. Her main role was to sensitize African governments to enact equitable financial laws. Okelo served as the first female senior advisor to the African Development Bank, charged with developing policies that could enhance women development. Okelo is a pioneer in private education in Kenya. Together with her husband, Dr. Pius Okelo, they founded Makini Schools.

Susan Mudhune is one of the leading financial executives from AGHS whose influence on the sector is remarkable. She has served in senior managerial positions at the National Bank of Kenya, Carbacid Investments and as Chairperson, Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB). During her tenure at KCB, she spearheaded the expansion of the bank in Eastern Africa. Through her transformative leadership, KCB became a leading regional bank. She is passionate about women's inclusion in corporate leadership.

Another influential alumna from AGHS is Justice Effie Owuor. Owuor was the first woman to be appointed a resident and senior resident magistrate, high court, and court of appeal judge. She chaired several organizations, namely the Kenya Law Commission, the Kenya Magistrates Association and Kenya Women Judges Association. Susan Wakhungu-Githuku notes, "she was a leader of task-forces of laws pertaining to children and women" (2010, p. 267). She also served as Kenya's Goodwill Ambassador to the United Nations Children's Fund.

Other AGHS alumnae that have excelled in various fields that deserve mention include Professor Margaret Kobia, who has served as Cabinet Secretary, Chair of the Public Service Commission, Director of Kenya School of Government, among other roles; Betty Maina who has served as the Chief Executive Officer of Kenya Association of Manufacturers, PS in various ministries and Cabinet Secretary; Professor Rosalind Mutua, founder and former VC of Kiriri Women's University of Science and Technology; Professor Micere Mugo, a leading human rights activist, academic, and literary critic; Margaret Githinji, who has served as a PS, and Joy Mboya, the Director of GoDown Arts Centre that nurtures talents of artists among others.

THE INFLUENCE OF ALUMNI FROM OTHER KENYAN PIONEER SCHOOLS

Apart from AHS and AGHS, there have been several other Kenyan pioneer schools whose alumni have had a tremendous impact on the Kenyan nation. One such school that stands out is Mangu High School (MHS). Some of its towering alumni include: Mwai Kibaki who served as Kenya's third President, Vice-President, Minister, MP, and opposition leader; Moody Awori who served as Kenya's Vice-President, Minister, Assistant Minister, and MP; Professor

George Saitoti who served as Kenya's Vice-President, Minister, and MP; Thomas Mboya who served as Minister, MP, and a trade unionist; John Michuki, who served as PS, a MP, and Minister; Peter Nyakiamo who was a corporate leader and an MP; Lawrence Sagini who served as an MP and Chairman, UNC, and; George Muhoho who served as an MP and a corporate leader.

Other leading alumni from MHS include Cardinal Maurice Otunga who was the first Kenyan Catholic priest, Bishop, Archbishop and head of the Catholic Church in Kenya; Archbishop Ndingi Mwana wa Nzeki who was the Bishop of Nakuru Diocese, and head of the Catholic Church in Kenya; Archbishop John Njenga who was head of Nyeri and Mombasa Dioceses of the Catholic Church; Hilary Ngweni who was the first African editor of *Nation Newspapers* and founder of *Weekly Review*; Joe Wanjui who led several corporate bodies and was Chairman, UNC. Summing up the early influence of MHS on post-independence Kenya, John Osogo observed, "Mangu High School has produced more doctors, both medical and academic, scientists and engineers than any other Kenyan school" (1970, p. 231). Osogo's assertion is true, and over the years, the impact of MHS alumni on various sectors in Kenya has remained strong. This is evidenced in the fact that from MHS alone have emerged three Kenyan Vice-Presidents, a President, and two heads of the Catholic Church.

MAKERERE UNIVERSITY AND THE TRAINING OF KENYAN ELITE

By 1945, secondary and higher education were still rare in Kenya and the larger East African region. There were just 395 African secondary pupils in Kenya and 52 Kenyan students studying at Makerere, the only post-secondary institution in the region. The history of higher education for Africans in Kenya and the making of the Kenyan elite until the late fifties is a story about Makerere. Although few Kenyans went for higher education outside Makerere, the greater majority discussed in this chapter went to Makerere during the colonial period and early independence years.

Makerere started as a native technical college in 1922. In the Directors of Education Conference held in Dar-es-Salaam in March 1929, it was agreed that higher education for East Africa should be centered at Makerere. Its initial aim was to provide technical training and qualifications to promising East African students. In 1938, it became the Higher College of East Africa, offering a two-year general diploma course in the higher sciences, arts, and professional courses such as education, medical, veterinary, and agricultural sciences. It was open to all successful students from British East Africa. An examination of various alumni of AHS and AGHS discussed in this chapter shows the tremendous impact they have had on Kenyan society and the educational preparation that Makerere provided them. In summative, some of the leading alumni from Makerere discussed in this chapter and other pioneer Kenyan schools not discussed include Eliud Mathu, Mwai Kibaki, Oginga Odinga, Daniel Otiende,

Bethwel Kiplagat, Bethwell Ogot, John Mbiti, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, David Wasawo, Simeon Ominde, Thomas Ogada, Douglas Odhiambo, Eddah Gachukia, Micere Mugo, Rebeka Njau, Joan Waithaka, Mary Okelo, Tabitha Seii, David Mwiraria, Kenneth Matiba, Benjamin Kipkorir among others.

CONCLUSION

The chapter illustrates lucidly that Kenyan pioneer schools such as AHS, AGHS, as well as MHS have had an enormous impact on Kenyan society in the postcolonial period. It is clear that this influence is likely to continue despite the emergence of other well-performing schools in recent years. It is vital to note that beyond the two pioneer schools discussed in this chapter, other leading pioneer Kenyan schools are not covered in this chapter whose alumni have equally left their stamp on Kenyan society. It is of significance to note that apart from studies that have been done on MHS, Maseno School, Nyangori High School and Starehe Boys Centre and School, minimal research has been done on many of Kenya's pioneer schools and their role in shaping the nation. This is an area that demands more research and scholarship. A robust scholarship of these schools is expected to provide pathways on how Kenya can create a solid transformative education system that can make it a leading African nation.

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African Women in Colonial Kenya, 1900–1963

Julius Simiyu Nabende and Martha W. Musalia

INTRODUCTION

Women have been a major theme of discussion in social science research in Africa since the World Conference on Women in Nairobi in 1985. This research has predominantly examined women participation in politics, women's movements, women's rights, and women's economic empowerment in the post-independence era in Kenya (Kabira & Kimani, 2012; Kamau, 2010). There exists a major knowledge gap in our understanding of African women in Colonial Kenya. Colonial Kenya was racially categorized in terms of Europeans, Asians, and Africans and, thus, women too were perceived racially as European women, Asian women, and African women. Since the European colonial state was constructed on the dominance of the European race, then automatically, white women were more privileged in contrast to Asian and African women. The historiography of colonial Kenya has largely focused on the position, activities, and involvement of the African man in the British colonial political economy. The African woman has marginally featured in Kenya's colonial historiography. Yet there exists historical evidence to demonstrate the proactive role of African women in the social, political, and economic processes in colonial Kenya. This chapter attempts to document the role of African women in the socioeconomic and political dynamics of the Kenya colony with a special focus on African women and resistance movements against the establishment of British colonialism, African women in British colonial administration, African women in the colonial economy, African women and western European education, African female body, and African women in the politics of decolonization.

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AFRICAN WOMEN AND RESISTANCE AGAINST BRITISH COLONIALISM, 1900–1914

The declaration of a British protectorate over Kenya and Uganda in 1895 triggered resistance movements against British imperialism. In Kenya, the Nandi, Masai, Babukusu, Kikuyu, Gusii, Kamba, and the Giriama staged strong military responses toward penetration of British colonial rule. Other Kenyan societies organized passive resistance movements. The Arabs in the ten-mile coastal strip of Kenya, a section of the Masai led by Lenana, the Abawanga were among societies that collaborated with the British colonial administration. African women were at the forefront, particularly in armed resistance against British colonial rule. The Giriama community in coastal Kenya organized an armed struggle against British colonial rule. The Giriama resistance movement, which reached its apex in 1912–1915, was led by a powerful woman named Mekatilili wa Menza. This resistance was caused by the discontent of the Giriama against British colonial policies of taxation and forced labor in European plantations and public works. The Colonial administration also controlled Giriama trade in ivory and palm wine. Mekatilili wa Menza played a major part in organizing meetings in July 1913 that were held in Kaya Fungo, which was the ritual center of the Giriama.

In these meetings, oaths were administered whose purpose was to unite the people so that they do not cooperate with the British colonial administration. Mekatilili wa Menza traversed the entire Giriama territory and mobilized the people to rebel and resist European colonialism. The conflict between the Giriama and the British colonialists reached its climax in August 1913 when Mr. Arthur Champion, a local colonial administrator, detained nine young men who had failed to pay taxes. This triggered the Giriama, under the leadership of Mekatilili wa Menza, to attack the police post so as to free the detainees. This led to a battle in which the Giriama were conquered and Mekatilili, together with her colleague Mr. Wanje wa Mwadorikola fled to Kisii, Nyanza region, Kenya (Maxwell, pp. 60–64; Nyamweru, 2006, p. 8).

The African women in the Gusii community made a remarkable impact in resisting British colonialism. Moraa Ng'iti, a medicine woman, provided leadership in the Gusii resistance against the British administration. She inspired the warriors to fight and assured them that she had medicine that would dissolve the bullets of the British soldiers into water. In 1908 she collaborated with her stepson Mr. Otenyo and killed the District Commissioner. The colonial security agencies arrested her, but she was released later because of her old age. She passed on in 1929 after leaving a mark on women's radical resistance against British Colonialism (Ndubi, 2013, p. 60).

African women in pastoralist societies were also on the front line in resisting British colonialism. The Borana and Rendille women organized demonstrations against British colonial policies. In 1950 these women challenged the dress code which the colonial authorities had imposed. These women were required to wear long dresses to cover their bodies so that the European male

colonial administrators won't be tempted to seek sexual favors from these African Borana and Rendille women. This law had been enacted out of pressure by the wives of colonial administrators who accused African women of walking around with their breasts bare and only putting a loin/piece of cloth around their waist. The women took to the streets in Marsabit town, demonstrated, and called on the colonial government to do away with the dress code. They also took the opportunity to ask the colonial government to ban the chewing of Khaat/miraa because women bore the burden of buying Khaat for their men from the savings they made after selling baskets and jewelry (Guyo, 2017).

Definitely, women from other African communities also participated in resisting British colonialism in Kenya but their roles are yet to be documented.

AFRICAN WOMEN IN COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION

African women entered the colonial administration as early as 1901 when Wangu wa Makeri was appointed as the “headman” of Weithaga location in Murang'a district. She was recommended by Chief Karuri of Weithaga location, Murang'a district. She worked as a colonial chief till 1909. Wangu was remembered by her community as an authoritarian administrator who dealt ruthlessly with tax evaders. It was said that she subjected tax evaders to hard labor and used them as transport whenever she moved from one village to another. The tax evaders would carry her on their backs (<http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article2000051911/wangu-wa-makeri>).

Women participation in colonial administration expanded particularly in Nairobi, Kiambu, Murang'a, and Nyeri because of concerted efforts to wipe out the Mau Mau Movement. Women in these regions were enrolled for service in the emergency villages as Community Development Officers. Their terms of service were to organize childcare, distribute food, and set up women clubs in the resettlement villages. A few of the women were also employed by the colonial government in counterinsurgency campaigns where they persuaded the community to delink itself from the Mau Mau operatives (Feichtinger, 2017, p. 65).

The visibility of African women in colonial administration was quite low because the British colonial state deliberately discriminated both African male and female genders in mainstream public administration sector.

AFRICAN WOMEN IN THE COLONIAL ECONOMY

African women constituted a considerable percentage of traders in Nairobi city as early as 1899 when the town emerged as a commercial center with the building of the Kenya-Uganda Railway. African women from Kiambu, Machakos, and Kajiado were attracted by new commodities and the vibrant money economy and commuted to Nairobi to sell their agricultural products (Ngeza, 1996). In the private sector, women were predominantly employed in the

prostitution sector in Nairobi, Kisumu, and Mombasa. They had a ready market among European, Asian, and African male workers in these cities. Women who participated in commercial sex came mostly from the Nandi, Masai, Somali, Kikuyu, Luhya, and Mijikenda ethnic groups. A considerable proportion of African women also got jobs as house helps, commonly referred to as Ayahs. This occupation was dominated by women from the Ganda, Kikuyu, and Nandi societies. Ayahs earned on average Kshs.34 a month. African women used the proceeds from prostitution, particularly in Nairobi to put up semipermanent rental houses in Pumwani. The African women in Nairobi also put up houses for lodgings, which marked the origins of the African women's petite bourgeoisie (Stitcher, 1982, p. 10). Anar Vibram (1994) noted that whereas the colonial government regulated and controlled women's mobility, a few women managed to accompany their husbands to towns and then began participating in petty trading enterprises such as brewing beer, selling crafts, selling cooked food, and others engaged in prostitution. Trading in beer-brewing and prostitution were so lucrative that a few women entrepreneurs used their proceeds to purchase property and put up rental houses, becoming landlords in Nairobi, Kisumu, and Mombasa (Vibram, 1994, pp. 83–84).

In the formal sector, women's wage labor was on European agricultural plantations. They worked as coffee pickers and maize harvesters. It was estimated that by 1926 about 4,800 women worked every month on European Settler farms in the Kiambu district and they earned between 12 and 14 Kenya shillings per month. The average number of African women in wage employment in European plantations between 1919 and 1934 was 3387. The number of African women in casual employment in the European agricultural economy in the same period was 6685. Most of the African women casual workers were from the Kipsigis, Nandi, Kamba, and Luhya communities. By 1954 African women constituted 12% of all employees in the formal sector (Vibram, 1994, p. 14).

In the rural areas in Kenya, African women gradually took over the production processes in the peasant economies of colonial Kenya. This was because European colonial labor laws forced many African males out of the traditional economy into European settler agricultural economies. In the absence of the men in the traditional economies, women had to produce food for the household and take care of cash crop farming to supplement the household income (Chege, 2016, p. 21).

In Josame location in Nyanza, women were involved in the provision of labor in colonial government public works that included roadside clearing and soil erosion conservation. The male labor in the location had migrated into European settler farms and in the towns of Nairobi, Mombasa, and Kisumu, thus leaving women as the dominant labor force in the rural areas. In 1946 census showed that out of 254,757 African labor force in the Kenya colony, 106,460 were from Nyanza, evidence that the region and specifically African women bore the burden of provision of labor in the African reserves. The absence of male labor in the rural areas in Nyanza limited women's mobility,

confining them in rural areas (Okuro, 2006). Anar Vibram (1994) has reinforced the argument of confinement of African women in peasant economies in colonial Kenya by highlighting that the colonial administration sought the intervention of chiefs and elders to promote social control of African women so that young men could provide labor in the public sector while women could take care of production in the peasant sector. Colonial legislation and policies relating to marriage, mobility, taxation, land, and inheritance had a relationship with the control of African female labor power on the one hand while on the other hand, secured firm control of cash crop production and ownership of land in the hands of African male heads of households. Anar Vibram echoed the crucial significance of African female mobility by asserting that “Women’s mobility represented a fundamental challenge to the structural basis of their power since women were the primary producers within lineage. As well, absent migrant farmers would lose land rights if wives did not remain behind” (Vibram, 1994, p. 85).

