Terrorism in Africa

THE EVOLVING FRONT IN THE WAR ON TERROR

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edited by

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Contents

Acknowledgments

Introduction
The Evolving Terrorist Threat in Africa
John Davis

PART I States in Africa: A Diverse Terrorist Menu

Chapter 1
An Islamic Solution to State Failure in Somalia?
Melissa Simpson

Chapter 2
The State in Historical and Comparative Perspective:
State Weakness and the Specter of Terrorism in Africa
Alem Hailu

Chapter 3
Terrorism in West Africa: Real, Emerging or Imagined Threats?
Cyril I. Obi

Chapter 4
Terrorism in North Africa: An Increasing Regional Threat
Mohamed A. El-Khawas

PART II Regional Dynamics and Response to Terrorism

Chapter 5
Terrorism and Islam in Africa
Abdul Karim Bangura

Chapter 6
Understanding Terrorism in Africa
John Davis

Chapter 7
Confronting Disaster: Terrorist Safe Havens in Africa
John Davis

PART III Regional Solutions to the Threat of Terrorism

Chapter 8
Rethinking Developmental Practices as a Panacea for Terrorism in Africa
Ben K. Fred-Mensah

Chapter 9
The Imperative of Good Governance and Strong Democratic Institutions to Spur
Development and Prevent the Expansion of Terrorism in Africa
Abdul Karim Bangura

Chapter 10
Evaluating Counterterrorism in Africa
John Davis

Chapter 11
Vital Cog: African Intelligence Efforts and the War on Terrorism
John Davis

Chapter 12
Transforming the War on Terrorism:
Human Security Solutions in the Horn of Africa
Adrian Taylor

Chapter 13
From Blueprint to Implementation:
Assessing the Progress of the African Union in the Fight Against Terrorism
Samuel Moki

Conclusion
The African Response to Terrorism: An Assessment
John Davis

Bibliography

About the Contributors

Acknowledgments

The previous research effort (*Africa and the War on Terrorism*) paved the way for the need to consider and later write a second study that examined terrorism in the region from an African perspective. That is the study that unfolds in the pages that follow; it explores the evolving threat of terrorism in Africa through the prism of multiple regional dynamics. The study represents an attempt to examine the regional response to a host of burgeoning and alarming trends and the study explores the unfolding regional solutions to terrorism.

The initial realization for a second study on terrorism in Africa is owed to a number of scholars and close associates who prodded and in some cases bluntly stated that the next study should be based on a wholly African perspective. This approach they surmised would provide a more definitive and they believed a more focused research effort on the need for the international community to comprehend Africa's on-going struggle with terrorism.

I wish to thank those colleagues who suggested that I consider a second study on terrorism in Africa. While those individuals requested anonymity, it is nonetheless essential that I acknowledge that the advice by them was critical to the development of this study.

I cannot forget the assistance of the contributors to this volume, many of whom provided welcomed advice to advance the research endeavor. I would like to thank the librarians at Howard University and Georgetown University. The efforts of the librarians proved invaluable in locating a host of critical sources that were used in the development of this study.

Finally, I am equally indebted to my graduate assistants: Jason Hunt and Jason Alston. The extraordinary research support, assistance with the bibliography, and other efforts by these individuals were critical in assisting me in completing the manuscript in a timely manner.

Introduction

The Evolving Terrorist Threat in Africa

John Davis

The study, *Terrorism in Africa: The Evolving Front in the War on Terrorism*, represents a research endeavor aimed at increasing scholarly discourse on the ever-expanding threat of terrorism and terrorist-related violence in the region. This collection of essays offers a comprehensive analysis of the states, terrorist groups, and critical issues that have increased the specter of terrorism in Africa.

The study is divided into three themes: (1) the diversity of the terrorist threat among states in the region, (2) the regional dynamics and the local response to terrorism, and (3) regional solutions to the threat of terrorism in Africa.

In any study of terrorism in Africa a critical point should be made: the threat of terrorism is uneven. If one were to examine terrorism in East Africa, for example, the rates of terrorist incidents are extremely high. The expansion of terrorism in the region is a result of increasing violence associated with subnational groups (Al Shabaab for example) and the appearance of new transnational terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda in East Africa (EEAQ). These groups and the alarming number of safe havens foreshadow the likelihood of increasing terrorist attacks in the region.

North Africa "is a second area of significant terrorism threats and vulnerabilities on the continent."[1] In addition, recently there have been a number of actions that have been directed by or attributed to al Qaeda operatives which have been active in the region. Finally, the region is home to "a large number of al Qaeda affiliated groups."[2] The center of gravity of North African terrorist-related violence is inspired by and conducted by transnational terrorist groups with links to al Qaeda whether in the form of

the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) or its replacement Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

> The regional examination of terrorism aside, in a previous work the editor asserted there were a host of additional indices that illustrate the presence of terrorism in region. Those indices include the following: there are a host of internal indicators (abject poverty, widespread corruption, and Islamic revivalism), Political Terrorism, the presence of Failed and Weak States, and then there is the presence of external indices, a reference to the ubiquitous al Qaeda threat and the presence of Hezbollah in the region. These indicators notwithstanding there are other measures that are equally significant:
>
> In understanding Africa's path to terrorism and why the continent remains a source for recruitment for al Qaeda, a source of terrorist financing, and equally significant the continent is replete with terror havens for bin Laden's "Afghan Arab" or his senior lieutenants which roam the region in search of sympathetic clerics or indigenous groups to exploit.[3]

The aforementioned statement was written in late 2006. In examining the indicators in the contemporary context—that Africa is a source for recruitment for al Qaeda, a source of terrorist financing, and equally significant the continent is replete with safe havens that are being used as sanctuaries by al Qaeda or their affiliates—terrorism and terrorist related violence is increasing.

To validate the statement that terrorism is increasing in the region it is a well-established fact that al Qaeda's presence is expanding in many states—particularly those in the strategic Horn and in North Africa. Second, terrorist-related violence is rising dramatically as well. Indeed, the terrorist-related violence in the aforesaid regions is second only to the violence in the Middle East. Third, there is a commonality about the rise in terrorism and terrorist-related violence: a substantial component of both is due in part to al Qaeda-linked organizations such Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Al Qaeda in East Africa (EEAQ).

Not to be dismissed terrorist recruitment is itself on the rise. What accounts for the increase in recruitment? There is no single indicator but rather there is a compendium of forces. There are those that suggest the rise is connected to Islamic radicalism that is increasing in many quarters in the region. In some quarters many assert the recruitment is a result of the "blowback" for creation and success of two Bush era inventions: The Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) or The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI). Still others point to the decision by al Qaeda to form alliances that symbolize two dissimilar yet important realities. On the first, by itself al Qaeda has been unsuccessful in

co-opting local Islamists. This issue is particularly acute in East Africa (especially in Somalia) where al Qaeda continues to be victimized by the Salafist/Sufi divide. Covering the period 2001-2005 this reality negatively impacted recruitment and ideologically the al Qaeda brand suffered a major hit. Second, since 2005 in a major tactical adjustment al Qaeda made a decision to form alliances, AQIM being the most conspicuous example. Because of the success and volume of operations recruitment in the AQIM continues to increase even as security forces in Algeria and Morocco have arrested a number of senior and middle level members of the organization.

The growing presence and viability of transnational terrorism in a major threat to stability in the region, but there is an attendant concern: subnational terrorist groups represent an equal cause of concern. In a salient example, Al Shabaab represents a threat that by itself has resulted in tactical adjustments in counterterrorism by both the CJTF-HOA and African Command (AFRICOM). Kenya and Ethiopia have consequently reacted to the threat of Al Shabaab.

Kenya for its part is concerned about its Northern border which houses a large Somali community (many of the Somali's are displaced by the ever present civil war in Somalia). In the case of Ethiopia in December of 2007 the government of Meles Zenawi launched an invasion to end the threat posed by the Islamic Union Courts. Now the Zenawi government is calibrating about how to confront Al Shabaab. Even as the response to the regional threat unfolds states in the region—Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti—recognize that Al Shabaab is receiving assistance from another al Qaeda-linked group organization, Al-Muhajirun. Events in East Africa represent just a slice of the security dilemma posed by sub-national terrorist threats in the region. The fact that there are numerous other such threats, albeit on a smaller scale, elsewhere in the region is representative of the ever-evolving terrorist threat in Africa.

Structure of the Study

The study is divided into three sections. In Part I—**States in Africa: A Diverse Terrorist Menu**—this section examines the contributing variables that indicate why terrorism continues to impact states in Africa. In chapter 1

Melissa Simpson asserts that incessantly the international community refuses to cooperate with Islamic terrorist groups in Somalia that have links to Al Qaeda. In this essay the author suggests that it is necessary to engage Al Shabaab in the peace process and subsequently to support a moderate Islamic government. Without the participation of local Islamic actors in the peace process Simpson argues the civil war is unlikely to dissipate and the terrorist-related violence will further weaken "the government and therefore rendering the objective of improving the lives of Somalia's citizens impossible."

In chapter 2 Alem Hailu examines state weakness and the specter of terrorism in Africa. Hailu assesses state weakness in a historical and comparative context, and then the author explores the specter of terrorism in selected weak states with the eye toward lessons at the regional and international levels.

Chapter 3 examines terrorism in West Africa. In this chapter Cyril I. Obi identifies and analyzes the issues and challenges that flow from the integration of West Africa "into hegemonic transnational/globalized security arrangements, and the ways in which the emerging state (militaristic) and globalized security framework could reinforce or, paradoxically, undermine regional, intra-national human, and environmental security in one of Africa's most troubled regions." This perspective provides a wholly new approach to terrorism in the region.

In the final entry of this section Mohamed A. El-Khawas explores terrorism in North Africa. In a comprehensive study El-Khawas examines the impact of the war on terrorism in the region and highlights connections to al Qaeda that have contributed to a rise in violence in the area. The chapter then explores Algeria's Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) (now Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)), an organization that is "the epicenter of terrorist activity in the region." Third, the chapter examines Morocco's responses to terrorism and explains "why it has been more successful than others in keeping a tight rein on terrorism." Lastly, the study concludes with an assessment of the strategies that North African governments have employed to counter terrorism in this increasing violent region.

Part II of the study examines the **Regional Dynamics and Response to Terrorism.** In the opening chapter Abdul Karim Bangura explores the

always controversial issue of Terrorism and Islam in Africa. Bangura's chapter addresses three questions: Where and what types of terrorist activities have occurred in Africa? What are the reasons associated with the terrorist activities in Africa that have been characterized as "Islamic"? What can be done to discourage terrorist activities in Africa? These queries according to the author are central to comprehending the connection (or lack thereof) of terrorism and Islam in Africa.

In chapter 6 the editor endeavors to provide a better understanding of terrorism in Africa. This chapter addresses the extent that sub-national and transnational terrorist entities have impacted the course and direction of terrorism in Africa. Second, he examines the areas within the region where the threat or specter of terrorism is likely to cause the greatest unrest. Finally, the author examines the prospects of al Qaeda establishing a new, more robust presence in the region through a host of nascent affiliates whether in the form of Al Qaeda in East Africa (EEAQ), Al Shabaab or Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM).

In a subsequent chapter the editor addresses another significant issue: "Confronting Disaster: Terrorist Safe Havens in Africa." The subject of this chapter explores the expansive list of terrorist safe havens in the region. In this study the point is to provide an examination of some of the terrorist sanctuaries in select regions in Africa, with particular emphasis on East Africa, within countries in the Maghreb and in West Africa. At issue, what are local governments or regional organizations doing to confront the safe havens?

PART III of the study explores a host of **Regional Solutions to the Threat of Terrorism**. In chapter 8 Ben K. Fred-Mensah leads off this section with his entry "Rethinking Developmental Practices as a Panacea for Terrorism in Africa." The central argument of this study is that terrorism is heinous and morally objectionable. Fred-Mensah argues the plans and policies meant to deal with the threat in Africa must not obscure the region's development efforts.

In chapter 9 Bangura ("The Imperative of Good Governance and Strong Democratic Institutions to Spur Development and Prevent the Expansion of Terrorism in Africa") argues that the road to development and the prevention of the expansion of terrorism depends greatly on the willingness on the part of public administrators to remain open to the mass public and

to acknowledge the virtues of consultation and consensus. This chapter analyzes Africa's economic, political and social prospects of dealing with terrorism by taking into account the impact made by civil societies, rule of law and democratization.

In chapter 10 the editor evaluates African counterterrorism efforts. The chapter poses a number of critical queries: What states in the region have adopted counterterrorism measures? Second, what accounts for the successful implementation of counterterrorism programs in those states? Third, if these programs are so successful why are so few states in Africa involved in efforts to confront the challenge of terrorism?

In chapter 11 ("Vital Cog: African Intelligence Efforts and the War on Terrorism") the editor assesses the bilateral and multilateral intelligence relationships by African states in their disparate efforts to confront the threat of terrorism. Second, this chapter explores the continuing problem of reciprocal intelligence sharing. In particular, the chapter explores the extent to which two-way intelligence cooperation has increased among African states and U.S. intelligence agencies.

In chapter 12 Adrian Taylor examines human security solutions in the Horn of Africa. The chapter begins with a critical analysis of the competing regional, international, and humanitarian interests of the former Bush Administration in the strategic region of the Horn of Africa. Thereafter, the author indicates why human security dimensions are vital to regional solutions to confront the specter of terrorism in the region.

In the final chapter Samuel Moki examines "From Blueprint to Implementation: Assessing the Progress of the African Union in the Fight Against Terrorism." The study explores the AU's post-9/11 efforts to ensure that states in the region are cognizant of and are working toward the implementation of major international agreements on terrorism. Similarly, the study unveils the numerous AU sponsored conferences aimed at expanding regional efforts to confront terrorism.

The study concludes with "The African Response to Terrorism: An Assessment." In this chapter the editor utilizes aspects of the aforementioned chapters to identify the strengths and weaknesses of Africa's response to terrorism.

Notes

1. Andre Le Sage, *African Counterterrorism Cooperation: Assessing Regional and Sub-Regional Initiatives* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), 18.

2. Ibid.

3. John Davis, *Africa and the War on Terrorism* (London: Ashgate, 2007), 2.

PART I

States in Africa: A Diverse Terrorist Menu

Chapter 1

An Islamic Solution to State Failure in Somalia?

Melissa Simpson

Introduction

The world continues to witness the abysmal descent of Somalia toward complete state failure. Since civil war broke out in 1991, the chaos plaguing Somalia has only been punctuated briefly in 2006 by a period of stability under the administration of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). After Ethiopia invaded Somalia to dispose of the UIC and support the defunct transitional government, the country fell again into disorder and has since been overrun by extreme poverty, piracy, and armed insurgencies.

Despite the departure of the Ethiopian troops and installment of a coalition government in February 2009, the Islamic militant group, Al Shabaab, has increased its attacks on peacekeeping forces and continues to hinder the peace process. Some Somalis regard Al Shabaab as patriots fighting for freedom, but the majority of Somalis are moderate Muslims and history has shown that they generally prefer a less radical government.

Though the international community is hesitant to collaborate with a group it considers to be terrorists, Al Shabaab's dominance in Somalia is so widespread that it will be impossible to solidify a peace agreement without its participation, as ostracizing the group runs the risk of perpetuating the conflict beyond the possibility of cooperation.

In the following chapter the author presents the background to the crisis and my subsequent argument that it is necessary for international actors to engage Al Shabaab in the peace process and then assist in strengthening the moderate Islamic government. I contend that the West must overcome its usual aversion to empowering Islamic governments, because utilizing these

Islamic groups is the key to resolving the conflict and establishing a legitimate, effective government that can address the dire issues threatening to dismember Somalia.

Background of Conflict

One need only read the daily news to know that Somalia is in need of immediate international assistance. In December 2008, the Defense Secretary of the United Kingdom, John Hutton, reported that "Somalia is a basket case, I'm afraid. It's a classic area where you've got ungoverned space, no effective state apparatus, and criminality and potential terrorism."[1] The current situation is deteriorating daily, causing international experts and leaders to declare Somalia a failed state and one of the world's worst humanitarian cases. A prominent lobby group, the Human Rights Watch, labeled the lack of functioning government, and desperate conditions the "most ignored tragedy in the world."

A country steeped in tribal factionalism since Great Britain unified it in 1960, Somalia has been overrun by civil war and complete discord as no effective central government has taken power since the fall of Mohamed Siad Barre's socialist government in 1991. These poor governance conditions have not only allowed complete mayhem, but have also left Somalia's economy a disaster, with a devastating famine in the early 1990s and 73 percent of the population currently living on under $2 per day.[2]

Due to the deplorable violence and poverty ruining the country, it is estimated that more than one million people have died and a quarter of Somalis have fled the country, making Somalia "a nation of immigrants who depend on other immigrants."[3] In addition to this destitution international concern has heightened as a result of increasing piracy off Somalia's shore and the domination of most of the country by the Islamic militant group: Al Shabaab.

Somalia has long been a country plagued by conflict. After the Barre government was ousted in 1991, the country fell into a state of disarray, as instead of a replacement government coming to power, warring clans vied for control of valuable towns, seaports, and neighborhoods.

Clannism was one of the main sources of conflict when the government crumbled, as there are several powerful clans, such as the Darod, Dir, Issaq, Hawiye, and Rahanweyn, and numerous sub-clans. Extreme violence and famine broke out in the early 90s and an estimated 250,000 Somalis died in this fighting. The international community involved itself by supplying humanitarian aid and assisting in the reconciliation processes, but the way in which these peace processes were undertaken only perpetuated the conflict. At the Arta Peace Conference in 2000, a Transitional National Government (TNG) was created with the intention of ending the civil war and establishing a stable regime. However, this government was doomed from its conception, as key actors in Puntland, Somaliland, and a number of militia leaders in Mogadishu were excluded from the process.[4]

Despite its continued presence, the reformed TNG, established in 2004, has been plagued by corruption and has been unable to control the various warlords and militant opposition groups, so it remains a façade government with no true power or control.

Al Shabaab: Freedom Fighters or Terrorists?

Presently, the most alarming manifestation of this lack of governance is the widespread dominance of Islamic militants. In the power vacuum left after the 1991 government coup, civil war between tribal warlords immersed the country. After 15 years of chaos in this predominantly Muslim country, a fundamentalist Islamic group emerged in early 2006 and gained backing from many citizens. In June 2006, a coalition of clerics, business leaders, and Islamic court militias known as the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) seized the capital of Mogadishu from warlords and expanded militarily southward.[5] Despite the extremism of some of the UIC's approaches, such as imposing *sharia* law, the courts were credited with reducing much of the crime and lawlessness of the country, including piracy, and reuniting the capital.[6]

Though Somalia under the UIC was more stable than it had been since the civil war began, the growing strength of this Islamic group alarmed both its Ethiopian neighbors and the United States, so in December 2006, Ethiopia, armed with U.S. backing, invaded Somalia to quell the Islamists

and restore the defunct TFG. This invasion and subsequent occupation disbanded the UIC and many of its leaders were exiled, but it has only resulted in more violence. The youth and military wing of the UIC, Al Shabaab, controls many parts of the country and continues to wage resistance against the recently departed Ethiopian force and African Union unit (AMISOM) through attacks.

After being exiled, the UIC split into two vying factions, the Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), and Al Shabaab. The ARS has taken a more moderate approach, as they originally vowed to fight against the Ethiopian invaders and the TRG but are now willing to engage in the peace process and government building. The Islamic radicals of Al Shabaab view them as cowards and defilers of the purity of their movement, so they have waged an extensive guerilla campaign without the ARS. In February 2008, the United States designated Al Shabaab[7] as a "specially designated Global Terrorist" and "a violent and brutal extremist group affiliated with al Qaeda."[8] Sheikh Muktar Robow, an Al Shabaab leader, welcomed this label by responding, "Al Shabaab feels honored to be included on the list. We are good Muslims and the Americans are infidels. We are on the right path."[9] The Ethiopian foreign ministry claims that this terrorist designation has actually emboldened Al Shabaab into vowing to establish a Taliban-like Islamic Caliphate in the entire region.[10] Terrorist Planet Online reports that Al Shabaab was initially created to protect the leaders of the UIC and to carry out assassinations of foreign targets, but it has now developed into an extremist terrorist organization with suspected association to al Qaeda.[11] Due to this suspicion, the United States has fired long range missiles into Somalia and carried out a number of air raids on suspected Al Qaeda sites, killing Somali citizens. Although Al Shabaab leaders deny links with al Qaeda, they claim that al Qaeda are their Muslim brothers and share the goal of enforcing *sharia* law.[12] Al Shabaab's proclaimed goal is to "fight a jihad to rid Somalia of Ethiopia and its allies, the secular Somali stooges" and they "will continue to attack peacekeepers in Somalia, despite their nationality."[13] This mission has resulted in 16,000 citizens being killed and one million forced from their homes in the conflict between the government and the militants.[14]

Although the Islamic militant movement is fractured between the Hawiye subclans, former UIC combatants known as Al Muqawamah ("the

Resistance"), and Al Shabaab, Al Shabaab has proven to be the most militant, well-financed, and well-organized of the three.[15] To undermine the Somali government, intimidate civil society activists working to bring about peace reconciliation, and discourage citizens from collaborating with the Ethiopians and the TRG, Al Shabaab attempts to dominate the country through shootings, kidnappings, bombings, and death threats through text messaging. The group scattered leaflets on the streets of Mogadishu warning participants in last year's reconciliation conference that they intended to bomb the conference venue and shoot anyone who planned to attend.

According to a leader of a cell of Al Shabaab fighters, Al Shabaab does not care about people who do not want *sharia* law. He explained that if citizens refuse to pray five times a day, they will be jailed without food until they agree to pray. Due to its strict adherence to *sharia* law, Al Shabaab has been reported to enforce startling forms of antiquated justice, such as the November 2008 stoning of a 13-year-old girl after she had been raped by armed men in the southern port city of Kismayo. After the guilty verdict was decided by the court without lawyers or witnesses involved, cars with loudspeakers announced the stoning, an event in which fifty men participated and more than 1,000 spectators attended. Other examples of Al Shabaab's austere discipline have included public floggings, beheading Somali soldiers at checkpoints, and closing cinemas, shooting dissenters and shaving the heads of those associated with them.[16]

The increasingly powerful militant organization currently controls a number of key regions, including Kismayo, the country's third largest city, and Baidoa, the former stronghold of the transitional government. Despite previous Ethiopian and current African Union troop presence, Al Shabaab moves freely in the capital and South and instills fear in the citizens, one of whom has said, "You keep quiet and follow the commands of the Islamists, or emigrate to neighboring countries, or simply die and leave the world."[17] In November 2008, Somalia's then president, Abdullahi Yusef, revealed that the TRG and Ethiopian troops only controlled parts of Mogadishu and Baidoa, as they were not able to harness the influence of Al Shabaab.[18] To make matters worse, in December 2008, Ethiopia began withdrawing its troops due to the occupation's drain on resources and steady stream of casualties, and completed this withdrawal of its 3,000 member force in

January 2009. A spokesman of Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca, a government-allied Sunni Islamist group, said in response to the withdrawal that "no Somali wants the Ethiopians to stay, but there will be chaos whether they withdraw or not."

In the void of authority left by the departing troops in mid-January, violence has intensified, as Islamist militants fired mortar bombs at the presidential palace, which is being guarded by AU troops, and took control of most of the Ethiopian bases.[19] Additionally, fighting between Al Shabaab and rival militant groups resulted in at least thirty deaths in clashes in the town of Guriel following the Ethiopians' withdrawal.[20]

Humanitarian organizations lament that the actions of Al Shabaab have not only harmed peacekeeping forces, but they have further impoverished and restricted the freedoms of Somali citizens. These organizations explain that Al Shabaab claims to be dedicated to protecting Somalis from foreign domination through the implementation of *sharia* law, but it has only contributed to the abysmal humanitarian situation. Besides killing citizens through its violent tactics, the militants' attacks have left many parts of Somalia inaccessible to humanitarian agencies because of chronic insecurity. Three million Somalis desperately need food aid due to conflict and drought, which is being called the "invisible food crisis."[21] The deputy country director of the U.N. World Food Program (WFP), Denise Brown, has described Somalia as "a catastrophic combination of circumstances" as a result of rising food prices, hyperinflation, violence, and famine. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) warns that Somalia is nearing a total famine while the world's attention is focused on Somalia's other problems.

The ICRC's Alexandre Liebeskind asserts that the violence between Islamic militants and the government makes it impossible to service the half of the Somali population that are dependent on aid, so, in desperation, many families are resorting to eating camels and goats, their most prized possessions. Because of famine, drought, and conflict, the situation is being compared to the great famine of 1992 when hundreds of thousands died, so the ICRC is encouraging Somalis to cross the border and escape.[22] These will add to the one million citizens who have already been displaced from their homes, including 500,000 from Mogadishu alone.

Aid organizations such as Médecins Sans Frontieres and CARE have been forced to withdraw due to threats from the militants and, in January 2009, a WFP food monitor was shot and killed by a militant gunman while he was distributing food to displaced people near Mogadishu.[23] The danger is only escalating for international relief workers, as this was the second WFP worker to be killed in three days. These aid employees are essential in Somalia, as the prominent female politician, Asha Hagi Elmi, explains, "This is the worst time ever in the critical moment in our lives. There is no food, no shelter, no water, no medicine and people are dying every day, [and] children are dying every day. There's a kind of human tragedy in Mogadishu right now."

Another group affected by Al Shabaab's control of the country is the media. Transmission of media is often fractioned and partisan and Reporters without Borders labeled Somalia as "Africa's deadliest country for journalists."[24] In the secessionist regions of Somaliland and Puntland, the authorities dictate and censor all media. These examples make clear Al Shabaab's obstruction of Somalis from economic and intellectual sustenance. In addition to impairing its own citizens and the aid community, Al Shabaab is considered by many in the international community to be a menace to other countries. Besides Al Shabaab's determination to "continue the jihad until the country [Somalia] is ruled by Islamic law," it also has been tied to Islamic insurgencies abroad, as international intelligence agents contend that "several of the senior leaders fought with al Qaeda in Afghanistan and that the late leader Aden Hashi Ayro sent his Islamic fighters to Lebanon to fight against Israel in 2006."[25]

Recently, the head of MI5, the British counterintelligence agency, announced that many British Muslims are traveling to terrorist training camps in Somalia and that "Somalia was now in danger of becoming a safe-haven in the way Afghanistan was before the removal of the Taliban."[26] Though the Somali government denied all links, U.S. intelligence suspected that Osama bin Laden fled from Afghanistan to Somalia to go into hiding after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. During that time, the Somali language newspaper, *Ayaamaha*, reported that pictures of bin Laden were being displayed in businesses in Mogadishu with captions such as "Muslim Hero, God is Great." These theorists contend that bin Laden may have chosen Somalia

because of the humiliation it symbolizes for the U.S., a reference harkening back to the U.S. withdrawal of troops from Somalia in 1995 after an unsuccessful humanitarian mission.[27] Further Islamic solidarity was demonstrated in January 2009, when thousands of Somalis joined an Al Shabaab organized protest against the January Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip, as Sheikh Dahir Addow Alasow declared that "it is our duty as Muslims to support our Muslim brothers in Palestine."[28] To add to international consternation, both the President and Prime Minister resigned in December 2008, along with Ethiopia's withdrawal of troops, leaving a great power vacuum.