AFRICAN WOMEN IN COLONIAL EDUCATION

The position of African women in education in colonial Kenya was closely intertwined with three issues, namely the values of Christian missionaries who institutionalized education for Africans, the colonial state’s perception of education for African women, and lastly the attitude of African men towards the education of the African girl/woman. Christian Missionary organizations such as the Church Missionary Society (CMS), African Inland Mission (AIM), National Holiness Mission (NHM), Holy Catholic Fathers, and Friends African Mission (FAM), among others, pioneered education for African girls. All these mission organizations had leaders who were middle-class, educated men with Victorian ideals of gender relations. Their perception of education for African girls/women was to produce ideal housewives for the educated African men. Thus, the curriculum for African girls’ education consisted of cookery, tailoring, and laundry. The girls were also taught aspects of agricultural skills and basic hygiene (Chege, 2016, p. 27).

In Kericho and Nandi communities in the rift valley of Kenya, the AIM and NHM were actively involved in the provision of education for African girls and women. The AIM set up its first African Girls’ school at Litein in Kericho in 1925 with an initial enrolment of 25 girls, and by 1936 the enrolment had increased to 40. The curriculum was made of homemaking, hygiene, infant welfare, food preparation, and sewing. NHM set up the first African school in 1936, and by 1939 enrolment stood at 34 girls/women. Enrolment in mission schools for girls declined drastically in the 1940s because of strong resistance by the Kipsigis community against the Christian/missionary teachings in the schools. The missionaries denounced female circumcision, a tradition deeply rooted in the values of the Kipsigis and Nandi communities, for the low enrolment of girls in Christian mission schools. The missionaries criticized forced early marriages for African girls of ages 12–16 for low enrolment, yet for the

elders, once a girl was circumcised, she proceeded to get married. The community leaders demanded that the colonial government set up secular schools for their African girls (Ronoh, 2000, pp. 112–121).

In Western Kenya, Miss Appleton and Miss Mollner opened girls' schools at Church Missionary Society (CMS) Butere and Ng'iya, while the Ursuline Sisters opened a girls' school at Mukumu in 1934. While Agnes Clarke of the British and Foreign Bible Society opened a school for girls at Kamagambo in 1922. In central Kenya, Marion Stevenson opened a girls' school at Tumu Kama ambo in 1926. On the coast, the Catholic Sisters under the Holy Ghost Fathers Mission set up a girls' school at Bura (Khanani, 2015, pp. 39–42; Peterson, 2000; Amayo, 1973). These initiatives inspired other missionary organizations to open girls' schools in different parts of the country in the colonial era.

The colonial government began thinking about girls' education in 1924 as it enacted its educational policy of the Phelps-Stoke Commission, which recommended the need for African girls' education. But it wasn't until the post-Second World War period that the colonial government took steps to promote African girls'/women's education. Specifically, in 1950 the colonial government opened the first training school for women organized on the same model as the Jeanes School which had been founded in 1924 to train African men in vocational and agricultural skills. The students were recruited from married women, and the purpose was to produce women leaders for the African communities. The curriculum was cookery, housewifery, laundry, hygiene, childcare, first aid, home nursing, needlework, handwork, games, curios, literacy, agriculture, and simple accounting (Chege, 2016, p. 28). The training also focused on midwifery, pre- and post-natal care, and domestic science. The philosophy of this curriculum was to produce an effective and all-rounded housewife (Ibid.). Mildred Ndeda (1999) concurs with Chege (2016) and affirms that by 1948 the colonial government had encouraged the formation of community centers funded by grants from the Local Native Councils, whose purpose was to enhance vocational training among African women. These centers were established in towns such as Kericho, Kisumu, and Nairobi. The centers provided weaving and spinning training sessions for African women. The training lasted for twelve months. The centers too provided domestic social welfare programs that included baby shows, displays of cooked foods, sports, singing, and dancing (Ndeda, 1999, p. 6).

Education for African girls/women remained very low in colonial Kenya. In 1953, for instance, the enrolment of African girls in primary school level was 28,278 for primary 1, 18,223 for primary 2, 12,934 for primary 3, and 10,115 for primary 4. This was a big contrast to boys' enrolment in schools which was 71,229 for primary 1, 50,822 for primary 2, while primary 3 and 4 had 41,614 and 39,127 boys, respectively. In the intermediate school, the enrolment for girls was 4,629 for primary 5 and primary 6 had 2,814. In primary 7, the enrolment was 1,760 and in primary 8, it dropped to 955 girls. At the secondary school level, the scenario was worse because in form 1 the girls were 347, then

108 in form 2, and in form 3 and 4 they dropped to 25 and 11, respectively. The enrolment for the boys was 2,072 in form 1, in form 2 there were 946, in form 3 the enrolment declined to 398, and in form 4 it came down to 298 boys. In the post-secondary level, the enrolment for girls was almost nonexistent. While the male enrolment was about 48 (Shepherd, 1955).

The colonial government was not keen on promoting education for African girls. The few girls who accessed school received an education that neither prepared them for equal job opportunities with their male counterparts nor gave them economic independence, dignity, and self-esteem. Colonial western education that guaranteed employment in the prestigious public and private sector was reserved for Europeans and a few African men. The majority of African women were denied access to secondary and tertiary education. Even at the primary level, the philosophy of the curriculum for African boys was the three Rs, that is, arithmetic, writing, and reading, whereas the curriculum for African girls was three Bs: namely, baby, bath, and broom (Chege, 2016, p. 24).

THE AFRICAN FEMALE BODY IN COLONIAL KENYA

The debate on female circumcision had a remarkable impact on the construction of the African female body. Female circumcision in colonial Kenya took on different perceptions depending on the scholars discussing it. Some scholars preferred to use clitoridectomy, while others referred to it as female circumcision (Luongo, 2000; Boulanger, 2008). The controversy over clitoridectomy reached its climax in the 1930s when there was a struggle for political dominance between the colonial government on the one hand and the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) on the other. The KCA used the controversy to advance their freedom struggle against British colonialism. The KCA was not just concerned with the alienation of land in central Kenya by the British colonial government but also the interference of the colonial state in the customs and traditions of the Kikuyu community. Circumcision of girls was one of the customs that had immense significance in relation to promoting gender relations in the Kikuyu Community. Yet the colonial state and the Christian mission organizations such as the Church Missionary Society, and the Scotland Missionary Society attacked these traditional rites of passage for girls in the Kikuyu Community. From the perspective of KCA leadership, the colonial state wanted to destroy the intricate organization of the Kikuyu community by outlawing and denouncing female circumcision. Ironically, the voice of girls and women was marginalized in the clitoridectomy debate. Clitoridectomy was simply a platform used by the two protagonists, that is, the KCA and the colonial government, to achieve their political aims. For KCA, female circumcision was to facilitate women to remain in the traditional agricultural setup where their roles were to provide labor by producing and reproducing surplus capital.

In the 1930s, the perception of the colonial government on initiation of African women and girls had drastically gone through changes. There was a general observation that birth rates had declined in colonial Kenya and, thus,

the colonial officers were under pressure to provide all incentives to increase birth rates. The British colonial economy was founded on plantation agriculture that relied on cheap African labor. A decline in labor had consequences on the colonial economy at large. The colonial administrators felt that their denouncement of female circumcision could have led to low birth rates, since in the Kikuyu, Kipsigis, and Nandi communities, it was a disgrace for a girl to become pregnant before circumcision. If such an event occurred, then the uncircumcised girl's child was killed, which has been described as infanticide. The colonial administration came up with regulations that legalized mass excisions on girls who had reached the puberty stage. Men conducted these excisions. This exercise is known in Kikuyu as "Kiwagrie", that is, the one for which we were unprepared. Lynn Thomas described it in the following words: "After gathering the young girls in a field the policemen would place them in a line and select for excision those whose breasts had begun to develop. They would circumcise the girls and leave..." (Thomas, 1998, p. 43).

This was a clear demonstration that the body of the African woman was for reproduction purposes to maintain labor supply on the farms of the European settlers. The fact that it was men who were police officers that conducted the excision on the girls was adequate evidence that the colonial state had no dignity and respect for African women's bodies. The colonial administrators went further and demanded that the age at which girls ought to be circumcised be lowered to reduce abortion, especially among girls who feared being disgraced by the community for getting pregnant before circumcision. The colonial government defended its decision to legalize mass excisions as a better approach to addressing abortion, which had become prevalent in the Mount Kenya region (Luongo, 2000, p. 121). Yet the fact of the matter was that the colonial government was simply concerned with promoting high birth rates.

The perception of the African woman's body and subsequent roles defined for her was a consequence of European racial and gender bias. This bias is eloquently captured in the off-the-cuff remarks of British colonial administrators who argued that to any observer, African women are inferior to the men and that they are not fit to get freedoms of mobility and independent decision-making because their instincts are purely animal (Vibram, 1994, p. 82).

AFRICAN WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF DECOLONIZATION

African women put a remarkable impact on the liberation struggle for independence in Kenya. Nonetheless, African women in central and eastern Kenya, and specifically the Kikuyu and Meru women, emerged as the dominant representation of African Kenyan women in the struggle for independence. Eudora (2012) traces the involvement of African women in the decolonization process to the formation of the Young Kikuyu Association, which was founded by Harry Thuku in 1921. In her treatise, she points out that this movement had many objectives, one of which was to denounce forced labor and sexual assault of young women by colonial government officers. In March 1922, Harry

Thuku was arrested while leading an anti-British demonstration. African women in Nairobi came out forcefully and demanded the release of Harry Thuku because they knew that the Young Kikuyu Association was fighting for their rights. African women commandeered 8000 protestors outside the Nairobi police station with the aim of breaking into the police station to free their leader, Harry Thuku. There was a confrontation between the police and the protestors, and in the process, the police opened fire on the crowd. Mary Muthoni Nyanjiru, one of the African women leaders, was among the people killed in the demonstration. There were three other African women and seventeen men who lost their lives. Twenty-eight of the protestors were seriously wounded (Eudora, 2012, p. 24). This incident marked the genesis of women participation in the African liberation movement in Kenya. Women in Nairobi and Kiambu district, particularly the women coffee pickers, were inspired by the death of Mary Muthoni and began organizing constant work stoppages and demonstrations as a method of demanding better wages for their work.

African Kikuyu women were at the forefront of the struggle for liberation in the country. In 1930, they formed the Mumbi Central Association (MCA), which was very active in developing the social, economic, and political capacities of women. They used the association to make it known to the British colonialists that Africans would not sell their soil to Europeans. They created awareness among their women members not to report their male leaders to the colonial authorities. The association was actively involved in providing education for African girls. For example, the leaders raised funds to set up a women wing of the Githunguri College in Kiambu district that had opened its doors in 1939 as an African Independent Teachers College for training African male teachers. This college had a curriculum that combined western education with African indigenous education on the one hand and emphasis on challenges facing Africans in the colony on the other. In 1947 the MCA built a dormitory in the Githunguri College, which gave an opportunity for girls to board. Interestingly enough, some of the women graduates from this college joined the Mau Mau Liberation Army as combatants in the early 1950s. The early 1950s witnessed increased political radicalism among women, which was manifested in the burning of cattle sheds and pens as they protested against the inoculation of livestock and poultry to control rinderpest. This forced the colonial administration to arrest over 500 women in 1951 in Kiambu district to crack down on their political activities (Eudora, 2012, pp. 27–28).

The Mau Mau liberation struggle was very intense in the period 1952–1955 and throughout this period, the fighters in the forest relied on food supplies and other resources supplied from the reserves by women. Gachihi (1986) elaborately demonstrated the critical role of Kikuyu women in the Mau Mau liberation movement. She discussed the multifaceted roles of women in the movement as providers of food supplies, arms and ammunition, spies, and combatants in the freedom army. The supplies were disrupted in 1954 when the colonial government came up with the villagization program, where they dug deep trenches to cut off the forest from the villages. Nyaguthii Theuri was

one of the women leaders in the Mau Mau movement who organized food delivery to the fighters in Nyeri. These women acted as Mau Mau couriers. They gathered information by spying out locations where arms and ammunition were stored. Apart from Nyaguthii Theuri, there was also Wamuyu Gakuru alias Cinda Reri, who joined the courier of Mau Mau in 1951. Cinda Reri was a scout who recruited young girls into the Mau Mau movement. She and the young women recruits had the mission of luring soldiers of the Kings African Rifles Army based at Kiganjo to isolated houses in Nyeri where the Mau Mau fighters would pounce on the soldiers, kill them, and take away guns. The women also seduced the soldiers and obtained useful security information on their plans to attack the Mau Mau and this information was relayed to the fighters in the forest. Mama Habiba Ali, one of the strong Mau Mau women leaders in Nyeri town, used to hide arms and ammunition brought by African girls who were girlfriends of the King's African Rifles Soldiers in Kiganjo in her house in bags of dry maize and beans. She would then organize for the armaments to be ferried to the forest (Gachihi, 1986, pp. 36–184).

Kikuyu women were also at the forefront of the Mau Mau Liberation Army. In 1954 the colonial administrators reported that Mau Mau women fighters had raided Fort Hall and killed three men, five children, and one woman at a place called Muriani. A Mau Mau woman combatant called Njoki Waicere was among the leaders of these women fighters. Others included Marshal Muthoni and Cinda Reri, who participated in many Mau Mau raids against British colonial establishments. Cinda Reri led the Mau Mau raid against the Kings African Rifles Army in the battle of river Ruiru, in which the colonial government lost heavily to the Mau Mau fighters (Gachihi, 1986, p. 196).

Eudora (2012) has added her contribution to African women's involvement in the Mau Mau liberation struggle. She highlighted the active role of Wambui Otieno in the movement. From her analysis, Wambui Otieno took her first oath at age 16 and swore to fight for the soil of Gikuyu and Mumbi's children, which had been grabbed by the Whiteman, acquire guns and money to support the fighters in the forest, keep any information on the movement secret, and be ready to kill anyone, including her own brother who betrayed or opposed the movement. She worked as a scout and a spy for the movement. Her main contribution was to coordinate network contacts of government secretaries, house servants, and taxi drivers in order to obtain information on government plans against the movement and relay the same to the leadership of the movement. She visited police stations and homes of home guards to identify excellent exit routes for the freedom fighters once they planned an attack. On many occasions, she was arrested by security agencies but successfully defended herself. Other notable women figures were Elizabeth Gachika, a combatant who excelled on the frontline in battles; Muthoni Ngatha, referred to as Field Marshall; and Wagiri Njoroge, nicknamed Queen of Mau Mau. However, Wamuyu Gakuru was legendary because of her great prowess. For instance, in August 1953, under the leadership of General China and Field Marshall Dedan Kimathi, she commandeered a force of 200 women against the enemy. There

was also General Wanjiru Nyamenju in charge of food in the Ndothua, Nessuit, Gichobo, and Menengai Hills in the Njoro and Nakuru areas, while Elizabeth Wanjiku, Virginia Gacheke, and Rebecca Njeri, among others, administered oaths. There was also a cadre of women who did domestic work, getting firewood, cooking, washing, and providing sexual services for male fighters in the forest. Women who participated in Mau Mau suffered heavily at the hands of British colonial security agents. They were arrested and, from 1952 to 1955, their numbers in prisons increased from 347 to 13,265. This crackdown on women starved forest fighters of food and armament supplies, which led to the decline of the movement (Gachihi, 1986, pp. 37–43).

CONCLUSION

African women were extremely active in colonial Kenya's social, economic, and political process. They left a landmark in the struggle for independence in Kenya. They were the lifeline of the Mau Mau liberation movement in which they were spies and suppliers of food, arms, and ammunition. The African women in the Mau Mau movement also led attacks on the enemy. Indeed, the historical evidence of the participation of African women in the resistance movements and struggle for independence challenges assumptions and myths about the passive nature of the African woman. In the resistance movements, Mekatilili wa Menza staged a strong movement that the British colonialists had to deal with to establish their role in coastal Kenya.