Piracy Strikes the Gulf of Aden

Emanating from the disintegration of Somalia's government and economy are the frequent attacks on international shipping by Somali pirates. It is reported that between January and November 2008, there were hijackings of at least 100 vessels. Piracy has been occurring in the Gulf of Aden since the civil war began in the 1990s, as Somalia was in chaos and lacked a central government. With a coastline of 3,300 kilometers, Somalia has one of the longest coasts in Africa with no single authority that controls the waters.[29] When the UIC seized power in 2006, incidences of piracy actually decreased, as the strict punitive system they imposed dissuaded much criminality. However, since the Ethiopians invaded in 2006 and lawlessness has once again overrun the country, an enormous increase in piracy has caused the Piracy Reporting Center, part of the International Maritime Bureau (1MB), to declare the Gulf of Aden the "most dangerous waterway on earth" and "the number one piracy hotspot in the world." The IMB reports that in September 2008, there were thirty nine attacks in the month, the highest instances of pirate attacks in the past three years. In 2008 alone, it was estimated that the pirates extorted at least $150 million in ransom money, an alluring figure for the millions struggling in poverty in Somalia.[30] Piracy has become popular among the impoverished population, as "a share in a ransom translates into an easier life of meat and honey; not just pirate parties but a beautiful bride, a camel, a home, even a car," irresistible loot for Somalia's starving citizens.[31]

These pirate attacks are significant to the international community because the oil industry relies heavily on shipping lanes through the Gulf of Aden to transport 30 percent of the world's oil.[32] Additionally, ransoms from piracy adversely affect international commerce, as it causes higher insurance premiums, delays for customers, lower revenues for the Suez Canal, and another variable affecting the volatile oil prices. In January 2009, Somali pirates received a $3 million ransom for the Saudi Arabian tanker the *Sirius Star* hijacked in November 2008, an unprecedented attack as it is the largest ship to ever be hijacked and the hijacking took place 450 miles off Kenya's shore.[33] This ship was carrying two million barrels of crude oil worth $100 million, a hijacking which "raised the specter of environmental disaster" with the risk of the cargo exploding if the pirates had ignited it or navies had attempted to take it by force.[34] Though the *Sirius Star* has been returned, there was a further upsurge of pirate attacks as 2009 began. The NATO Shipping Centre reported in January 2009 that Somali pirates are currently holding fifteen vessels with more than 200 merchant seafarers.[35] They are now targeting larger cargo ships and oil, gas, or chemical tankers, taking the ships to the pirates' haven in the semiautonomous region of Puntland. Included in the tally of hijacked ships in the past are United Nations and World Food Program vessels carrying food aid to Somalia, further exacerbating the hunger and poverty that are propelling citizens towards piracy.[36] These attacks serve as a drastic warning to the international community that the appalling conditions in Somalia are resulting in crime which is impacting the welfare and security of the entire world.

Not only are the pirates hazardous for international commerce, but they also have direct ties to the Islamic militants. Although the UIC was effective in curbing the epidemic of piracy, its armed wing has formed an unholy alliance with the pirates. Bruno Schiemsky, who formerly monitored U.N. arms shipments to Somalia, reported that the partnership between the pirates and Al Shabaab has consisted of a number of services. These include the pirates assisting Al Shabaab by bringing in arms shipments and foreign fighters in exchange for weapons and training, Al Shabaab providing funds and weapons in exchange for a share of the ransoms, and Al Shabaab using the pirates to train its own forces in naval operations in order to provide protection for smuggled arms. A 480-member maritime force has now been

organized by Al Shabaab, and is being compared to the Sea Tigers, the nautical branch of the Sri Lankan militant group, the Tamil Tigers.[37]

The key location for this flourishing piracy ring, as well as the alliance with Al Shabaab, is the state of Puntland. Puntland declared itself a semiautonomous state of Somalia in 1998 to avoid clan warfare, but nevertheless, it has been affected by conflict, as it has clashed with the independent state of Somaliland over contested regions and is a common destination for Somalis displaced by al Shabaab's attacks.[38] It is also a well-known haven for Somali pirates and, as the majority of Puntland's citizens are poor livestock herders and fishers, the vast amount of money brought in by pirates has led to accusations that authorities are ignoring the pirates' attacks on shipping. In addition to harboring pirates, the port of Puntland has received weapons shipments facilitated by the pirates for al Shabaab. Foreigners in Puntland are becoming targets, as insurgents bid to collect large ransom payments, such as the case of the British journalist and the Spanish photographer who were kidnapped in November 2008 while doing a story on piracy.

Some predict that the situation could improve in the near future, as Puntland elected Abdirahman Mohamud Farole as its Prime Minister in January 2009, who claims that he will eliminate piracy and deal with the security issues.[39] There has been evidence in the past of the Puntland government's dedication to tackling piracy, as Puntland forces stormed a hijacked ship from the United Arab Emirates in April 2008 and its court in the capital city of Bosasso gave life sentences to seven pirates. Despite this commitment of Puntland's government, concerted international effort is necessary to weaken the influence of the pirates.

Proposed Solutions to the Crisis

There is no obvious answer to this crisis, as international policy makers have continued to debate the appropriate recourse to keep Somalia from obliteration. What is obvious is the glaring dearth of governance in Somalia that has impeded the government from regulating lawlessness and from focusing on improving the living conditions of its suffering citizens. In terms of explicit approaches to thwarting the increasingly successful Somali

pirates, some measures have already been taken by key international actors such as the United Nations., the European Union, the African Union, and the United States.

In December 2008, the U.N. authorized countries to send warships to patrol the Gulf of Aden and expand anti-pirate missions to the land as well. Additionally, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced a U.S.-led contact group on Somali piracy that aims to better coordinate anti-piracy actions among countries, international organizations, and the commercial shipping industry.

Following this announcement, the U.S. Navy put a multinational force to the task, with more than twenty countries contributing ships, and the European Union launched Operation Atlanta, which will have EU-member navy ships patrol the waters off the Horn of Africa. This intensified patrolling has already produced positive results, as, despite fifteen attempted hijackings in 2009 already, there have only been two successes. One such assault was foiled in the middle of January when a Russian warship rescued a Danish cargo ship after it called the coalition of patrolling navies for help against the attacking pirates.[40]

Though improvement has been made at sea, there is a great need for military intervention on land. Even with the U.N. authorization for naval action, the U.N. has long refused to send a peacekeeping force, despite United States backing for such an operation, as Secretary General Ban Ki Moon claims that the situation is too precarious and fifty member states have rejected the proposal to lead such a force.[41] On January 16, 2009, the U.N. Security Council tentatively adopted a resolution agreeing in principle to a peacekeeping force, though it is postponing its final decision until June. Moon prefers to financially support the currently undermanned African Union force, consisting of 3,400 Ugandan and Burundian troops out of an intended 8,000, who have been enduring the wrath of Al Shabaab's daily destabilizing attacks. Though these developments may improve the situation, "the new measures fall short of addressing the root cause of piracy: instability and lawlessness that have racked Somalia for nearly two decades."[42] Thus, while a military-based strategy is important for solving piracy in the short run, sustainable action must be taken in the economic and political realms to prevent other forms of lawlessness from emerging.

These military measures are essential, but, as the International Crisis Group (ICG) states in its December 2008 report, "the international community is preoccupied with a symptom—the piracy phenomenon—instead of concentrating on the core of the crisis, the need for a political settlement."[43] In the wake of the resignation of the TRG government and the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, Somalia needs the international community to assist in strengthening the government and institutions while also engaging legitimate local actors. To the dismay of numerous international leaders, the political solution must include the Islamic elements in Somalia. Many are recalcitrant to cooperate with the declared terrorists, but they are vital to this process, as they dominate large parts of the country and are regarded as Somali patriots by many citizens. The ICG report advises that "it makes sense for the international community to use the incentive of international recognition and extensive support for such a regime to ensure that it draws in a wide spectrum of militia elements, including not only ARS-A [Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia Asmara] but also Al Shabaab elements."

Reconciliation talks have already been attempted by a U.N.-led coalition in Djibouti with the aim of creating a powerful political alliance capable of stabilizing the country, marginalizing the radicals, and stemming the Islamic militants. These talks began in May 2008 when the international community realized "that the only way forward was a peace process involving the Islamists and eventually leading to a power-sharing accord." However, the armed Al Shabaab has refused to cooperate in the Djibouti talks and the Ethiopian foreign ministry has stated that Al Shabaab has "the declared objective of spreading extremism to the entire region" and refuses to allow it to take part in any peace negotiations."[44]

The ICG report cautions that Al Shabaab may be unwilling to compromise as they now have the upper hand and see no advantage in succumbing. This is where international pressure must be applied. This may come in several forms, including encouraging Al Shabaab's international allies to involve the group in the peace process. The ICG report notes that Saudi Arabia greatly impacts Al Shabaab through financial support and the prevalence of Wahhabism, which is currently fashionable with the Somali Islamist radicals, so the Saudis could use their influence to persuade the radicals to join the peace process.

Ethiopia has accused Qatar of supporting Eritrea and through it the armed opposition in Somalia. Additionally, Qatar has been known to have friendly relations with Hezbollah and Hamas, so Eritrea and Qatar would be other sources to seek out in this process. The Gulf States are critical, as the UAE is Somalia's main commercial and financial hub and Yemen its chief source of small arms and a primary transit stop for Somali migrants seeking work in the Gulf. All the Gulf countries, including Oman, pursue special agendas in Somalia. Thus, the international community should push Al Shabaab friendly regimes to use their "moral and financial leverage" in promoting the peace process.

Another important role for international policy makers in reconciliation would be encouraging Djibouti participants to utilize clan leaders in the process, such as in the case of Somaliland. Although economic conditions in the independent state of Somaliland are deplorable, there has been a remarkable degree of stability as a result of traditional clan-based negotiations.[45] The World Bank reports that "traditional clan elders are a primary source of conflict mediation, clan-based customary law serves as the basis for negotiated settlements, and clan-based blood-payment groups serve as a deterrent to armed violence."[46] This peace process should strive to include clan and militia leaders to avoid the uproar resulting from their exclusion at the 2000 Arta Conference.

As the ICG observes, while most Western governments are hesitant to give legitimacy to a group associated with terrorism, "in a situation where a seemingly intractable conflict is raging, causing extreme suffering, and these groups appear to have gained public credibility and legitimacy, it would not be pragmatic to refuse engagement." Rebuilding of Somalia cannot occur until Al Shabaab is controlled, so it is essential that the organization plays a key role in ameliorating the conflict.

If the international community does not commit to involving Al Shabaab in the peace process and subsequent government rebuilding, there will be a serious risk of ostracizing the Islamic group and ruining any chance of cooperation, as in the case of Hamas in Palestine. Though Hamas was originally created as a militant organization to resist Israel and has engaged in countless terrorist acts, it became a legitimate political party when elected into government in 2006. Despite the fact that Palestine underwent democratic elections as the West desired, Israel, America, and many other

Western nations were distraught when Hamas won a majority of seats in the parliament. Instead of engaging Hamas to bring about peace in the Palestine-Israeli conflict, Western states have continued to label Hamas as a terrorist organization and have not treated it as an equal partner in the peace process. The events of January 2009 in the Gaza Strip reveal that it may now be too late to cooperate with Hamas as a partner in any future Arab-Israeli peace process.

For this reason it is essential that international actors not discount the strong hold that Al Shabaab has over many parts of the country and the importance of including them in a solution for peace. The international community should learn from this example, as, by not recognizing the need for Al Shabaab in this process, the opportunity of collaboration may be lost and more violence may occur.

After brokering peace agreements with the militants, the next step in rehabilitating the dying country is to assist in establishing a lawful, effective government. As the Ethiopian occupation has shown, foreign domination breeds contempt and violence, so it is incumbent upon the international protagonists to intervene briefly to empower the parties viewed as legitimate within Somali society and then allow them to govern. Asha Hagi Elmi, the founder of the Sixth Clan, a women's group that won five seats in parliament before being exiled, explained in a 2007 interview that "the Somali solution is very clear. We need a comprehensive political solution and the proper vehicle for that is reconciliation—genuine, all-inclusive and serious reconciliation—dialogue, confidence building amongst the clans, trust building. We need all those positive practical solutions."[47] Statistics have indicated that general conditions improved under the leadership of the UIC, the moderate Islamic group that has renounced ties to Al Shabaab. It regulated lawlessness, such as cracking down on pirate operations in Hobyo and Harardheere, and citizens were willing to accept stricter enforcement of *sharia law* in return for the stability that the UIC brought.[48]

Though some Somalis regard Al Shabaab as patriots, there is no history in Somalia of widespread support for radical religious movements, as the Islam practiced there has traditionally been more moderate and tolerant.[49] In the Hiiran region, where the towns have experienced the presence of both the UIC and Al Shabaab, citizens recognize the differences between the moderate approach of the UIC and Al Shabaab's extremism. Residents in

the town of Beled Weyne reveal that Al Shabaab has killed seventeen citizens in their town without reason or due process of law, and "they are holding the region with the barrel of the gun and it has nothing to do with Islam."[50] Sheikh Ahmed, the former head of the UIC, came to power as the new president of Somalia, along with 149 members of the ARS opposition group.[51] President Ahmed enters office at an extremely volatile time for Somalia, as he faces a daunting set of challenges: famine, poverty, chronic insecurity and lawlessness, meddlesome neighbors, and the enduring memory of numerous failed peace processes, with the most pressing issue being how to deal with Al Shabaab.[52]

Despite Ahmed's election, Al Shabaab continues to wage war against the AU peacekeepers, increasing the death toll to eighty-one in the worst fighting for weeks at the end of February 2009.[53] There is no immediate end in sight for this crisis, but international policy makers must intervene now to support the new moderate government and increase pressure on Al Shabaab's allies to involve them in the peace agreements. This will be an arduous process but it is clear that the rebuilding cannot begin until the key Islamic players are involved in the proceedings.

Conclusion

According to the U.N. Humanitarian coordinator for the country, Somalia is the "world's second largest humanitarian crisis [and] one of its most politically complex, so it is now a make or break year." Intervening in the situation is daunting due to the varying levels of conflict involved, and many international bodies shirk from the opportunity to assist. However, as the world looks on, Al Shabaab continues to carry out attacks on peacekeepers, hindering the new government from establishing order and providing assistance to its citizens. Pirates still pose a tremendous threat to international commerce as they have already hijacked several ships since the beginning of 2009. And worst of all, Somali citizens by the thousands are dying of starvation and malnutrition, living in squalor while warring factions tear their country apart.

It is therefore crucial that the leaders of the international community take immediate action to address the governance breakdown that is

perpetuating these societal ills by assisting in the Djibouti peace talks, helping to support moderate Islamists in the new government, and abetting the anti-piracy naval force. A legitimate, functioning government is essential in order to start reuniting the fractious country and finally address the poverty that drives citizens to piracy and violence.

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Chapter 2

The State in Historical and Comparative Perspective: State Weakness and the Specter of Terrorism in Africa

Alem Hailu

A thousand years scarce serve to form a state; An hour may lay it in the dust: and when Can Man its shattered splendor renovate, Recall its virtues back, and vanquish Time and Fate?

Lord Byron

Introduction

The chapter attempts to show the association between the state and terrorism in Africa. The state as a sociopolitical institution in its positive form of providing security and continuity for all social groups was given positive ratings by mainstream scholars and analysts for a long time. The power and prestige of the state, however, were eroded by its worst representatives of irresponsible elites who unleashed unimaginable levels of repression, atrocities and genocide as well as its most extreme critics who approached it by the ideals of perfect, classless and Utopian society.

Leonardo A. Villalon marks the 1980s as one such period when an assault on the state as an institution was undertaken as a global enterprise. He noted: "Around the world, not least in the industrial West, the state has been challenged both from 'above' and from 'below' by ethnic, religious, and regional groups, by international actors, supranational bodies and institutions, and indeed by the state elite itself."[1] While the challenges to the state are universal, Africa has been most bedeviled by the multiplicity of

forces undermining the institution. Diagnoses of the health of African states have been variously described as failing, failed, disintegrating or collapsed: all are manifestations or gradations of weakness. The characteristics of the state, similarly, have been identified as predatory, rentier, dependent, patrimonial, extractive, and inverted.

Despite the surfeit of terms describing the traits of selected states, however, theorists, analysts or practitioners have not developed conceptual frameworks that could bring clarity and understanding to the issues of state failure. In the context of the development theory, scholar Colin Leys found the substantial absence of a systematic theory of the state or the nature of politics in conditions of underdevelopment "as the most troublesome deficiency."[2] Critique of the understanding of the state judged as inadequate from the perspective of the left early in the development of African states is currently echoed by many observers who do not necessarily share the ideological postulates. Erosion of the authority and capacity of the state has been attributed to not only structural factors but also issues of policy adopted by ruling national elites or international actors.

Terrorism as the new global challenge threatening even the hitherto insulated developed states of the West has inadvertently focused attention on the state in Africa. The dissolution of state structures in countries that had been considered stable as Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo clearly underscored the danger to all states. Many analysts showed the interdependence of the fate of states with the capacity of a few terrorists to use the bases of remote failed states as the training and staging ground for global violence.

In the post September 11th era it became clear that the establishment of a viable, accountable and responsible state is the *sine qua non* for peace and security in Africa and the world. Contrary to perceptions among activist communities, terrorism is not a problem fabricated in the United States to co-opt Africa but a real danger that threatens Africans and all members of the community of states. The state embodying the interests and common will of the people, rightly anchored in the institutions and needs of all in its jurisdiction, is indispensable to the welfare and security of all citizens.

After reviewing its historical evolution and the development of the modern state the chapter strives to offer an understanding of the state in Africa in the context of historical and comparative perspectives that could

shed light on the lesson that can be learned from the early examples of modern statehood and the contemporary cases of states successfully adopting its valuable features.

The State in Historical and Evolutionary Perspective

The state has occupied a central place in the historical development of human civilization. Its role in defining societies, political changes and socio-cultural developments has been so pronounced that many theorists have singled out the state as the sole machinery that is capable of ensuring human continuity. This view is challenged by the acknowledgement of the fact that "over 99 percent of past human history (and, for a part of the world's population, even history today) was spent in societies that did not govern themselves by legalistic, institutionalized systems of control." As such, "primitive society was nevertheless not anarchical, for societal behavior was strikingly constrained."[3]

Still, the paramount significance of the state in the sociopolitical development of humankind is, on the other hand, indicated by the universal evolution of communities toward institutionalized structures of political organization: the state. Furthermore, almost all the major religions and philosophical thoughts of the world pay tribute to its centrality and importance with their multiple explastates for its genesis, development and relevance for human security and development. Hindu doctrines on the origin of the state provide divinity and social contract theories. The degeneration of human society through periods of social existence is offered as the explanation for the necessity for government. In ancient China the Confucian view traced the rise of the state in response to the inherent evil of human nature. Classical Greek philosophers, likewise, translated the Hindu and Vedic religion to emphasize the rule of "the strong, and the reckless" presaging the human evolution to justify the state. Hegel goes as far as to credit the people of the Orient as those who "first laid bare as the rational nature of the universe, created the first systematic religions, and invented the notion of the state."[4]

Scholars, political theorists and activists have offered various interpretations on the birth and development of the state. Different approaches employed to explain the phenomenon have been classified into divine, patriarchal, organic, force and consent theories to name a few. Divine theories encompass broad doctrines ranging from the traditional religions to the particular ideas of theorists such as the Vizier of Seljuk Persia of the eleventh century and John of Salisbury of medieval Europe.[5] Echoing the political thoughts of the classical Asian theologies, the divine theories traced the pre-political state of anarchy and evil leading to the divine, assigning governance to the trustees of the state. Patriarchal theories point to the role of the family network of hierarchies as the basis for the development and continuity of the state. Organic theories conceive "the state as the inevitable consequence of the needs of human nature [and not] an artifact to be made or unmade at will by man." Force theories, on the other hand, maintain that the state is a product of "man's aggressive and egocentric instincts and behavior." Early proponents of this theory include the thirteenth-century Muslim thinker, Ibn Jama'a, who argued that the authority and force of arms imposed by man laid the basis for the state while Ibn Khaldun gave a similar explanation of the need for restraining the unlawful aggression of human beings with legitimate force as the foundation.[6]

This idea is expounded through the times from the sixteenth century theorists as Alonso de Castrillo to contemporary proponents who stress state authority deriving from violence and force. David Hume articulated this perspective when he noted: "Almost all the governments which exist at present or which there remains any record in history, have been founded originally either on usurpation or conquest or both, without any pretense of a fair consent or voluntary subjugation of the people."[7]

In sharp contrast with this view, consent theories give greater weight to the role of explicit or implicit consent as the basis for the viable state. Theories of the state surrounding ancient civilizations predicated the establishment and legitimacy of the state on written or customary social contracts between governments and the people. These are understood in the doctrines of the Mahabharata in India, the mandate of heaven in China or the feudal communities of Europe. In its modern form, it is developed by the nuanced views of Spinoza's social compact, Locke's circumscribed

exposition of the state, Rousseau's entwining of the state with the general will, and contemporary views that have incorporated the various elements of accountability, governance and community in its broader conceptualization.

The Modern State

Understanding the state as the agency through which legitimate authority is established to ensure stability and continuity is central to the quest for viable political organization. Political elites, scholars, and activists have often misunderstood the foundations as well as the multiple objectives of the state. Alongside political leaders that recognized the long-term and broader societal goals, many leaders and activists could only view the particular or sectarian elements of statehood. The state's societal role in providing modicums of justice, security and continuity was thus overlooked or undermined by leaders and powerful elites from above and alienated sociopolitical groups from below. Some scholars played roles in adding to the confusions and ambiguities of the state.

The high degree of disillusion surrounding the modern state is illustrated by the growing violence, sociopolitical fragmentation, and dissolution of its institutions world-wide. Political elites presiding over the affairs of the state lead in this march by subverting the essential elements of the institution through their mismanagement, repression and policies of polarization. On the other end of the political spectrum, their opponents engage in equally destructive undertakings with their agendas of widespread violence and ideologies of hate. The current global trend toward the proliferation of states is fed by the confrontations of these realities.

As the list of the number of countries plagued by the forces of state failure and disintegration grows, the number of states splitting into even smaller units has gone apace at a "dizzying rate." The trend toward endless fragmentation resulted in an incredible acceleration of the birthrate of state instability. In a subsequent era, dubbed "the decade of secession," this was "a decade whose secessionist movements were bloody—at times bloodier even than were the earlier colonial conquests—and the terribly cruel,

characterized by internecine warfare between peoples who, a short time before had been co-existing peacefully."[8]

Political groups that aimed at changing the state have appealed to abstract principles of self-determination, claims of ethnicity, religion or particular cultures as justifications for armed struggles and portrayals of the state as the unmitigated enemy of the people. Marxist and ethno-nationalist radicals taking their cue from Vladimir Lenin called for the smashing of the ready-made state machinery and not merely being confined to seizing it.[9]

Yet, even the presumed theorist of the thesis, Karl Marx, acknowledged the broader origins and implications of the state. Contrary to the reductionist theory of economic determination and one dimensional interpretation of the institution, Marx anticipated the "sociological approach to the state" offering "the beginnings of a theory of the state that pays attention to the multiplicity of possible historical trajectories." Accordingly, in his thought, "it is feudalism, very narrowly defined, that is the key variable in the construction of the state."[10] Neo-Marxists conceptualize the state in terms of its relative autonomy that would enable the institution to function as a centralized authority standing above narrow national interests. The vitality of this approach lies in the fact that political and social actors can work in the transformation of state institutions not only in the context of single dimensional perceptions of a monolithic machinery of power but also in the broader frameworks of the legal, ideological, and societal underpinnings.[11] The various bureaucratic, legal and administrative components that encompass larger societal concerns, consequently, should be addressed in non-polarized or nonviolent strategies of change.

However, political leaders and activists still operate under false assumptions and conceptions of the state. Abstract rights, self-determination, principles of democracy, justifications for rebellion such as ethnicity are all presented as preconditions for forming new or separate forms of statehood. A good number of the political actors have assaulted the state with their corrupt practices, liberation fronts, and extreme movements that failed to differentiate between particular enemies and social institutions have been motivated by greed, egotistical drives and treacherous ideologies. Larger sections of society have, nonetheless, been drawn into the destructive movements as a result of the lack of a clear understanding involved in building, reconstructing and maintaining a viable as well as

legitimate state. In the first instances, the disintegration of the state in the former Yugoslavia, for example, was fueled by the ethno-nationalist ideology and propaganda that transformed the need to swiftly turn "a senseless fratricide, once organized by criminals and third-rate political leaders for power and wealth, into an orgy of killing, torture, and mass execution."[12]

For members of the latter group that inadvertently become tangled in the euphoric movements of ethno-nationalism, armed struggles, and political conflicts that lead to the dissolution of society and whole institutions, a better understanding of historical, cultural, and sociopolitical conditions of the modern state is in order.

The modern state is believed to be the "by product of a specific historical process, that of Western Europe, and of a specific era, the renaissance"[13] as well as the following movements of the reformation, the enlightenment and the industrial philosophical thoughts of the modern social sciences. The renaissance tradition building on the Greco-Roman classical heritages introduced the stoic concepts of equality and the Roman doctrines of the rule of law and constitutionalism. The Renaissance bequeathed the spirit that "put emphasis on human beings and the world they live in."[14] The Christian contribution gave the stoic doctrine of human equality "far more depth and force."[15] The reformation's protestant values in particular contributed to secularization of the state. Theorists of the enlightenment revived and popularized the ideals of constitutionalism, separation of powers, limits to government, the social contract and civic freedom.[16] Out of the diverse philosophical and political traditions that followed the industrial era emerged a host of theories and ideas that presented re-conceptualizations of the state.

One major paradigm that approached the state was the reenvisioning of the institution not only in terms of the concepts of accountability and social compact but also in the contexts of new concepts of sovereignty, territoriality and internationally recognized multiple systems of the Nation State. State power prior to the new era had been recognized either in the old Empire system or with the medieval frameworks of shared sovereignty. The doctrine of Nation State sovereignty embedded in an international framework of equality among constituent parts emerged as the defining structure for Europe and subsequently for the world.[17]

The concepts of state and nation were treated as separate entities for centuries. Accordingly, the state was considered "from the point of view of the ruled rather than the ruler." In fact, the dictionary of the L' Academie Francaise as late as 1878 was still giving as its primary definition of the nation, "the totality of a person born or naturalized in a country and living under a single government."[18] The modern state's ideal form of political organization assumed the Nation State, whereby the political boundaries were anticipated "to coincide with ethnographic or linguistic frontiers."[19] The political-territorial definition of the state transformed the modern state by grounding it on the principles of consent, accountability and the rule of law. The incorporation of the ideas of culture, nationality and language as preconditions for legitimate statehood, however, opened the door for ideologies of exclusion, ethnocentrism, and xenophobia as well as endless cycles of communal conflicts. The cultural-ethnic conceptualizations of statehood, hence, "emphasized the differences, rather than similarities between peoples, and their several destinies."[20]

On the other side of the ledger, the modern state elevated the principles of individual rights, citizenship, tolerance, governance, pluralism, and democracy. On the negative side of the column, nonetheless, have been the acts of violence, persecution and exclusion carried out among subgroupings within the Nation State and between contending groups along international frontiers. What comes clearly out of the historical overview is the fact that the Nation State is a European invention that has had a very limited life span of a few centuries but has spread over all corners of the earth and has become the dominant form of political organization at both the national and global levels. A brief examination of its development could throw light on many of the debates African countries confront in building viable structures and political organizations of statehood.

Development of the State

Numerous scholars and political analysts have suggested that symptoms of violence and sociopolitical disintegration stem from the incongruity of nationality and statehood. To the extent that communalities of culture, language and religion contribute to greater levels of harmony and

coexistence, the deadly conflicts played out in multinational environments can partly be explained as by-products of diversity exacerbated by other factors. Yet the glib attribution of violence to ethnic diversity as the singular causal factor is belied by historical evidence.

Very often in the analysis of the Nation State, cultural variables are offered as the key ingredients in building viable political organizations. The prominent role played by the state in fostering shared cultures, institutions, and common values of coexistence is either ignored or even totally forgotten.