The foregoing discussion has brought out the innovative strategies adopted by African women to deal with the discriminative gender-based colonial labor policies. Despite being marginalized in the colonial economy, they used informal trade to penetrate the emerging African petite bourgeoisie social class that owned rental houses in Nairobi, Mombasa, and Kisumu.

The British colonial state deliberately marginalized African women in accessing western education, thus laying the foundation of gender inequality in independent Kenya. British colonial administrators dehumanized African women, which was well demonstrated in how they perceived the body of the African woman. The use of male police officers to conduct female circumcision of Kikuyu girls was not just evidence of the despise the colonialists had for the African women but a case of crimes against humanity. For the British colonial administrators, an African woman's role in the colonial economy was to supply cheap labor for the European settler farms, so she had to be confined in the village to procreate.

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The Trade Union Movement in Colonial and Postcolonial Kenya

Magdalene Ndeto Bore

INTRODUCTION

According to the Kenyan Labour Relations Act of 2007, a trade union is “an association of employees whose principal purpose is to regulate relations between employees and employers, including any employers’ organization” (Republic of Kenya, 2007, p. 5). Trade unions are regulated by an Act of parliament and are formed to protect and promote freedom of association, which is the right of every citizen according to the bill of rights in the constitution (Republic of Kenya, 2010). Politics and labor movements in most African countries are intertwined. During the struggle for independence, many workers were actively involved in the fight for independence. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana as a case in point shows how the labor movement and politics were and are still intertwined. Nkrumah is recognized as one of the founders of the labor movement in Africa. In the spirit of Pan-Africanism in 1958, Nkrumah invited Tom Mboya and other African labor movement activists to Accra, Ghana, for a trade union congress which was the first in Africa, and this gave a boost to the trade union movement in Kenya. Tom Mboya became instrumental in the labor movement throughout the whole of Africa (Kagwanja, 1992).

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TRADE UNIONISM IN COLONIAL KENYA

Kenya was declared a British protectorate in 1895 and in 1920, it became a British colony. During the precolonial period, Kenya had two main groups of inhabitants, the agrarian societies and the pastoralist societies (Amsden, 1970). At the start of 1900, the white colonial settlers settled on land previously occupied by Agrarian and pastoralist societies like the Maasai, who were pushed from high potential lands to low potential lands. During the precolonial period, labor among the agrarian and pastoralist communities was organized in voluntary communal systems. The roles of each member of the society were defined and every individual was valued. However, with the spread of the white settlers, the locals' need for labor increased. This changed the customary way of working, which involved family and communities (Zezeza, 1989).

The increased labor demand for the settlers created the need for passing legislation to ensure there was adequate labor to take care of the settlers' agricultural interests and other growing sectors. The legislations introduced then included the Anti-slavery Edict of 1881, the African Passage Ordinance of 1900, the Hut ordinance of 1900, The Master and Servant Ordinance of 1904, and the Registration of Domestic Workers Ordinances of 1910 and 1915 (Goldsworthy, 1982). During the First World War, from 1914 to 1918, Africans were also engaged to assist in the war. This created an exposure to better labor systems, which directly led to the establishment of a workers' assembly and later on the start of trade unions, as explained by Aluchio (1998). The workers' assembly agitated for better working conditions for employees.

In 1921 the Young Kikuyu Association was formed by Harry Thuku, and it agitated for workers' rights (Gona, 2003). The association opposed the forced labor of women and children, reduction of wage labor, the Kipande system, segregation, and increased taxes, among other labor issues. This agitation led to the arrest of Harry Thuku in 1922. In the same year before his arrest, Harry Thuku had formed a multi-ethnic movement called the East African Association headed by Joseph Kang'ethe to address issues such as the British colonial government's plan to reduce wage labor by a third, the Kipande system, and forced labor for women and children (Gona, 2013). The arrest of Harry Thuku enabled the colonial government to repress the East African Association. This led to the members of the association regrouping and eventually forming the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA).

According to Zezeza (1989), the Kikuyu Central Association agitated for labor reforms, changes in land and political representation, wages, and better working conditions. In 1930 the leader of KCA, Jomo Kenyatta, initiated some amendments to the KCA constitution so that it could act as a trade union. KCA got a lot of support from Asian associations like the East Africa Indian National Congress and the Nairobi Indian National Congress. The formation of trade unions in the form of associations continued to take place. Some of the unions formed then were the Railway Artisans Union formed by Makhan

Singh's father Sudh Singh in 1922, and the Workers Protective Society of Kenya of 1931 (Singh, 1969).

The year 1935 is a landmark in the history of Trade unions in Kenya. The Labour Trade Union of Kenya (LTUK) was established by Africans and Asians, led by Makhan Singh. LTUK was constituted with democratic provisions and was nonracial and membership was open to all. The vision of Makhan Singh was to have a union that would ultimately engage all the workers in East Africa (Hornsby, 2012). Makhan Singh was the secretary-general, and Gulam Mohamed was the first president.

Patel (2006) explains that in March 1937, LTUK was renamed Labour Trade Union of East Africa (LTUEA) after expanding to other parts of East Africa. LTUEA won a victory when, after a series of strikes, workers received salary increments of 15 to 22 percent, and all the workers were reinstated after the strike. Due to the widespread strikes, the government enacted a legislation, the Trade Unions Ordinance of 1937. The Ordinance gave official recognition to the trade unions in Kenya and made unregistered trade unions illegal. LTUEA then got registered in September 1937. After its registration in Kenya, it was also registered in Tanganyika since it had grown its membership to Tanganyika and Uganda. LTUEA also enjoyed significant support from the rest of Africa (Ochieng & Maxon, 1992). In 1938 and 1939, the British gave orders defining the White Highlands, and, as a result, many Kikuyu were moved from their land without compensation, leading to great protests. At the same time, there was unrest in Nyanza and also among the Kamba people. Therefore, many African Associations like the Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Associations, the Taita Hills Association, and New Ukamba Members Association joined with KCA to protest the British Orders defining the White Highlands. After the LTUEA's annual conference in July 1939, a new development of including a political reform demand in the union's demands was adopted (Mindó, 2002).

During the Second World War, there was a lot of agitation by African and Asian workers together with LTUEA. LTUEA was opposing the Compulsory Service Ordinance. The Compulsory Service Ordinance forced Africans and Asians to work for European settlers and the government. Other issues the union protested were demands for high wages, the Kipande system, and a proposed bill to amend the Trade unions Ordinance of 1937. At this time, there were only two registered trade unions in Kenya, LTUEA, and the African Nationalist Movement. According to Gona (2013), in 1940, Makhan Singh was arrested and detained without trial. Three weeks later, the leaders of KCA, Taita Hills Association, and Ukamba Members Association were arrested and detained in Kapenguria. The arrests of the union and the association's leaders did not stop the activities of the union. In 1943 the Trade Unions Ordinance of 1937 was replaced by the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance.

Goldsworthy (1982) avers that at the time of the Second World War, only two trade unions were registered, the LTUEA and East African Ramgarhia Artisan Union, although during the war a third union was registered, the East

African Standard Asian Staff Union. The Nairobi African Taxi Drivers Union was formed in 1946, and this was purely an African organization. Other unions that were later registered were Kenya Houseboys Association, African Press Association, and Thika Native Motor Drivers Association. The year 1947 was marked by many strikes, which paralyzed all the sectors, including the dock, banks, railways, and even commercial offices. The workers were seeking a universal wage increase. This was followed by all the strike organizers announcing the formation of a new labor union, The African Workers Union, which was later renamed the African Workers Federation (AWF) under the leadership of Chege Kibachia (Mindó, 2002). The LTUEA had collapsed after the arrest of their leader. In August 1947, the British colonial government tried to abolish the AWF by arresting Chege Kibachia and eighteen other members of AWF and detaining them without trial. At the same time, Makhan Singh was tried in court and won the case. He returned to the leadership of the Kenya Trade Union Movement.

Under the leadership of Makhan Singh, all the African and Asian workers were united in demanding reform of the colonial economy. A close ally to Makhan Singh, Fred Kubai reformed the Nairobi African Taxi Drivers Union into the Kenya African Road Transport and Mechanics Union, which later became Transport and Allied Workers' Union. The Transport and Allied Workers' Union was the largest, most influential labor association of its time and was headed by Fred Kubai (Musandu, 2007). In 1949 Fred Kubai and Makhan Singh established the East African Trade Unions Congress (EATUC), headed shortly by Fred Kubai and later by Makhan Singh. EATUC had affiliate organizations such as LTUEA, Transport and Allied Workers Union, and the Clerks and Commercial Workers Union led by Bildad Kaggia, among others.

EATUC had its demands as a union which included minimum wage for the workers, annual leave with pay, pension, better working conditions, eight-hour day and forty-five-hour week, and compulsory free education, among others (Ochieng & Maxon, 1992). In one year, EATUC had a membership of around 12,000 and had more unions affiliated with it. Due to the frequent agitation of EATUC, the government introduced bills and regulations that directed the re-registration of all the trade unions and when the EATUC applied for registration, it was denied on the basis that it was not a trade union. Later in the year, the government arrested Fred Kubai and Makhan Singh. Several strikes by the remaining trade unions did not secure the release of the arrested (Patel, 2006).

In 1950 many trade unions had faced a lot of opposition from the government because the unions had combined labor demands with political agitation, and some of the union leaders had joined political organizations such as Kenya African Union (KAU). This, coupled with the arrest of Kubai and Makhan Singh, weakened the trade unions (Mindó, 2002). Pio Gama Pinto took over the leadership of the trade unions informally because he did not hold any official office for the four years he led the unions. In 1952 the Kenya Federation of Registered Trade Unions (KFRTU) was formed and Aggrey Minya became

the General Secretary with Mushegi Karanja as the President. Later, Tom Mboya became the Secretary-General of the trade union. KFRTU, by then, had five affiliated trade unions.

The British government felt that the Africans were not ready to form trade unions based on the labor commissioner's annual report: "It has been found advisable to exercise a great deal of more supervision over the existing trade unions and nascent organizations of employees... owing to the almost complete lack of understanding of the primary purposes of trade union by the vast majority of African workers in East Africa, and their susceptibility to the influence of educated persons, who may have ambition of a political nature" (Clayton & Savage, 1979, p. 324). After the declaration of the state of emergency in 1952, the political and labor activists Jomo Kenyatta, Bildad Kagia, Achieng Oneko, Paul Ngei, Fred Kubai, and Kungu Karumba were arrested and detained at Kapenguria. The team is commonly known as the Kapenguria Six (Ibid.). The detainees were accused of being part of the Mau Mau movement and were found guilty and sentenced to seven years imprisonment with hard labor.

In 1952 the legislative council passed the Kenya Trade Unions Ordinance, which required every trade union to be registered with the Registrar of Trade Unions. The Registrar of Trade Unions had the power to register and deregister any trade union if, in the registrar's opinion, the trade union was not acting within its constitution. Tom Mboya took up the position of Secretary-General from Aggrey Minya, who was then Secretary-General of the Kenya Federation of Registered Trade Unions (Zezeza, 1989). With the urging of Tom Mboya, the union changed its name to The Kenya Federation of Labour (KFL). The Federation did not need to register with the Registrar of Trade Unions because it was not a trade union but a federation. During the state of emergency in 1952, all the trade unions were banned and KFL became the voice of Kenyans and struggled for the freedom of the detainees. The regulations of trade unions during the emergency resulted in a reduction in trade union membership and the general weakening of the trade union movement (Gona, 2003). In 1954 the European settler's council members accused KFL of engaging in political activity.

At the time of independence in 1963, the number of registered trade unions had reached 52, representing approximately 155,000 workers (Hornsby, 2012). In 1965 conflicts within KFL led to division and formation of a splinter group which was known as the Kenya African Workers Congress (KAWC), which was led by Ochola Mak'Anyengo and Dennis Akumu. In June 1965, a presidential ministerial committee was formed by then-President Jomo Kenyatta to make inquiries on the state of workers' unions in the country (Amsden, 1970). The President assented to the recommendations of the Presidential Ministerial Committee on Trade Unionism in Kenya to deregister KFL and form and name a new umbrella organization, Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU).

CONDITIONS OF WORK ENVIRONMENT DURING THE COLONIAL PERIODS

According to Aluchio (1998), the construction of the Kenya-Uganda Railway line between 1896 and 1901 opened up the country and led to the influx of white settlers into the country. The white settlers occupied the fertile lands of central Kenya and the Rift Valley with the approval of the colonial government, which later named the areas the White Highlands. After naming Kenya as a colony and a protectorate, Kenyans were to pay hut and poll taxes. The chiefs and the headmen were appointed and given powers to maintain law and order as well as collect taxes and settle disputes. The influx of white settlers led to an increased need for labor and also the need to have legislation for the sustainability of the labor supply in the agricultural, building, and service sectors (Gona, 2003).

The passed legislation was for the interest of the settlers and not for the local people. The legislations were oppressive and led to the hiring of forced, cheap labor from the locals for the benefit of the settlers (Goldsworthy, 1982). The mobility of the locals was controlled through the Kipande system. Those who returned from war had the exposure and wanted union representation, but their desire was suppressed by the colonial government and those who campaigned for the workers' rights ended up arrested and jailed or detained. During the colonial government, labor disputes lacked a fair and well-laid out industrial dispute resolution mechanism. This led to frequent riots and strikes by African and Asian workers (Hornsby, 2012). The first major industrial strike in Kenya was in Mombasa in 1939 by the African Railway apprentice. The strike was violent and spread to most parts of the country. Those who carried the blame for the strike were Makhan Singh, Jomo Kenyatta, Joseph Kangethe, Fred Kubai, Jessie Kariuki, and Bildad Kaggia.

TRADE UNIONISM IN POSTCOLONIAL KENYA

After independence in 1963, Tom Mboya was appointed the Minister for Labour, and in association with the trade unions and the employers' associations, he formulated the Industrial Charter. The Industrial Charter was a social agreement between the employers, the trade unions, and the government. After Tom Mboya left the Kenya Federation of Labour (KFL), Clement Lubembe took over as the secretary-general and was continually opposed by Ochola MakAnyengo and Dennis Akumu in the KFL organization. Their rivalry led to the splitting of KFL with the formation of the Kenya African Workers Congress (KAWC). The two trade unions were dissolved in 1965 and COTU was formed. COTU managed to bring together all the trade unions. In 1967 Dennis Akumu won the COTU elections and became the secretary-general (Mindó, 2002).

After the assassination of Tom Mboya in 1969, Dennis Akumu's control of trade unions became stronger but was short-lived because of the ethnic divide.

Later, Akumu left COTU for Ghana and Juma Boy became the secretary-general. Due to continued wrangles within COTU, President Jomo Kenyatta ordered fresh elections of COTU office bearers to be conducted. The Juma Boy camp won the elections and the President appointed him as the Secretary-General and James Kerebe as his deputy. In 1983 Juma Boy passed on after a heart surgery in England. One of his legacies is the Tom Mboya Labour College in Kisumu, opened in 1983 (Patel, 2006).

The successor of Juma Boy at COTU was Justus Mulei in 1983 and in 1987, Mulei handed over power to Joseph Mugalla. Kenya, by then, had amended the constitution to a single-party state and Kenya African National Union (KANU) was in control of all the operations of the country, including the operations of COTU and for a while, COTU was under KANU (Zaleza, 1988). Kenyans opposed the single-party state, and this was followed by public demonstrations. This led to the arrest and detention of Kenneth Matiba, Charles Rubia, and Raila Odinga after the Saba rally, which was to be held on Kamukunji grounds, was aborted. COTU was condemned for its silence after the arrests. In 1991 Joseph Mugalla was reelected as secretary-general, and fifteen trade unions led by Wafula wa Musamia, the secretary-general for Kenya Quarry and Mine Workers Union, left COTU. Some of the unions that left COTU were Hotel and Allied Workers Union, the Union of Posts and Telecommunications Workers, the Kenya Petroleum Oil Workers Union, and others who later formed the National Congress of Trade Unions (NCTU), which collapsed after the government failed to register them (<https://cotu-kenya.org/history-of-cotuk/>).