Another example that reflects the difficulties analysts face in sorting the myths from the realities of statehood in the Third World context is India. As in the states mentioned above, Sir Winston Churchill pronounced: "India is merely a geographical expression. It is no more a single country than the equator." The partial validity of the observation is seconded by Shashi Tharoor when he explained that it was true that "no other country in the world embraces the extraordinary mixture of ethnic groups, the profusion of mutually incomprehensible languages, the varieties of topography and climate, the diversity of religions and cultural practices and the range of levels of economic development India has." Despite this acknowledgement, nevertheless, the author boldly asserts: "And yet India is more than the sum of its contradictions. It is a country held together in the words of Jawaharial Nehru 'by a strong invisible threads' . . . about her there is the elusive quality of a legend of long ago, some enchantment seems to have held her mine. She is a myth and an idea, a dream and a vision, and yet very real and present and pervasive."[21]

Even though the notion of the democratic will of citizens is provided as the basis for modern statehood, the European state, as in most of those around the world, was mainly established by the coercive powers of ruling elites. In many parts of Europe "groups of related or unrelated peoples were welded into political unity during the medieval period by the force of feudal overlords, supported by their baronage."[22] Accordingly, "during the eleventh and twelfth centuries strong dynasties laid the foundations of English, French and German states, while lesser rulers, such as the Ramon Berenguer dynasty, were creating smaller nationalities like the Catalan." The royal institutions established the substructures of governance and loyalty to the state going back to the medieval period.[23]

Even after centuries of this process, it took the military and political initiatives of the state builders of the post-feudal absolutism to hammer the societies into the modern national community. State building before 1800 is believed to antedate nationhood. And yet even if nationalism thereafter is credited with redefining states, processes of state building as in the unifications of Germany and Italy still needed the military initiatives of particular statesmen.[24] The distinction between the two roads to statehood, nonetheless, remains valid inasmuch as the cultural/ethnic paradigms put a great deal of emphasis on the issues of history, culture and language as the determining factors. At least perhaps until the last decades of the twentieth century when ethno-nationalist movements emerged as the dominant organs, "the process in the Third World often has had more in common with the sixteenth and seventeenth century developments that created early European states like France and Britain than with the nineteenth-century emergence of Italy and Germany."[25]

The problem with giving primacy to nationality, culture and language as the main basis for statehood lies in the hate, violence and destruction that is often spawned by the focus on differences. In this regard what is neglected is the critical role of the state to promote internal loyalty and create a process whereby its "diverse citizens gradually acquire nationalism through similarities as the common historical experiences and regular social, economic, political, interaction, and cooperation that occur among people living within the same state."[26] Furthermore, even though political leaders and activists have exaggerated the communalities of language and culture as the keystones of statehood, the realities in the Nation States around the world challenge the notion. In a study of 132 states only twelve were found to be ethnically homogenous. Additionally, the largest ethnic group in thirty states accounted for less than 50 percent of the population; while fifty-three states contained five or more significant ethnic groups.[27]

The social construction of the concept of the Nation State is revealed by the realities of a study that indicated only 9.1 percent of the states described as Nation States had some justification. The ease with which descriptions, categories and events flow interchangeably from the nation to the state and ethnic group likewise reinforce the validity of the multinational state.[28] Political visionaries who posited the premises of a unifying idea, principle and paradigm as the basis for statehood in the United States; India affirmed

the legitimacy that being within a state sometimes allows a demographically diverse people to come together as a nation through a process of "E. Pluribus Unum (out of many one), as the U.S. motto says."[29] The long historical examples of state organization that incorporated multinational entities attest to the validity of the notion. The experiences of Nation States such as those of Great Britain, Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland also reinforce the idea.[30]

The Traditional African State

The state in traditional Africa encompassed the variety of traits universally shared by all states while exhibiting the particularities shaped by the combistates of human design as well as the will of historical circumstances. Many scholars and political activists have attached specific dimensions of choice to identify essential elements underlying African statehood. Sociologists have taken the Rousseauist view of the noble savage to paint Africa as a picture of equality, freedom and unity. Nyerere argued that political authority in Africa was based on democracy, consensus and free discussion among the elders in which "they talk till they agree."[31]

Jomo Kenyatta expressed similar thoughts when he asserted that before the coming of the Europeans, the Gikuyu had a democratic regime. Leopold Sengor described West African realities as community countries that were once feudalistic, but traditionally classless. Many scholars amplified views that underscored the classless nature of African states. According to this thesis, African countries at the time of independence had no class divisions. But the examination of traditional African societies reveals the heritages of both democratic and authoritarian values not unlike the experience of other states. What is certain, however, is that African communities built political organizations that were able to ensure peace, prosperity, and continuity for their populations over long historical periods.

The ancient states of Ethiopia, Nubia, Meroe and Egypt provided structural foundations that enabled the flowering of great civilizations. The renowned states of Ghana, Mali and Songhay as well as the numerous succeeding states of Benin, Mossai and Fulani kingdoms demonstrated great skills in political organizations. The vast African states in other parts

of the continent from the Bunyoro and Buganda kingdoms in Central and East Africa to the kingdoms of Zimbabwe and the Lunda Empire in the southern region, similarly, built sophisticated systems of governance. And as noted, all the attributes of good political rule were manifested in most of the states while the degrees of democratization differed from place to place or across different historical eras.

The debate over the democratic nature of African states can not be settled in terms of a yes/no dichotomy given the diversity of the conditions experienced by the numerous states. The elements that go into effective statehood, nonetheless, can be found in most of the African states. The computer analogy of hardware and software that comprise the information system could serve to illustrate the complementary but autonomous components of the structural and infrastructural dimensions that support the state architecture.

Theories and principles of modern statehood often emphasize the principles of democracy, self-determination, and pluralism as the key foundations. The theories, of course, conveniently neglect to take into consideration the historic factors of force, coercion, compulsion, and might that have laid the groundwork of state building around the world.

The evolution of the state, therefore, as an institution of power is mostly attributed to the role force has played in shaping its primary characteristics. That organized violence made a major contribution toward its development can be illustrated not only by examining its historical process but also by looking at sociological and linguistic vestiges that shed some light on its evolutionary features.

The states of the European countries of France, the United Kingdom and Spain created the states by laying the political basis for the integration of diverse nationalities. The United Kingdom brought together the three historically distinct entities of England, Scotland and Wales. France, the country held up as the model of single identity and democratic consensus, manifested similar characteristics. Not only the visible minorities of Jews and Romans who were classified in the overseas minorities, the Alsatians, Basques, Bretons, Catalans, Corsicans, Flemish, and Occitanian communities that still maintain their local identities indicate the primacy of the power of the state. In fact, when France declared its modern statehood during its 1789 revolution large sections of the country did not speak

French. As Walker Conner noted, “prior to the nineteenth century, political legitimacy was dependent upon such diverse and often overlapping attributes as divine right, title to land, conquest, inheritance, or marriage. All of these justifications stemmed from the view that the right to rule emanated not from below but from above, that is, the basis for legitimacy was not to be sought among the governed.”

In the African context the states such as Ethiopia undertook the universal tasks of building the territorial and political structures of stability and continuity. Adrian Hastings, while declaring most of the African modern states as arrested in their development and giving primacy to the factors of language and culture, still bows down to the power of the state structure over the feelings of community when he recognizes Tanzania’s post-independence government’s leading role in forging the state’s identity.

The other components of viable statehood include the structures of governance and economic development. The theories and practices of political organization incorporated the concepts as well as goals of check and balance, pluralism, accountability, legitimacy, and differentiation. Historical accounts of some of the more democratic states such as the Lunda Empire in Zaire record how they developed a “complex but well structured system of popular representation and administration of justice and tax collection before European arrival.” Intricate structures of check and balance were erected to prevent the concentration of power even in the states that appeared to be authoritarian. Accordingly, “the forces that maintain supremacy of the paramount ruler are opposed by the forces that act as a check on his powers.” In the political organization of the Zulu state were built-in counterbalancing institutions through the establishment of councils, courts and regional devolution of powers to place boundaries on the power of kingship.

Clearly delimiting the bounds of power and authority, the states at their best devised architectures of political organization that attempted to bring balance to the needs of society and governance. In the words of M. Forbes and E. E. Evans-Prichard: “The government of an African state consists in a balance between power and authority on the one side and obligation and responsibility on the other. Everyone who holds political office has responsibilities for the public weal corresponding to his rights and privileges. The distribution of political authority provides machinery by which the various agents of governments can be held to their

responsibilities. A chief or a king has the right to exact tax tribute, and labor service from his subjects; he has a corresponding obligation to dispense justice to them, to ensure their protection from enemies, and to safeguard their general welfare by ritual acts and observances. The structure of an African state implies that kings or chiefs rule by consent."[32]

State Building, State Weakness

The profound impact of the vertical forces of integration is complemented by the softwares of state building. At certain levels the state is believed to play the commanding role in fusing a population into nationhood. Yet the softwares of norms, values, culture, belief systems, rituals and ideologies seem to account for equally significant or even at times more determining parts as to render the choice the proverbial chicken-egg dilemma. The European preenlightenment cultures of nationhood consisting of literature, language, liturgy, music and time, honored political doctrines of legitimacy in Ethiopia is provided as the basis for the continuous 1,500 years of statehood. Another African polity credited with possessing the attributes of nationhood is the Buganda state—"a strong sense of its own history, centralized government, an effective territorial division in countries and possessing in its clan organization a horizontality of social consciousness to balance the verticality of royal and bureaucratic rule."

The softwares of viable statehood consisted of the cultural integration of the people as much as the doctrines, principles, and belief systems that were embedded in the structures of power and authority. Force utilized to consolidate power is supplemented by the constraints of values, norms, and moral sanctions established to facilitative accountability, tolerance and justice. Consequently "an African ruler is not to his people merely a person who can enforce his will on them. He is the axis of their political relations, the symbol of their unity and exclusiveness, and the embodiment of their essential values." Reverence for justice and fair play was built into the value system in the monarchial states from Ethiopia to Benin and Ghana to Zulu Kingdom. According to Claude Ake, cultural norms demanding accountability "were even stricter than in western societies whereby the heads of state were answerable not only for their own actions but for natural

catastrophes such as famine, epidemics, floods and drought. In the event of such disasters, chiefs could be required to go into exile or asked to die."[33]

Kings were revered for their governance skills as well as their spiritual role in maintaining "harmony between society and its natural environment by means of ritual action." The religious basis of the state was predicated on the belief that the king was the spiritual repository of the collective soul of the people as well as the powers of ancestors. Thus "the office was sacred [and] protected by many taboos and rules. The king and kingship would be identical only if the king obeyed these rules. Structures of the state defined by law were established with the accepted criteria of centralized authority, administrative machinery, and judicial institutions, which assume that territorial sovereignty, a specialized bureaucracy, and the monopoly and legal use of force are aspects of the African state." Integrating the political principles and practices of responsible authority, division of power and decentralization, the system of governance and state power ensured accountability, prosperity, and security in the defined territorial jurisdictions.[34]

If the close association of religion and state politics in Africa appears astonishing by contemporary standards the value systems of governance shared great commonalities with the other regions in Asia or Europe. Comparing traditional African and European cosmologies observed how the Catholicism of fifteenth or sixteenth century Portugal or Spain had "far more in common with African religion than might be imagined." The social sanctions on wrongdoing regulated by angels and devils, the spiritual power of intercessors such as Saints, folk beliefs and nature spirits featured in both the African as much as the European cultures. Not only were "European states intertwined with Christian ethos but not unlike the Africans, most European Christians accepted that their monarchs should play major roles as the arbitrators and enforcers of religious orthodoxy."[35]

The softwares of statehood, therefore, manifested by common religion, belief systems, cultural norms and values contributed to the smooth functioning of the polity laying the foundations of harmony, good governance, stability and continuity for Africans held together by the synthesis of the structural as well as spiritual building blocks of effective political organization.

The research offers a survey of the development of the state from the pre-colonial and colonial periods to the post-independence era. The elements of strength and continuity are weighed against the negative factors that have undermined state building and stability. The hopes and aspirations for strong and viable nation states expressed during the early years of independence are examined in the context of the ideologies embraced and strategies adopted by the political and intellectual elites. The tragedies of corruption, decay and criminalization of the state that led to the disintegration of many states in the continent are analyzed against the structures and policies formulated by the post-independence governments. The puzzling question asked about what went wrong with the state will be addressed in terms of the way the institutions were built, concepts adapted to suit the African realities and the approaches politicians, intellectuals and civic groups used to establish a durable enterprise. While appearing to focus on the negatives involved in failing to constitute a functional nation state, the study in actual fact intends to identify the strong factors that go into the process of viable nation building as well.

The durability, fragility and transience of the state have been analyzed and discussed by scholars as well as policy analysts. The most eloquent observation of the fragility of the state was Byron's juxtaposition of state life span as a thousand years with the peril of disintegrating in an hour.

Similar judgments on the contemporary state were made when many pointed out that the collapse of states such as Yugoslavia underscored the maxim that while it might take decades and centuries to build a nation, it only took a year to bring one down. The continued existence of the state in many of the older states is also given as the argument for the strong durability of the state as an institution. The speed with which the state can rise, die, or reemerge is illustrated by the historic and contemporary cases of states that have risen or left the international stage over long periods or instant time spans.

The proliferation of states has come to threaten large states such as Russia and India as well as many smaller countries in Africa. Similarly it poses a threat to redeveloping states such as Iraq and Afghanistan. And the disintegration of the state, highlighted in the states challenged by sub-national groupings calling for self-determination, does not even include the large number of states determined to be already on the long paths of decay and dissolution. In the wake of the African states that collapsed in the

decades before the 1980s, Chad, Congo, and Uganda, to name a few examples, a study of the issues extending to the second phase of the 1990s "identified 50 percent of the African states as being in serious or maximum danger of collapse, if not already gone." Smaller states from Liberia and Somalia, to the Congo and Rwanda had succumbed to the forces of dissolution. Yet by the 1990s even states such as Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon and Algeria, considered to be stable and strong, began to stagger under the weight of the domestic as well as international pressures. The African giant, Nigeria, with the largest population and huge oil revenues, joined the list of countries threatened with dissolution of the state. Nigeria has often been singled out as the African nation that symbolizes the hopes, dreams as well as tragedies of the continent. The tale of the breakdown of the state seems to not really apply to this country that has been a bulwark of economic vitality and security for the West African region. Yet the seemingly remote danger of collapse is illustrated by not only the perhaps hyperbolic characterization of Nigeria as "the largest failed state in the Third World" by Karl Maier but also the wide range of the telltale signs of decay, corruption and erosion of civic institutions that presage the final state of dissolution. For as William Zartman observed: "The most striking characteristic of state collapse is that it is not a short term phenomenon, not a crisis with a few early warnings: nor simply a matter of a coup or a riot. State collapse is a long term degenerative disease."[36] Maier likened the Nigerian state to a "battered and bruised elephant staggering toward an abyss with the ground crumbling under its feet. Should it fall, the impact will shake the rest of West Africa."

Ironically, the numerous factors that play into the disintegration of the state can be counterbalanced by the forces of stability and continuity. While states large and small continue to be threatened by state failure, the resilience of sociopolitical communities to withstand erosive forces or bounce back from situations of catastrophic dissolution is manifested in the experiences of many countries as well. The relative regeneration of the public institutions in failed states receives the accolades of some scholars attributing the survival to the strong idea of stateness. Thus it has been judged: "The African state's resilience is remarkable and its relative influence on society is still greater than that of any other organization."

A full understanding of the vulnerability of the state is critical to preventing the deadly consequences of failure. However, appreciating the

building blocks of stability, continuity and resilience is also important in undertaking the processes of maintaining, repairing and reconfiguring the structures of the state and society.

Manifestation of African State Weakness: Strength, Fragility, Failure

Like the proverbial routes to Rome, the paths to failure and state collapse might take different avenues, but the main road to disintegration seems to be shared by almost all the states at risk. The comparative view of the African traditional and modern states clearly reveals the wrong turns and avenues of self-destruction the political elites have adopted during the last four-decade post-independence period. Obviously, the external factor in the development or failure of the African states has to be taken into account when one charts the paths of state failure. And the dynamics in the interactions between the domestic and international factors have to be analyzed as well. But the major role played by the post-independence African economic, political, social and intellectual elites in the severe breakdown of the institutions of governance and civility cannot just be swept aside as merely the by-product of global forces as many scholars and analysts have done very often.

Critiques of the shortcomings of the African state point to the ethnic diversity of the states as the major cause for the disintegration of the countries. Basil Davidson blames the incongruence between ethnicity and nationhood as the main curse behind the failure. Even Chief Obafemi Awolowo subscribed to this view when he proclaimed: “Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographic expression.” In the European case the same description had been made of Italy when Metternich dismissed it as a mere geographic expression. But observers note that this characterization in one sense turned out to be an apt comment when Italy, embarking on its statehood, received the exhortation from one of its founding fathers who stated: “having made Italy, we must [now] make Italians.” And indeed at the time only 10 percent of the population spoke Italian.

The overview of the development and viability of the traditional African state was done with the objective of shining light on what went wrong in

the post-independence era. The African states, while possessing particular attributes that differentiated them from civilizations in other parts of the world, still held their ground in terms of providing economic sustenance, political security and stability for their populations over long historical periods.

The contradictory traits of the durability and fragility of the state have been underscored by Lord Byron's profound cited observation as much as the current events unfolding on the world stage. Africa, however, has been at the forefront of this world-wide phenomenon. Dozens of states from Liberia to Somalia and the Congo to Sierra Leone have fallen apart while other states including large countries believed to be bastions of stability for a long time have teetered on the brink of collapse. Very often casual observers, political analysts or even scholars look for the immediate explanation as the factors for failure. The challenge, nevertheless, is to connect underlying structural and historical conditions with the series of steps and missteps that take place up to the eve of the final crisis. An overview of the multiplicity of the historical, structural, sociopolitical and policy issues that contributed to the failure and disintegration of the state in Africa is key to understanding the process in its broad context.

Legacy of the Colonial Era

The impact of colonialism on the development of the state in Africa is obviously demonstrated by the ways many traditional states were severely affected and the process of continuity disrupted. The many negative effects colonialism had on the healthy evolution of the state cannot be exaggerated. Yet this also has been the phenomenon shared by the majority of states in the Third World. Without having to absolve colonialism's adverse impact, the positives that can be built on in salvaging tragic legacies are revealed in the experiences of some states. Sunil Khilnani notes that power was not embodied in the concept of a state in India. Contrary to the Marxist descriptions of Oriental despotism as the political explanatory variable, he argues that in pre-colonial tradition characterized by an assortment of political arrangements no single authority of the state over the vast Indian landscape existed. "Politics was," therefore, "consigned to the realm of spectacle and ceremony. No concept of a state, an impersonal public

authority with a continuous identity emerged: Kings represented only themselves, never enduring states.

Debates on the impact of colonialism linger over whether colonial rule in India led to the ruthless fracturing of society or contributed to the relative consolidation of disparate elements and regions. But Khilnani posits the judgment that "whatever view one takes of its economic and social consequences, the political effect of its intrusion was unambiguous and resounding." Colonization, thus might have had its negative effects, but the "foreign rulers brought with them to India a concept of the state—with its distinct, if often locally influenced, administrative and military technologies, its claim to rule over a precise territory, its determination to initiate social reforms, and its reorganization of the texture of the community—that drastically changed ideas about power in India." Thus, it is upon this positive element of the colonial legacy that the independence elites of India chose to build a state combining traditional and modern elements of statehood."[37]

The brief comparative look at the impact of colonialism on the modern Indian state was made with the purpose of throwing light on the similar debate carried out in Africa's case. The Indian example of other states is provided to indicate that a colonial legacy per se does not condemn a state to failure. That the consideration of all historical, contemporary, social, personal, and organizational factors is truly needed in understanding the phenomenon of state failure is demonstrated by another case in Africa where the legacy of modern statehood had nothing to do with colonialism. This refers to the African nation of Ethiopia that maintained its continued independence for the millennia and yet shares the factors of state failure exhibited by countries with colonial legacies. Even though the Ethiopian state, thankfully, has not yet reached the eventual stage of collapse witnessed in the other areas, many of the telltale signs of failure still continue to haunt it. The contrastive view of the related experiences of India and Ethiopia could serve to remind us of the important but still limited contribution of the role of the colonial period in accounting for the failure of the state in Africa.

The congenital defects bequeathed to the African state range from the political and economic structures of coercion and authoritarianism to the effects the colonial policies would have on social institutions as well as the

values of society. At the political level, colonialism built structures of power not supported by indigenous institutions of authority or principles of legitimacy.

Scholars emphasize the role of this unmitigated utilization of power as colonialism's main legacy of authoritarianism for the emerging states. Colonial states as external creations established political structures in which the sources of their power were essentially foreign. Consequently, colonialism helped create a perception of government as foreign.

Colonialism laid out the basis for dualistic patterns of development, gross inequality and distortions in the state's financial and fiscal structures at the economic level. Uneven development created by the reorganization of the economy to concentrate on extractive industries and export oriented sectors of monoculture has been termed enclave production. The enclave production system involving mining, oil drilling and cash crop agriculture carved out isolated regions that were tied to the world economy but largely disconnected from the concerns of productivity and the general welfare of the nation. One aspect of economic marginalization cited to stem from the colonial legacy is the fragmentation of the continent into too many small and economically unviable units. In this respect, colonialism left Africa Balkanized to engage in meaningful development. As a result, small states measured by international population standards, GDP and GDP per capita were created to fulfill the juridical definitions of statehood without the necessary economic foundations. Of the forty states, thirty-one had fewer than ten million populations, and ten had fewer than two million.

The social impact of colonialism like the political and economic effect is gauged from the vantage points of the ideologies, interests as well as the paradigms of the analysts. Apologists for colonial rule underscore the role of colonial powers in unifying autonomous politics, putting an end to negative traditional practices such as slavery or introducing the process of modernization that opened economic opportunities and social mobility for millions of people. Conversely, critics point to the negative dynamics of uneven development, social inequality, alienation and polarization introduced by colonialism. Even the people's gaining of sociopolitical community bequeathed by the colonial legacy is scorned in the words of Jawaharial Nehru disregarded them as merely "the unintended beneficiaries of European exploitation." Yet even if one acknowledged the positive by-products of colonialism—education, urbanization, the adoption of the

concepts of modernization, and equal opportunity—the adverse effects of the destruction of the indigenous institutions of check and balance, pluralism, legitimacy, and historical solidarity as well as significant African traditions and norms cannot be denied.

The negative effects of colonial legacy that contributed to the failure of statehood in Africa are beyond doubt. However, as in the examination of other issues, the factors that led to the decline and ultimate collapse of statehood in many African countries cannot be limited to the mere pointing of an accusing finger at an unfortunate historical era. Important as this phenomenon might be in its long-term impact, other important factors need to be examined as well. One significant element in the long causal chain of variables is the set of visions, ideas and ideologies espoused by the independence elites in Africa.

The independence elites started the task of building the African state with faulty visions, wrong ideas and very inadequate grasp of their political, social and economic traditions. This was combined with the marrying of their modern political thoughts with an equally insufficient understanding of how the traditional and western ideas could be organically synthesized to fit the African realities. African political traditions, even in states that were considered totalitarian, understood and incorporated the concepts and practical implications of check and balance, broad elite participation, legitimacy and concern for the well-being of the population as the main foundations of viable statehood and good governance. But the African elites at independence picked the nominal categories of state politics from the West and combined them with distorted interpretations of their traditions to concoct theories of state building that were not in accord with their historic or contemporary realities.

As noted, the built-in doctrines and practices of check and balance can be illustrated by the traditional systems in many parts of the continent including the case in West Africa in which N. J. J. Oliver observed that the Bantu Chief was surrounded by various bodies and institutions that prevented him from abusing his authority. He called the Bantu state "a peculiar democracy, although it [was] not based on the principle of free election and on individual or communal voting."[38] This system and norm of accountability and legitimacy is echoed in the many kingdoms in Ethiopia, Uganda, and Rwanda in the East and their counterparts in Southern and

West Africa. Underlining the sense of commonality Cheikh Anta Diop records the people's reverence for the institutions and limits to prerogatives enshrined in boundaries of power on the African king whereby his authority was "limited, shared, and decentralized." Calling the tradition constitutional monarchies, he emphasized the political system's built-in structure of a shared commonwealth. Thus institutions of accountability and interdependence characterized many traditional African states.[39]

In contrast, independence elites fashioned ideologies of grandeur, centralization, and unlimited power. The state was viewed not as an instrument for attaining broad representation and participation but rather as the private domain of unaccountable leaders. The elites fused two sources of political power: "the hierarchical apparatus of colonial rule and the popular force of African nationalism . . . to form the party-state, which seemed to be effectively unchallengeable." While happily adopting the life styles and luxuries of the West, the elites condemned notions of democracy, accountability and pluralism as Western. Multiple parties, opposition papers and independent associations were branded anti-unity. Often democratic institutions were banished and supplanted by systems that were often more repressive than foreign rule. Even rudiments of pluralism, civil society and autonomous economic groups were discouraged. Restrictions of the autonomy of embryonic civil and political associations were made under the guises of appeals for national unity. And many African rulers would even ban associations which had existed as bulwarks of civil society for generations. This set the stage for the following years of mismanagement, personal rule, the criminalization of the state and the ultimate demise of the state in many countries.

Evidently the cliché, "it takes two to Tango," applies to the failure, failing or collapse of states currently being witnessed in the continent. Development of nation-statehood in the global and African context was shaped by the interplay of domestic and transnational forces. The role of structures and policies of governments and international organizations in influencing the positive and negative dynamics in Africa is obvious. The crises of the state in Africa cannot, therefore, simply be dismissed as only the failure of African elites. Acknowledging the shared responsibilities of the causes and effects on a wider global scale provides greater clarity and assists in drawing attention to the obligations of collective efforts to address the challenge.

Theories, Myths and Realities of Terrorism

Gauging the threat terrorism poses to Africa and the world depends on understanding the ideas, ideologies and belief systems behind the realities of terrorism. Goals of preventing terrorism ultimately hinge on developing a solid grasp of the issues involved in the genesis and dynamics of the problem. Separating myths and misconceptions of the phenomenon from grounded theories and reliable studies is critical to devising responses that mobilize the will of political and civic leaders as well as the masses of people who must be enlisted in the strategy.

Terrorism is a human malaise that has plagued all sociopolitical communities for centuries. Its purpose and modus operandi have been debated; its essential features of indiscriminate violence, victimization of innocent bystanders and end goals of exacting punishment on authority, however, are widely accepted. Exact definitions of its nature or legitimacy of its execution have been subjects of controversy. Competing definitions emphasizing different aspects of terrorism have led to controversies on how political groups, states or international bodies could agree on concerted efforts that could bring together the resources, institutions and goodwill of all individuals directly or indirectly affected by its negative impact. In place of the ideal of building policy models that incorporate absolute consensus, ideas and strategies addressing terrorism have opted for modalities reflecting general patterns of shared social and political values.

Among the bones of contention on what constitutes the phenomenon, agencies or purposes of the act are issues of definition, ethics or sociopolitical contexts. Not only with ordinary citizens interested in comprehending the basic traits and potential effects of terrorism on their lives, policy makers, researchers or scholars do not agree on its definition or dimensions of its causes and impacts. Many refer to the task of defining terrorism as an endless debate or a fruitless enterprise fraught with the contradictions posed by divergences in culture, political systems, religions and historical narratives. Differences are attributed to ways people perceive injustices, changes in historical accounts, identifications with political goals or contexts provided to justify or condemn the phenomenon. The relativist view of terrorism is reflected by the often quoted mantra—one person’s

terrorist is another person's freedom fighter. One interpretation of terrorism views it as a political act carried out to purportedly rectify injustice.[40]

A competing perspective vehemently denies terrorism as having any political goals. Combining terrorism with political ends accordingly lends psychological respectability to a purely criminal act. Consequently, "cognitive dissonance, not clarity and coherence, is the only result that one can expect from privileging the terrorists' self understanding and dishonest language."[41] Some psychosocial theories emphasize the mental pathologies of actors that drive the process while others give primacy to the rational calculus of terrorist organizations in devising strategy.[42]

Theoretical and policy debates on terrorism are revealed in widely divergent views among scholars and analysts arrayed along polarized ideologies. Yet even within intellectual and research circles subscribing to ideals of democracy, peace and security, differences still flourish. Two prominent names cited to exemplify this conundrum are Brian Jenkins, who identified terrorism as the use or threatened use of force to bring about a political change, and Walter Laqueur, who defined it as an illegitimate use of force that targets innocent people. In view of the wide controversy associated with the term, Laqueur argues that attempts to "move beyond a simple definition are fruitless."[43] The confusion over the inability to frame it in precise terms is illustrated by the more than one hundred definitions of terrorism identified by Laqueur.[44] This frustration is mirrored in a multitude of other studies including the work of Alex Schmid who after an examination of different definitions for years conceded that the search for adequate definition was still continuing. Bruce Hoffman, nonetheless, acknowledges "the fruitless attempt to cobble together a truly comprehensive definition" as a reality we could accept. But if terrorism proves to be less amenable to precise definitions, "we can," in his view, "at least usefully distinguish it from other types of violence and identify the characteristics that make terrorism the distinct phenomenon of political violence that it is." Accordingly, he assembles a frequency list of definitional elements that embody a general consensus.[45]

The challenges of developing feasible theories that sift through the myths and realities of terrorism have thus proven to be daunting in view of its varied geographic spread and mutating characteristics. Conflicts arise on definitions of terrorism, factors deemed to constitute its realities or over

myths and reductions of simplified interpretations of symptoms. In attempts at devising models that capture the principal features of terrorism studies selecting particular traits have fallen into the category of myths or realities depending on the analytical frameworks. Michael Stohl's identification of ten Myths of Contemporary Political Terrorism ranging from postulates that posit terrorism as an activity of non-state actors and few agents of evil, all terrorists are mentally unbalanced, all insurgencies are acts of terrorism, terrorism is relative and demonstrates the rigorous work needed to connect over generalized observations with the specific particularities of the threat.[46]

The ultimate test for determining the effectiveness of theories and policy responses, therefore, lies not on reaching a point of absolute unanimity but rather on the judicious balance attained through setting reasonable boundaries around ideas and practices addressing the challenges of terrorism. Moreover, two approaches that could assist in this quest are the adoption of multidimensional modalities and the location of abstract theories in the unique characteristics of specific areas and confluence of events. Africa's problems of terrorism serve as excellent examples for understanding the issue in its global and regional contexts and interconnections.

Global and Local in Africa's Terrorism

> What we don't want to see in Africa is another Afghanistan, a cancer growing in the middle of nowhere.
>
> Gen. Jeffrey Kohler

The threats, realities and interpretations of terrorism have been played out in particular national settings as well as Africa's key position in the world. Understanding terrorism in Africa from the standpoint of general theories entails an examination of factors that exhibit the distinct features of the continent. An outline of some of the theories, ideas, and practices embraced in the search for finding practical answers to the problem is offered as follows.

Major challenges in addressing terrorism have been the conceptual dilemmas of establishing the connections, separate identities and communalities of the phenomena of conflicts, rebellions, criminal operations, identity, social justice, liberation movements and terrorism. Thus social mobilization theses associated with modernization theories attempt to explain ethnic conflicts. But the emergence and escalation of violent conflicts in such countries as Chad, Ethiopia, The Sudan, and Mauritania remained not fully explained.[47] Studies examining the relations between ethnicity, regime types, political, and economic conditions to political violence have developed theoretical frameworks assigning greater significance to selected variables. Poverty, depravation, political oppression, and economic mismanagement are among the most important factors associated with extreme violence.

Contending theories, nevertheless have questioned the salience of such selected root causes arguing either on grounds of greater macro-structural or policy issues operating at broader political levels. A more nuanced analytical model that would have relevance with refined elements of specific measures is incorporated in the framework. Deprivation, for example, is operationalized to have significance only when concepts of inequality, relative deprivation, and sociopolitical mobilization are integrated in explaining the dynamics of conflicts.[48] Diversity in the ethnic composition or religious affiliation of national populations is again spelled out as an explanatory variable for violence only with the politicization of the identities. Grievance models have emphasized the role of non-democratic political systems in fostering conditions leading to violence and terrorism. Alternate explastates define grievances more narrowly to refer to human rights violations and repressions that engender violent reactions. In this respect grievance not only becomes a condition that fosters terrorism through exclusion from the political arena but also leads to alienation, disorientation, and frustration.[49]

The general root causes school of violence lending blanket cover for groups, states or networks of terrorism is critiqued on empirical data showing conditions of depravation that produce no incidents of conflicts and social communities of relative economic growth leading to terrorism. The specific condition of rising expectations stemming from urbanization, unemployment, and mobilization are offered as the broader underlying

conditions creating the paradox of terrorism. Religious fundamentalism as the new Islamic radicalism spawning terrorism, for example, is explained by the interconnected proxy variables of disorientation and social dislocation demonstrated by its genesis not in the heart of Islam's birth but rather in the peripheral regions of southern Asia and the Muslim Diaspora.[50]

One school of thought linking the global and local in explaining violence and terrorism in Africa is the theory of economic factors as the major reason underlying the phenomenon. The economic variables are manifested in the forms of resources such as the diamonds of Sierra Leone, Angola or the Congo, oil in the Niger Delta, commodities such as drugs, human trafficking, cattle raiding, criminal, and illicit arms flows into different parts of the continent. The global and local in terrorism are manifested in the African context with the running threads of trade, political ties and mobilization for violence or security taking place at national, regional and international levels of society.

The Specter of Terrorism: Weakness, Failure

> Weak states . . . can pose as great a danger to our national interest as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.
>
> White House Office of the President, 2002

In response to the glorification of the state which had been excessively supported by many theorists of modernization, the vitality of the institution has been challenged both as the end point of human achievement or a necessity for existence particularly among small traditional communities that happily survived by managing their societies without the machinery of governance. This perspective extended to many hunting and gathering groups or pastoral systems referred to as acephalous societies could make a clear case for absolute autonomy in many regions. Globalization in its positive sense of linking states and regions with access to the benefits of nutrition, health and material comfort or its negative effects of spreading the instruments of violence, social displacement, and alienation has determined

that states and communities can no longer survive without political institutions of statehood and good governance.

Weak states unable to fulfill the obligations of protecting their populations from external threats or domestic responsibilities of providing human security to their citizens expose not only the people under their political jurisdictions but also great numbers of states in their region. Terrorism greatly empowered by the forces of globalization with the increased lethality of weapons, developed means of transportation and advanced systems of communication and mobilization looms large over African countries posing the dangers of political and social disintegration for many. Numerous analysts have maintained that terrorism is a problem hyped by the industrial states and not an issue for Africa, but, whatever definitions are employed, terrorism in its African form still threatens to bring major destruction and dissolution to the continent. For weak states already teetering on the brink of social breakdown, terrorism inflicts the final blow not only on the failing state but the social fabric of the community that exercised governance without government as well.

As research data on terrorism indicate, the problem long predates the era of modernity. What distinguishes its contemporary mutation is the proliferation of arms, the advances in technology of communication and transport that have introduced asymmetric warfare whereby a few actors could induce incalculable disaster. Associated with the characteristics of a weak state such as the problems of economic dislocation, massive youth unemployment, sociopolitical polarization, and radicalization, terrorism in Africa has had the potential to lead to the disintegration of whole communities. In its modern form, the subject of terrorism serves at the intersections of criminal trade in arms, drugs and resources, the radicalization of religious, ethnic, and regional identities as well as the breakdown of trust and community in states that have lived in relative harmony for centuries.

State weakness can be understood in the gradations of abilities ranging from erosion of authority revealed in protests or radical opposition movements to the nearly complete loss of control manifested by hallowed governmental institutions and armed insurrections. Ideologies of Islamic terrorism spawned in countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Libya, and Morocco in this sense represent the early signs of state weakness. Other countries in the continent described as collapsed states include Sierra Leone, Liberia and

Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, on the other hand, indicate the gravity of the problem. Somalia, the poster child of failure, standing on the extreme pole of the issue exemplifies state weakness with its terrorism benefiting from the confluence of its location at the epicenter of global mobilization.[51] Nigeria on the surface, occupying the position of being the most populous nation in the continent and the powerhouse of West Africa, still reflects the weakness of statehood described as "the battered and bruised elephant."[52]

Volatile mixes as ethnic and religious radicalism, corruption, economic inequality and the growth of a huge army of frustrated youth who lack the tools to face the demands of a modern economy prepare its weakening state institutions for terrorism as illustrated by the Delta Region militants' (the MEND) ability to not only inflict terrorist violence but also succeed in shutting down 900,000 barrels of oil a day raising oil prices by $2.33 a barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange.[53] The crisis, far from being an isolated, small area incident, is traced to the confluence of local, national and regional failures of governance that suggest the "current regime of institutionalized despotism is collapsing under the weight of past violence and present inequalities"[54] Mali, in contrast, a poorer and even weaker state, finds itself even more vulnerable to the threats of terrorism from the Algerian-based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) from operating in its territory.

The country's inability to address the problems of ethnicity evidenced by its Tuareg pastoralists and its open space along with the problems of poverty and depravation open it to terrorist assaults. The conducive atmosphere created by the breeding grounds of poverty, alienation and polarization is compounded by the weak state's incapacity to provide services or monitor its poorly controlled borders and vast uninhabited spaces that render it "attractive for recruiting, training and hiding places for the GSPC." Lack of resources and institutional capacity to meet the population's needs is contrasted with the resources terrorists gain from smuggled goods such as cigarettes and other contraband to raise cash for terrorist activities.[55]

Zones of violence and terrorism in the region extend from Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Mali, Senegal, and Mauritania to Niger, Chad, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. The national

characteristics change from assuming the traits of state terrorism from above to insurgency and group movements in urban and rural areas from below. In view of the international/national dimensions that significantly increase the lethality and geographic reach of the threat, the countries on both ends of the Sahel Belt receive global focus.

A wide shadow is cast on this region by the terrorist group al Qaeda, which mutated from GSPC in Islamic Maghreb. Profiting from the discussed structural weaknesses of the state to functional failures such as the problems of the vast spaces, Northern Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Southern Algeria are extremely difficult to police.[56] Young men wielding AK-47 rifles kidnap, kill, and roam the frontiers almost carrying parallel shadows of authority.

Somalia on the opposite end of the continent representing the final phenomenon of being the only completely collapsed state with little semblance of governance exemplifies the unimaginable threat of violence and terrorism that is involving the world's vital economic and security interests. Its potential to inflict incalculable human and material cost is manifested by the country's attraction of al Qaeda, superpower intervention and failed continental attempts to restore it to some modicum of stability. The regional complexion of its problems started with the fragile Sudan's state that served to incubate al Qaeda during the early 1990s. Bin Laden and his associates established terrorist bases in Somalia leading to the infamous downing of an American Black Hawk helicopter following the training of terrorists by al Qaeda for the 1993 operation.

The collapse of the state in 1991 has turned Somalia into a breeding ground for terrorism whereby internal Islamist movements could link with insurgencies and radical groups in the region and around the globe. Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI) organized by Somalis who returned from their studies in the Middle East blazed the trail of Islamist terrorism by engaging in terrorist activities in Somalia and neighboring Ethiopia.[57]

Its dissolution in 1997 allowed replacement and proliferation of armed groups, charity organizations and networks of alliances with different clan groups receiving material and ideological support from foreign governments and terrorist cells. According to a 2005 U.N. report, Somalia was reported to be sheltering "an army of Jihadi fighters supported by a network of at least seventeen terrorist training camps."[58]

A relatively moderate Islamic government installed in the wake of an organized military onslaught led by the extremist wing of the networks, the al Shabaab teeters on the edge of total breakdown. Those members of al Shabaab that espouse the most extreme interpretation of the Sharia are allied with international terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda and are believed to receive "Cargo planes full of AK-47 assault rifles, rocket propelled grenades and other weapons"[59] from Eritrea. Indicating the wide implications of terrorism in any remote part of the world, the tentacles of its violence spread from the prevalence of piracy along its longest coastline in Africa to spillovers to Kenya and the United States where recruitments of volunteers marked the first case of a U.S. suicide bomber to carry out an operation in Mogadishu.[60]

The circular route of the causes and effects of terrorism in the region is demonstrated by the networks of ideologies, insurgencies and proliferating supply of weapons that extend from the Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and the coastal areas of the southern Indian Ocean.[61] The Islamist state of Sudan led the early sponsorship of transnational terrorism with its hosting of diverse groups from Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, Gama Islamiya and Hamas to al Qaeda and radicals from Algeria, Libya, Eritrea, and Tunisia. Kenya, a state not allied with terrorist networks, still found itself a breeding ground for militants within their border regions. The acuteness of the problem is best demonstrated by the al Qaeda attack that destroyed the U.S. embassy in Nairobi in 1998 and a subsequent terrorist attack in its port city, Mombasa. Elements of state weakness manifested in its mismanagement and corruption, the alienation of Muslim citizens along its coast, and its geographic location in a violent neighborhood have made Kenya vulnerable to the threat of terrorism. State weakness as the enabling environment of terrorism is signified by an elderly witness at the border of the nightly bribery of Kenyan police to allow the free flow of assault rifles and other smuggled goods into Kenya. "These guys are so corrupt," he observed, "that if 100 Shabaab pulled up with a truckload of weapons and said they were coming to Kenya to kill the president, the police would let them through—for the right price."[62] The failure to protect the borders expands to create an environment of lawlessness.

The free flow of arms, illicit goods and financial resources across national frontiers in the region creates a fertile ground for terrorism by

eroding the authority of the state. In the vast areas of Northeast and Central Africa official and criminal lines of social intercourse are blurred with networks of contrabands, organized crime, gangs and traffickers operating with individuals and institutions working for governments and/or insurgencies. Traditional populations that settled minor conflicts with mediation are now engaged in sophisticated warfare, whereby AK-47s and M16 machine guns rented or sold for as little as $100 or $50 are "now employed to terrorize non-pastoralists outside the pastoralist ranges." The high rise in the arms trade and its accompanying violence can be gauged from East African weekly newspaper reports of between 150,000 and 200,000 firearms in the Karamoja region of Uganda alone and about 50,000 in the Turkana region of Kenya.[63]

The intersection of the weak state and terrorism underpinned by the conditions of criminality in economic and social transactions are similarly played out in the adjoining regions of Central and Southern Africa.[64] The phenomenon subsumed under the debates of grievance or greed as the primary factors manifested itself in the insurgencies of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, and Uganda. Greed theories emphasizing the criminal opportunities of commodities as the motivation and fuel for violent insurgencies have called attention to the regional and global connections of economic transaction as the primary causes that need to be addressed.[65] Proponents of the alternate explanation point to grievance stemming from real and imagined perceptions of injustice. Other studies synthesize the two approaches and indicate the central role of the state as the overarching cause. Violent conflicts in the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Chad, like Sierra Leone and Liberia in the west, had their origins in the inability of their states to manage effectively both the economic and sociopolitical obligations of good governance.

Charles Cater's argument for his case studies of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, and Sierra Leone applies to almost all the weak states in Africa when he acknowledges the vital role conflicts over resources have played in the genesis and dynamics of violence but underscores the larger point that decades of political misrule, corruption, and criminality characterizing the failing state served as the bedrock of the insurgencies.[66]

Conclusion

An overview of the general and particular conditions of statehood in Africa has been related to the specter of terrorism that looms large in the continent. The state as a factor in Africa's realities has been debated in the context of development and Africa's unique historical advance attenuated by the external conditions of slavery and colonialism. In the conceptual framework of democracy whereby the institution could be reestablished along traditional experiences of acephalous societies it has been believed to hold a future of decentralized existence for African communities. On the heels of post-colonial Africa in which the state modeled on the European experience was anticipated to be strong and engaged in nation-building, the Washington consensus era extolled the virtues of the minimal state.

A large number of African states battered by the undermining of their authority of malgovernance and the abandonment of the semblances of support from the Cold War sponsorship became vulnerable to the emergence of insurgencies, criminalities and terrorist assaults carried out by the network of global and local forces. Africa emerged as the major theater of state failure with studies indicating sub-Saharan Africa earning the dubious distinction of being home to just over half of the world's worst performing states in 2009.[67]

Terrorism, a phenomenon that thrives under conditions of economic decline and sociopolitical dislocation, found suitable breeding grounds in many parts of the continent. State weakness is reflected by the seemingly strong authoritarian politics that spawn ideologies and agents of violence represented by Egypt, Libya, Algeria Eritrea, Sudan and other states producing terrorists that operate within their territories and beyond their jurisdictions into other countries. Conversely, state weakness revealed by the crumbling of governmental structures and abilities to provide services or protection of citizens is witnessed in the long list of cases from Sierra Leone and from Liberia to Somalia and the Republic of the Congo.

The specter of terrorism haunts not just the large number of countries in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, Maghreb region and the Niger Delta or the Gulf of Guinea. It stands to pose unimaginable threat of death and destruction on the continent and the world. For a long time political analysts

and theorists of all kinds in the West have casually dismissed Africa as having any significance for the well-being of the world.

Post September 11th world has clearly demonstrated the power of asymmetric warfare to bring about incalculable damage to not only a small nation but the most technologically advanced and well-armed superpower state. Al Qaeda was spawned in the Sudan when Osama bin Laden developed his ideology and organizational capacity between 1991 and 1995. The bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, piracy along the Somalia coastline that effectively paralyzed global commerce and the incubating environments of drugs, human and arms trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea, Niger Delta, the Sahel, and the Horn clearly show the specter of terrorism imposing its Armageddon-like scenario on Africa and the world.

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Chapter 3

Terrorism in West Africa: Real, Emerging or Imagined Threats?

Cyril I. Obi

Introduction

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and terrorist attacks in Africa, Europe, and Asia, it has become obvious that in a globalizing world, such attacks can come from anywhere, assume any form and can target Western military, strategic or economic interests and citizens (or allies) abroad. Thus, protection from terrorism involves complex operations on a global scale. This much has been the cornerstone of the defense and foreign policies of the George W. Bush presidency in the United States, its closest ally, the British government under Prime Minister Tony Blair, the G-8 countries, the European Union (EU), and their allies across the world.

This essay seeks to locate the West African region in the context of the construction and representation of global security, particularly as it relates to the post-9/11 global discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism. It also identifies and analyses the critical challenges that flow from the integration of West Africa into the "global war on terror," and the ways in which the emerging militarized and globalized security complex may reinforce or, paradoxically, undermine regional, intra-national human, and environmental security in one of Africa's most troubled regions.

Although no terrorist strike has occurred in West Africa (unlike East and North Africa), security strategists, scholars, and policymakers are concerned that, given historical and cultural factors and the political instability, poverty, socio-economic and governance crises and conflicts that have ravaged the region, it could be potentially vulnerable to terrorism. Of

particular note are the "networked wars" of the 1990s that ravaged Liberia and Sierra Leone and involved neighboring states, and the outbreak of civil war in Guinea-Bissau between 1998 and 1999 and in Côte d'Ivoire in 2002.

Although peace has returned to West Africa (even as an uneasy truce holds sway in Côte d'Ivoire), it remains fragile. As Nigeria, the region's most populous country and economic powerhouse, approached general elections in 2007, there were also concerns that political instability largely driven by zero-sum games for power involving the manipulation of ethnic, religious and communal identities, could take a turn for the worse and threaten regional security. The escalation of violence in the Niger Delta—the main oil-producing region in Nigeria—has also attracted international attention. Attacks on oil installations and security forces, the abduction of expatriate oil workers, the stealing of oil from pipelines and the operations of militant and armed groups intent on controlling oil revenues in the region are widely seen as a threat to the West's energy security. Thus, as one of Africa's most unstable regions, as well as a rapidly expanding source of oil and gas for the United States, and to a lesser extent, Europe and Asia (particularly China), the stakes in the security of West Africa have become very high, and the need to prevent it from becoming a site for terrorist attacks against Western interests never greater.

The concern of the United States in focusing on this region is impelled by several broad considerations: its openness and perceived lack of effective governance or secure borders; a need to integrate the region into a Uncontrolled global security framework; the region at present provides 15 percent of U.S. oil imports and this is expected to increase to 25 percent within a decade; the possibility of recruiting locals in the "Muslim Belt" to terrorist cells; and opportunities to launder or move large amounts of money using the cross-border trade in "blood diamonds," timber and arms, and to raise funds within the state of chaos of conflict or emerging post-conflict zones.

Critics argue that the terrorist threat in West Africa has been exaggerated to fit into Washington's hegemonic global security agenda. It appears that the terrorist threat that has preoccupied the attention of strategic and policy planners has been largely constructed around political/radical Islam, oil, and the stereotype of weak, failed or failing African states. Although no compelling evidence of terrorism has been found, West Africa is thus writ

large in the emerging post-Cold War transnational geostrategic and energy security calculations.

As far back as 1999, Article 3 of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace Keeping, and Security had identified the tackling of international terrorism as one of the objectives for regional cooperation.[1] However, since 9/11, cooperation between the United States, Europe Union, and the ECOWAS (and individual member states) has grown. The concern with terrorism in West Africa has therefore been framed not only in global terms, but also as the reserve of "high politics" involving the political elite, military top brass, ministers, heads of state, and the regional economic organization, ECOWAS.

Thus, to some extent the relevance of the West African connection to the war on terror transcends the concern with internal security. It also attempts to collectively address the "globalization" of the region's security. However, in doing this much emphasis lies on the institutional and military approaches to antiterrorist and defense arrangements, while little attention is focused on providing the national and international resources badly needed for addressing the harsh political and desperate socio-economic conditions that may provide the nourishment for dissent, violence, repression, proliferation of small arms and highly mobile youth fighters, and possibly, terror. Terrorism in West Africa therefore lies more in the realm of possibilities and/or perceptions of potential threats in a region that is being further opened up to global influences and transnational actors.

Terrorism: Some Conceptual Issues

Terrorism is a highly contested concept. It therefore can be "flexibly constructed" to suit ideological, nationalist, propagandist and political objectives. With its origins in revolutionary political violence, it is now associated with an illegal unconventional war against a society or against an established, but resented, order. Thus, while terrorism could be intended to attract attention to a cause through acts of extreme violence/threat of violence and spreading grief and fear, it could also be used as a label by

status quo forces to excoriate and demonize their opponents or those struggling against domination and exploitation.

The history of modern terrorism is often traced back to the "Red Terror" during the French Revolution in the eighteenth century, and the spread of similar tactics to the rest of Europe and then the United States and Russia, often in the service of nationalist and anarchic goals. In the twentieth century, terrorism became more sophisticated and spread throughout the world. In agreement with Schmid, Jongman et al., it would be apposite in our context to note that "terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi) clandestine individual, groups, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets."[2]

In a globalizing world, "new" terrorist networks have also become more sophisticated, mobile and trans-global in their operations: moving resources, conventional and unconventional weapons, recruiting operatives, planning and coordinating their activities within, and across national borders. Apart from the use of civilian airplanes in the tragic 9/11 attacks, terrorists have also used dangerous chemicals and gases (such as Sarin gas, used by Aum Shinrikyo in the Tokyo March 1995 subway attacks), suicide bombers and biological weapons such as anthrax. Increasingly terrorists have targeted and bombed civilians (tourists, bus and train commuters, hotels/tourist resorts, public buildings and air travelers) while largely avoiding military installations and infrastructure.

At present, the discourse on global terrorism is largely framed with reference to threats posed to Western society by Al Qaeda and the groups sympathetic to it, as well as to the activities of extremist political and nationalist groups operating across the world. Yet, there is a sense in which the conceptualization of terrorism, and by implication counterterrorism, could become an ideological construct that is embedded in history and international politics. This is precisely the point made by Mamdani,[3] based on his observation that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), working with other foreign agencies, provided support to al Qaeda during the later part of the Cold War, when the latter was involved in fighting against the pro-Soviet Union regime in Afghanistan. What flows from this

is that the conceptualization of terrorism should be both nuanced and placed in context.

The current focus on West Africa is partly informed by the centrality of Africa to emerging global security discourses. Although the continent had been victim of the 1998 terrorist bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in which over 200 people were killed, it was not until the September 2001 attacks in the United States, and in the face of the prioritization of Africa's oil in U.S. strategic energy calculations, that the continent—and by extension, West Africa—became integrated into the U.S.-led "global war on terror." It is important that West Africa's place in the emerging discourse on global terrorism should be situated within an African context that places a premium on Africa's interests and priorities. This is pertinent partly because the current debates tend to be almost exclusively framed within Western paradigms that represent Africa as a source of threats to Western society which should be integrated into a hegemonic framework of global security. Therefore a conceptual discussion of terrorism in West Africa must include a radical analysis of the integration of the region into the global war on terror, and provide an African perspective to the emerging discourse on global security.

West Africa in the Context of the "Global War on Terror"

> We can't allow areas like that to be ungoverned, to become a haven for terrorists.[4]

The above statement, credited to the deputy commander of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) (AFRICOM now has responsibility for Africa), encapsulates the current U.S. perspective of its national security interest in the Saharan and Sahelian belts of West Africa. West Africa is one of the global sites for the U.S.'s war on terror, involving both governments of the region and ECOWAS in a counterterrorism partnership with the United States, and its G-8 allies.

Critical to this partnership is U.S. interest in ensuring that terrorist groups do not find sanctuary, raise funds, recruit terrorists and operate from this region. Another consideration is the need to protect vital Western and

U.S. strategic and energy security interests in the region. In this regard the United States launched the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), aimed at training 150 soldiers each from Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad. These were countries believed to harbor extremist groups likely to be linked to the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in Algeria. The PSI was followed by the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) at an estimated cost of approximately US$120 million. Apart from building up regional defense and security capacities, the TSCTI aimed to "train additional forces, include more countries and help foster better information sharing and operational planning between regional states, considered as important as creating new units."[5] The TSCTI then expanded its coverage to include Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria. Its focus has been largely on training soldiers from these countries, providing military assistance in the form of both hardware and software, preventing the spread of extremist forms of Islam and securing national and regional borders. Rear Admiral Tallent, director of operations for the U.S. European Command, said before the U.S. House Sub-Committee on International Terrorism and Non-proliferation that "we are supporting U.S. national security in the global war on terrorism by enhancing Africa's regional security, thus promoting an Africa that is self-sufficient and stable."[6]

The same thinking underlies the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA), which replaced the African Crises Response Initiative (ACRI). It specifically designs tailor-made programs for individual African states (militaries) in the areas of security, humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Such training is handled by U.S. military and U.S. private military/security companies and involves the use of U.S. military technology and hardware. Part of the U.S. policy thrust is also to build facilities and bases (airports, ports, buildings) in West Africa from which the U.S. military can launch missions in the region.[7] It would appear, then, that the United States and West Africa share a common interest in the fight against global terror. This may be so, but it is also clear that the "partnership" is an unequal one in which the United States, is clearly the dominant party. This raises the critical point of West African states being held captive by external security interests and projects that may undermine the long-term interests of the region and its people. However, the reality is that United States West African counterterrorism initiatives exist and are probably here to stay. What remains is to deepen the analysis of the

considerations that drive and sustain this partnership and its short and long-term implications.

West Africa's Fragile Peace and the Risk of Regression to Violent Conflict

The U.S.-led counterterrorism initiatives in West Africa are partly informed by the view that societies in conflict or just emerging from civil wars are vulnerable to infiltration or capable of harboring transnational criminal networks and terrorists. Such views have been strengthened by the connection drawn between the illegal trade in conflict diamonds in West Africa at the peak of the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the funding of terrorist networks linked to al Qaeda. According to a report on the U.N.-supported War Crimes Court in Sierra Leone that quoted the head prosecutor in Freetown:

> Certainly, al Qaeda have been here for a couple of years and they have been using diamonds to wash their money and so, yes, they certainly have a presence here. There's specific and direct evidence to that effect.[8]

A report in the *Washington Post* also noted that the former Liberian president, Charles Taylor, collaborated with al Qaeda operatives involved in the trade in "blood diamonds."[9] Taylor is at present in the Hague awaiting trial following his transfer from Sierra Leone after his arrest in Nigeria. This was after the new Liberian president, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, following concerted U.S. pressure, requested his extradition to the Sierra Leonean court. Until Taylor's trial commences, it may not be possible to evaluate the extent of al Qaeda involvement in the Mano River area of West Africa.