In 1993 COTU, under the leadership of Joseph Mugalla, called for a 100 percent pay increase and the sacking of George Saitoti, who was then minister for finance. The trade unions backed Mugalla, and they called for a nationwide strike if their demands were not met (Patel, 2006). The strike was declared unlawful and during the Labor Day of the same year the workers were given a 17 percent pay increase by the minister for labor then, Phillip Masinde. The strike called by COTU took place and paralyzed operations in the country, mainly Nairobi, Mombasa, and Kisumu. Some members of COTU, led by Johnson Ogendao, tried to overthrow Mugalla by appointing and registering new COTU officials. The move to overthrow the COTU officials failed because the court ruled against the newly elected officials and ordered that the new COTU officials be deregistered.

In the year 2000, the government started a four-phased retrenchment process, a move that the trade unions resisted. The retrenchment was part of the structural adjustment proposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to third world countries. In 2001 the government had retrenched 42,000 workers at the cost of \$99 million (Omolo, 2010). Many private organizations also did retrenchment, with some multinational companies closing their manufacturing units and moving to other countries. This left COTU with less than 30 trade unions affiliated with it, with very few members due to the thousands of employees left jobless by the structural adjustment.

Workers felt that COTU had failed to protect them from the government retrenchment process (Tubey et al., 2015). The retrenchment left COTU with about 400,000 from about 800,000 membership before retrenchment as explained by KNUT (2015).

In 2001 Mugalla withdrew from the leadership of COTU and was succeeded by Boniface Munyao as the secretary-general, who was also the secretary-general of Kenya Railway Workers Union. In the elections held the same year, Francis Atwoli of the Kenya Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union was elected COTU secretary-general. In 2002, COTU left its association with KANU and backed the opposition National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) political party, whose candidate was Mwai Kibaki, which led to the end of KANU's regime after the general election (Hornsby, 2012). COTU pushed for a new constitution and was incorporated into the task force of constitutional review and the Constitutional Review Committee. COTU campaigned for the support of the new draft constitution to its members because of the benefit it could get in the creation of a specialized court with the status of a high court to deal with industrial disputes. The constitution was approved by the majority of the Kenyans during a referendum and promulgated in 2010 (Gona, 2013).

Attempts to revive the Kenya Federation of Labour and the Kenya African Workers Congress in 2012 proved a challenge to COTU. The revival was based on the claim that the government had unlawfully deregistered the unions and COTU had taken their place and assets, including the Tom Mboya Labour Colleges in Kisumu and Mombasa and the Solidarity House headquarters in Nairobi (Nyombi, 2013). Judge Nzioki wa Makau of the Industrial Court dismissed the application in a ruling in October 2012.

The country has about fifty registered trade unions with two federations, the Central Organization of Trade Unions Kenya and the Trade Unions Congress of Kenya (TUC-Ke). All the registered trade unions under COTU have about 2.5 million members from all sectors (TUC, 2016). The Agricultural sector has the biggest trade unions, followed by the wholesale and retail-related trade unions, and the third largest are the public services trade unions. COTU has forty-five unions affiliated with it while the others are affiliated to TUC-Ke, which are the Union of Kenya Civil Servants (UKCS), the Universities Academic Staff Union (UASU), and the Kenya Universities Staff Union (KUSU). TUC-Ke was formally Public Service Trade Unions (PUSETU), which was formed by Wilson Sossion in 2014 as the umbrella body for civil servants (KUDHEIHA, 2014). Wrangles within TUC-Ke made KNUT pull out and later rejoin COTU in January 2019. With a membership of about 200,000 members, the KNUT move strengthened the membership of COTU and saw the teachers' trade unions, Kenya Union of Post Primary Teachers (KUPPET) and Kenya National Union of Teachers (KNUT), both under COTU.

CHALLENGES FACED BY TRADE UNIONS IN KENYA

The trade unions have faced their share of problems since independence. The anti-trade union governance has crippled the industrial relations of the country by the government (Opara, 2014). The absence of a well-established alternative dispute resolution mechanism to solve the trade disputes has led to a huge backlog of disputes in the industrial court. This has been caused by the slow government processes of resolving disputes (ILO-COTU, 2015). Ultimately, this has resulted in many labor cases remaining unresolved, thereby discouraging the vitality of trade unions.

Technology growth has seen many workers lose their jobs. COTU has been struggling to ensure that the introduction of new technology in organizations, especially in the agricultural sector, does not render the employees jobless. The computer has changed the labor market; some people work from home and online. Automation of businesses has caused the reduction of labor needs and the substitution of labor-intensive operations by machines, making the office place virtual (Odhong' & Omolo, 2014).

The composition of workers is also changing based on competence, with more workers tending to be better educated and career-minded, not motivated by the solidarity of employees (Tubey et al., 2015). Although most employees are unionized, the trend of the workers becoming individualistic may weaken the trade unions in the future and hence the need to possibly make alliances with other institutions to remain relevant in this fast-changing world. Other organizations have adopted anti-union practices to avoid work disruptions by union activities (Olufunmilayo & Kola, 2014).

Since the time of the struggle for independence, it has not been easy to separate trade unions and government politics. The line between political leadership and union leadership has been thin for a long time. Sometimes the trade union leaders have doubled as politicians (Wanyoike, 2013). Politics has hindered the progression of the trade unions in the country. Politicians have taken the trade unions as their platform of campaigns, and instead of fighting for the rights of the employees, the trade unions' attention is diverted. This has increased political interference and intimidation of trade unions by politicians.

Trade unions are dependent on trade union membership contributions for their revenue. When they lose members through organizational restructuring or closure of industries, the trade unions face financial constraints. The splitting of trade unions also has affected their financial stability (Omolo, 2010). The splitting of the KUPPET from the KNUT affected the financial stability of KNUT because the members who moved to KUPPET reduced the membership contributions (ILO, 2006). The privatization of public firms has seen employees who belonged to trade unions join the private sector, where employers do not allow employees to participate in trade union activities.

Like any other association in the country, corruption has hit the trade unions hard, with funds meant for various activities of the trade unions ending up in the pockets of a few people and hence hindering the achievement of the

organizational objectives. Due to corruption in trade unions investments are initiated and the projects later collapse with the funds of the trade unions. The greed of union members has also led to the splitting of trade unions, weakening the trade unions. The splitting has seen the weak trade unions collapse (COTU, 2016).

Another challenge faced by trade unions is the involvement of the Salaries and Remuneration Commission (SRC) in the salary negotiations in the industrial court. The SRC has also increased the collective bargaining agreement duration from two years to four years and imposing restrictions in the collective bargaining agreement negotiation process (COTU, 2016). Some employers also are anti-union and employ workers on a casual basis, which has been brought about by the high cost of recruitment of employees on a permanent and pensionable basis.

Other barriers to the effectiveness of the trade unions are the failure of employers to deduct trade union dues from the employees and the failure to even pay the employees, especially when the employees go on strike (Nyombi, 2013). This has made the trade unions bear the cost of every strike. A case in point is the frequent strikes of the teachers and the failure of the Teachers Service Commission to deduct dues from the teachers. The imprisonment of the doctors' union officials is evidence of the challenges the trade unions face in pursuing their members' welfare.

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The Rise of Anti-colonial Nationalism

Robert M. Maxon

INTRODUCTION

The rise of anti-colonial nationalism was a significant factor in Kenya's transition to independence during the last two decades of British rule. It was one of several forms of resistance to oppressive and exploitative foreign rule, just as in other parts of Africa. Nevertheless, anti-colonial nationalism was particularly critical in uniting substantial portions of Kenya's population in support of political and non-political strategies to end colonial rule and create an independent nation-state. The broad-based nature of support for anti-colonial nationalism in Kenya, reflective of a desire not to be ruled by foreigners and to enjoy basic human rights, did not produce a single nationalist political party.

Colonial Kenya was a creation of foreign conquest and the imposition of an alien colonial state. The colony's population included diverse peoples who spoke different languages and were characterized by diverse political formations, cultural norms, and histories. The political, economic, and social changes produced by colonial rule further enhanced differentiation. Anti-colonial nationalism thus had to deal with powerful divisive factors, such as ethnicity, religious differences, and racism which were enhanced by the colonial policy of divide and rule, ruthless oppression, and economic exploitation. Despite this, the rise of anti-colonial nationalism during the 1950s and early 1960s forced the colonial rulers to alter their plans for Kenya's future and agree to negotiations with leaders of the nationalist political parties, which produced an independent Kenyan state on December 12, 1963.

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BACKGROUND

This Kenya experience was hardly unique. Anti-colonial nationalism has been associated with periods of globalization in world history. Just as colonies were established in various parts of the world, so also did anti-colonial nationalism arise, which proved a critical factor in a process now referred to as decolonization. As is well known, conditions in twentieth-century Africa produced calls for self-determination, and anti-colonial nationalism in Kenya embraced demands for civil liberties and human respect, freedom of movement, and an end to exploitation and cultural domination by outsiders. The global economic and political order after 1945, in particular, facilitated a rise in anti-colonial nationalism and the emergence of new nations.

Despite these commonalities, Kenyan nationalism was unique in respect to other key characteristics of nationalism. While an important aim of anti-colonial nationalism was the ending of colonial rule and the creation of independent states, for example, the goal was complicated by Kenya's ethnic and racial diversity, which, combined with economic and educational differentiation, peasantization, and proletarianization, rendered the ideal of a state based on a common national identity hard to attain. In the case of Kenya, the politics of exclusion based upon race held sway.

The latter took shape in the first decade of the twentieth century with the arrival of European and Asian (from British India) immigrants. European settlers pressed successfully for exclusive political and economic rights, which entrenched segregation in most aspects of life. As late as the 1950s, the small European settler population enjoyed exclusive access to land in the white highlands and the right to elect representatives to the Legislative Council (LegCo) on a communal roll that left the larger Asian population with fewer elected representatives and Africans with only nominated members. Many of Kenya's settlers had worked towards making the colony a "white man's country" along the lines of South Africa. Thus, anti-colonial nationalism and other forms of resistance to colonial rule had to confront white supremacy as well as the negative impacts of colonial rule, including loss of land, heavy taxation, and restrictions on freedom of movement.

FORMS OF RESISTANCE AND THE ROOTS OF ANTI-COLONIAL NATIONALISM

Anti-colonial nationalism was one of several forms of resistance to colonial rule in Kenya. These political, social, and intellectual movements contributed to and helped shape nationalism. First of all, the idea of African nationalism arose at first among a small, educated elite. These individuals' educational experiences made them a distinctive group in early colonial Kenya. Their experiences allowed them to develop perspectives drawn from local, continental, and international contexts. They thus wished to play a part in the government and society of their time, particularly at the local level, but colonial rule denied them

any meaningful role until late in the colonial era. For elites like Harry Thuku, Jomo Kenyatta, and Mbiyu Koinange, Africans must liberate themselves from the physical and mental shackles of colonial rule.

It was natural that Africans, like Kenyatta, who felt this way, would subscribe to the Pan-African ideal. This ideal advocated unity among Africans and people of African descent. Solidarity was not a goal in itself but rather aimed at ending discrimination and segregation in Africa as well as other parts of the world. A further aim was to bring an end to economic exploitation and political domination, achieving the ideal of “Africa for Africans.” Many educated elite demanded independence as an important step towards African unity. The drive for African freedom thus found inspiration from Pan-Africanism. The Pan-African Congress held in Great Britain in 1945 brought together Kenyatta and many elite leaders who later played a role in the rise of anti-colonial nationalism (Maloba, 2018).

This rise grew out of, and paralleled, other reactions and forms of resistance to European colonial rule both in motivation and modes of protest. Among such forms were elite political activities, separatist churches, millenarian movements, local political organizations, trade unionism, and armed rebellions. Most relevant to the rise of anti-colonial nationalism in Kenya were elite politics and local political organizations.

From the end of World War I, an educated elite emerged among Kenya Africans, largely as a result of western education. While small in number, they were dissatisfied with colonial rule. They encountered racial discrimination in varied aspects of their lives, including employment, and they demanded other changes such as greater educational opportunities. In terms of political discontent, many were driven by a desire to participate in the colonial state so as to have a voice in governance. As a result, Harry Thuku and other elite founded the Young Kikuyu Association, which they quickly renamed the East African Association in mid-1921. Their protest was characterized by a focus on demands for equitable treatment and reforms that would allow the elite to play a more central role within the system rather than ending colonial rule. This quest for equality and a voice in government was characteristic of this form of protest. When Thuku tried to expand the association’s appeal beyond Nairobi, he was arrested, demonstrators were killed, and the EAA was banned in 1922. This elite movement thus achieved little, and the repressive measures discouraged others from trying to form a colony-wide African political organization.

The other influential form of resistance emerged in rural Kenya. This took the form of local political associations, which came into prominence during the period before World War II. They were organized and led by individuals with some schooling and an interest in promoting modernization in the form of more schools, access to high-value cash crops, improved communications, and enhanced opportunities in commerce. These individuals, prominent at the local levels, were teachers, civil servants, and peasants who combined cash crop agriculture with businesses and salaried employment in a process often termed *straddling*. They aimed to influence local government bodies established under

colonial rule and local development through political associations normally limited to a locality such as a district or location created under colonial rule. These associations often were ethnic-based due to their focus on a particular locality. The leaders, many of whom were ethnic patriots, sought not an overthrow of colonial rule but rather improvement within the system to more effectively deal with the reality of colonial domination. Examples include the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) and the Young Kavirondo Association and its successor, the Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association (KTWA), formed in the 1920s. Such local political organizations directed political activism against the colonial state's agents at the local level, the chiefs appointed by the colonial rulers. The KCA, for example, faced opposition from Kikuyu chiefs in the form of the Kikuyu Association (KA) during the 1920s. Both the KA and the KCA emphasized the issue of land, and it was significant in the rise of anti-colonial nationalism.

These local political organizations achieved some progress in the direction of modernization and improvement in the economic status of the leadership. However, the modernizers found chiefs backed by the colonial state in their way. This situation, together with the local focus of the resulting protests, blocked major changes in Kenya as a whole. These and other forms of protests did not present a serious threat to the colonial order prior to World War II. A major reason for this, as with elite politics and separatist churches, was a lack of support among the bulk of Kenya's African population. Nevertheless, this changed after 1945 as local political leaders and ethnic patriots began to look beyond their district; rather, their focus came to be territorial.

ROOTS OF ANTI-COLONIAL NATIONALISM AFTER WORLD WAR II

By this time, the great changes that accompanied the end of World War II had begun to impact the European colonial powers all over Africa. The colonial powers, for example, emerged from the mid-twentieth-century conflict in a much-weakened position. Great Britain, Kenya's colonial master, exited the global war weaker militarily and economically. Quite aside from the African colonies, Britain faced significant metropolitan and international challenges after World War II.

Dealing with these had an impact on the rise of anti-colonial nationalism, as in the case of British support for democracy and universal human rights at home but not in colonies such as Kenya after the war, where there was an absence of democracy and civil liberties for the African majority combined with racial discrimination and segregation. Internationally, Britain was no longer a great power, and that could not help but weaken British rule in postwar Africa. Changes in the global economy after 1945 reduced the value of colonial possessions as it became clear over the next two decades that Britain could still access resources and markets in Kenya without having to bear the expense of colonial control.