Also, rebel groups reported to be operating in the northern fringes of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad have been linked to possible terrorist infiltration from North Africa. Such fears have been heightened by rebel activity in Chad with occasional incursions across Nigeria's northeastern borders, by the Darfur crisis in Sudan, and by insurgency linked to Tuareg groups in Mali and Niger. The United States is determined to keep a very close watch on the region and build up the capacity of the armies and police forces in West Africa to nip terrorist threats in the bud.

The fragility of post-conflict West African states has contributed to the use of peace-building as part of the counterterrorism process. So far, most of the attention and resources have gone into security sector reforms, building up military and intelligence capacities, while international interventionism in relation to post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction appears to fail to tackle the complex roots of the multiple crises rocking the region. Also, such interventionism is often strategic and vertical, excluding the grassroots and often undermining social justice, democratic consolidation, economic redistribution and growth. This suggests that that the current partnerships, which hinge on the prognosis that weak or distressed states and conflict societies are vulnerable to terrorist infiltration and that states and governance should be strengthened to contain the threat, very often neglect the socioeconomic and historical inequities that lie at the roots of most violent conflicts or wars.

West Africa and Global Energy Security

A critical consideration underlining counterterrorism measures in West Africa is the existence of substantial U.S. and Western oil interests and investments in the region. The region accounts for 15 percent of all U.S. oil imports and it is projected that this will increase to 25 percent by 2020.[10] Leading U.S. policymakers, energy and strategic analysts have emphasized the centrality of oil from West and Central Africa, dubbed the "New Gulf States" in the media, to U.S. efforts to diversify oil supplies from the Middle East and secure steady supplies of oil and gas against a background of declining domestic oil production in the United States. The reasons for this lie in the proximity of Africa to U.S. oil markets and the fact that most of the oil Africa produces is of the light, "sweet" variety, with a low sulfur content that is favored by U.S. refineries. Also, more oil is being discovered and produced offshore in the Gulf of Guinea and Western oil companies have vast investments in the region that guarantee jobs and profits to shareholders. With growing domestic demand in the U.S.—and dependence on imported oil to satisfy about half of domestic demand—it has become important to secure new sources of oil from across the world. Part of the calculus is also to diversify U.S. dependence on oil supplies from the volatile Middle East and to preempt the likely strategic implications of

growing Chinese demand for oil imports from African and other international producers.[11]

Another important consideration is the protection of offshore oil installations and international sea lanes in West Africa from the activities of international criminal and terrorist networks. This much was confirmed recently by Admiral Henry G. Ulrich, commander of the U.S. Naval Forces in Europe and Africa, in response to reporters' questions at a symposium in Abuja, Nigeria.[12] Thus, an unfettered access to West African oil is critical to Western energy security and global power. Western oil interests are also locked into major oil-producing countries such as Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, and the "new oil boom states"—Chad, Equatorial Guinea, São Tome, and Principe. Since most of the oil being discovered is offshore, it has the added advantage of being beyond the reach of protesting oil communities on land who are capable of disrupting the oil flow, as has been the case in the restive oil-rich Niger Delta in Nigeria since the early 1990s.

The African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG) Report contained the following quote by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Walter Kansteiner III: "African oil is critical to us, and it will increase and become more important as we go forward."[13] Apart from guaranteeing stable supplies of oil to the expanding oil-guzzling U.S. market, it gives the United States the leeway to promote its values of free markets, regional economic growth, good governance and democracy, which would influence regional stability and peace in ways that broadly favor U.S. hegemonic interests and security.

U.S. oil corporations have been in the vanguard of the new scramble for West Africa's oil. They recognize the need to compete more against their European counterparts, such as Royal Dutch Shell, Total, BP, and ENI (Agip), as well as Chinese oil companies that are aggressively seeking a foothold in the region. U.S. oil multinationals such as Exxon Mobil and Chevron Texaco have been the visible front runners in the quest for new oil finds in West Africa. Gary and Karl note that: "Chevron Texaco announced in 2002 that it had invested $5 billion in the past five years in African oil and would spend $20 billion more in the next five years," and "Exxon Mobil signified its intention to spend $15 billion in Angola in the next four years, and $25 billion across Africa in the next decade."[14]

In addition, both Exxon Mobil and Chevron Texaco were investing billions of dollars in Nigeria, the fifth largest exporter of oil to the United

States, accounting in 2002 for 600,000 barrels per day of U.S. oil imports.[15] Chevron Texaco was also involved in developing the oil and gas fields in Equatorial Guinea, while Exxon Mobil had cornered the São Tome and Principe oil and gas fields. The 1,070 km Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline, carrying oil from the Doba oilfields in Chad for export through the Cameroon port of Kribi, is reportedly the largest single U.S. private investment in Africa by Exxon Mobil, valued at US$3.7 billion.[16] Other sources, however, put the investments by Exxon Mobil (which owns 40 percent of the equity, followed by Petronas of Malaysia with 35 percent and Chevron Texaco with 25 percent) at US$2.2 billion.[17] Whatever the real figures are, it shows a pronounced U.S. oil multinational presence in Chad.

Other U.S. oil interests include the West African Gas Pipeline Project (WAGP), valued at US$500 million, to transport an estimated 120 million cubic feet per day of gas to Ghana, Benin, and Togo from Nigeria's Niger Delta by 2005, over a distance of 1,033 km.[18] According to the Energy Information Association, the oil consortium that has invested in the WAGP is led by Chevron Texaco (36.7 percent), and includes Shell (18 percent), the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) (25 percent), Ghana's National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) and Volta River Authority (VRA) (16.3 percent), Benin's *Société Béninoise de Gaz SA* (SoBeGaz) (2 percent) and Togo's *Société Togolaise de Gaz SA* (SoToGaz) (2 percent). The WAGP is central to plans for power generation and industrialization along the West African coastal corridor and could be extended further, possibly as far as Senegal, given the right security and economic conditions. The United States, other Western countries and China also have interests in Senegal, Mauritania, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, and Cameroon, where their oil companies are involved in the search for oil.

What flows from the foregoing is the reality that the security stakes of the United States, and the West are very high in West Africa. The possibility that terrorists can infiltrate oil-rich but unstable or weak states impels the urge to intervene to promote U.S. security interests in the region. The U.S. Navy has established a presence in the Gulf of Guinea, largely to protect international sea lanes for transporting oil and gas, and keep a watchful eye on oil interests along the coast, particularly in the Niger Delta where ethnic minority militants have periodically attacked oil company installations and workers and disrupted the flow of oil.

Nigeria's Troubled Oil-Rich Niger Delta Region

Since the 1990s there has been an upsurge in the agitation in Nigeria's volatile Niger Delta. The protests in this paradoxically oil-rich but impoverished region have been largely targeted at the Nigerian federal government and the oil multinationals, which are accused of neglect, exploitation, and the environmental degradation of the region. They hit the global limelight in the early 1990s when Ken Saro-Wiwa, the charismatic writer, environmental and ethnic minority rights activist, led the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) in a campaign against the Nigerian state and Shell, the largest multinational oil operator in Nigeria. MOSOP's demands were contained in the Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) in 1990 and its Addendum in 1991. The use of the OBR to make demands on the state in a non-violent manner was very much in line with a tradition borrowed from the history of the United States The key OBR demand was for the "right to control and use a fair proportion of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development."[19] Indeed, it was an attempt to (re)take control of the oil-rich land from the state-oil big business alliance.

The MOSOP campaign quickly caught on internationally and Shell came under a lot of pressure. The then Nigerian military government crushed Ogoni resistance through the repression of Ogoni protest and the trial and hanging of Saro-Wiwa and eight other MOSOP activists in November 1995. However it failed to stem the tide of protests and violence in the Niger Delta as other communities confronted oil companies and each other. At the fore were the militant Ijaw youth. The Ijaw could be found across the Niger Delta and saw themselves as the fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria.[20] In December 1998 the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) released the Kaiama Declaration in which it claimed ownership of the oil in Ijawland and "advised all oil companies' staff and contractors to withdraw from Ijaw territories by the 30th of December 1998, pending the resolution of the issue of resource ownership and control of the Ijaw area of the Niger Delta."[21] In response, the federal government declared a state of emergency in the region and thousands of soldiers, naval troops, and anti-riot policemen were deployed to the Niger Delta to protect oil installations and investments and disperse Ijaw protesters. Many of the protesters, and those

suspected of being IYC members or supporters, were arrested and some were killed.

However, other incidents deepened tensions. In May 1999 Chevron Texaco allegedly transported Nigerian military personnel in its helicopters from which they shot and killed two protesters on Chevron Texaco's Parabe oil platform.[22] In November of the same year federal troops razed the oil-producing town of Odi to the ground after the community had failed to produce a criminal gang suspected of murdering seven policemen. According to a report, over 2,000 inhabitants of Odi lost their lives and many more were displaced. It was clear that the operation at Odi fitted a regular pattern in which the Nigerian state deployed maximum force to deter and contain threats to oil interests and oil companies in the region.[23]

In spite of the militarization of the region, it has witnessed the escalation of violent conflict, particularly along communal lines. Shortly before the 2003 elections in Nigeria, there was an escalation of violence in the western Delta city of Warri, involving armed ethnic Ijaw, Urhobo and Itsekiri militia.[24] In 2005, the military sacked Odioma following a dispute with a neighboring community, which also involved an oil multinational corporation. Such military campaigns have continued to target communities in the Niger Delta perceived as threats to oil companies or suspected of harboring armed youth militia.

The atmosphere of tension has been compounded by the massive theft and export of oil from pipelines. This illegal act, locally called "oil bunkering," is believed to involve criminal gangs with connections to highly placed people and access to sophisticated ammunition. According to an estimate, Nigeria lost between US$392 and US$500 million worth of crude oil to illegal oil bunkerers in 2003.[25] It is also believed that illegal bunkering feeds into criminality, corruption, communal violence and the proliferation of arms in the Niger Delta. Profits from this illegal trade provide resources for patrons of the youth militia (usually local politicians or notables), act as an incentive for unemployed youth to embrace a life of criminality, and provide the militia groups with resources for the purchase of sophisticated arms.[26]

In spite of heavy military presence under the framework of the Nigerian army's Operation Restore Hope, violence and conflicts have continued and the security situation remains fragile. More recently, acts of violence by

militant groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Martyrs Brigade and the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), including the widely publicized kidnapping of expatriate oil workers and attacks on oil installations, cut Nigeria's oil production by 25 percent or an estimated daily loss of $56.7 million in the first quarter of 2006.[27]

It is in the light of the growing tensions in the Niger Delta—particularly the activities of the armed militant ethnic minority/community in spite of the presence of the Nigerian military—that there has been a growing demand for the increased "securitization" of the region. Such efforts have attempted to link the activities of armed militia in the Niger Delta to a "terrorist threat" to the U.S. and Western oil interests. Indeed, a few Western strategists have canvassed for direct military intervention to protect their strategic energy interests in the troubled region, but the approach has remained that of providing assistance to Nigerian security forces operating in the Niger Delta.

It must be emphasized that no terrorist connection has been established in relation to the Niger Delta crises. This is mainly because the tensions and crises in the region are largely the product of a history of injustice, inequality and inequity, the legacy of military dictatorship and the militarization of the Niger Delta, and the ways in which the globalized political economy of oil predation involving the Nigerian petro-state—its security agencies, oil multinationals and the local elite, through their politics, and policies—deepen the social crises and conflicts in the region.[28]

What is at stake is the control and (re)distribution of the benefits from oil production and sales, and how the people of the region can access a substantial part of these benefits. Admittedly most of the people are alienated and bitter and blame the federal state and oil companies for their plight. But it is perhaps more rewarding to approach the issue from the perspective of positively promoting the socio-economic conditions in the region in ways that reflect social and environmental justice, equity, and dignity, rather than resort to further securitization that would only serve to increase tensions and steer violence in more dangerous directions.

Militant Islam in West Africa

West Africa has a substantial Muslim population, as high as 40 percent in some estimates. Owing to the linkage being drawn between al Qaeda and radical/militant forms of political Islam that are clearly anti-American/Western, many strategic thinkers and analysts are of the view that Muslims in West Africa may provide a sanctuary for terrorists. Thus, countries in the Sahelian belt that are largely Muslim, including Nigeria, with substantial Muslim populations, have been under very close watch. The focus here is on the Nigerian case. Politicized religion is a highly explosive issue in Nigeria and political elites have manipulated religious differences between a predominantly Muslim north and predominantly Christian south in the pursuit of access to power and resources in a context of socio-economic crises. The conflation of religious with ethnic identities has added an explosive element in a context where the citizenship question remains unsettled and the nation-state largely remains an unresolved question or incomplete project in the eyes of many, who then retreat into the protective shells of their various ethnic/communal (micro) identities.

Another factor in the tensions between ethno-religious groups in Nigeria is the adoption from 2000 of *Sharia* Islamic law by most of the states in northern Nigeria. This move, which contradicted the constitutionally declared secularity of the Nigerian state, heightened tensions between Christians living in the north and the majority Muslim northerners. It must be noted, however, that the adoption of *Sharia* in northern Nigeria is in part a political project that depends to a large extent on the religious faith of the Muslim majority, who are critical of decades of misrule, poverty and corrupt rulers. It is based on the calculation of the elite that it would provide renewed legitimacy for them and protect the region from opposition politics linked to the age-old fears of southern (Christian) domination. For these reasons, the Islam practiced in the northern states is not radical or militant. Although militant groups exist, they are small, limiting their activities to known preachers or leaders and areas. Mostly found in cities and tapping into the grievances of the poor, unemployed and the youth, these groups have been involved in sporadic protests such as those against the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the hosting of the Miss World beauty pageant in Abuja in 2002. It is believed that Muslim students in higher institutions of learning are involved in the rather episodic upsurge in militant Islam in northern Nigeria. Although most of the religious violence has taken place in north and central Nigeria, it does not preclude the

existence of violence in the south involving militant or vigilante groups like the O' Odua Peoples Congress in the west, and the Bakassi Boys and the Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra in the east.

Most critical, however, have been the activities since late 2003 of a militant group referred to as the "Taliban" in northeast Nigeria, particularly in Borno and Yobe states. This group, suspected of being affiliated to the Al Sunna Wal Jamma, has been involved in attacks on police stations and other government offices and in the murder of police officers and civilians in 2004.[29] Militant Muslim university and polytechnic students reportedly formed the group that reportedly models itself after the Taliban of Afghanistan. Others believe that a fugitive Afghan Taliban leader in Nigeria established it. In September 2004, one of the group's camps was routed in a raid by a combined team of police and the military. Located within the Sahel and the Southern-most limits of the Sahara, Northern Nigeria falls within the region [that is] perceived as being vulnerable to becoming a terrorist sanctuary. Also, the arming and training of militant groups in Nigeria has been traced to funding from groups in Saudi Arabia, radical Islamic countries, and to the activities of militant Islamic preachers or even members of terrorist networks operating along the trans-Sahara routes.

From the foregoing, it is not difficult to fathom why there are concerns that northern Nigeria could become an incubating site for militant Islam and possibly terrorism. However, it would appear that some of the claims about the existence of a terrorist threat are overstated. This is because Islam in northern Nigeria is largely conservative and welded into traditional structures and cultures. Militant groups are relatively few and exist on the fringes of society where they are also visible. However, the existence of deep poverty, youth unemployment and misery across the region, as well as the uneasy relations between the dominant religions and between "indigenes" and "settlers," needs to be attended to urgently to avert the further worsening of the crises.

Conclusion

This essay has perhaps raised more questions than answers. However, West Africa is being further integrated on the basis of perceived threats into a

U.S.-framed global security system in a globalizing, unipolar post-Cold War world, with direct implications for the people of the region. Through this "partnership" West African states have been co-opted into hegemonic external counterterrorism discourses. In concrete terms, this implies closer military cooperation between the region and the West, but without a corresponding closing of the yawning gap between the prosperous West and the economically marginalized and impoverished West Africa. It appears that the region's place in the post-Cold War world order remains one of continued subordination to the imperial powers in the international system. The dominant discourse plays down the contributions of hegemonic external interests in the creation of the "same" threats from which Western society seeks to protect itself, without addressing the roots of the crises in West Africa.

In reality, the roots of globalized terror lie outside Africa. Mamdani, in a rather provocative book, places the roots of political terror in the "unfinished business of the Cold War."[30] He argues that the transition from political Islam to terror was born out of the history of political Islam and its connections with the U.S. Cold War strategy of rolling back communism in Afghanistan, Central America and Southern Africa. Terrorism in the post Cold War era is globalized and targets a dominant system of global power. This raises questions about whether an all-out zero-sum military victory can be won against such an adversary, or if it is more rewarding to tackle the historical and socio-economic roots of political terror.

What is most significant about the fragile conditions in West Africa and the region's vulnerability to terrorist infiltration and attacks may not be the questions of whether or not the threats are real or imagined. It lies more in the implications of zero-sum militarist top-down globally driven solutions that may fail to address the asymmetries of power, and the historical, political and social-economic roots of violent conflict and crises in the region. Such a failure would increase the probability that the war on terror in the region would miss its target and possibly end up empowering state security in ways that increasingly contradict human, environmental and social security. It could also increase the risk that governments would pander to the dictates of external constituencies and agendas that undermine local popular democratic aspirations, and regional peace and development.

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Chapter 4

Terrorism in North Africa: An Increasing Regional Threat

Mohamed A. El-Khawas

Introduction

Political violence has emerged in North Africa in a context of autocratic political systems, weak economies, social decay, and ethnic and religious conflicts. In the last two decades of the twentieth century these governments did not allow Islamic groups to form political parties and compete in free and fair elections. The only exception was Algeria between 1989 and 1992, when the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was a political party, much to the dismay of neighboring Morocco and Tunisia. When the FIS won big in multiparty legislative elections in December 1991 and was likely to win the runoff elections in January, the military intervened, cancelled the elections, declared a state of emergency, and detained thousands of FIS leaders and supporters.

Despite these and other government actions over the last two decades, Islamist opposition has continued, and in many countries has grown dramatically. In the 1990s, Islamist opposition throughout North Africa was radicalized by the return of native sons who had fought the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. An estimated 2,800 Algerians, 2,000 Egyptians, 400 Tunisians, and 200 Libyans returned to their respective countries. They were left with combat skills but without a cause to fight and not much to do at home. Lack of marketable work experience and governmental failure to set up training programs made them potentially dangerous. It was like setting "a ticking time bomb" under the undemocratic regimes of North Africa.[1] The Afghan veterans found a new cause in trying to oust secular

governments, accusing them of abandoning Islam, manipulating the political process, and silencing opposition. They formed groups that took up arms to try to establish Islamic states. They initially received seed money from Osama bin Laden to support their efforts that involved both internal and external actions.[2]

In Algeria the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) targeted the military, security forces and the police at home. It conducted a brutal campaign against civilians and spurred violence in France, its former colonial power, because of its acceptance of the coup and bailout of the military-backed regime. On Christmas Day 1994, the GIA hijacked an Air France plane in Algiers and planned to crash it into the Eiffel Tower in Paris. The tragedy was averted when French commandos stormed the plane and killed the hijackers during a refueling stop in Marseilles. Between July and October 1995, the GIA launched a wave of bomb attacks on tourist locations, outdoor markets, and subway lines in Paris, causing a large number of civilian casualties. It demanded the closing of the French embassy in Algiers and the end of French aid to Algeria, which amounted to $1 billion a year.[3]

Violence also affected Egypt during this period. In June 1995 the Islamic Jihad attempted to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Upon his return to Cairo, he moved swiftly to uproot terrorism. Security forces clashed with militants, resulting in 620 people killed or injured in 1995. They arrested, detained, and imprisoned hundreds of suspects. Those convicted of committing violent acts were executed. The government thought it had broken the ability of the Islamist groups to operate inside Egypt until terrorism struck Luxor in 1997, killing fifty eight people and wounding twenty six. It was the worst terrorist attack on the country and was intended to deny the government the $3 billion a year in tourism-related revenue and undermine the country's economy.[4]

In comparison there was hardly any violence in Tunisia after the discovery of a plot to assassinate President Ali Zin el-Abidine Ben Ali, who had come to power through a military coup the late 1980s. In August 1992 he outlawed the an-Nahda Party (Renaissance Party) after it had been implicated in a plot to overthrow the government as well as acts of violence against government institutions. He threw its leaders and many supporters in jail in an effort to prevent the country from being torn by the violence that was occurring in neighboring Algeria.[5]

Following the 9/11 attacks on the United States, North African governments and the insurgencies took different sides in their response. Governments cooperated with the United States, in counterterrorist activities, and were supplied with military hardware and training to strengthen their capabilities to combat domestic terrorism. At the same time, al Qaeda turned to North Africa to compensate for its loss of manpower and to form affiliation with several groups in order to create a global network guided by bin Laden's jihadist principles. Violence flared up in the region as the United States, and its coalition partners waged war on two Muslim countries, Afghanistan and Iraq. While Algeria was in the midst of its own civil war, the pro-Western governments of Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia were targeted and hit by al Qaeda-linked groups because they were considered to be not sufficiently Muslim. A wave of terror also struck Europe, in which North Africa was implicated. Its connection to the 2004 Madrid bombings and the 2005 London bombings alarmed European officials. They feared that future threats might come from within their own countries. There were many supporters of the Islamist groups in the North African migrant communities throughout Europe who would pose a threat to Europe's stability and security.

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss terrorism in North Africa to better understand the challenges that these countries face. First, the chapter examines the impact of the war on terrorism on the region and highlights any connections with al Qaeda that might have spiked violence in the region. Second, the chapter focuses on Algeria as a case study because it has emerged as the epicenter of terrorist activity in the region. Algeria's Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) is the longest running and the most important Islamist insurgency in the region. Third, the chapter examines Morocco's responses to terrorism and explains why it has been more successful than others in keeping a tight rein on terrorism. Lastly, the study concludes with an assessment of other ways that North African governments have implemented counterterrorism strategies.

The Impact of the Terrorism War on North Africa

After the September 11 attacks, President Bush announced that no nation could stay neutral in the war on terrorism. As he put it, "you're either with

us or against us."[6] North African governments approved of Bush's broader definition of terrorism, which turned former insurgents into terrorists and later to jihadists. It also helped to justify their totalitarian rule and gave Washington a reason to forget about spreading democracy in the region. These governments cooperated with the United States and, in turn, received military assistance to strengthen their military and security capabilities to combat domestic terrorism. It did not matter whether there were any ties between local groups and al Qaeda at the time. They played up the bin Laden connection and the United States responded by expanding military aid to governments such as Algeria and Morocco.

North African governments shared information with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and interrogated their nationals who had been rounded up overseas. For example, in February 2002, Morocco's intelligence interrogated Moroccan detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and discovered a plot to attack U.S. and British Navy ships at the Straits of Gibraltar. Disaster was prevented by the arrest of three Saudis who had been sent by al Qaeda to carry out the mission.[7] Algeria went farther and turned over to Washington the names of 350 citizens known to have ties with al Qaeda.[8] Algeria and the United States found a common interest in the prosecution of a war on terrorism. The Algerian government, which had been unable to defeat the insurgents, welcomed the resumption of the U.S. military assistance after a decade of absence. Libya, which was on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, began to cooperate with the United States after the invasion of Iraq. It shared information with Washington about the al Qaeda-linked Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which was unrelentingly suppressed at home. It had twice attempted to assassinate Mua'amar Qaddafi. To come on board with the United States, Qaddafi gave up his country's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and moved to compensate families and relatives of the Pan Am Flight 103, which was destroyed in 1988 over Scotland and the bombing of a Berlin discotheque in 1986.[9]

The U.S. war in Afghanistan forced al Qaeda leadership, which was on the run, to reorganize to meet the new challenges. It transformed itself from a tightly hierarchal organization into a global movement and sought affiliation with militant groups in North Africa. It was restructured as a multinational corporation, with subsidiaries overseas. Each entity operated

independently and could initiate and execute its own plans without waiting for approval from the headquarters. Bin Laden's strategy was to create a transnational network and to expand terrorist activities outside the traditional battleground in Afghanistan. To accomplish this goal he sent combat trainers and explosives experts to other regions to help local groups acquire the skills and the knowledge needed to operate on their own.

Turning to a global operational mode al Qaeda called on other terrorist groups to strike against the United States and its North African allies. In December 2001, the Italian police discovered that the Tunisian Combatant Group was plotting to attack the Algerian, Tunisian, and American embassies in Rome. This group also recruited volunteers to fight the U.S. coalition in Afghanistan. It also dispatched two assassins disguised as journalists to interview the Afghan leader, Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, who had sided with the United States against the Taliban regime. During the interview, a booby-trapped camera was detonated, killing all of them.[10]

In 2002 al Qaeda contacted North African insurgencies in an attempt to further its agenda. For example, Emad Abdelwahid Ahmed Alwan, a close associate of deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, went to Algeria to assess the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) and to discuss a plan to bomb the US Embassy in Mali. This plan was never carried out because Alwan was killed in the Batna province in late 2002. Although the media were quick to link the GSPC to al Qaeda's network, some observers doubted the connection at this time. As a European counterterrorism official put it, "We don't see the GSPC needing al Qaeda or vice versa."[11] In their judgment, the GSPC leaders were nationalists and wanted to concentrate their effort no overthrowing the military-backed regime and avoid provoking the United States.

Tunisia, which strengthened security and law enforcement measures to keep terrorists away, was struck by terrorism in April 2002. A propane truck driven by Nazir Naouar, Tunisian, exploded outside the El Ghriba synagogue on the resort island of Djerba, killing fourteen Germans, five Tunisians, and two French. Because of the large number of German casualties, Germany's Interior Minister, Otto Schily, went to Tunisia, examined the evidence, and consulted with Tunisian officials. He concluded that the explosion was not an accident but "the work of terrorists."[12] The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Land claimed responsibility for

the Tunisian blast. This was the same group behind the 1998 bombings on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The Tunisian authorities arrested the truck driver's uncle, Belgacem Naouar, and sentenced him to jail. In France, the driver's brother, Walid Naouar, and a German convert to Islam, Christian Ganczarski, a close associate of bin Laden, were arrested and accused of complicity. According to German officials, Ganczarski received a telephone call from the suicide bomber an hour before the attack.[13] Furthermore, an arrest warrant was issued for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of September 11, for ordering the bombing.[14] He was captured by the CIA in Pakistan and currently is awaiting his fait in the United States.

The Tunisian government took several measures to counter terrorism. In December the Tunisian government enacted a comprehensive law to support the global effort to combat terrorism and restrict money laundering.[15] Since then President Ben Ali has come down hard on Islamists, not allowing them to form religious-based organizations, to spread Islamism among the masses, or to organize political parties. He has insisted on separating religion from politics. He used harsh measures, including illegal detention and denial of free speech, to silence opposition. The Judiciary has not been independent. Courts have rendered lengthy sentences to people suspected of trying to or encouraging others to join Islamist groups. In hundred of cases, people were convicted on these vague charges without actually committing terrorist acts. Amnesty International has repeatedly criticized these measures as violation of human rights.[16]

The U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003 sparked a renewed round of violence. Al Qaeda leaders claimed the United States was waging war on Islam and used it as propaganda to arouse anti-Americanism across the region. Its affiliates exploited the war to recruit new fighters for the *jihad* against the West. As a Western intelligence official said, "More young militant men are becoming terrorists than ever before. The men are joining groups inspired by the occupation of Iraq and the exhortations of Osama bin Laden, who is a hero to many disaffected Muslims."[17]

In May 2003 Morocco was struck by terrorist attacks that had never been seen before. In that same month twelve suicide bombers carried out five coordinated simultaneous bombings at a Jewish cemetery, an Italian restaurant, a nightclub, a Spanish culture center, and a hotel frequented by

foreigners. The bombings killed forty two people, including seven Europeans, and injured about one hundred.[18] Morocco's Minister of Interior, Mustapha Sahel, stated that the attacks "bear the hallmark of international terrorism."[19] There was a possible al Qaeda connection because of the modus operandi and the intended targets. Besides this no indigenous groups were "known to use violence of this sort to further their cause."[20] The authorities went after as-Salafiya al-Jihadiya, which was known to be sympathetic to bin Laden, and rounded up all known radical Islamists in the country, many of whom were Afghan veterans.