Most critical of the factors weakening colonial control and facilitating the rise of anti-colonial nationalism were those arising from conditions within Kenya itself. These fell into two broad categories; those simmering and growing out of the past that had produced resistance from segments of Kenya's population prior to World War II and those that emerged after 1945 as a result of the developmental initiatives that characterized colonial policy. These were combined with a period of postwar prosperity that reflected increased demand for Kenya's agricultural produce in the world market. British policy for Kenya sought to utilize the developmental initiative to capitalize on this as well as to restructure and expand the colony's economy to enhance exports for the benefit of the metropolitan power.

The developmental push was especially important from the 1940s through the early 1960s. It focused on increasing agricultural production through improved crops and methods of cultivation, better land management, and marketing. It also focused on improved communications for enhanced agriculture as well as import substitution industries. Such development was to be made possible by investment from the colonial rulers in terms of more schools and increased levels of education, as well as greatly increased access to health care. These goals meshed with those of Kenya's people. All over the colony, for example, there was a demand for more schools; attempting to meet this presented challenges for the British rulers. This, among other things, was because of the inequality that characterized the existing system. All European children attended schools, but only a small portion of African school-age children did so in Kenya.

In Kenya, as elsewhere, the means to successfully accomplish this developmental imperative has often been referred to as the second colonial occupation. A huge increase in the number of expatriate officers serving in development-related departments—agriculture, veterinary services, and education—occurred, as well as the arrival of additional European settler farmers. As the number of European officers involved in developmental initiatives increased, so did the colonial state's intervention in the affairs of farmers, workers, and entrepreneurs. An important example of this may be seen in the marketing of food and cash crops during and after the war, where the colonial state sought to control the process. The usual means was the establishment of marketing co-operatives through which the state could effectively "capture" the peasantry and gain revenue from control over the sale of commodities. This provoked much opposition from rural leaders as well as large numbers of peasants. A second example of rural opposition arising from the second colonial occupation may be seen in Kenya colonial state's combining the emphasis on increased production with policies aimed at soil conservation. The latter involved forced labor (of women particularly) to carry out the building and maintaining of trenches and measures deemed necessary to halt erosion.

Both the increase in the European settlers and the impact of so-called rural improvement initiatives provided fuel for anti-colonial nationalism. Resistance to soil conservation provoked what has been termed "*mitaro* wars" in the

1940s in today's Murang'a county in central Kenya and Vihiga county in the west (Throup, 1988; Shanguhya, 2015). The colonial state's forced digging of anti-erosion ditches drew opposition. In both areas, such opposition came close to leading to a loss of state control in these rural areas. This provoked long-lasting anti-colonial sentiment.

So also did the drive for increased production lead to rising demands for labor on European farms and estates and in the transportation sector (railroads and ports). There had been much dissatisfaction among Africans with Kenya's migrant labor system prior to World War II with opposition to poor working conditions as well as the repressive system of labor control. This dissatisfaction grew during and after the war as trade unions emerged to articulate worker demands focused largely on the colony's urban areas.

The African Workers' Federation, formed in 1947 as a result of a strike in Mombasa, was the first such union. The state suppressed it, but another union, with a broader appeal, soon emerged in 1949, the East African Trade Union Congress (EATUC), led by Makhan Singh and Fred Kubai. It too championed economic demands, but the organization also backed political demands (increased African members in the LegCo and a quick end to colonial rule). The EATUC met hostile responses from employers and the state by calling for a general strike in 1950. It was broken by the state and the union banned, but the discontent of workers remained a potent force that would be harnessed by anti-colonial nationalism.

Another force was associated with deeply rooted and longer-lasting desires for political representation and equality of treatment among the African and Asian populations. This had been a demand of the EAA in the 1920s. Asian political demands had long reflected a "quest for equality" in Kenya in terms of an end to segregation and in equality of opportunity in all walks of life. After the war, demands for greater numbers in the colony's LegCo featured strongly at the same time that the 11 European settler members of that body claimed a greater voice in the affairs of state that would lead to self-government under a European prime minister. The British government refused to accept such a goal and instead insisted after 1951 that Kenya's political future lay in multiracialism, a system of racial power-sharing in which Europeans, the smallest segment of Kenya's population, would play the dominant role for many years to come. The number of European members in the legislative body was to equal those of the Africans, Arabs, and Asians combined.

This view was challenged by Asian politicians and the new colony-wide political organization founded in 1944, the Kenya African Union (KAU). The KAU drew support from educated and urban Africans as well as many former KCA members. It initially followed a moderate approach to political advocacy. Leaders, including Eliud Mathu, the first African LegCo member, and Jomo Kenyatta, KAU president from 1947, addressed demands for human rights for all and increased African political participation in the form of petitions, letters, and resolutions to the state. The KAU was also adamant about the need to address the land question and landlessness in Kenya, reflecting a long-felt KCA

grievance. Initially, the KAU had no objection to the policy of multiracialism but objected to Kenya moving to independence under such a system until the African majority of the colony's population had the right to vote and also enjoyed a majority in the LegCo and council of ministers.

By 1950, the KAU had gained little from its moderate and constitutional approach as economic and political conditions worsened in the views of most Africans in Kenya. The KAU was pushed in a more radical direction as trade unionists such as Kubai took the lead. They demanded a quick political transition to majority rule and independence in contrast to Kenyatta's more moderate approach. Some inside and outside the KAU advocated a more militant approach, including using violence to end colonial rule. While support for the approach existed in and around Nairobi, this was not the case in all parts of Kenya. Most authorities agree that the KAU had not yet emerged as an anti-colonial nationalist political party since it lacked broad-based support, representing all segments of the population in all parts of the colony.

This resulted in the KAU being torn by division in mid-1952. As violence in Nairobi and central Kenya drew complaints from Kenya's European population, a hesitant and virtually leaderless colonial state responded by suppressing the KAU. This came with a declaration of a state of emergency on October 20, 1952, precipitated by the murder of the Kikuyu chief Waruhiu and following the Kenyan and British authorities' decision to "bust" Kenyatta rather than to "buy" him (Maxon, 2010). This decision and rising dissent and militancy in central Kenya and the white highlands led to the Mau Mau war (active phase 1952–1956).

MAU MAU WAR AND ANTI-COLONIAL NATIONALISM

For those involved in the conflict against the colonial state, the Mau Mau war was for land and freedom. These goals involved not only the ending of colonial rule but also the dominant political and economic position of Kenya's European settlers, critical concerns for many in colonial Kenya. The Mau Mau war and the state of emergency represented a setback for anti-colonial nationalism but at the same time unleashed conditions that hastened the rise of anti-colonial nationalism and the end of British rule in Kenya.

With the declaration of the state of emergency and the colonial state's resultant political and military actions, the rise of nationalism was rendered much more difficult. Several leaders of the KAU, including Kenyatta and Kubai, were convicted of criminal acts and jailed. In mid-1953, the KAU was proscribed, and the colonial state refused to legalize any colony-wide African political parties until March of 1960. Civil liberties, including freedom of speech, press, and assembly, were greatly curtailed under the emergency, as was freedom of movement. These restrictions particularly targeted Africans. Another critical part of the state's emergency strategy that had a negative effect on the rise of nationalism was the propaganda campaign that blamed ethnic communities in central Kenya, particularly the Kikuyu, for the unrest and violence associated

with the Mau Mau war. Demonizing and isolating the Kikuyu could not help but produce division among Kenya's largest community and others (Anderson, 2005).

These negatives notwithstanding, the state of emergency brought conditions and new initiatives that proved conducive to a rise in anti-colonial nationalism. The increased emphasis on agricultural development for African-inhabited rural areas of the colony was particularly important. The Swynnerton Plan, introduced in 1954, offered many economic benefits for African small farmers, including access to high-value cash crops, opportunities for credit, and better marketing and transportation. But these did not go as far or as fast as many peasants wished, while other peasants desired to be left alone and not subjected to development initiatives. The provincial administration would not accept opposition as emergency powers gave them the means of overcoming any and all dissent. A major issue for many peasants was the continuing negative contrast between their situation and that of European farmers in the white highlands. The latter received better extension and market services and had exclusive land control. Even more significant in provoking suspicion and dissent among African rural households was the land reform program initiated as part of the reforms. Individual land tenure and consolidation of holdings were begun first in the then Central Province and, by the end of the decade, initiated in other parts of Kenya. In these areas, the land reform process was welcomed by some, but not by all. For the latter, it proved a spur for antigovernment feeling.

Another set of emergency era reforms that impacted the rise of nationalism were those dealing with workers and trade unions. These sought to build a stable and more satisfied working class in urban Kenya through better wages and living conditions. Trade unions were now encouraged if they were "responsible" and organized on the British model. Thus, the Kenya Federation of Labour (KFL) was registered in 1955. Under the leadership of Tom Mboya, the KFL not only championed worker issues; it quickly supported the goals of anti-colonial nationalism and played a major role in its rise during the 1950s (Goldsworthy, 1982). The expansion in a number of schools that also characterized the colonial state's response to the Mau Mau war contributed to anti-colonial feeling during the same period and later. The rise in the number of educated and politically conscious individuals was significant when Africans finally got the right to vote in 1957. Nevertheless, educated Africans could not help but note that segregation continued in full force in schooling, hospitals, and public facilities.

Just as important as these emergency era changes were the political reforms introduced. These fostered anti-colonial activity and speeded the rise of nationalism by providing major opportunities to mobilize the African public to attain political victories before the end of the 1950s. The first such reform was the Lyttleton Constitution of March 1954. Imposed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies Oliver Lyttleton, it was meant to entrench multiracialism at the center of Kenya's political system of racial power-sharing. The then six appointed African members of the LegCo rejected it because it provided for

only a single African minister and did not allow African elections to the legislature. Lyttleton agreed to introduce the latter if the African members would agree to participate in the new constitution. The first African election resulted in March 1957. This did not provide for universal suffrage; the electoral system was “rigged” to favor those with wealth and education and also so that any Kikuyu candidate would find it hard to win a seat (Branch, 2009; Maxon, 2010). This was justified by reference to the community’s support for the Mau Mau war and the alleged radical demands asserted by the freedom fighters (land for Africans and independence). Despite these efforts, the African vote proved a turning point since the eight elected members quickly adopted a nationalist posture in demanding the end of multi-racialism with equality for all in Kenya without regard to race.

The immediate goal for the African Elected Members Organization (AEMO) was to secure an early end of the Lyttleton Constitution and a rapid transition to independence for Kenya based on one person, one vote, and equal rights for all. Led by Mboya, Oginga Odinga, and Masinde Muliro, the so-called western Kenya radicals, the AEMO refused to take up the now two ministerial positions reserved for African elected members. This opposition, backed by rising support for nationalism in urban and rural areas, led a new Secretary of State for the Colonies (SofS) to abandon the Lyttleton Constitution in November 1957. The British government continued to back multiracialism and oppose the idea of independence in the form of the Lennox-Boyd Constitution, implemented fully in April 1958. The now 14 AEMOs continued their opposition strategy and a year later, Secretary of State Alan Lennox-Boyd agreed to a key demand of the nationalist campaign: the holding of a constitutional conference to plan Kenya’s future. By the end of 1959, it was clear that anti-colonial nationalism was roaring ahead on a path toward key goals of an independent Kenya with human rights for all, an end to segregation based upon the politics of inclusion, and no more racial voting rolls (Maxon, 2010).

ANTI-COLONIAL NATIONALISM’S TRIUMPH AND DIVISION

While these goals reflected the demands of the educated elite primarily, the ideal of an independent state ruled by the African majority now appealed to other segments of the population. Wage laborers had come to feel that an independent, inclusive government would be sympathetic to their aspirations and demands. Worker representatives, it was assumed, would be sympathetic to demands for higher wages and better living conditions. In the rural areas, likewise, the peasant majority felt an African-ruled Kenya would be more responsive to their concerns. As noted earlier, these reflected a desire for improved standards of living as well as to not be forced by the state to accept changes, as in land tenure reforms. For the landless and poorest peasant households, an African-led administration seemed to offer the prospect of obtaining access to land held by European farmers. The latter was also an attractive proposition for the straddling households in the rural areas as these sought access to expanded

opportunities for profitable endeavors in farming, commerce, and transportation. For many, local leadership in a post-colonial Kenya, no longer the exclusive preserve of chiefs, seemed a means to enhance wealth and status.

These potential and real benefits promised by the rise and triumph of anti-colonial nationalism received a huge boost with the outcome of the first Lancaster House constitutional conference in early 1960. With the politics of race now tossed in the trash and African political parties now possible on a national basis, leaders of the AEMO moved rapidly to establish such an organization in March. However, hopes to set up a single party reflecting a united and inclusive nationalist movement did not materialize. Even before the conference, the AEMOs had become increasingly divided over personality, ethnicity, and policy issues. Thus, the second half of 1959 witnessed the emergence of the Kenya National Party (KNP), a multiracial grouping, and the Kenya Independence Movement (KIM), which was exclusively for Africans. The latter was more radical in some of its demands (immediate independence) than the former. The KIM membership was initially confined to members of the Kikuyu and Luo ethnic communities, then the colony's two largest. The two parties put aside their differences to form a united delegation at the conference, but afterward, differences quickly came forward. The Kenya African National Union (KANU), founded by many KIM leaders (e.g., Mboya, Odinga, and Dr. J. G. Kiano), was first in the field. It drew support from the Kikuyu and Luo as well as the Kamba. In June of 1960, a second nationalist party, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), was founded by KNP leaders (e.g., Muliro, Ronald Ngala, and Daniel Moi) who claimed to represent what they termed "minority tribes," such as the Kalenjin, Maasai, Mijikenda, and a portion of the Luhya.

As a result, a divided anti-colonial nationalism propelled Kenya towards independence from mid-1960 to December 1963. While the goal was independence, the two parties presented contrasting visions. This was a result of the fact that the politics of ethnicity was now most influential, with Kenyan society deeply divided by ethnic cleavages. That being the case, the question arose of how the goals of anti-colonial nationalism could be realized so as to establish an inclusive political and social system and deal effectively with the critical issue of land reform. From the second half of 1961, a key factor was the structure of government: a unitary or federal state. While both political parties subscribed to the goals of anti-colonial nationalism, these divisions produced difficulties. Independence was achieved while leaving many of those difficulties unresolved.

CONCLUSION

Independence, a primary objective of anti-colonial nationalism, brought an end to foreign rule and the creation of a nation-state. The achievement of these goals left others, such as an inclusive society and political system, land reform, human rights for all, and freedom of movement, unfulfilled. Kenya's independent government sought to deal with these by creating a one-party regime and

an imperial presidency which included curbs on civil liberties. It is thus not surprising that many of the demands and tactics associated with anti-colonial nationalism emerged in post-colonial Kenya, now couched in the terminology of universal human rights and democratization. The ultimate goal was not national sovereignty but a constitutional change in search of an inclusive political and social order.

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Lancaster House Independence Constitutional Negotiations, 1960–1963

Robert M. Maxon

INTRODUCTION

Kenya's constitutional negotiations for the critical 1960–1963 period that produced the independence constitution (December 12, 1963) involved three conferences at Lancaster House in London. The first conference lasted from January 18 to February 22, 1960. The second conference, which ran from February 14 to April 6, 1962, produced a framework for the self-government constitution. The third lasted from September 25 to October 19, 1963, and finalized the independence constitution. The three thus had a substantial influence on Kenya's constitutional development.

Each was a product of a rapidly changing environment that propelled Kenya from a colonial dependency to an independent state much more rapidly than the colonial rulers and most of Kenya's inhabitants could have imagined in the middle of the 1950s. The conferences were a result of the rising tide of anti-colonial nationalism that marked the second half of that decade and the start of the 1960s. The negotiations thus dealt with constitutional issues in a period of heightened pressure for decolonization. They also took place in an era of political transition: from a system characterized by the politics of race to the politics of ethnicity. These conferences involved, almost exclusively, the political elite rather than the Kenyan public as the latter had little to do with the deliberations directly. Just as important, the politicians attending the three conferences failed to reach a comprehensive agreement. It was thus left to the British

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government, through the leadership of the Colonial Office (CO), to impose a settlement in each case. While not all those participating in the conferences accepted the imposed formulas, the CO was able to obtain the agreement of influential groups and individuals and so move the process of constitution-making forward to independence.