Although American and European officials warned North African governments in advance about possible terrorist attacks, they were surprised by the magnitude of the operation, especially its planning and execution. As a top European counterterrorism official put it, "We continue to disrupt Al Qaeda's activities and capture more of its leaders, but the attacks are escalating." He added, "There are fewer leaders but more followers."[21]

European officials became more concerned with the North African groups than with al Qaeda's leaders because of the region's close proximity to the continent and the presence of North African migrant communities in many European cities. A senior European official said that he was worried about "the spontaneous groups that are sprouting up from the northern African community based in Europe, and going down the path of jihad." He added that they would be "the next generation of terrorists."[22] Spain, a member of the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq, and Egypt were struck by terrorism in March 2004. Madrid was rocked by ten synchronized bombings of commuter trains during the rush hour, killing 191 people and injuring 1,500 others. Within days the police arrested eleven Moroccans who were suspected of belonging to the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM).[23] The attacks showed that there was a growing network of al Qaeda affiliates in North Africa.

In October Egypt's resorts of Taba and Nuweiba in Sinai were hit by three coordinated attacks, killing 34 tourists and Egyptian workers and wounding over 140 others. Two terrorists were killed and five others were later apprehended. When it was revealed that the ringleader was a Palestinian residing in Sinai, it was rumored that Hamas or al Qaeda was behind the attacks. The government denied any external involvement. In July 2005 terrorists struck the resort city of Sharm el-Sheikh. Three

simultaneous explosions targeted a hotel, a market, and a parking lot near shops and restaurants, killing 88 and wounding more than 200. It was the worst terrorist attack in Egypt since 1997 and occurred less than two months before the voters were to decide whether Mubarak would serve a fifth term as president.[24] These attacks affected the tourist industry, discouraging tourists from coming to Egypt and denying the government huge revenues from tourism.

At this juncture attention turns to Algeria, which fought the longest and suffered the most from terrorism. Examining Algeria in some detail offers a basis for understanding the nature and the extent of terrorism. The focus on the Safalist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) is significant. The GSPC implemented a national agenda and in time increased the organization's regional role over the years. In September 2006 the GSPC became allied with al Qaeda and changed its name to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). It shed its national program and emerged as a regional force, operating loosely connected networks to promote bin Laden's global jihad. As Jean-Louis Bruguiere, then a top French judge and an expert on counterterrorism, has said, the group's mission is "to recruit people in Morocco and Tunisia, train them and send them back to their countries of origin or Europe to mount attacks."[25] Its new role raises several questions. Why did it change directions? Was it beneficial for AQIM to join al Qaeda's network? Has it forged links with other terrorist groups in the region to escalate violence? What relationship has it had with the North African migrant communities in Europe? Is it still a threat to Europe?

Responses to Terrorism: Algeria in Turmoil

In the short-lived experiment with democracy in Algeria, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was the only Islamist political party in North Africa in 1989. It rejected violence and agreed to play by the democratic rules. It conducted a well-organized campaign attracting thousands of people to its rallies. Notably, the rise of the party coincided with the return of Algerian veterans of the Afghan war. The security services recruited some Afghan veterans to infiltrate the FIS and to spread violence to turn public opinion against the Islamist party and to use it as an excuse to crack down on

activists. These dirty tricks failed to derail the FIS. Instead it competed and did well in the first multiparty legislative elections in December 1991.

The ruling secular party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), suffered a major electoral defeat for the first time since independence in 1962. This was a vote of no confidence against its corrupt, self-serving rule, whose leaders had monopolized power for decades. Their realization that the FIS was poised to win the January runoff elections sent shock waves through the party and the military, the self-appointed guardian of the state.

The military mounted a coup in January 1992, forced out President Chadli Bendjedid, the architect of the democratic experiment, and replaced him with a five-member High Council of State (HCE). It declared a state of emergency for a year and cancelled the elections to prevent the FIS from coming to office. Within two months, it dissolved the FIS and evicted its elected officials from local offices. It jailed leaders and detained tens of thousands of activists and supporters, without charge or trial, who were sent to remote camps in the middle of nowhere. This harsh treatment of the detainees hardened their attitudes toward the military and moved them to greater militancy.[26] The annulment of the election results alienated voters and led to widespread popular dissatisfaction. These oppressive measures led to the rise of many paramilitary groups, which were prone to violence. Increasingly, militant groups revolted against the return to authoritarianism. It became clear that "the Algerian military had set in motion a cycle of violence and counterviolence."[27] The armed resistance evolved into a protracted civil war because the military had decided to use force to wipe out Islamist groups and showed no sign of compromise.

Between 1992 and 1998 there were two main groups fighting to oust the illegal Algerian regime. The Armed Islamic Movement (MIA) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) attacked the military, security forces, and the police to destabilize the country. The GIA targeted government officials and their families, and political leaders in an attempt to stop the government from providing public services. The GIA declared war on all layers of society. As its leader, Antar Zouabri, put it, "In our war, there is no neutrality. Except for those who are with us, all others are renegades."[28] They unleashed a reign of terror on civilians, killing writers, professors, doctors, clergy, and women and girls who did not wear headscarves. By mid-1995 an estimated 40,000 Algerians were killed.[29] They turned against

secular education. In a two-month period in 1994 they killed thirty teachers and principals and burned down over fifty schools.[30]

The Algerian government imposed a curfew on the capital and extended its state of emergency indefinitely. It did not tolerate criticism, silenced opposition, and muzzled the press. Since it could not stop the violence, it started massive arrests of people whom it suspected of being terrorists or supporters of terrorism. It created special courts to handle terrorist cases. Between October 1992 and October 1994, 13,770 cases were brought before the Special courts, 3,661 were acquitted (about 25 percent), 1,661 sentenced to death, including 1,463 in absentia, and 8,448 were given jail sentences. It mobilized the country's security forces and the military to hunt and kill insurgents. It organized local militias in villages and small towns and gave each household a gun and ammunition to defend their families. Militiamen were placed under the military or the gendarmerie, paid monthly stipends, and participated in raids against terrorist hideouts near their homes. They included the veterans of the anti-colonial struggle against France whose combat experiences helped the government to fight back and to reduce the number of attacks in their localities.[31]

The GIA complained about the media and journalists who had criticized their killing of civilians and the destruction of the country's infrastructures. As its leader put it, "those who fight against us by the pen will die by the sword."[32] Backing up this threat they murdered more than one hundred journalists who were viewed as backers of the regime.[33] They also told foreigners to leave the country in order to deny their services to the government and to weaken the economy. Between September 1993 and mid-1997 more than 120 foreigners, mostly French, were killed. This sent a clear message that it was dangerous for foreigners to live and work in Algeria.[34] Many foreign nationals left because the government could no longer guarantee their safety. Oil and gas companies had to send their technicians and engineers home and to scale down their operations. This caused a sharp drop in revenues and made it difficult for the government to attract foreign investment. The GIA attacks however gave the insurgency a bad image and made it difficult for exiled FIS leaders to convince Europeans to pressure the Algerian government to restore democracy.[35]

During the civil war Algeria was the most dangerous place in the world. Between 1992 and 1997 approximately 120,000 people were killed, mostly

civilians, by insurgents or by security forces.[36] It was estimated that "there were around sixty Islamist terrorist groups in Algeria in mid to late 1990s."[37] The country was not safe for Algerians who were killed, abducted, tortured, and raped. In operations to hunt down insurgents, security forces meted out summary justice and committed atrocities. One observer reported, "Policemen secretly complained of being ordered to participate in death squads, shoot-to-kill raids and the torture of suspects."[38]

It was in this environment that a new group, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), was founded in 1998. An examination of this group is divided into two parts. The first covers the period between 1998 and 2006 when the GSPC was a strictly Algerian-based movement with a national agenda seeking a regime change and the creation of an Islamic state. The second part starts in September 2006 when the GSPC allied itself with al Qaeda and became a regional force with a much broader agenda to further bin Laden's global jihad.

The Salafist Group: 1998-2006

Three years before September 11, 2001, some GIA members who opposed violence against civilians left the group and formed the GSPC. It decided to only attack the military and security service, which were the source of the problem. The strategy of not targeting civilians helped the group to become popular and enabled it to recruit new members. Its membership reached 28,000 at its zenith, making it the largest and most influential Islamist group in the country.[39] It rejected the government's amnesty offer to end the civil war, which the voters overwhelmingly approved in September 1999. There was a significant drop in the level of violence because 5,000 insurgents had accepted the state of emergency, which remained in effect.[40] The GSPC, however, continued armed resistance against the national government, which rigged elections to stay in power.

After the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom commenced against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in October 2001, the GSPC became a magnet, attracting militant Islamists from other North African countries. They came to be trained or to participate in the fight against the United States and its regional allies. In November, seven armed men, including two Tunisians and one Mauritanian, crossed the border to join the GSPC. They

clashed with Algerian security forces in the Zbarbar Mountains near Bouira. Some were killed and others were arrested. The GSPC also provided training to Tunisians and sent them back home to fight its apostate regime. During that year, the GSPC trained 200 an-Nahda militants to carry out attacks in the Kasserine region along the Algerian border. In 2002 four Tunisian logistical experts confessed that they were working for the GSPC.[41] This common danger led Algeria and Tunisia to increase cooperation to stop the smuggling of men and weapons across the border.

On the home front in January 2003, the GSPC ambushed military convoys in the Aures Mountains, killing forty three soldiers and local militias and injuring nineteen in the town of Batna. Soon after, Amari Saifi (also known as El Para), a former Special Forces paratrooper considered to be bin Laden's man in the Sahel, kidnapped thirty two European tourists in southeastern Algeria. They were later released after the Germans paid a ransom of $6 million. In 2004 Saifi used this money to purchase weapons in Mali. With help from the U.S. military, the arms shipment was intercepted when it entered Algeria. Algerian and American intelligence judged Saifi to be dangerous because they feared that he might use the ransom money to finance a 9/11-style attack in Europe or in the United States. The U.S. Navy surveillance aircraft tracked his movements and relayed his position to ground forces in the area. In March 2004, it guided Chadian troops in a two-day battle near the Niger border, during which forty three GSPC fighters were killed.[42] Saifi managed to escape but before the end of the year he was captured and held for several months by Chadian rebels, the Movement for Democracy and Justice. He was transferred to Libya, which turned him over to Algeria where he was later sentenced to life imprisonment.[43]

During 2004 Algerian security forces continued their offensives against terrorist groups, aiming to disrupt their plans. They arrested over 400 insurgents including the GIA leader Nouredine Boudiaf. Also, they killed the GSPC leader Nabil Sahraoui. His replacement, Abdelmalek Droukdal, announced his takeover in June 2004 with a truck bomb at El Hamma electric power station in central Algeria. It caused major damage that left many towns and cities without electricity for several months.[44] In August the GSPC attacked a military convoy, killing forty security people, and conducted other smaller attacks in Boumerdes and Kabylie. Over the years

government offensives dramatically succeeded in countering attacks and were able to reduce the number of insurgents from 28,000 in the mid-1990s to 800 in 2004.[45] It looked as if the GSPC was on the verge of collapse.

The GSPC, short of manpower, needed time to regroup and rearm. Additionally, the GSPC had money problems and could carry out only a few attacks. In May 2005 the GSPC killed fifteen soldiers in Algeria and fifteen in Mauritania the next month. These operations were funded by money raised by a group of North African migrants who had burglarized twenty villas in the southern coastal cities in Spain.[46] Other illegal sources of funding included setting up phony checkpoints near cities to extort money from wealthy Algerians, kidnapping tourists, smuggling refugees and drugs, holding up banks, and other crimes.

To stop the flow of cash to terrorists, the Algerian government lifted banking secrecy regulations and required banking and insurance companies to report any suspicious transactions. It criminalized money laundering and established a financial unit to gather evidence to be used in the courts to prosecute violators.[47] Furthermore, it worked closely with its neighbors to try to stop illegal border crossing and the flow of money across the border. In March 2005 six Tunisians who were suspected of being part of the al Qaeda network were caught in Annaba trying to sneak across the border to join the GSPC in Algeria. In searching their homes, Tunisian security forces found satellite images of the U.S. embassy and the British High Commission and the names of their diplomats.[48]

An Alliance with Al Qaeda: A New Role

The government also thought to take advantage of the GSPC weakness and to offer them a way out. In March 2006 the GSPC offered another amnesty program as part of a national reconciliation policy to end the civil war. During the six-month amnesty period, the government released 2,300 prisoners, and some self-exiled members of the banned Islamic Salvation Front were able to return home. Approximately 350 insurgents including some GSPC leaders accepted this amnesty offer.[49] Their defection weakened the group but the hardliners, hundreds strong led by Droukdel, rejected reconciliation and decided to align itself with al Qaeda. At the beginning bin Laden and al-Zawahiri were reluctant to do so because the

GSPC was basically an indigenous movement with a narrow national focus. It took some time to convince them that the GSPC was ready to take on a new role in North Africa. Around the time the amnesty expired, and on the fifth anniversary of September 11, al-Zawahiri announced the alliance.[50]

Some observers thought that the alliance would boost GSPC confidence at a time when its stronghold Kabylie was under attack by the military, trying to defeat the remaining insurgents who had rejected the amnesty. Others argued the union was only cosmetic and that the Algerian group would continue to operate independently. George Joffe, a professor at Cambridge University and a specialist on the region, doubted that bin Laden would control the GSPC, which, in his view, was a regional organization, "more a series of groups with national agendas and a common ideology."[51]

Nevertheless, the new alliance was beneficial for both sides. For al Qaeda it demonstrated that it was alive and allowed it to claim credit for terrorist acts in North Africa. It was also facing a shortage of manpower as fewer Saudis were coming to Iraq to join the anti-U.S. insurgency. With the merger al Qaeda was assured of a steady supply of North Africans to fight in Iraq or to carry out attacks elsewhere. In 2007 50 percent of al Qaeda's new arrivals were North Africans. As newcomers, they were used in suicide bombings that often targeted civilians.[52]

The alliance also gave the GSPC a new lease on life. The GSPC benefited from bin Laden's support, which contributed to the decline of its rival, GIA. The organization transformed itself into al Qaeda's wing in North Africa and has become part of the global *jihad* to rid the Muslim world of western influence and establish a theocratic state. Droukdel made it known that "Our general goals are the same goals of al Qaeda."[53] The GSPC's urgent task was now to unite North African terrorist groups under al Qaeda's umbrella and to direct their activities against western interests. Documents seized in a later raid in Morocco confirmed that talks commenced to form a union between the GSPC, the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM), the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, and some Tunisian groups.[54]

Further evidence of cross-country cooperation to spread terror occurred in Tunisia. Tunisia had not witnessed a terrorist attack in four years but now was hit by terrorism between December 23, 2006 and January 3, 2007.

Months earlier five Tunisians and one Mauritanian, led by Lassad Sassi, a former Tunisian police officer who had spent some time in Afghanistan and Italy, had crossed the border from Algeria. They set up a camp in the mountains of Djebel Terif and trained twenty Tunisians in the use of automatic weapons and explosives. Their plan, to attack embassies and foreign diplomats, was foiled when a woman was detained outside the capital. For eleven days, the police and the army attacked terrorists in several locations, killing twelve and arresting fifteen.[55] If the terrorists had carried out these attacks it would have been a blow to the country's economy, which relied heavily on tourism revenue. The incident vividly demonstrated the country's vulnerability and its inability to protect its border and prevent terrorist infiltration from Algeria.

Now operating as a regional group, the GSPC operatives actively recruited North Africans to join the anti-U.S. insurgency in Iraq. Their efforts were not always successful because new recruits sometimes could not make it safely to the camps in Algeria. In March fourteen Tunisians were convicted of having ties with the GSPC, seven of whom had been captured in Algeria and turned over to Tunisia two years earlier. They were accused of planning to go to Iraq and were given lengthy sentences. In August three Tunisians, two Libyans, and one Moroccan were killed in clashes with Tunisian security forces in the Bir El-Ater Mountain in the Tebessa province. According to the government they were part of a group of 70 terrorists who were operating in this area and attacking security forces.[56]

Tunisia and Algeria worked cooperatively to slow cross-border infiltration, relying heavily on new technology and state-of-the-art equipment. Their success was due to the strengthening of ". . . their joint border surveillance, using electronic sensors and drones." This enabled them to "improve the monitoring of the terrorist withdrawals across both sides of the border."[57]

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): A New Mission

In Algeria security forces continued their manhunt for terrorists, capturing and killing over 1,000 terrorists.[58] Amid tight security the GSPC found it hard to remain in Algeria. Its battered remnants, a few hundred, retreated to northern Mali. In a vast ungovernable arid area, they regrouped and rebuilt, drawing new members from the defunct GIA, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, and the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group. They also used mosques to recruit young men from villages and small towns.[59] This led North African and European governments to fear that "the group is coalescing into a regional terror movement."[60] U.S. Army General Bantz J. Craddock said that al Qaeda affiliates have taken advantage of the political instability in the Sahel and have established sanctuaries in remote areas to "recruit, indoctrinate, train, equip, transit and mount operations."[61] The Mali government tolerated their presence with the understanding that they would not carry out attacks in the country.

The GSPC was soon back operating in Algeria, targeting foreigners and spreading terror across the country. In November 2006, the GSPC killed seven soldiers in Bouira.[62] The following month, it attacked a bus transporting Halliburton employees at the outskirts of the capital, killing an Algerian and wounding nine.[63] A local newspaper warned citizens "not to be seen with Americans" because they "risk becoming collateral damage."[64] This attack was a prelude to a brutal campaign, making 2007 the bloodiest year ever.

In January 2007 the GSPC changed its name to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a name referring to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. It kept its independence and remained financially self-sufficient. The only link with al Qaeda was ideological.[65] The GSPC continued to target the government but made substantial changes in strategy; it shifted the campaign to urban centers, and ended the nine-year ban on attacking civilians.[66] Additionally, the GSPC adopted al Qaeda's tactics brought to Algeria by the veterans of the Iraqi war. They introduced the use of suicide bombers, roadside bombs, and improvised explosive devices, which guaranteed many civilian casualties. Algeria feared an escalation in violence since the jihadis "are now waging their fight in North Africa."[67]

In February the AQIM used cars packed with explosives to bomb police stations in six towns, killing six people and injuring many others. The following month in the Ain Defla province, AQIM ambushed a bus that was

transporting workers of a Russian oil company, killing one Russian and three Ukrainians.[68] In April it carried out two coordinated high profile attacks in the capital, killing twenty people and wounding one hundred and sixty two. The first targeted the building of the office of the prime minister and several ministries in central Algiers. The bombs damaged the building façade, killing twelve people and wounding one hundred and eighteen. Prime Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem was not harmed. The second bombing destroyed a police station in Bab Ezzouar on the road to the international airport, killing eleven people and wounding forty four.[69] These attacks were the deadliest in the capital in a decade and were timed to destabilize the country prior to the next election, which the prime minister vowed to hold as scheduled.[70]

The use of suicide bombers alarmed Algerians and heightened concern that the country was sliding back to the civil war violence, with the capital as the battleground. Some analysts believed that it was a "major escalation" and "part of a new strategy aimed at boosting the group's profile." The *Economist* however questioned whether they largely served as "propaganda to revive the flagging spirits of North African insurgents."[71] This question was answered in July on the opening day of the African Games in the capital. Two suicide bombings occurred in Kabylie province where some of the games were scheduled. Also, a truck loaded with explosives detonated near military barracks in the town of Lakhdaria, killing eight and wounding thirty. Another suicide bomber set off an explosion close to a police patrol near the village of Tigzirt, killing one and injuring another.[72]

The AQIM also carried out multiple attacks during the month of September. On September 6 the AQIM attempted to assassinate President Bouteflika during his tour of the eastern part of the country. A suicide bomber blew himself up prematurely in a crowd of people waiting for the President's arrival in Batna, killing more than fifty and injuring more than one hundred and fifty.[73] President Bouteflika accused the terrorists of trying to scuttle his policy of national reconciliation and pledged never to abandon it. He added, "Terrorist acts have absolutely nothing in common with the noble values of Islam."[74] Two days later, a car exploded at the Coast Guard barracks in the coastal town of Dellys, killing thirty and wounding forty.[75] On September 15 there was an explosion outside a police station in the capital, killing three and wounding five.[76] A week later a car loaded with

explosives rammed a police escort traveling with construction workers employed by the French company Razel, which was building a dam in Lakhdaria, injuring two French, one Italian, five Algerian soldiers, and a driver. This attack came after al Qaeda's al-Zawahiri called upon Muslims to "cleanse" North Africa from Spaniards and French.[77]

The deadliest attacks took place in the capital in December. Two simultaneous car bombings struck the Constitutional Council and the headquarters of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Algiers, killing sixty two and injuring one hundred and seventy seven. According to Anis Rahmani, the editor of the *Ennahar* daily, the AQIM "wanted to send a strong message that it is still capable despite the loss of several leaders."[78] Arezki Daoud, editor of *North Africa Journal*, warned that North African insurgent groups might unite under "al Qaeda's spiritual guidance." Western experts urged North African governments to do more to fight terrorists "without radicalizing more of their citizens or isolating moderate Muslims."[79]

The U.N. bombings got the United States and Europe to pay more attention to threats coming out of North Africa, which has become a sanctuary for terrorists plotting attacks outside the region. Recruiters were active in Spain's North African migrant community, sending them to the Sahel for training. In June 2008 eighteen people were arrested in Spain on suspicion of providing money and logistics to support the AQIM's bombing of the U.N. and government offices in Algiers in December of 2007. During the raids, the Spanish police seized cash, money transfer receipts, bank records, and other papers.[80] The number of arrests alarmed European officials because radicalized and impoverished North African youth also could be used to stage terrorism in their adopted countries. They feared that future threats would come from within as young migrants were recruited and indoctrinated in the jihadist ideology. As an expert pointed out, "Every single attack carried out or attempted by al Qaeda throughout the world has some link to Europe, even prior to September 11."[81]

Whenever the AQIM has financial problems it resorts to the abducting of European tourists across North Africa. They hold them to raise ransom money to support their activities and to free comrades. For example, in February 2008, it kidnapped two Austrian tourists in Tunisia and warned others to stay away.[82] It demanded ransom and the release of prisoners,

including Amari Saifi, who were held in Algeria and Tunisia. The hostages were released in October after a ransom of $2.8 million was paid.[83] In December, AQIM kidnapped a Swiss, a German, and two Canadian diplomats and demanded the release of twenty of its own members who had been in prison in several countries. It was reported that the hostages were held in captivity for several months until the ransom was paid.[84]

In response the Algerian authorities launched a massive campaign against AQIM that rounded up a few hundred suspects. This crackdown, like previous ones, did not cripple the group. To the contrary, it emerged stronger, warning people against supporting or working for the government. In June 2008 there was a twin suicide bombing on army outposts. In August multiple car bombings took place in towns near the capital. The first targeted a police academy in Les Issers, a district of Boummerdes, killing forty three people and injuring thirty eight. The second car bombing was outside a military headquarters in Bouira, killing eleven and wounding thirty one others. Other attacks on security forces and police recruits caused the death of 200 people over eighteen months.[85]

The broader effects of these attacks were subject to debate. Diaa Rashwan of the Cairo-based Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies pointed out that AQIM was sending a strong message to young people that "this will be your [fate] if you join their enemies, the police and security forces."[86] Howard Hartwell, Middle East editor for *Jane's Country Risk*, observed that AQIM had no support among the population and was "viewed increasingly as an outsider coming in to attack Algeria." Other analysts said that the group still "fights for many of the same reasons as the GSPC did" and that "the violence may be more about opposition to the government than global *Jihad*."[87] James McDougall, a history professor at the University of London, cautioned that the surge of violence did not mean a return of the civil war.[88]

The Algerian government's response was to tighten security and fight back. In 2008, there were 85 significant bombings, killing 639 people, including 409 suspected terrorists, 158 members of security forces, and 72 civilians.[89] Subsequently, there was no attack reported in several months, giving people a false hope that the worst was over. In January 2009, Tuareg rebels abducted a British, a German, and a Swiss couple in Mali. They were turned over to AQIM,[90] which offered to release the British hostage, Edwin

Dyer, if the British freed Abu Qatada, a Jordanian cleric who was in prison in Worcestershire fighting Jordan's request for extradition. Abu Qatada had been sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment on terrorist offences. AQIM threatened to kill Dyer if its demand was not met within twenty days. When Abu Qatada was not released after several deadlines had passed, Dyer was killed in Mali.[91] In April a German and a female Swiss were released but her husband was not.

The killing and kidnapping of Europeans have heightened concerns that Algeria was becoming a center for terrorism that could threaten Europe and North America. Although AQIM has not carried out any terrorist attack in Europe since its inception, security and intelligence services considered it "a major threat" that cannot be ignored. As the *Economist* put it, "The emergence of a powerful regional group of Islamist insurgents, recruiting members from among the millions of religious and poor North Africans, is rattling all the governments in the region and raises the unnerving prospect of a new wave of North African bombers heading for the cities of Western Europe."[92]

Western experts on terrorism are divided on whether AQIM is capable of carrying out large-scale attacks outside of Africa. Some disagree with the intelligence assessment on the risk factor. Hugh Roberts, former head of the International Crisis Group's North Africa project, pointed out, "They haven't actually pulled off a single terrorist attack in Europe [since] . . . they've existed." He added, "They haven't done anything spectacular."[93] The reason for European success in preventing a major terrorist attack is due to the vigilance of its security services. They have been a step or two ahead of terrorists, looking out for suspects and dismantling cells as preemptive measures to combat terrorism.

In Algeria the AQIM attacked a police station in the town of Les Quacifs in March 2009, injuring four officers. In June the AQIM attacked a police convoy in the Bordj Bou Arreridj province that was accompanying Chinese workers building a dam between Algiers and Mansoura, killing eighteen policemen and a civilian. This time the government dispatched 10,000 soldiers on a mission to hunt down the perpetrators. They managed to arrest several people and to seize weapons and ammunition.[94] In May 2009 Spanish police arrested twelve Algerians suspected of being a support cell. At the end of the month, Italian authorities issued arrest warrants for

two Moroccans, two Tunisians, and one Algerian who were suspected of plotting to attack a church and a subway line.[95]

Algerian authorities now claim that counterterrorism has been a success and that many local insurgent leaders have surrendered, been eliminated, or imprisoned. They reported that the number of AQIM fighters has been reduced to between 500 and 800. During the presidential election in April 2009, the Interior Minister, Noureddine Yazid Zerhouni, said that the extremists "are currently cornered" but he admitted that they "are hard to catch because [of their] refuge in remote mountains and forests."[96] During the first four months of 2009 there were 64 bombings, killing 61 security forces and 19 civilians. During the same period, 167 terrorist suspects were killed by ground and air attacks. The long drawn-out war has been costly, diverting critical resources away from economic and social development. A sizeable share of the country's budget is spent on fighting terrorism. For example, the total cost of war was $9 billion or about a quarter of the budget in 2008.[97] It has been costly for humans with over 200,000 people killed. The economic losses have been estimated at over $20 billion. It is evident that military action is not a solution. Other alternatives need to be explored to end terrorism.

At this point the discussion will turn to another government's responses to terrorism. The focus on Morocco examines what it has done to contain terrorism. Such analysis will illustrate ways that have been more successful than others in putting a lid on terrorism.

Responses to Terrorism: The Case of Morocco

North African governments have viewed terrorism as a threat to the region's security and stability. Consequently, they have supported the U.S. push to confront the war on terrorism through a global response. By accepting U.S. weapons and training, North African governments have shored up their military and strengthened their security capabilities to confront terrorist threats. They have come down hard on terrorist groups, killing terrorists, arresting suspects, and dismantling cells at home while sharing intelligence with European and Americans to pull the rug from under terrorism. They have cooperated with African neighbors and have helped apprehend wanted

terrorists. They have tried to stop border crossing of both weapons and men, have closed loopholes in the banking system to stop illegal money transactions, and have enacted laws to criminalize money laundering.