LANCASTER HOUSE 1 (LH1)

The first Lancaster House conference was a product of British colonial policy for Kenya in the 1950s, and, even more so, the rising opposition to it that led to a reassessment at the end of the decade. That policy was firmly based on the politics of race. The colonial rulers viewed Kenya as inhabited by distinct racial communities characterized by differences that necessitated a system that made the politics of exclusion or segregation a key feature. The early representative political institutions, such as the legislative and municipal councils, were segregated in that membership was defined by race, with only Europeans qualifying at first. Until the end of the 1950s, the electoral system provided separate voting rolls and seats for Europeans, Asians, and Arabs with no electoral rights for Kenya's African majority. In the colony's Legislative Council (LegCo), the relatively small European population after 1958 returned 14 members to the LegCo, while Africans, who first gained the right to vote for candidates of that race in 1957, also returned 14.

This idea of racial parity was part of the politics of exclusion of Kenya's African population and formed the underpinning for the constitutional philosophy known as multiracialism. This foresaw Kenya's future as a state where there would be a sharing of political power between and among racial groups rather than rule by the majority. British policy, as enunciated by the Secretary of State for the Colonies (SofS), set self-government within the British Commonwealth as an ultimate goal, but the colonial rulers held that Kenya was not ready for such a step. This could only be countenanced when the rights and interests of all communities of the colony were safeguarded.

The British government changed course in 1959 when the SofS agreed to discussions involving members of Kenya's LegCo. The decision was forced from the colonial state and the British government by rising discontent associated with anti-colonial nationalism. African elected members took the lead. They demanded "undiluted democracy" through increased African representation, universal suffrage with a common electoral roll, equal rights and opportunity for all living in Kenya, and an end to segregation in all its forms, most notably relating to land in the so-called white highlands.

The delegates to the conference included all elected members (elected on a racially exclusive franchise). When they arrived in London, they resolved themselves into four main groups. These were the United Party (UP), a right-wing, European-only party. It advocated white supremacy and the politics of exclusion, opposing any move towards majority rule. The second group, led by Europeans but claiming multiracial membership, was the New Kenya Party

(NKP), formed like the UP in 1959. The NKP favored a racial sharing of power with continued substantial influence for the European settler minority. A third important group was the African Constituency elected members, and an Asian and Arab group of LegCo members constituted the fourth. The chairperson for LH1 was Iain Macleod, and this conference presented a challenge. How to move Kenya quickly towards the goal of independence while containing African nationalism and working to promote an important goal of British policy: that Kenya would “become a single nation” within which the population would have “sufficient understanding of parliamentary institutions and a sufficient sense of responsibility in public affairs” to hold out a reasonable prospect that representative institutions would produce “responsible government and not chaos and dictatorship” (Great Britain, 1960).

Macleod and his advisors interpreted this to mean that while independence was the ultimate goal for Kenya, it was not the task of the conference. The identification of that ultimate objective was something the African delegation had for several weeks been advocating. The conference soon got down to work in a series of plenary sessions, which provided the opportunity for all delegates to reply to the SofS’s speech. That speech had also intimated key issues for delegates to consider: the franchise, composition of the legislative and executive branches, and safeguards for minorities.

Following the completion of delegate speeches, Macleod addressed them on February 1 and urged discussion of the issues. Many informal discussions took place over the next two weeks, but no agreement on the franchise and composition of the legislature and council of ministers emerged. By this time, the CO had concluded that the constitutional advances they desired must, at minimum, have the agreement of the African delegation and the Europeans in the NKP in order to sell any such changes in Kenya and Britain. This left much work to be done as the innovations the CO hoped for went further than the NKP delegates felt they could accept. They did not go far enough for the African delegates who pushed for a universal franchise on a common voters’ roll, no reserved seats for minorities, and self-government in 1960 under an African chief minister. Discussions among NKP and African delegates brought some improvement in understanding, but no comprehensive agreement on a new constitution as the CO hoped.

This left it to Macleod to take the initiative to put forward a constitutional plan in the hope that the two groups would accept. On the morning of Friday, February 12, he presented his proposals to the four groups in separate meetings. He told each delegation that if the proposals met with a “sufficient wide measure of approval”, it would be possible to wind up the conference the following week after dealing with safeguards, including a bill of rights. Macleod told each delegation that he would meet with them again in the afternoon to receive their verdict on his proposals, take it or leave it. There would be no additional negotiations. However, he did not provide each group with the same plan. For example, the paper he gave the African delegation called for 60 elected members in the new legislature. For the NKP and UP delegations, the

SofS's paper listed 65 such seats; 53 of these were to be open, with 20 of those reserved for minorities. In addition, 12 "national" seats were to be elected by the new LegCo. The new executive would consist of 12 ministers, four official, and eight unofficial (four African, three European, and one Asian). The paper proposed franchise qualifications that fell short of universal suffrage but provided for an African majority among the electorate.

When Macleod returned in the afternoon, he met the African delegation first. Group leader Ronald Ngala stated that the delegation accepted the paper but wished for modifications. Macleod expressed disappointment and stated that he would now withdraw his paper. Before he could leave, Ngala and Tom Mboya told him that the African delegation did accept the proposals "in every detail." This acceptance of the CO proposals was now sweetened by setting the size of the new LegCo at 65, as in the other papers. The UP delegation rejected Macleod's paper while the Asian delegation accepted it, but the key to the conference now lay in the attitude of the European members of the NKP. When Macleod met with that delegation, the NKP could not accept the proposals without a number of changes. Macleod refused to budge, but he asked the NKP leadership to consider the proposals over the weekend. After a weekend of extensive discussion and talks with African delegates, the NKP delegation met Macleod on Monday to announce that they would accept the proposed constitutional changes. This was a huge win for the CO and allowed a new constitution to be implemented in the months that followed. It proved a victory for the African delegation and African nationalism, even though the delegation did not achieve all it had hoped to in constitutional terms. NKP members' insistence on safeguards delayed the formal closing of the conference until February 21. As Macleod noted in his closing speech, LH1 was not an end but a beginning of the process that would bring further constitutional changes on the way to independence (Great Britain, 1960; Maxon, 2010a).

Significantly, LH1 marked the end of multiracialism and European political supremacy in Kenya. African opinion in Kenya was pleased with the outcome, while many European settlers viewed it as the final act of "sell out" by the British government that had begun with the opening of the white highlands to all races a few months earlier. The politics of inclusion was now ascendant as the barriers of segregation began to fall following the implementation of the new constitution in the following year.

LANCASTER HOUSE 2 (LH2)

Kenya's politicians, as well as the CO and colonial state, expected another conference would be required to work out the constitutional means of moving Kenya to independence, but a second Lancaster House conference came sooner than the CO anticipated. This was because events in Britain, British-ruled Africa, and Kenya forced an accelerated pace. The growing force of nationalism was one very potent factor, while the implementation of the Lancaster House 1 constitution brought in its wake several pressing matters, such as the form of

government and land, that led the colony's political leadership and the colonial rulers to agree on a London conference early in 1962.

By that time, Kenya was in the second year of an economic depression while pressure for democratization continued. The question of inclusion assumed new directions as ethnicity took center stage. This emerged with the creation of new colony-wide parties during 1960. The Kenya African National Union (KANU), formed in March, and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), established in June, were both ethnically based. KADU was supported by what was dubbed the "minority tribes" such as the Kalenjin, Maasai, Mijikenda, and a portion of the Luhya and KANU drew support from the then-largest ethnic groups such as the Kikuyu, Luo, and Kamba as was demonstrated by the elections of January-February 1961. Europeans who opposed the outcome of Lancaster House 1 and advocated exclusion (e.g., segregated schools and hospitals) while calling for the British government to buy up the land of settler farmers so that they could leave Kenya now supported the Kenya Coalition.

The elections of 1961 also set the stage for further political discord and yet another London conference. The result had an impact on LH2. KANU won the most votes while claiming 19 seats to KADU's 11. Eventually, a new government was formed, with KADU taking the lead in alliance with the NKP and independent members of LegCo.

The CO refused to agree to the new government's demand for self-government under the Lancaster House 1 arrangements. Not only was KANU strongly opposed to this. Macleod and his advisors were concerned by mid-1961 that any government that would lead Kenya to independence must have the support of the largest ethnic communities, the Kikuyu and the Luo. This was because the CO felt it was critical to have the support of the former for a land settlement with Kenya's new government that would guarantee property rights and reject the nationalization of the white highlands. The release of detained nationalist Jomo Kenyatta in August brought no solution to the divisive and potentially explosive political situation. Discussions on land and constitutional issues between KADU and KANU produced little agreement in a series of September meetings. The only point of concord was that the party leaders requested the CO to arrange for a conference to work out the details of the constitutional advance to independence under the chairmanship of the SofS.

This stalemate was largely the result of KADU's attitude. KADU leaders turned to another constitutional philosophy in the second half of 1961 that they hoped would preserve their influence as well as mitigate the fears of the ethnic groups (particularly the Maasai and Kalenjin) that supported the party. The new approach took the form of advocacy for a federal constitution. Over the remainder of 1961, KADU leaders called for federalism as the best defense for democracy in Kenya as well as a means of protecting claims to land in the white highlands and in the parts of Kenya reserved for the KADU-supporting tribes during the colonial era. The third pillar of KADU's federalist advocacy was a fear of exclusion, reflecting the party's claim that its supporters did not

want to be ruled by a government in which they had no representation. These became the primary justifications as KADU leaders developed their federal plan and began their public campaign for what they termed *majimbo*, a Swahili word that became synonymous with federalism in Kenyan history. KANU leaders, including Kenyatta after he took leadership of the party in late October, called for a unitary state and a single political party. Division thus marked the start of LH2. There a new SofS, Reginald Maudling, was faced with a gigantic task of obtaining an agreement on a constitution for Kenya's independence.

The protagonists in what proved to be a battle for *majimbo* were KANU and KADU delegations made up of LegCo members, which now included European and Asian supporters of the parties (Odinga, 1966; Maxon, 2010b). The Kenya Coalition was represented by its three LegCo members, but produced no detailed constitution, placing its main emphasis on the claims of settlers for compensation for their farms and businesses. KANU made public its plan for a unitary republic based on universal suffrage and a single chamber legislature prior to its arrival in London. KADU kept details of their *majimbo* plan secret even as the conference began. The British government was forced to play the role of arbiter.

Contrary to popular myth, the CO did not favor KADU's federalist plan, which was deemed too expensive and inappropriate for Kenya's future. The CO sought a successor state in Kenya that would be able to maintain stability, protect investment and property rights, and stand with Britain in an international arena divided by the cold war. A particular concern was KADU's conception of the importance of group rights over land and that land rights must be controlled by regional governments to make sure land ownership remained in the hands of the indigenous inhabitants. In terms of specifics, Maudling felt that Britain should go some way to meet KADU's demands by expanding the powers and functions of existing local government bodies while resisting that party's demands for a fully federal system. Another British aim was to try to take advantage of any opening to bring about a split in KANU in the hope that what they perceived as the moderate faction might unite with most of the KADU group in a new party, thus isolating those viewed as radicals. Finally, Maudling sought to follow Macleod's example by letting the participants "talk themselves to a standstill" and then producing a British "solution" in the hope that delegates would accept it (Maudling, 1978).

After opening statements, the conference began its work by examining KANU's plan. This was followed by calls for KADU to finally make known the details of its federal plan. KADU leader Ngala was reluctant, and only on February 20 did the party put before the conference a memorandum that called for six regions and a two-house parliament having equal powers. KADU's proposed executive was critical in seeking to fulfill the party's aim of preventing domination by a political party, group, or tribe. This meant the executive must be inclusive through the election of ministers, at least one from each region, by both houses of parliament sitting together. The proposal framed by KADU called for a council of ministers which annually elected a chairman who would

be the head of state. Such a leadership position was to be subject to term limits (two years). This power-sharing executive plan drew little support from KANU or the CO, but KADU was unmoved as Ngala led his delegation in stubbornly claiming that before any specifics of a constitution could be discussed, agreement on what the party termed fundamental principles had to be accepted. The KANU delegation, by contrast, was divided as Kenyatta provided little leadership.

KADU persisted in the obstructive stance well into March. CO leaders tried to move the deadlocked conference towards some agreement by establishing committees, subcommittees, and working parties to address specific points, but Ngala and colleagues insisted on fundamental principles first. As a result, the CO concluded that though no amount of talking nor the 1960 tactic would result in a negotiated agreement, the conference must not be allowed to break down; the danger of violent unrest in Kenya was too substantial. The best that could be hoped for was agreement on broad principles upon which a constitution could be based as well as the formation of a coalition government by bringing KANU representatives into the executive.

Thus, on March 21, Maudling shared an outline with delegates aimed at breaking the long deadlock. This sought to incorporate principles that would appeal to the KANU and KADU delegations. For example, he proposed a bicameral parliament, though the two houses were not to have equal powers. Paragraph 19 of the framework stated that amendments would require 75% in both houses, but for "entrenched rights" of individuals, regions, or tribal authorities, the majority in the upper house had to be 90%. Maudling's framework also proposed six regions with elected assemblies. These aspects of the framework were acceptable to the KADU delegation, but the proposed executive was not. Maudling was unmoved by the calls for a power-sharing formula and the need for a council of ministers representing all portions of the country. He proposed an executive on the Westminster model where the leader of the political party that gains the most seats in the lower house would be asked to form a government.

Both delegations found things in the framework that they liked and others that they disliked. Negotiations on numerous details continued over the following two weeks, while at the same time the CO and Kenya's governor worked to put together a coalition government with equal numbers of ministers drawn from the two delegations. In the end, both sides claimed success while serious differences remained. Three factors may be noted here due to their future significance. These were the structure of the police, the organization of the civil service, and land. As regards the latter, Maudling became convinced during the conference that the process of settling landless households in the former white highlands must be speeded up. The KANU and KADU delegations recognized the critical importance of such a policy, but disagreement arose over how this was to be carried out. KADU-supporting communities feared land settlement schemes in the white highlands would bring people from different ethnic groups to farm there at the expense of the people who

had controlled those areas before the colonial era. KADU leaders opposed the CO's desire to place land in the highlands under an independent central land board. This aspect of the land question, focusing on group or individual rights, was not settled at LH2.

The organization of the police was also not settled to the satisfaction of all delegates. KADU delegates maintained that each of the regions should have its police force under the complete control of the regional assemblies. KANU and the British favored the colonial model of police control by the central government. The framework provided for regional police contingents under a regional commissioner of police, but it called for an inspector general and independent police service commission, part of the central government. As far as the organization of the civil service was concerned, the framework merely left this to be worked out by the coalition government (Maxon, 2010b).

The formation of such a government and the acceptance of the framework by most, but not all, of the delegates brought the conference to an end on April 6. As in 1960, this was an imposed settlement. There remained much to be done insofar as the self-government constitution was concerned, and it took a year for this to be accomplished. Fundamental disagreements remained, and it required the new SoFS, Duncan Sandys, to decide almost two dozen issues in dispute before the new constitution could be published. Nevertheless, the battle for *majimbo* that characterized the lengthy conference pushed Kenya much farther in the direction of a federal constitutional framework than could have been foreseen at the start of 1962. In that sense, LH2 proved a victory for KADU's stubborn tactics and Ngala's brilliant leadership. However, the final chapter in this history of Kenya's independence constitution had yet to be written. That was decided as a result of the third Lancaster House conference.