Out of all the countries in North Africa, Morocco has been the most successful in confronting terrorism without relying solely on a military solution. King Mohammed VI promised his people that the 2003 Casablanca attacks would be the last.[98] Since then, the government has pursued a two-pronged approach to combat terrorism. The first was to introduce political and legal reforms to address the causes of terrorism. There are more linguistic and cultural freedoms than before. In 2004 the Ministry of Islamic Affairs was assigned new responsibility, to promote religious tolerance and moderation. During the same year, the Truth Commission, modeled after South Africa, was created to investigate crimes committed by the state during the reign of his father, King Hassan II, who died in 1999. The hearings were televised and 23,000 victims or their families were compensated. It was a step in the right direction to heal the wounds and to start anew. Women now enjoy more rights. They are allotted thirty seats in parliament and elected on a nationwide basis. A major political reform was undertaken to transform the kingdom from a traditional monarchy to a constitutional monarchy with diverse political parties and fair elections. Morocco has the only legalized Islamic party, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD), in North Africa. The authorities however have continued to refuse to allow militant Islamists to form political parties or to organize public rallies to protest public policy.[99]

The second prong was to conduct an aggressive campaign to uproot terrorism, based on the premise that the best defense is a strong offense. It changed its laws to give a broader definition of terrorism, to expand the investigative powers of law enforcement, and to impose lengthy sentences for belonging to terrorist groups or participating in terrorist acts. It also streamlined procedures to facilitate the exchange of information between security forces and the national police. Since 2003 it has conducted an uninterrupted and aggressive counterterrorism campaign to protect citizens. The authorities have pursued every lead, have arrested thousands of terrorist suspects, and have prosecuted them to the fullest extent of the law. Their strategy to prevent attacks is, in case of doubt, arrest the suspects and let the courts decide guilt or innocence.

Following the 2003 Casablanca attacks the Moroccan authorities rounded up about 3,000 reputed militants, some of whom were Afghan veterans.[100] The Ministry of Justice was quick to announce that about 90 percent of the terrorists were arrested and that the other 10 percent were being pursued through international arrest warrants. About 1,800 were questioned and released; 300 were charged and acquitted by the court; and 900 were given jail sentences.[101] Five men, members of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM), were charged with the Casablanca bombings and were sentenced in absentia to twenty years' imprisonment.[102] This was a surprise because this group was not known to have the capability to mount attacks of such magnitude. It was the same group that was later connected to the 2004 Madrid bombings. The government began to focus on GICM because it posed a threat not only to Morocco but also to Europe.

In November 2005 the authorities arrested seventeen Moroccans allegedly linked to Algeria's GSPC and accused them of plotting to attack tourist sites and public buildings. A month later they uncovered a cell that operated along the border of Algeria and Mali. Eleven suspects were accused of planning terror attacks in the country.[103] In March 2006 nine people were arrested and charged with plotting to attack the American consulate in Rabat, the headquarters of French intelligence services in Paris, and a commuter train station in Milan and a church in Bologna. The pro-government newspaper *Al Alam* reported that the ringleader Mohamed Benhedi Msahel, who resided in Italy, traveled to Algeria where he shared his plan with the GSPC leader and sought his help to recruit suicide bombers. Upon returning to Morocco, he was arrested.[104]

In May 2006 the government moved against Justice and Charity which had launched a campaign in several cities some weeks earlier to counter what they considered to be the biased media reporting on their activities and to recruit new members. The organization renounced violence and operated openly. It was the largest Islamic opposition group with a quarter of a million members. It was not allowed to form a political party. The media had reported that its leader talked about preparing for an uprising. In response, the authorities raided the group's offices, hauled away computers and boxes of documents, and sealed offices. In a quick sweep, they detained 330 members in several cities although they were quickly released for a lack of evidence of wrongdoing.[105] Mohamed Darif, professor at Hassan II

University in Mohammedia near Casablanca, said, "The authorities want to limit the group's activities but not destroy it."[106] In the following month security authorities tried to stop the families of the as-Salafiya al-Jihadiya detainees from holding a protest and delivering a letter to the minister of justice that complained about the conditions at the Sala Detention Center where their relatives had been on a hunger strike for three weeks.[107]

In August security services broke up a cell and arrested fifty six members of the Mehdi Support Group in six cities. It was the first time that middle-class women were involved in extremist activities, which also involved soldiers and police officers. They were accused of plotting to attack government buildings, tourist sites, and foreign holdings. Their leader Hassan al-Khatab, who was imprisoned after the 2003 Casablanca attacks, was suspected of preparing to wage a *jihad* in northeastern Morocco.[108] In November other suspects belonging to another group were rounded up and were accused of planning similar attacks in the country.[109]

In January 2007 security forces dismantled a cell affiliated with the AQIM and arrested twenty six people who were involved in recruiting people to join the anti-U.S. insurgency in Iraq.[110] Professor Darif reported that the government has "broken up more than 30 terrorist cells sending fighters there."[111] In March, Saad Houssaini, a cofounder of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM), was arrested in connection with the 2003 Casablanca bombings and was implicated in the 2004 Madrid bombings. He had been part of an al Qaeda network in Afghanistan and a bomb-making instructor in Kabul. He also participated in the anti-U.S. insurgency in Iraq.[112]

Despite the crackdown on suspected terrorist cells, a suicide bomber blew himself up at an Internet café in Casablanca in March 2007, wounding four people. A few weeks later three suspects blew themselves up as the police surrounded their apartment building in the working-class Hay Farah neighborhood. A fourth man was shot and killed before he could detonate the explosives under his clothes. An Interior Ministry official alleged that two of the four, Mohamed Rachidi and Mohamed Mentala, were involved in the 2003 Casablanca bombings. In the operation, a policeman was killed and another was seriously injured. The authorities discovered that the cell was planning a series of attacks on the port of Casablanca, as well as police stations and tourist sites in the country.[113] Police also arrested another

suspect and were looking for three or four men who, in their judgment, were connected to the Internet café bombing.[114] Five days later two brothers blew themselves up near the U.S. Consulate and the American Language Center in Casablanca, wounding a woman. This incident led American diplomats to close the consulate and to advise employees to stay home because the risk of possible attack against Americans was high.[115]

The Moroccan government has been steadfast in combating terrorism, closing six or more cells on the average every year and reducing sharply the number of terrorist attacks. It has closed loopholes in the law that enabled terrorists to move money undetected through the banking system. It enacted law to allow authorities to monitor, investigate, and prosecute illegal financial transactions. Recently, it closed 267 local bank branches that were vulnerable to terrorist robberies that would finance their operations.[116]

Conclusion

Of all the world's regions, North Africa has suffered greatly from terrorism. The GSPC/AQIM is the main culprit behind the region's terrorism, especially after it became the North African wing of al Qaeda. The network established a loose union with other terrorist groups in northwestern Africa and was instrumental in spreading terror attacks across the region. The network trained new recruits from Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritania in the use of weapons and explosives and sent them to Iraq or Europe or back home to attack domestic and foreign interests. The AQIM and its affiliates have had no problem finding new recruits who are frustrated with a system that has done little to help them and are willing to die to get out of poverty. The group is financed through illegal means and has cells in Europe that provide financial, logistical, and material support. They have established networks to facilitate traveling overland across the region. Their resilience has led western experts to wonder whether North Africa might become the next al Qaeda base and a launching pad for attacks against Europe and the United States.

Among North African countries, Algeria has shouldered the greatest burden of terrorism. Algerians have suffered at the hands of both the security and the AQIM. They are tired of violence and have supported their

government's crackdown on terrorist groups. Economically, terrorism has destroyed much of the country's infrastructure, discouraged foreign investments, and reduced foreign trade. Kidnappings and the killing of tourists have kept others away, devastating the tourist industry and denying the government billions of dollars in foreign exchange earnings. Militarily, the crackdown on suspected terrorists has succeeded in weakening terrorist groups, but not eradicating terrorism.

In giving top priority to their fight against terrorism North African governments have diverted critical resources away from economic and social development to finance the war. As a result they have not dealt with youth problems or solved ethnic-national and religious conflicts. To counterterrorism some countries have trampled on basic human rights, using illegal detention, torturing opponents, and muzzling the press. In Tunisia, for example, in 977 cases between 2006 and 2008, people were convicted on charges of "planning to join jihadist groups or inciting others to join, but never on charges of having planned or committed acts of violence."[117] These oppressive measures were taken to tighten the president's grip on power and to prevent the establishment of a Taliban-type regime in Tunis. President Ben Ali's draconian laws have spared the country political violence for many years, except in 2002 and 2006/2007.[118] Yet Algeria's record suggests that a military approach is not a viable solution to the problem. Its strategy, decided by the military after the 1992 coup, has proven unworkable, yet hard to change. Their amnesty programs did not bring about national reconciliation because former generals and the ruling elite still manipulated the political process to ensure favorable outcomes in every presidential election.

At this point North African governments need to learn from past mistakes and from one another about effective measures to counter terrorism. Morocco is far from being a perfect model because more constitutional and political reform is needed to establish a true democracy. But its neighbors can benefit from its dual strategy of having internal reforms going hand in hand with offensives against terrorism. First, they can adopt Morocco's Truth Commission as a way to acknowledge that the governments have committed crimes during the war on terrorism. Televised hearings can be held and compensation paid to victims or their families. It is a constructive step toward building trust between the government and the governed. Second, as in Morocco, internal reforms can be made to

democratize the political system, to extend human rights, and to foster religious moderation. Morocco is the only country in North Africa that has a legalized Islamic party, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD). The Algerian and Tunisian leaders should realize that people, not the military, are the real power in a democratic setting. Third, more attention is needed to address the economic and social problems that contribute to the spread of extremism. Poor living conditions are turning young people against governments and driving them into the arms of terrorists. After eighteen years in office and after shootouts with terrorists in December 2006/January 2007, Tunisia's President Ben Ali decided that it was time to help youth in an attempt to "safeguard them against the currents of extremism, fatalism, and terrorism."[119]

Unless serious programs are in place to solve problems among the youth, no country in the region is safe from terrorism. Security forces are killing terrorists and arresting suspects on a regular basis but the underlying reality is that terrorist groups "can recruit just as fast within the desperate and angry youth,"[120] as a Western intelligence has commented. Finally, the war in North Africa must be won in order to eliminate threats to Europe. A senior French counterterrorism official reported that his agency works "constantly" with its Algerian counterparts to contain terrorist threats. He added, "At least six AQIM-related cells, dormant or getting ready for action, have been dismantled across Europe in recent years."[121]

Notes

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PART II

Regional Dynamics and Response to Terrorism

Chapter 5

Terrorism and Islam in Africa

Abdul Karim Bangura

Introduction

As someone trained in Linguistics I am cognizant of the fact that the title of a discourse is a powerful thematization device, it indicates to the reader how the author intends his/her argument is to be chunked, and it influences the interpretation of the text that follows. Thus, when it was suggested that the title for this chapter be "Islam and Terrorism in Africa," I changed it slightly to "Terrorism and Islam in Africa." On the one hand, I did not want the word Islam to be in the head-initial position of the title since I wanted to avoid what some writers on the topic have done by proffering the view that Islam condones terrorism. On the other hand, I did not want to convey a denial of the fact that a few radical Islamist groups, like other radical religious groups, have engaged in terrorist acts. To do so would be hypocritical, an act that is *haram* (i.e., forbidden) in Islam.

That Islam is a balanced and moderate *din* (meaning "a way of life"; as such, Islam is more than just a religion) is well-documented by many well-respected scholars. Islam is balanced in everything, in its creed, in its worship, and does not condone negligence on the one hand and extremism on the other. Therefore, the concepts "Islamic terrorism" and "Muslim terrorism" are misnomers. Karen Armstrong is quite correct when she poignantly points out that using such concepts are dangerously counterproductive as they suggest that those in the West believe that such atrocities are caused by Islam and, hence, reinforces the perception that the West is an implacable enemy in the Muslim world. She is also correct when she states that the terrorists in no way represent mainstream Islam.[1] Fred

Halliday is equally correct by arguing that most Muslims consider terrorist acts egregious violations of Islam's law.[2] It is therefore not surprising that groups such as the Free Muslim Coalition have rallied against terror, sending a clear message to radical Muslims and their supporters that they reject them and that they will defeat them.[3]

Thus the three major questions probed in this chapter are as follows: (1) Where and what types of terrorist activities have occurred in Africa? (2) What are the reasons for the terrorist activities in Africa that have been characterized as "Islamic"? (3) What can be done to discourage terrorist activities in Africa? Before addressing these questions, however, a brief historical background on Islam in Africa is provided to give the reader who may not be familiar with it a sense of Islam's essentiality on the continent.

A Brief Historical Background on Islam in Africa[4]

As in the rest of the world, Islam is the fastest-growing religion in Africa. Islam reached East Africa in 615 CE, just five years after the birth of the religion when some Muslims from Mecca fled to modern-day Ethiopia to escape religious prosecution—today, 50 percent of the citizens of Ethiopia, the original home of the Coptic Church, which is the first church in the world, are Muslim. The spread of Islam into North Africa was followed by the spread into West Africa and later Central and the Southern Africa. There is not a single African country today that does not have a Muslim population (see Table 5.1). Africa has the second largest population of Muslims (401,975,628 or 27 percent) in the world next to Asia (1,023,564,005 or 69 percent). The breakdown of the Muslim populations for the five geopolitical regions in Africa, in order of size, is as follows: North Africa, 180,082,076 or 89 percent; West Africa, 133,994,675 or 50 percent; East Africa, 66,381,242 or 34 percent; Central Africa, 12,582,592 or 15 percent; and Southern Africa, 8,935,043 or 7 percent. Consequently, an examination of the history of and reasons for Islam's growth in Africa is imperative for understanding the impact of the religion on the continent.

Table 5.1: Africa's Religion Statistics

African Countries	Population	% Muslims	% Christian	% Others
Algeria	34,178,188	99.0	1 (including Jewish)	0
Angola	12,799,293	2.5	53.0	44.5
Benin	8,791,832	24.4	42.8	32.8
Botswana	1,990,876	3.0	71.6	25.4
Burkina Faso	15,746,232	50.0	10.0	40.0
Burundi	8,988,091	10.0	67.0	23.0
Cameroon	18,879,301	22.0	40.0	38.0
Cape Verde	429,474	5.0	85.0	10.0
Central African Rep.	4,511,488	22.0	50.0	28.0
Chad	10,329,208	53.1	34.3	12.6

Comoros	752,438	98.0	2.0	0
Congo	4,012,809	2.0	50.0	48.0
Dem. Rep. Congo (Zaire)	68,692,542	10.0	70.0	20.0
Djibouti	516,055	96.0	6.0	0
Egypt	83,082,869	94.0	1.0	5.0
Equatorial Guinea	633,441	2.0	93.0	5.0
Eritrea	5,647,168	50.0	50.0	0
Ethiopia	85,237,338	50.0	43.6	6.4
Gabon	1,514,993	12.0	75.0	13.0
Gambia	1,782,893	90.0	8.0	2.0
Ghana	23,832,495	30.0	68.8	1.2
Guinea Bissau	1,533,964	50.0	10.0	40.0
Guinea	10,057,975	85.0	8.0	7.0
Ivory Coast	20,617,068	38.6	32.8	28.6
Kenya	39,002,772	33.0	55.0	12.0

Lesotho	2,130,819	5.0	80.0	15.0
Liberia	3,441,790	20.0	40.0	40.0
Libya	6,310,434	99.0	0	1.0
Madagascar	20,653,556	7.0	41.0	52.0
Malawi	14,268,711	36.0	56.7	7.3
Mali	12,666,987	90.0	1.0	9.0
Mauritania	3,129,486	100.0	0	0
Mauritius	1,284,264	16.6	32.2	51.2
Mayotte	216,306	97.9	2.1	0
Morocco	34,859,364	98.7	1.1	0.2
Mozambique	21,669,278	20.0	41.3	38.7
Namibia	2,108,665	3.0	80.0	17.0
Niger	15,306,252	95.0	5.0	0
Nigeria	149,229,090	50.0	40.0	10.0
Reunion	787,584	2.0	98.0	0
Rwanda	10,473,282	15.0	83.2	1.8

Sao Tome and Principe	212,679	3.0	77.5	19.5
Senegal	13,711,597	94.0	5.0	1.0
Seychelles	87,476	1.1	93.2	5.7
Sierra Leone	6,440,053	60.0	10.0	30.0
Somalia	9,832,017	100.0	0	0
South Africa	49,052,489	2.0	43.7	54.3
Sudan	41,087,825	70.0	5.0	25.0
Swaziland	1,123,913	10.0	20.0	70.0
Tanzania	41,048,532	50.0	30.0	20.0
Togo	6,019,877	25.0	29.0	46.0
Tunisia	10,486,339	98.0	1.0	1.0
Uganda	32,369,558	20.0	76.0	4.0
Zambia	11,862,740	15.0	84.0	1.0
Zimbabwe	11,392,629	10.0	25.0	65.0

Sources: U.S. CIA, 2009; MuslimPopulation.com, 2009; NationMaster.com, 2009; Bangura and Said, 2004.[5]

The famous North African historian from what is today known as Tunisia, Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406 CE), states that the name *Ifriqiya* was given after Ifriqos bin Qais bin Saifi, one of the kings of Yemen. The boundaries of *Ifriqiya* stretched from Barga on the East to Tangier on the West; this means that in addition to Africa proper of the Romans, *Ifriqiya* included Tripolitania, Numidia and Mauritania. Today, when the word *Ifriqiya* or Africa is used, it means the entire African continent which includes North Africa (including the Maghreb), East Africa, Central Africa, West Africa and Southern Africa.

The first major attempt to expand Islam in Africa is that by Uqabah (Okba) b. Nafi, who to this day is dubbed the founder of Muslim Africa. In most of the areas that were conquered by Muslim armies, the former religions of those areas—whether Judaism, Christianity, Zoroastrianism, or indigenous religions—continued to thrive unimpeded for centuries after the conquests. Even those areas where political authority was in the hands of Muslims owing allegiance to the central power of the Caliphate in

Damascus or Baghdad, the actual Islamization of the population was generally a slow process of absorption.

The Almoravid Berbers of North Africa, who became the bridge between the Muslim conquerors of Spain in the eighteenth century and the African traders of the Sudan, were among the first African converts to Islam and the first to perform the annual *Hajj* (holy pilgrimage) to Mecca in Arabia. Occupying a territory known as Western Sahara, this particular Berber ethnic group of the Sanhaja found itself caught between the strong Moroccan lands and the Ghana Empire to the south. The Sanhaja were able to compel the Muslims to bring down the Ghanaian Kingdom in the name of religious propagation. While infighting later caused the collapse of the Almoravid dynasty in Ghana after less than fifteen years, Berber control of the region resulted in the wide-ranging conversion of West Africa to the Islamic faith.

Besides the fact that the arrival of Islam in Africa as far west of the Atlantic shore dates back to over 1,000 years, this phenomenon of Islamization is a much more interesting fact than is often perceived. The Almoravid constituted a dynamic religious movement, often defined as fanatical, which is credited with the religious conversion of numerous African communities. In the Western Sudan and areas south of the Sahara, religious conversion was used as a tool to engineer the collapse of the king of Ghana's lengthy reign. The organization of those African communities that had been conquered by Ghana into an empire-destructing force resulted in the unified Almoravid campaign, which toppled Ghana around 1070 CE under the leadership of Abu Bakr.

A more in-depth investigation, however, bears witness that the majority of historical analysis regarding the rapid and blanket spread of Islam was not entirely by trade or a result of militaristic force. While Islam was introduced in West Africa by both of these means, the religion spread throughout East Africa and the Sahel by the piety and scholarship of its early personalities; many converts also traveled long distances to West Africa to study the Islamic faith. Not long after the Berber invasion, the regular migration of Muslim travelers to Mali made it the *Medina* (i.e., a place of religious pilgrimage) of the African continent.

The fall of the Almoravid in 1087 CE represented the liberation of the Ghanaian populace. Together, the southward flow of Islamization from the

northern region and the westward directed Islamic propagation from the eastern regions of the Sudan were the cause of the domino effect in the Islamic conversion of West and parts of North-central Africa. Many of the Atlantic Berbers who were of Mande origin, known to be peace loving and studious, became part of the Islamic *ulamaa* (scholars trained in Islam and Islamic Law) of West Africa; the transmutation to Islam remained a tranquil one rather than replicating an Almoravid imperialistic model.

What renders this southward metamorphosis the more phenomenal is that, as stated earlier, Islam first entered into Africa from the Ethiopians in the east. In the history of Islam from its early inception in Mecca, the ruling oligarchy, consisting of wealthy merchants and bankers who rejected religious conversion and oppressed the small band of Muslim converts, regarded the teaching of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) as revolutionary. In order to escape persecution, Muhammad (PBUH) in 615 CE directed 52-53 of the early Muslims to migrate to the Kingdom of Axum or Abyssinia—i.e., today's Ethiopia during the rule of An-Najasha (i.e., the King Negus). The migration is considered the first *Hijra* (i.e., the emigration of Muslims that were being persecuted in Mecca in present-day Saudi Arabia). The pagan Quraysh followed the Muslims in their tracks and asked An-Najasha to exile them; but when the king heard the Muslims recite *Surat* (verse) Maryam, he cried and refused to exile the Muslims. Upon the death of An-Najasha, Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) made the Funeral Prayer for him in Medina, an indication that the king must have become a Muslim and had a group of followers that might have gone on to propagate Islam in Eritrea and northwestern Somalia.

Following that the Lamu Chronicle reveals that the Umayyad Caliph Abdullahi ibn Marwan sent emissaries to the East African Coast in 696 CE, an indication that some sort of trade or educational exchange existed between the two regions. The Kilwa Chronicle tells the story of seven Muslim brothers who emigrated from Shiraz, Persia, and established their rule on the East African Coast around the eighth century.

The Muslim historian Al-Mas ʻudl reports that in the tenth century, trade from Arabia, the Persian Gulf, India and China was entering the East African Coast. The Muslim geographer Al-Idris noted in 1154 that there was trade among Muscat, Oman and Zanzibar. Another Muslim geographer from Morocco and the first epic traveler to date, Ibn Battuta, visited Mogadishu, Mombassa, and Kilwa in the fourteenth century. He found that

the learned people and *ulamaa* in those areas practiced Shafi'i *fiq* (Islamic jurisprudence) and were corresponding with their counterparts in the Hijaz (west of present-day Arabia).

From the twelfth to the fourteenth century, the East African Coast witnessed the emergence of Swahili urban centers such as Kilwa, Kiwaii, Mombassa, and Zanzibar. The Swahili had a very natural lifestyle that was completely environmental friendly. Their diet was comprised mainly of indigenous fruits, vegetables and fish, and they used natural materials like coral to build houses some of which still stand today.

Christian Portuguese reached the East African Coast in the fifteenth century. Vasco da Gama arrived there as a representative of the king of Portugal to conduct trade and religious crusade. The irony is that da Gama had to rely on the maps of Muslims to reach the coast, and no Portuguese sailor dared to go around the Cape of Good Hope without receiving training from Muslim navigators. In his description of Kilwa, da Gama stated that it was extremely beautiful, with exotic fruit, organized streets, running water, strong structures, and literacy with scholars that matched those of Europe.

The trust of the Swahili people, however, did not stop the Portuguese from attacking Mombassa in 1496, forcing the inhabitants to flee from the heavy bombardment by cannons. The Portuguese built Fort Jesus in Mombassa and other forts along the coast. All along the Indian Ocean, from the Arabian Peninsula, Aden, India, Goa, Gujurat to Calcutta, the Portuguese continued their subjugation of the predominantly Muslim cities in those areas and created a trade route stretching from the East African Coast all the way to China. Drawing from the experience they had gained from engaging in warfare and proselytizing with Muslims in Andalusia, the Portuguese forced missionaries on all the lands it subjugated. The Muslims on the Swahili coast, however, revolted and demanded that they be placed under the protection of the Turkish Caliphate instead of the Portuguese Catholic colonizers.

With the help of the Omani, the Swahili were able to drive out the Portuguese. By 1812, however, there were clashes between Mombassa and Lamu, leading Sultan Sayyid Said to intervene and conquer the Swahili coast. By 1840 the area was completely subdued and Zanzibar was made the capital of the Swahili coast and of Oman, too, owing to its natural harbor and was, and still is, exceedingly beautiful. The Omani tried to

revive the golden age of Swahili trade under the reign of Sultan Sayyid Said, but they could not recover its earlier glory. This situation forced the Swahili merchants to engage in agriculture, producing spices such as nutmeg and cloves for commerce.

As a result not many Muslims settled in East Africa, indicating that the spread of Islam in Africa was not generated from the Ethiopian shores of the Red Sea. Rather, it flowed westward into Algeria, West Sahara and Morocco from Nilotic Egypt before making its journey southward into the Sahara and the Sahel. Remarkably, the conquest of Egypt by the Muslim army freed the Christian Copts from Byzantinian control as well as converted much of the Coptic and Byzantinian Orthodox Church followers to Islam, with much credit being given to Islam's simplicity and assurance of personal freedom.

At that time only the Nile Valley from Egypt to Abyssinia had been infiltrated by Christianity. While the conversion of Africans to Islam did eventually encompass most of the East African Coast from Egypt to Madagascar, the religion was slow to penetrate the central and southern interior. On the other hand, the Muslim conversion from the north was a blanket transformation that took place above the equatorial zone. Had Islam not entered Africa from the north, it is likely that the entire continent would have been Christianized when the invading European colonizers focused their attention on what they called the "dark continent."

By the time the Ghana Empire fell around 1070 CE, a Mandingo warrior named Soundiata Keita had already occupied himself with defeating Souman Kourou Kanté, King of the Soso entity to the southwest. From 1230 until his death in 1255 CE, Soundiata expanded the Maliam Empire ensuring that the Islamization of the new Malian Kingdom was completed by the end of the thirteenth century. Soundiata's son and successor, Mansa Uli, established the *Hajj* to Mecca as a permanent institution among the Mansas: i.e., Mandinka "kings of kings" particularly associated with the Keita Dynasty of the Mali Empire, which dominated West Africa from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century. The powers of the Mansas included the right to dispense justice and monopolize trade, particularly gold.

Among the memorable occasions in early African Islam is the *Hajj* of Emperor Mansa Musa who ruled Mali from 1312 to 1337 CE, followed by his brother, Mansa Sulayman (1341-1360 CE). During the nearly 45-year

reign of the two brothers, Mali became known for its many and unique mosques and was regarded as the center of Islamic scholarship in Africa. While much of early African history remained the property of Griots (oral historians) for centuries, the reign, particularly the *Hajj* of Mansa Musa, has been widely documented in written records. So great was the entourage and so vast the wealth of gold carried to Arabia by Mansa Musa, in 1324-1325 CE, that some regard African wealth as the financier of the further propagation and spread of Islam in the later centuries. Without a doubt, much of the gold transported across the desert trade routes by Mansa Musa remained in Egypt, Syria and Mecca and at all points along the way. The estimated twelve tons of gold made Mali the most well-known African kingdom, and its diverse but peaceful expansion is attributed to this factor along with the unification and political ability of its leaders.

Mansa Musa's nurturing of Islamic conversion and sponsorship of the building of mosques inaugurated Mali as a depot of Muslim scholars, facilitating a religious Imamate that was a necessary and important link in the global Islamic tradition. The city of Timbuktu, claiming a unique heritage of diverse traders, languages and mobility, eventually claimed itself heir to the African division of the Islamic Caliphate. It was common for traders and travelers to settle there for months to several years before moving on. The sedentary families of Mali, particularly in Timbuktu, possess generations of history about this transitory land, having remained inheritors of its cities for centuries unchanged.