LANCASTER HOUSE 3 (LH3)

Officially, LH3 was known as Kenya's independence conference. Such a conference had long been anticipated, but it could not be scheduled until the self-government constitution had come into effect and a date for independence agreed. The former occurred on June 1, with a KANU government led by Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta taking control, while independence day was set as December 12, following negotiations between representatives of the new Kenya government and the CO. This led to the decision to start LH3 on September 25 to give sufficient time to draft the independence constitution in time for its introduction.

At the insistence of Sandys, preparatory talks were scheduled in Nairobi between the Kenya government and the opposition (representatives of KADU and the African Peoples Party led by Paul Ngei) with Kenya Coalition representatives present in July and August. The talks achieved little in the way of agreement as KADU abandoned them, and Ngei wound up his party and joined KANU. Nevertheless, several of the key issues faced in London were aired. These included the head of state and other changes required by the transition

to independence and several matters that the Kenya government maintained required alterations in the self-government constitution. These included the organization of the police and civil service, regional powers and those of the central or national government, executive authority in the regions, and requirements for amendment. In all, Kenya's government delegation put forward nearly 20 proposed changes.

These proposed changes were considered by delegations representing the government, led by the prime minister and including Ngei, the opposition led by Ngala, and three Kenya Coalition leaders. Sandys led the British delegation, which was quickly placed on the defensive in their attempt to generate agreements between the delegations. This was because, on the one hand, some of the demanded changes in the self-government constitutions had been the result of personal decisions by Sandys (in February 1963) and by party leaders that they would abide by his ruling as in the case with the establishment of eight civil service commissions (one for the central government and one for each of the now seven regions). On the other hand, several changes called for overturning matters seemingly settled by the LH2 framework, as in the case of regional powers, the police, and the amendment process. The government and opposition delegations further complicated matters as they were miles apart and engaged in no direct negotiations as Sandys was forced to serve as an intermediary between the hostile viewpoints (Maxon, 2010b).

Kenyatta and fellow ministers claimed that many fundamental changes were necessary on account of workability. In other words, the self-government constitution contained defects that hindered effective governance. The government delegation presented examples of these alleged defects and backed their claims with political rationale. KANU had won a comfortable majority in the lower house election, and from June, there was evidence that KADU was losing support. The opposition delegation, on the other hand, maintained that the only changes they would accept were those necessary to transition to independence or to correct defects in drafting. The KADU leaders also called for the implementation of the self-government constitution. This proved to be the opposition's strongest card as the constitution had not been fully implemented. As for the question of head of state, KADU backed a republic headed by a president, but the government favored a monarchy with the Queen of the United Kingdom as head of state.

In these circumstances, the conference quickly reached a stalemate. In fact, LH3 experienced two October crises as a result. The lack of consensus and agreement produced, in early October, the possibility of a breakdown when the KADU delegation threatened to withdraw, return to Kenya, and support secession of those portions of the country that electorally supported KADU. This was averted, but a second crisis emerged in mid-October when a frustrated government delegation threatened to go home and declare immediate independence unless their demands for changes were met. In this instance, Sandys was forced to concede the bulk of the government demands. The British goal of maintaining good relations with the successor state in Kenya was a powerful

factor. Since the Coalition delegation, claiming to represent the views of Kenya's Europeans, accepted most of the government's demands, this provided a useful justification for the SofS.

As a result, Sandys announced significant changes to the independence constitution that undermined federalism and paved the way for the demise of *majimbo*. The police were to be under central control, and there would be a single civil service and one civil service commission. Kenya would be a monarchy upon independence. In other decisions, the SofS did not completely meet the Kenya government's demand for change, but the alterations were still substantial. Regional powers were reduced in important ways, and executive authority in the regions was to lie with each assembly's finance and establishment committee. The question of amendment proved thorny as the CO held out against the KANU demand of 65% approval of both houses for all amendments. Basic rights of the individual as well as the Senate, Judiciary, "tribal authorities," and districts, as well as the structure of the regions, were kept at 75% in the lower house and 90% in the Senate. Regional powers, however, could be altered by 75% in both houses. Sandys also bowed to the government's pressure in introducing a means for amendment by a national referendum if a government failed to obtain 75% in both houses. Sandys' main concession to the opposition was obtaining a written promise from Kenyatta to implement the current constitution as quickly as possible.

As the above account demonstrates, this was another imposed constitutional arrangement, as in the case of LH1 and LH2. Also, as with the earlier conferences, the imposed settlement did not last long. Changes to the independence constitution were made within a year. It is clear in retrospect that LH3 was the beginning of the end for *majimbo* in the era of decolonization, though not of course in the history of independent Kenya. Although the three conferences were pivotal in moving Kenya constitutionally to independence, it would not be long before the form of democracy demanded by African nationalist leaders in 1960 was also as dead, as neither Kenyan federalism nor Kenya's thorny land problems had been addressed. Exclusion, rather than inclusion, became a sore point for many ethnic communities in the years ahead. Nevertheless, the Lancaster House constitutional conferences continue to resonate throughout the history of independent Kenya with those who have sought to achieve a democratic and inclusive political system.

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Political Consolidation and the Rise of Single-Party Authoritarianism

Wanjala S. Nasong'o

INTRODUCTION

As argued elsewhere (Nasong'o, 2005), the fight for political independence in Kenya, as elsewhere in the colonial world, aimed at supplanting the exclusivist, oppressive, and exploitative colonial state with an inclusive and democratic postcolonial state based on the will of the majority. Kenyans expected to fully benefit from the fruits of independence in terms of improved access to health services, education, and development resources more generally. This expectation was presaged by constitutional negotiations that settled on a Majimbo (quasi-federal) form of government with seven regional governments and a bi-cameral legislature at the national level (see Chap. 20). Furthermore, the country emerged into independence under a vibrant multiparty system albeit one dominated by two major parties—the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). A Majimbo system, a bi-cameral national legislature, and multiparty system thus constituted the institutional basis for vibrant, competitive politics in the new post-independence democratic dispensation (Nasong'o, 2005).

In the immediate post-independence period, however, the newly independent government under Jomo Kenyatta went about consolidating power in a manner that resulted in undermining the democratic institutions set up at independence, leading to the establishment of a single-party state. This was rationalized as the most effective strategy for focusing on the onerous task of

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nation-building and economic development. This process of political consolidation saw about ten constitutional amendments between 1963 and 1969 that increasingly consolidated power in the executive branch while the independence and powers of other branches of government, especially those of the legislature, were undermined (Okoth-Ogendo, 1991; Oloo, 2004). This chapter examines the process of consolidation of political power in Kenya that resulted in the establishment of an authoritarian state soon after the country's attainment of political independence from colonialism. The chapter argues that this eventuality was a function of rational choice on the part of the new political class to maximize their control over political power as a means for accessing economic resources for personal self-aggrandizement.

RATIONAL CHOICE AND POLITICAL POWER

According to rational choice theory, individual as well as corporate actors are driven by egoistic self-interest in everything they do. The aim of such rational actors is always to maximize their own benefits while simultaneously minimizing the cost to themselves. Each type of actor has their own preferences. For the typical *homo economicus* (businessperson), it is maximization of wealth; for *homo politicus* (the politician), it is maximization of power; and for *homo sociologicus* (social person), it is maximization of prestige, honor, or social status (Nasong'o, 2005, p. 14; Barreto, 2001, p. 83). In brief, the assumption is that "whatever rational actors do, whether these are individuals, political parties, interest groups, or governments, they consider net payoffs, which may be material or psychological, egoistic or altruistic" (Nasong'o, 2005, p. 14). Levi (1999, p. 20) adds, nevertheless, that "although the choice of each actor may be intentional and individually rational, the overall results may seem unintentional and socially irrational to many."

In view of the above, this chapter argues that the establishment of a single-party authoritarian state in Kenya was an advertent rational choice made by the dominant political elite to hedge themselves against their political competitors, maximize their power, and thus remain unchallenged. This development was a product of contestations between the incumbent political elite and their opposition counterparts within a fragile political institutional framework and what Okoth-Ogendo (1991) calls "constitutions without constitutionalism." This establishment of authoritarianism was a favored strategy by many political elites in post-independence Africa as it assured them effective control over state institutions and with it, access to state resources for personal self-aggrandizement (Nyong'o, 1989). As Fredrick Wanyama (2000, p. 31) observes, African leaders wished to inherit the authoritarian colonial political institutions intact so that they too could enjoy the unfettered privileges that exclusive control of these institutions afforded the colonialists. The pluralistic political structures that were part of the negotiated independence package were thus seen as anathema by the new political class who rejected them, though they hid their egoistic self-interest in idealistic nationalist rhetoric. To legitimize their

preference for an authoritarian system, they argued that a single-party state would facilitate national unity as a prerequisite for rapid economic development and that “a plural political structure was incompatible with the traditional African lifestyle that was essentially communal and, hence, united” (Wanyama, 2000, p. 32). These arguments, in Wanyama’s view, provided African leaders with a “sound” backing to return to the authoritarianism and autocracy of the colonial period after a brief stint with democratic politics. Once they succeeded to state power, therefore, the new political elite in Africa sought to eliminate plural politics and co-opted the colonial discourse of “development” (Young, 1994, p. 231). To discourage opposition and perpetuate their power positions, “...they argued that the problems of development demanded complete unity of purpose, justifying on these grounds the criminalization of political dissent and the inexorable march to political monolithism” (Ake, 1991, p. 32).

This inexorable march to political centralization and the establishment of single-party authoritarianism meant that decolonization was, in effect, merely the substitution of foreign rulers with indigenous ones (Wanyama, 2000, p. 32). In this event, as Rok Ajulu (2000, p. 150) argues, the colonial state was simply deracialized, but it was never democratized; the African president replaced the colonial governor, but the provincial administration and its entire legal paraphernalia, through which the governor had lorded it over the natives, was left intact. “The new elites’ economic fortunes rested heavily on access to state power. Any attempts to democratize the post-colonial state would obviously threaten the new political class’s access to the state and the privileges that accrued from such control” (Ajulu, 2000, p. 151, cit. in Nasong’o, 2005, p. 15). Emblematic of this rational choice approach to the establishment of single-party authoritarianism is the case of Kenya wherein attainment of this objective was achieved via a combination of carrot-and-stick strategies (Nasong’o, 2005).

POLITICAL CONSOLIDATION AND THE RISE OF AUTHORITARIANISM

Kenya attained political independence in December 1963 under a constitutional framework negotiated at Lancaster as detailed in Chap. 20. The country’s politics at this time was dominated by two political parties, KANU as the ruling party and the opposition KADU. It would seem, however, that founding President Jomo Kenyatta was keen on doing away with formal opposition and establishing a single-party state. This process of consolidating and centralizing political power started with scraping the constitutional provisions for a Majimbo (quasi-federal) system of government. The Majimbo system, favored by KADU, provided for semi-autonomous ethno-regions with substantial decision-making power over agricultural land, primary and intermediate education, local government, and public health, among others. The central government was responsible for external affairs, defense, customs, international

trade, major economic development, and sourcing of foreign economic assistance (Nasong'o, 2005, p. 16). At the center was a bicameral legislature made of the Lower House and the Senate. The Lower House comprised elected representatives from single-member constituencies, while the Senate was made up of elected members, one from each of the country's then forty-one administrative districts. "Senate was constituted to guard the constitution from arbitrary amendment, as such amendment would require a 75% majority in the Lower House and a 90% majority in Senate" (Nasong'o, 2001, p. 121). "In effect, Senate was given powers to delay bills except those dealing with finances, powers that paralleled the delay powers of the United Kingdom's House of Lords" (Nasong'o, 2005, p. 16).

The ruling party, KANU, led by Jomo Kenyatta, Oginga Odinga, Tom Mboya, and James Gichuru, among others, was dominated by members of the Kikuyu and Luo ethnic groups. The opposition KADU, on the other hand, was led by Masinde Muliro, Ronald Ngala, and Daniel arap Moi, among others and was a coalition of politicians from the Luhya, Mijikenda, and Kalenjin communities. These leaders preferred Majimboism as the sure way of ensuring that no single large ethnic group could dominate the country. It was thus a calculation to counter the preeminence in KANU of the then two largest ethnic groups in the country, the Kikuyu and Luo. KANU signed onto the Majimbo constitution during the Lancaster House independence constitutional negotiations only as a way of hastening political independence. As V. G. Simiyu argues, Kenyan leaders appear to have taken the advice of Kwame Nkrumah very seriously when they were negotiating for the independence constitutions and could not agree on democratic checks and balances:

Nkrumah said, at least in the case of Kenya, he told Koinange, "go and tell Kenyatta in London [the second Lancaster House conference] to just accept what the British are telling him. If they want regionalism, and what-have-you, accept, let it be in that constitution, get independence then do what you like." So, for Kenya the 1962 constitution was only good for getting the independence. (Cit. in Nasong'o, 2005, p. 17)

Following independence, the new KANU government began a process of dismantling the system that had been settled upon at Lancaster. President Kenyatta and key members of his cabinet were devoted to a single-party state within the framework of a unitary state right from the beginning of Kenya's independence. As observed elsewhere, while speaking at Bungoma's Kanduyi stadium in the then Western Region in March 1964, President Kenyatta asserted that the opposition KADU (the champion of Majimboism) was "a dying horse ... very soon, the country would see to it that Kenya had only one party—KANU" (Nasong'o, 2005, p. 17). Achieng Oneko, the Minister for Information, Broadcasting and Tourism at the time, added that this would facilitate accomplishment of the government's agenda as Kenya would "speak with one voice" (Ibid.). Ronald Ngala, the KADU President, was unhappy

with this rhetoric and countered thus, "...for a democratic government to rule properly it must have a constructive opposition. The opposition is in fact the watchdog of the ordinary persons in the country [and] government ought to use its majority in parliament to fulfill the country's demands or else resign and pave way for the opposition to rule (Nasong'o, 2005, p. 17).

Ngala's protestations notwithstanding, KADU was forced to dissolve itself in 1964. This was achieved through intrigue, pressure, and denial of recourses to the regional governments by the central government. Walter Oyugi (1992, p. 13) recounts how this was accomplished:

...the strategy involved ignoring the stipulations of the constitution. When it came particularly to matters relating to financial allocations, regions were deliberately starved as a result of the center's refusal to release funds that were due to them. Development projects stalled and ministers went around reminding the opposition that no development funds could be released to their constituencies. In the meantime, they were also denied permits to hold political meetings by the provincial administration which, contrary to the stipulations of the Majimbo constitution, continued to be answerable to the center. The message sank and KADU disbanded in October 1964, thereby enabling Kenya to become a de facto one-party state under KANU, with KANU emerging thereafter as a multi-ethnic party soon to become an arena for factional ethnic infighting.

In announcing the dissolution of KADU to parliament in 1964, KADU President Ronald Ngala, said: "...in the interests of Kenya, I have full mandate to declare today that the official opposition is dissolved and KADU joins the government under the leadership of Mzee Jomo Kenyatta... we intend to face the national issue with one purpose" (Mutoro & Chweya, 1999, p. 73; Nasong'o, 2005, p. 18). This was followed two years later in 1966 by the merger of the two houses of parliament at the national center. The dissolution of KADU led President Kenyatta to enthusiastically declare that "...opposition for opposition's sake has died for ever and ever, Amen" (Gertzel, 1972, p. 110; Nasong'o, 2005, p. 18). The exodus of KADU parliamentarians into KANU enhanced the factionalization of the party by increasing the size of the leftwing side of KANU. This development had the effect of intensifying the ideological polarization between the right-wing, KANU-A, led by President Kenyatta and Cabinet Minister Tom Mboya and the left-wing, KANU-B, led by Vice President Oginga Odinga and Assistant Minister Bildad Kaggia. The two factions disagreed over issues of land and the kind of postcolonial state system to be established and nurtured.

Regarding the question of land, the leftists contended that social justice demanded the return of the millions of hectares of prime land appropriated by the white settlers to the landless Kenyans without cost to them or the government. To the contrary, during the Lancaster negotiations, the British government had, to safeguard settler interests, secured an agreement that the transfer of land in the "White Highlands" would be based on

willing-seller-willing-buyer. Accordingly, the right-wing political leaders argued that social justice demanded protection of private property and just compensation if an individual's property had to be taken over. They ruled out nationalization of the "White Highlands" as demanded by the leftists. The left-wing politicians regarded this as a betrayal of the anticolonial nationalist struggle for independence and stringently denounced the government for the same. For his incessant criticism of government's land policy, Bildad Kaggia, who served prison time with Kenyatta, and was a veteran of the trade union movement, was sacked from his position as assistant minister for education in early 1964 (Nasong'o, 2005, p. 19; Ajulu, 2000, p. 141). The question of land has remained an emotively contentious issue throughout post-independence Kenya.

On the question of the nature of the postcolonial state to be crafted, the progressive political leaders championed reforming the colonial state towards establishing one based on the principles of democratic socialism to foreground the people's aspirations in matters of national governance. They made the case for nationalizing key sectors of the economy and enacting radical agrarian reforms. In particular, Oginga Odinga denounced capitalism and asserted that Kenyans had not struggled for independence only to supplant colonial masters and adopt the same system of exploitation and plunder against the Kenyan masses. While representing Jomo Kenyatta at a United Nations conference in 1964, Odinga stressed that "...the government of Kenya is dedicated toward the establishment of a 'Democratic African State' ... [and] to take steps away from the Western orbit to redress the imbalance caused by former colonial ties" (Okoth, 1992, p. 86 cit. in Nasong'o, 2005, p. 19). For their part, however, the dominant conservative politicians were content to retain the colonial political edifice to which they had succeeded, and which guaranteed them status, privilege, and access to avenues for private wealth accumulation.

In the context of the Cold War, the ideological split between the progressives and conservatives became associated with the bipolarity of the international system. Whereas the progressives identified with the Soviet Union and China, the conservatives were supported and bolstered by the United States and the United Kingdom. The United States was particularly wary of Oginga Odinga, whom they viewed as "... the opening wedge in the Communist attempt to penetrate Kenya" (Nasong'o, 2005, p. 19; Okoth, 1992, p. 88). Enjoying the support of the United States and at their bidding (see Attwood, 1967), Kenyatta took steps to marginalize the progressives from the center of power. First, Odinga's tactical advisor and veteran of the anticolonial struggle, Pio Gama Pinto was assassinated in Nairobi in mid-1965. Pinto had just won a special election to parliament as the progressives' candidate, one of the twelve specially elected members. The assassin, Mutua Kisili, was arrested and arraigned in court. At the trial, "the man who pulled the trigger, Mutua Kisili, told the prosecution that he had only been an agent of the 'Big Man.' But nobody seemed keen to pursue the Big Man" (Ajulu, 2000, p. 141, cit. in Nasong'o, 2005, p. 19).

Second, a KANU delegates conference was convened at Limuru on March 11–13, 1966. The conference, said to have been sponsored by the United States, “took on the pattern of a closely stage-managed American-type political convention” (Okoth, 1992, p. 95), and scraped Odinga’s position of deputy party president replacing it with eight regional vice presidents. In response, Odinga and Bildad Kaggia quit KANU and established the Kenya People’s Union (KPU). They were quickly followed into the new opposition by ten Senators and nineteen Representatives. According to Rok Ajulu (2000, p. 142), on account of the buildup of pressures in the constituencies, “there were indications that more members would follow Odinga and Kaggia into the opposition.” To preempt this, a constitutional amendment was quickly enacted (the fifth in the two-year-old republic), which required members of the National Assembly who changed parties to seek a new electoral mandate from their constituencies. In the “little general election” that followed in 1966, insurmountable obstacles were placed in the way of KPU candidates. The government used its monopoly of legitimate means of violence and economic rewards to lock the party out of the rest of the country, leaving it to operate only in Nyanza, the home province of KPU leader, Odinga Odinga. As a result, KPU won only two of the ten contested Senate seats and only nine of the nineteen House seats (Ajulu, 2000, p. 142). The KPU Vice President, Bildad Kaggia, a Kikuyu like Kenyatta, lost his Kandara seat where “Kenyatta and Koinange took personal charge of Kaggia’s personal harassment. Kandara was too high a stake to be left to chance. Kaggia lost the election, but a few days later newspapers reported Kaggia’s abandoned ballot papers floating in Chania River”! (Ajulu, 2000, p. 142).

Third, three years after the “little general election,” KPU was proscribed in 1969, and its leaders detained following a heated verbal exchange during an official function in Kisumu between KPU leader Odinga and President Kenyatta, followed by a riot by Odinga’s supporters (Mutoro & Chweya, 1999, p. 74). These developments resulted in a *de facto* single-party system in Kenya beginning 1969. Agnes Chepkwony (1987) writes that following the banning of KPU, subsequent political developments in Kenya saw a decrease in people’s active participation in politics as institutional authoritarianism steadily increased. After utilizing KANU to marginalize the progressives from the center of power, Kenyatta abandoned the party to atrophy. After the 1966 Limuru national delegates conference, the party’s top organs never met again nor were national party elections held up to the time Kenyatta died in August 1978 (Nasong’o, 2001, 2005). It is this reality of a largely dysfunctional KANU under Kenyatta that Jennifer Widner (1992) describes as a loosely organized debating society with little policy influence. Widner (1992, p. 73) contends that “Kenyatta perceived that the best way to maintain political order in a society where ethnic or community boundaries usually coincided with economic differences, and where no one community constituted a majority of the nation’s voters, was to eschew central control of political views.” Instead, Widner (1998) asserts, Kenyatta utilized a unique extra-parliamentary bargaining

system in the name of Harambee (self-help movement) and a loosely defined political party to focus the attention of politicians on local issues and the formation of alliances across communities while limiting their power to force agendas on one another. “Arguably, however, Kenyatta and his faction simply used the party to entrench their power positions by shutting out their competitors after which the party became superfluous, at least for their purposes” (Nasong'o, 2005, p. 21). In Nyong'o's (1989) view, the disintegration of the nationalist coalition had enabled a strong authoritarian president to emerge. Consequently, the dominant faction maintained the party when it suited its interests to do so and then allowed it to atrophy to deny any other organized faction the chance of using it politically to attain its objectives within the bounds of the law (Nasong'o, 2005, p. 21).

Fourth, an ethno-regional powerbase emerged that was closely tied to the Kenyatta regime in the name of Gikuyu Embu Meru Association (GEMA). By the mid-1970s GEMA's power straddled the executive, legislative, and even judicial branches of government so much so that the then popular member of parliament for Nyandurua North, Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, remarked, “I tell you the cabinet is not running the country. It is no use having ministers who do not take decisions, who have no control over their ministries” (Chepkwony, 1987, p. 169). For his penchant for criticizing the Kenyatta regime's policies as set to create a Kenya of ten millionaires and ten million beggars, Josiah Mwangi Kariuki was assassinated on March 2, 1975, and his body thrown into Ngong forest (Mati, 2020). Similarly, Martin Shikuku, member of parliament for Butere and self-proclaimed “People's Watchman,” complained in parliament in October 1975 that the Kenyatta regime was intent on killing parliament the same way it had killed KANU. This comment elicited sharp responses from the front bench with cabinet ministers, led by Vice President Daniel Toroitich arap Moi demanding for substantiation or withdrawal. To the chagrin of the loyalist ministers, Deputy Speaker, Jean Marie Seroney, member for Tinderet, who was presiding for the day, ruled that it was not necessary for Shikuku to substantiate the obvious! (Nasong'o, 2005, p. 21). Despite provisions for parliamentary immunity, on October 17, 1975, both Shikuku and Seroney were arrested within the precincts of parliament and sent to detention without trial. While addressing parliament the following day after the arrests, Jomo Kenyatta metaphorically warned that “the hawk in the sky is always ready to swoop on the chickens” (Nasong'o, 2001, p. 123; Chepkwony, 1987, p. 167). In 1977 Shikuku and Seroney were followed in detention by radical parliamentarian George Anyona and journalist Koigi wa Wamwere, a committed critic of the Kenyatta regime (Ajulu, 2000, p. 144).

Jomo Kenyatta peacefully passed on in August 1978 and was succeeded by Vice President Daniel arap Moi. On assuming power, Moi, as a gesture of goodwill, granted clemency to all political detainees, decided to scrap the provision that granted the president the power of detention without trial, and declared his commitment to fight *magendo* (smuggling). Nevertheless, Moi firmly declared that he would follow in the *Nyayo* (footsteps) of his

predecessor. Moi was quite a popular leader in the first four years of his presidency. After the attempted coup of August 1, 1982, however, Moi turned his attention to clamping down on political dissidents, many of whom fled to exile or went underground. This resulted in the emergence of an underground organization known as Mwakenya (Muungano wa Wazalendo wa Kukomboa Kenya/Patriotic Union for the Liberation of Kenya) with its publications *Pambana* (Struggle) and *Mpatanishi* (Reconciler). In the face of this, the detention without trial law was reinstated in June 1983, “as populism was replaced by repression on a scale unprecedented even by Kenyatta standards. This saw the detention and conviction of members of the country’s traditional left-wing—university lecturers and student activists—as well as those associated with the former vice president and doyen of opposition politics, Oginga Odinga, under the guise of a crackdown on Mwakenya” (Nasong’o, 2005, p. 22).

President Moi embarked on systematically dismantling Kenyatta’s ruling coalition and reconstituting his own. First, the Minister for Constitutional and Home Affairs, Charles Njonjo was accused of working with a foreign power to overthrow Moi. A commission of inquiry was then appointed to investigate the minister who was forced to resign and was later “pardoned” by Moi after being found “guilty” of the allegations (Mueller, 1984). Second, as illustrated by Nasong’o (2005), Moi demonstrated a remarkable reluctance to co-opt powerful regional figures into government as Kenyatta had done before him. Instead, he chose to purge them from their positions of power. “Those who fell victim included Stanley Oloitip (then Minister for Local Government), G. G. Kariuki (Minister of State in the President’s Office), Charles Rubia, Zachary Onyonka (Minister for Education), as well as Robert Matano, a cabinet minister and long-serving secretary-general of KANU” (Nasong’o, 2005, p. 21). “Even within his [Moi’s] old KADU peers, men of independent minds like [Masinde] Muliro were sidelined” (Ajulu, 2000, p. 146).

Third, whereas Kenyatta had dealt with the “problem” of regional party bosses with power bases independent of the center by simply letting the party to go dormant, Moi addressed the “problem” by reviving the moribund ruling party, KANU, and then imposing his men at all levels of the party hierarchy. To achieve this, he reorganized and strengthened KANU and accorded it pride of place in the country’s politics. In 1982, he rushed through parliament a bill that introduced the infamous section 2(A) to the Kenyan constitution, which made Kenya a one-party state by law. The rush to do this was for purposes of preempting the registration of an opposition political party, which Oginga Odinga and George Anyona were preparing to register at the time.

The year 1986 marked the high noon of authoritarianism in Kenya. This is when the Moi government removed the security of tenure for the constitutional offices of judges, attorney general, and comptroller and auditor general. The government affirmed further that “KANU has supremacy over parliament and ... the party is also supreme over the High Court” (*Weekly Review*, November 21, 1986). In the same vein, the Moi government adopted the

queue voting (*Mlolongo*) system, which was used in the 1988 general elections. Herein, voters simply lined up behind their preferred candidates, any candidate who garnered 70% of the vote was declared elected. In the event of no candidate reaching this threshold, all candidates with 30% of the vote and above would proceed to the second round of secret ballot. This system was used to get rid of politicians unwanted by the system whose opponents were declared winners in the *mlolongo* round despite having little electoral support. With no official records/ballots other than the queue totals, losers could not make any credible case for appealing declared results. The queue voting system facilitated complete top-down control of the electoral process to the extent that the 1988 general elections have gone down as the most contentious elections in terms of the falsity of electoral outcomes. In essence, as Jennifer Widner (1992) asserts, Kenya transitioned from what she calls “a single-party-dominant system” to “a party-state.” According to Widner, the 1980s will best be remembered as the decade that saw the consolidation of the State House’s power to control the country’s political life through the ruling party (Widner, 1992, p. 199). The extent of personal rule in the country is well captured by President Moi’s command to his cabinet ministers to demonstrate blind loyalty to him the way he had done to Kenyatta. Upon returning from an official visit to Addis Ababa on September 13, 1983, he said:

I call on all Ministers, Assistant Ministers, and every other person to sing like parrots. During Mzee Kenyatta’s period I persistently sang the Kenyatta tune until people said, “This fellow has nothing except to sing for Kenyatta.” I say: I didn’t have any ideas of my own. Why was I to have my own ideas? I was in Kenyatta’s shoes [*sic*] and therefore, I had to sing whatever Kenyatta wanted. If I had sung another song, do you think Kenyatta would have left me alone? Therefore, you ought to sing the song I sing. If I put a full stop, you should also put a full stop. (Human Rights Watch, 1993, p. 7)

Evidently, the decade of the 1980s was the time when authoritarianism reached its peak in Kenya. It is in view of this that some scholars conclude that at this point in time, Kenya was operating under “a monster of a leviathan” (Mueller, 1984); or, as Rok Ajulu (2000) and Anyang’ Nyong’o (1989) rightly observe, Kenya was operating under “an imperial presidency.”

CONCLUSION

This chapter has focused on the dynamics of political consolidation and the emergence of authoritarianism in Kenya as embodied in the rise of the single-party state system soon after political independence. It has demonstrated that although the country attained independence under a multiparty political dispensation and quasi-federal system, consolidation of power by the dominant political elite led to the banning of opposition political parties. The nationalist movement in the country split into two major political parties on the eve of

independence, KANU and KADU. Although KANU won independence elections, its capacity for mobilization and control was circumscribed by the Majimbo system. The ideological polarization between the two major parties with diametrically opposite beliefs on the preferred form of political system effectively challenged and threatened the power positions of the new incumbent elite. Hence, to maximize their power and hedge themselves against competition, the dominant elite rationalistically opted for single-party authoritarianism, which they justified as a logical response to the politics of fragmentation and a basis for the onerous task of nation-building (Nasong'o, 2005). The groups that faced each other in mid-1960s Kenya were ideologically driven. On the one hand were the progressives who championed radical agrarian reforms, Africanization of the economy, and land redistribution. On the opposite side were the conservatives for whom radical reform of the colonial state was anathema and who thus ruled out nationalization of the economy. This group aspired to maintain the pre-independence status quo in terms of institutional setup for their own economic self-aggrandizement.

Although political independence was expected to herald a new democratic dispensation in the country, political action was taken that eliminated the opposition KADU one year into independence. The emergence of KPU in 1966 returned the country to a short-lived two-party system, which ended in 1969 when the new party was proscribed, and its leaders detained. Kenya remained a de facto one-party state from 1969 to 1982, when alternative political parties were outlawed via a constitutional amendment making the country a de jure one-party state. Utilizing the ideology of development and nation-building, the incumbent elite in Kenya sought to obviate political opposition and actualize political unanimity. They achieved this through co-optation, intimidation, exile, or detention of political opponents. Other strategies included manipulation of the electoral system to favor incumbent preferences, constitutional amendments to centralize wide discretionary power into the presidency, and restriction of the role of representative institutions, especially parliament. This authoritarian dispensation witnessed resort to a litmus test of political loyalty as the basis for appointment of key bureaucrats, central executive control over local government, dilution of judicial independence, and governmental control over electronic and print mass media. It was the quintessential antithesis of the democratic dispensation envisaged by the anticolonial struggle for independence.

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