Mali's present day capital, Bamako, became the second West African island of traditional Islamic belief and practice. Like other major Islamic communities from the Atlantic to the Niger River and Lake Chad, the political class in Bamako was slowly replaced by the Islamic *ulamaa*.

By the time Sonni Ali became the ruler of Mali in 1493, the transatlantic slave trade was already underway. Although slavery existed in some parts of Africa before the Europeans invaded the continent, the division into war slaves or home slaves did not imply economic significance. The system was also not entirely exploitative but was a common utilization of war captives and the indebted, and did not generally replace the labor of free men. In fact, some of the slaves married into their owners' families and some became important figures in society, including being rulers.

The history of Islam in Africa would be incomplete without at least a brief discussion of the religion's arrival and impact in South Africa. The Cape of Good Hope being a refreshment station for the Dutch East Indian Company and a place to send exiled and dethroned rulers from the Netherlands' eastern provinces became home for many exiled Muslims. Among the first Muslims exiled to South Africa was Sheikh Yusuf of Muscassar (Indonesia) who arrived in the second half of the eighteenth century accompanied by his family and entourage numbering forty nine people. Sheikh Yusuf's dwellings on the False Bay Coast attracted enslaved fugitives and other easterners who, in turn, helped to establish and spread Islam among the enslaved on the Cape. Thus, Sheikh Yusuf is considered to be the person who brought Islam to the Cape of Good Hope.

The earliest Cape Muslim leaders were freed convicts from Dutch colonies such as Malaysia and the Indonesian archipelago. Since historians have not documented their crimes, some contemporary observers have speculated that they could have been convicted for their resistance to colonial rule or simply because of their Islamic faith. The "freed convict" imams arrived at the Cape in several migrations throughout the eighteenth century and made up the *ulamaa* there.

Since in the eighteenth century the Dutch East Indian Company was prohibited from engaging in slave raiding in West Africa, the company had to turn to the Indian subcontinent for more than half of the formally enslaved. The Indonesian archipelago provided less than a quarter of those enslaved; Madagascar, the Mascarene Islands of the Indian Ocean and the East African Coast provided more than half of them. By 1770 mosques and *Jumu'ah* (Friday) Prayers had become permanent features on the Cape.

Realizing that the enslaved could not be sold if they converted to Christianity, the Dutch Reformed Church prohibited such conversions, leading the enslaved to turn to Islam. Slave owners were also very slow in manumitting enslaved Muslims. Those enslaved males who bought their freedom, or whose owners willingly freed them, converted to Islam. Unlike Christian slave owners who rarely freed enslaved Christians, free Muslim Blacks freed and manumitted all enslaved individuals, no matter their religions.

Enslaved Merdeka Muslims were set free to participate in the wars against the British and then the Xhosa. Many enslaved Africans intercepted

at sea by the British Navy were liberated and diverted to Cape Town, where very large numbers of them converted to Islam. Muslims on the Cape engaged in trade with other Muslims such as the Makkan *ulamaa*, some of whom intermarried with those on the Cape and settled there. The 1830s witnessed the first Cape Muslims going on *Hajjis* (pilgrimages) to Saudi Arabia via Mauritius and the Cape *ulamaa* writing religious and other books in the new Arabic-Afrikaans. They built Islamic schools and other institutions, manumitted the enslaved, ran mosques, conducted marriages and funeral services, and corresponded with colonial authorities. When the Cape Muslims complained that they had no Muslim "missionary" Queen Victoria of England sent the Kurdish scholar Sheikh Abu Bakr Effendi to the Cape in 1862.

Indentured Indians who made up between 80 and 90 percent of the second shipments to Natal comprised the second wave of immigration to the Cape. These Indians were brought there to work on the sugarcane fields and mines on the east coast of the newly colonized province of Natal. They were augmented with indentured servants from Zanzibar and Pemba islands.

Indications of the development of Muslim thought in early twentieth century South African society can be found in the correspondence between Al-Hajj Mustafa Al-Transvali and the Grand Mufti of Egypt Muhammad Abduh concerning Muslims living as a minority in a non-Muslim land. In 1923 the Muslims founded the Jami'at Al-Ulamaa in Natal.

In 1990 delegates from the Muslim organizations in South Africa held a meeting to discuss their response to a post-apartheid society. The outcome was the launching of the Muslim Front that campaigned for the African National Congress (ANC) in 1994. The alternative political parties formed by some Muslims failed to win seats in the new Assembly. The ANC, however, appointed Abdullah Omar to the portfolio of justice in the government of national unity. In recent times, the government's inability to create lasting law and order has led to a revival of Islamic education for the youth and the emergence of Muslim grassroots community organizations such as People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) in Cape Town.

Islam's impact has varied considerably from one African country to another and even within a country. For instance, Islam among the Hausa in Nigeria is quite different from that among the Yoruba in the same country.

While Yoruba Islam is less politicized, that of the Hausa is the opposite. The Yoruba are more likely to explode in defense of ethnic interests than in pursuit of religious concerns. For the Hausa, both religion and ethnicity are intertwined, and may assume political significance. Periodic religious explosions have occurred involving Muslims of different denominations in the north of Nigeria, sometimes leading to the loss of many lives. The links between religion and politics among Muslims in Northern Nigeria are deeper and more durable than such links among Muslims in the south. The major reason for this situation is that historically, pre-colonial Hausa city-states often attempted to enforce the *Shariah* (Islamic Law) and fused mosque and state. Pre-colonial Yoruba kingdoms, on the other hand, were based on indigenous Yoruba customs and traditions. The precise combination and weight between indigenous loyalty and Islamic allegiance notwithstanding, the Muslim presence in Nigeria has deep roots. In fact, the number of Muslims in Nigeria (126,635,626) is greater than that of any Arab country, including Egypt (69,536,644). There have also been many occasions when Nigerians going on pilgrimage to Mecca constituted either the largest or the second largest contingent of pilgrims from any part of the Muslim world.

The new international horizons within Africa are an extension of a process initiated by Islamization in some parts of the continent. Islam introduced a new understanding of distance and space, as well as a new comprehension of time and duration. The obligation for every Muslim is to go on pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in his/her lifetime was an extended perception of distance. African Muslims were forced to think of a faraway place called Mecca as a target to reach in their own lifetime. For many centuries, African Muslims have marched overland over many months, not fleeing from pestilence or drought, not seeking new worlds to conquer, but simply to visit Mecca.

Islam also introduced its own discipline of time in societies which previously were not enslaved to time. Islam's discipline of time was revealed in the five daily prayers mandated for every Muslim. Nonetheless, this revolution in the discipline of time succeeded only in the religious domain.

In addition to religious precepts, Islam also brought to Africa several other important cultural practices. The first of these practices is literacy. While Egypt and the Nilotic kingdoms of the Kushites and the Nubians had

long traditions of writing, and the Ethiopians had acquired the tradition through their connections with the Semitic people of southern Arabia, their writing systems did not spread throughout Africa. Islam, however, being a religion of the Book, spread writing and literacy everywhere it went. Many Africans found themselves dealing with two languages: the Arabic language, which was the language of the Islamic texts, and their indigenous language. This situation eventually changed as Africans began using the Arabic alphabet to write their own languages. To this day, the Arabic script is one of the most commonly used scripts for writing African languages.

With literacy, Arab Muslims also brought educational systems and institutions to Africa. In North Africa and the Sahel, these systems and institutions ushered in a great development of African thought, science and mathematics. The city of Timbuktu, for instance, had perhaps the greatest university in the world.

Prayers in African mosques, like those in other parts of the world, are preceded not only by the muezzin calling believers to prayer but also by a sermon in Arabic. Most Muslim children have to learn the art of reading and reciting the *Qur'an*, even if they do not understand what the Arabic words mean. Many Muslim schools in Africa are referred to as *Qur'anic* schools, emphasizing the verbal mastery of the Holy Book. The hymns in the mosques in Africa are in the Arabic language and are memorized and recited.

Islam has also appeared more accommodating to the wider cultures of Africa. For example, the use of the drum is widely accepted in certain Muslim ceremonies. In addition, Islam has been less militant against female circumcision compared to Christianity, even though, by the canons of orthodox Islam, female circumcision is equally alien and un-Islamic. Yet such deeply Muslim societies as Somalia and northern Sudan practice female circumcision on a wider scale.

There are also areas of similarities between African and Islamic cultures. One widely discussed area of convergence is that of polygamy. Islam has a limit of four wives at anytime (polygyny), whereas African cultures have an open-ended policy. Normally, African Muslims have not been tempted to go beyond four wives. Nonetheless, it has been suggested by some observers that part of Islam's success in Africa is precisely because it tolerates polygamy compared with monogamy taught by Christianity. This kind of

argument fails to take into consideration the numerous other disciplines Islam imposes upon its adherents. Among these is Islam's prohibition of alcohol. Many traditional African societies used alcohol for a variety of cultural and ritual ceremonies. African Islam has not made a concession on this issue.

Terrorist Activities in Africa

Examined in this section is the first major question of this chapter: i.e., Where and what types of terrorist activities have occurred in Africa? To answer this question, it makes sense to begin with an examination of all of the acts which have taken place on the African continent that have been labeled to be terroristic. As can be seen in Table 5.2, twenty four out of the fifty five African countries have been designated as places where terrorist acts occurred between 1998 and 2007—the years for which data are available. These activities include armed attacks, assassinations, bombings, kidnappings, and unknown.

Table 5.2: Terrorist Activities in Africa

Country	Total Number of Attacks	Types of Terrorist Attacks	Total Fatalities
Algeria	220	Armed Attack, Assassination, Bombing	987
Angola	21	Armed Attack, Assassination, Bombing, Kidnapping	307
Burundi	5	Armed Attack, Bombing	10
Chad	1	Assassination	1
Dem. Rep. Congo	2	Unknown	6
Djibouti	1	Bombing	0
Egypt	38	Armed Attack, Assassination, Bombing	143
Eritrea	3	Assassination, Bombing	8
Ethiopia	27	Armed Attack, Assassination, Bombing, Kidnapping	33
Kenya	4	Bombing	226
Libya	1	Assassination	4
Madagascar	7	Armed Attack, Bombing, Kidnapping	0
Mauritania	2	Armed Attack, Assassination	2
Morocco	10	Armed Attack, Bombing	37
Nigeria	35	Armed Attack, Assassination, Bombing, Kidnapping	12
Sierra Leone	8	Kidnapping	0
Somalia	66	Armed Attack, Assassination, Bombing, Hijacking	117
South Africa	37	Assassination, Bombing	4
Sudan	6	Armed Attack, Assassination, Bombing, Kidnapping	76

Swaziland	2	Bombing	1
Tanzania	5	Bombing	11
Tunisia	1	Bombing	15
Uganda	48	Armed Attack, Arson, Assassination, Bombing, Kidnapping,	524
Zambia	1	Bombing	1

Source: Lawson Terrorism Information Center, 2009.[6]

Matching Tables 5.1 and 5.2, one can see that terrorist activities were reported to have taken place in fourteen Muslim majority and ten Christian and other religions majority African states. Given the proposition of some observers that there is a connection between Islam and terrorism, at least three plausible questions emerge here. The first question is whether there is a statistically significant difference in the number of terrorist activities that took place in majority Muslim African states compared to those that occurred in majority Christian African states. The second question is whether there is a statistically significant correlation between African countries where Islam is the majority religion and terrorist activities. The third question, which is a corollary to the second, is whether there is a statistically significant correlation between African countries where Islam is the minority religion and terrorist activities. Answers to these questions will suggest either (a) Muslims terrorize non-Muslims in African countries where they are the majority and feel powerful, or (b) Muslims terrorize non-Muslims in African countries where they are the minority and feel powerless. In order to explore these questions and propositions, paired samples T-test statistics were computed for the data in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).

As shown in Table 5.3 the paired mean for attacks in the Muslim population is -30.26, the standard deviation is 51.29, the t-Statistic is -2.89, and it is statistically significant at .05 percent. The paired mean for attacks on the Christian population is -7.48, the standard deviation is 58.22, the t-Statistic is -630, and it is not statistically significant at the .05 level. This means that overall, the larger the percentage of Muslim or Christian population, the lesser the number of terrorist attacks. There is also a significant variation in the number of attacks and the population sizes.

Table 5. 3: Paired Samples Test, Paired Differences

Pair	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	t-Statistic	Significance (2-tailed)
1: Attacks-P Muslim	-30.263	51.2906	10.4697	-2.890	.008
2:					
Attacks-P Christian	-7.488	58.2248	11.8851	-630	.525

From Table 5.4 one can observe that there is no significant statistical correlation between attacks and Muslim population or Christian population. In fact the correlation between attacks and Christian population is negative, albeit not statistically significant.

Table 5.4: Paired Samples Correlations

Pair	Correlation	Significance
1: Attacks & P Muslim	.252	.235
2: Attacks & P Christian	-.204	.339

Since neither Islam nor Christianity or any other religion seems to be a significant explanation for the terrorist activities that have taken place in Africa, what then are the reasons for these activities? This question is explored in the section that follows.

Reasons for the Terrorist Activities in Africa Characterized as "Islamic"

This section probes the second major question in this chapter: What are the reasons for the terrorist activities in Africa that have been characterized as "Islamic"? For the sake of brevity, a sample of major cases is discussed.

The United States military has embarked on a long-term push into Africa to counter what it considers growing inroads by Al Qaeda and other

terrorist networks in poor, lawless and predominantly Muslim expanses of the African continent. The Pentagon plans to train thousands of African troops in battalions equipped for extended desert and border operations and to link the militaries of the different countries with secure satellite communications. The initiative, with proposed funding of $500 million over seven years, covers Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria, Morocco and Tunisia—with the United States military eager to add Libya if relations improve.[7]

The Pentagon is also assigning more military officers to United States embassies in the region, bolstering the gathering and sharing of intelligence, casing out austere landing strips for use in emergencies, and securing greater access and legal protections for United States troops through new bilateral agreements. The Pentagon's plan is to mobilize Africans to fight and preempt militant groups while only selectively using United States troops that are already taxed by operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.[8]

Algeria

A senior French counterterrorism official, speaking off the record, told Alfred de Montesquiou, an *Associated Press* reporter, that French officials work daily and constantly with Algerian security officials to contain the terrorist threat in Algeria, and six cells of the Algerian militants' group called Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have been dismantled across Europe in recent years. Montesquiou adds that in May of 2009 the Spanish judiciary announced that it had caught twelve Algerians from a suspected support cell; Italian authorities issued arrest warrants for two Tunisians, two Moroccans and an Algerian suspected of plotting attacks on a church and a subway line; and the Pentagon's new Africa Command is also striving to prevent the Algerian group's expansion south into the Sahara desert.[9]

But the bulk of the militants' activities takes place in densely populated northern Algeria where nearly every day they traffic goods, plunder drivers at fake road blocks, kidnap, and extort money from small businessmen in exchange for safety. The Algerian government has responded by ordering 267 local bank branches to close because they were vulnerable to holdups that could fund militants. The Algerian Defense Ministry has armed local

militias to fight the militants. Algerian authorities say that the militants are on the run. They have dismantled several large cells; important local "emirs," or militant leaders, have turned themselves in; and several former high-profile leaders, known as "repentants," are calling on militants to stop fighting. Algerian authorities estimate that between 500 and 800 active fighters are left, a mere fraction of how many there used to be, as security officers have indeed killed and arrested militants in droves.[10]

According to Montesquiou, the Algerian government has ramped up its security. The capital is surrounded by rings of police and army checkpoints. The Defense and Interior ministries are by far the biggest employers in the country, with 100,000 military police, 80,000 government-funded militia members, and 150,000 police officers. These figures do not include those of the regular military branches, whose numbers are kept secret. Together, the Defense and Interior ministries spent 656 billion dinars ($9.1 billion), according to Algeria's 2008 budget. The amount represented more than a quarter of the country's functioning budget, more than those of the Education, Justice and Industry ministries put together. For now, Algeria is able to handle these costs because of its enormous oil and gas wealth; but as the global economic downturn continues, the burden is getting heavier. Meanwhile, poverty is rampant, unemployment is widespread, development falls short, and 70 percent of the population is under thirty. These conditions stoke militancy that spreads far beyond Algeria's borders, especially with the assistance of Al Qaeda.[11]

As Montesquoiu also points out, in 2005, the AQIM, then known as the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, was running out of steam. Born during the 1992 insurgency, the group participated in the near-civil war the next decade that left about 200,000 people dead. But the group's fighters had lost popular support after killing Muslim civilians. Many of its leaders had turned themselves in during government amnesties, and the group was weak from internal feuds. So its new "emir," or leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel, called upon al Qaeda for support. His emissaries met with Osama bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, or close associates of his, according to Western intelligence sources. Al Qaeda refused to give its brand away to an unreliable group. Even by Al Qaeda's militant standards, the Algerian militants had a reputation of excess violence. But after a year of talks and

tests, al-Zawahiri issued a statement recognizing AQIM on September 11, 2006.[12]

One must ponder why a group such as AQIM would emerge and function in a country like Algeria in the first place. The answer may be found in how Islamic radicalism was birthed in the country. As Wayne Edge poignantly points out, despite the spread of Islamic radicalism in many Arab nations in recent years, Algeria until recently appeared an unlikely venue for the rise of a strong radical Islamic movement. Algeria's long association with France, its lack of historic Islamic identity as a nation, and several decades of single-party socialism made such a development unlikely. The failure of successive Algerian governments to resolve several economic problems, in addition to the lack of representative political institutions nurtured within the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN), however, led to the emergence of radical Islam as a response. Radicals took an active part in the 1988 riots; and with the establishment of a multiparty system, they organized a political party—the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The party soon attracted three million members among the approximately 25 million Algerians at the time.[13]

FIS candidates won 55 percent of the urban mayoral and council seats in the 1989 local and municipal elections. The FLN barely held on to power largely in the rural areas. Fearing an FIS victory, the government postponed for six months the scheduled June 1991 elections for the enlarged 430-member National People's Assembly. An interim government was formed to oversee the transition process headed by the technocrat prime minister Sid Ahmed Ghozali.[14]

In accordance with President (former Colonel) Chadli Bendjedid's commitment to multiparty democracy, the first stage of Assembly elections occurred on December 26, 1991, with the FIS candidates winning 188 out of the 231 contested seats. But just before the second stage could be conducted, the army intervened. The leaders of the FIS were arrested, and the elections were postponed indefinitely. On January 17, 1992, well ahead of the expiration (in 1993) of his third five-year term, President Bendjedid resigned as a sacrifice in the interest of restoring stability to the nation and preserving democracy. Mohammed Boudiaf, one of the nine historic chiefs of the Revolution who had been in exile in Morocco for many years, was brought back by the military to head the Higher Council. The FIS

headquarters was shut down and the party declared illegal in a court in Algiers. The local councils and provincial assemblies formed by the FIS after its electoral victory were dissolved and replaced by "executive delegations" appointed by the Higher Council.[15]

After that, Boudiaf named a sixty-member Consultative Council to work with the various political groups to reach a consensus on reforms. The refusal of such leaders as former President Ahmed Ben Bella and Socialist Forces Front (FFS) leader Hocine Ait Ahmed to participate in the council, however, doomed the effort. Boudiaf was also suspected of using the council to build a personal power base. He was assassinated, reportedly by a member of his own presidential guard, on June 29, 1992.[16]

With Boudiaf out of the way, the Algerian generals turned to their own ranks for a new leader. In 1994, the Higher Council named General Liamine Zeroual, the real strongman of the regime, the head of state. Zeroual promised to hold presidential elections in November of 1995 as a first step toward restoring parliamentary government. He had the top leaders of the FIS, Abbas Madani and Ali Belhaj, who had been sentenced to twelve years on charges of "endangering state security," released from jail but placed under house arrest, on the assumption that in return for dialogue, they would call for a halt to the spiraling violence.[17]

Even though the dialogue proved inconclusive, Zeroual still declared that the presidential election would be conducted as scheduled. Before that, leaders of the FIS, FFS, FLN, and several smaller political parties had met in Rome, Italy, under the auspices of Sant-Egidio, a Catholic service agency, and announced a "National Contract." The Contract had called for the restoration of the political rights of the FIS in return for an end to violence, multiparty democracy, and exclusion of the military from government. The leaders also defined the Algerian "personality" in the Contract as Islamic, Arab, and Berber. The military leaders, however, rejected the Contract outright because of the FIS' participation. Nonetheless, the November 1995 presidential election was held as scheduled under massive military presence—soldiers were stationed within sixty five feet of every poling station. As expected, Zeroual won handily, garnering 61 percent of the vote.[18]

Chad

Grooming effective military leaders is as central to the United States' mission in Chad as teaching infantry tactics, United States officials say. But the job is complicated because Chad's army, like the rest of the government, is run top-down by the feared Zagawa ethnic group. Indeed, many of the United States' goals in Chad appear to conflict with the Zagawa leaders' imperative to stay in power. Like the other governments across the region with which the United States military is working, the Chadian government has embraced counterterrorism as a way to stifle legitimate dissent and Muslim groups, according to reports issued by the International Crisis Group.[19]

In March of 2004 Sgt. Mohamed Nour Abakar, twenty eight described how he served as one of America's African fighters in a battle against terrorism: "I was between the border of Chad and Libya. . . . It was about 3 p.m.," he said, when his regiment received intelligence from a United States Navy surveillance plan on the location of eighty fighters from an Algerian group affiliated with Al Qaeda. The fighters, from the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, were wanted for the kidnapping of thirty two European tourists in southern Algeria in 2003. At 6:00 p.m. about 150 Chadian soldiers first spotted the guerrillas, who were traveling in eight Toyota trucks mounted with heavy machine guns. "We found the Salafists hunting gazelle. When they saw us, they left the gazelle and began to shoot at us with machine guns," Abakar said. Just then, Abakar recalled, the guerilla commander hurled an insulting appeal: "You monkeys! We are not your enemy, we are America's enemy," he yelled. "It was our mistake to fire at you, so why are you chasing us? We are all African!" But the Chadians fought on. They pursed the guerrillas into the hills for two days, killing twenty eight of them, and capturing seven, Abakar said. The Chadians lost twenty men, and Abakar was shot in the chest. "I was about to give up and be a civilian," he said, "but I found out the Americans were coming with new training, so I joined again."[20]

Kenya

Security cooperation has long been an important aspect of Kenya-United States relations, underscored by airbase, port access, and overflight agreements since the Cold War. Despite political disagreements between the United States and the Daniel arap Moi government, the security

components of the relationship endured. Since 1998, the United States has spent nearly $3.1 million on antiterrorism assistance, including the training of more than 500 Kenyan security personnel in the United States and a donation of $1 million in airport security equipment under the "Safe Skies for Africa" program to improve aviation safety.[21]

Kenya is also a partner in the United States-sponsored Combined Joint Task-Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti that seeks to check terrorism. This program envisages the United States' training of regional militaries in counterterrorism procedures. Furthermore, as part of the multinational campaign, a special anti-terrorism squad, composed of the German Naval Air Wing, is currently based in Mombasa to monitor ships plying the Gulf of Aden and the Somali coast.[22]

In July of 2001 Nairobi police arrested eight Yemeni and thirteen Somali nationals. Similarly, police arrested more than twenty people suspected of having links with Al Qaeda in Lamu in November of 2001. Al Qaeda struck again in November of 2002 with an attack on the Paradise Hotel in Mombasa and an attempt to shoot down an Israel airliner in Mombasa. In May of 2003, the Kenyan government admitted that a key member of the Al Qaeda terror network was plotting an attack on Western targets, confirming Al Qaeda's firm local presence.[23]

The slow government response to terrorist threats since the 1998 bombing grew from a denial based on the perception of Kenya as a victim, rather than a source of international terrorism. The Kenyan government has always been afraid to alienate Kenya's minority Muslims who often complain of marginalization. There was, however, a marked shift in policy after Muslim protestors embarrassed the Moi regime by marching for Al Qaeda in the wake of September 11, 2001 attacks.[24]

The new government of President Mwai Kibaki moved to establish mechanisms to meet the growing threat. In February of 2003 the government formed an Anti-Terrorist Police Unit composed of officers trained in antiterrorism. At the same time, the cabinet authorized negotiations between the executive and legislative branches on legislation to detect and punish suspected terroristm. In June of 2003 then Foreign Minister and now Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka called on parliament to expeditiously pass an Anti-Terrorism Bill. In other measures, the ministry of finance established a Task Force on Anti-Money Laundering and

Combating the Financing of Terrorism, consisting of representatives from finance, trade, and foreign affairs ministries; the Central Bank; the police; the Criminal Investigation Department (CID); and the National Security Intelligence Services.[25]

Mali

United States counterterrorism initiatives are two-fold in Mali: (1) military assistance and (2) nonmilitary programs which provide instruction for teachers and job training for young Muslim men who are susceptible and singled out by militant recruiting campaigns. With regards to military assistance, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is spending about $9 million on counterterrorism programs in Mali. The goal of the USAID program is to act quickly in that country before terrorism becomes as entrenched as it is in Somalia. Mali has been willing and able to permit dozens of American and European military trainers to conduct exercises there, and its leaders are plainly worried about militants who have taken refuge in its vast Saharan north.[26]

In nonmilitary action, the USAID is building twelve FM radio stations in the north to link far-flung villages to an early-warning network that sends bulletins on bandits and other threats. In addition, the Pentagon will produce radio soap operas in four national languages that will promote peace and tolerance. The USAID has noted that the biggest potential threat comes from as many as 200 fighters from an offshoot of Al Qaeda called Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which uses the northern Malian desert as a staging area and support base.[27]

Mali has not experienced any terrorist attacks. Members of the Al Qaeda affiliate have not attacked Malian forces, and American and Malian officials privately acknowledge that military officials here have adopted a live-and-let-live approach to the Al Qaeda threat, focusing instead on rebellious Tuareg tribesmen, who also live in the sparsely populated north. With only 10,000 military and other security forces, and just two working helicopters and a few airplanes, Mali acknowledges how daunting a task it is to try to drive out militants from its territory.[28]

Nigeria

In the early 1980s a fundamentalist Islamic sect, the Maitatsine, was active in northeastern Nigeria, influencing neighboring Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Today, Islamist customs are applied in Northern Nigeria, with twelve of its thirty six states officially adopting Sharia Law as their legal practice. What is different about the rise of Islam in Nigeria than in other countries in Africa or the Middle East is that it all happened in a rather unusual period of "democracy" perhaps better described as chaotic, free-for all politics. Since the collapse of the latest military junta in 1999, Nigeria has a weak but elected government.[29]

Religion in Nigeria plays a big factor in its demographics. Nigeria has 50 percent Muslims, 40 percent Christians, and 10 percent indigenous religious adherents (see Table 5.1). Nigeria's Christianity-Islam division largely parallels its major ethnic cleavages: Muslims, who until recently dominated the Nigerian military, make up a far more significant percentage of the population in the northern parts of the country, as opposed to a mostly Christian population in the south.[30]

To make things worse, Nigeria's major source of revenue comprises oil and gas which provide 20 percent of its GDP, 95 percent of its foreign exchange earning, and about 65 percent of its budgetary revenues, and is all concentrated in the southeast, the mostly Igbo and Ijaw non-Muslim areas of the country. Due to the way the newest Nigerian Constitution (1999) is written, local governors have had a free hand to manipulate religion.[31]

In 2004 when a unit of GSPC (Jamiyy'a Salafiyya li'l-Daw'a wa-1 Jihad, a Salafist Group), the main radical Algerian Islamist group, led by Amari Saifi, aka Abderezzak el Para, was decimated or captured in Chad, it turned out that a larger part of its members were Nigerians. This is no surprise, for in addition to the irresponsible political ambitions of northern state governors, Islamic fundamentalism is encouraged there by Wahabbi-trained Imams. As a result, the old and respected Islamic-tradition cities of Kano and Sokoto increasingly serve as secondary recruiting and indoctrination centers for unemployed and unemployable youths from throughout the Sahel. Sahel is a huge breeding ground for terrorism, since this area on the margins of the Sahara extends from Mauritania on the Atlantic to Darfur in Western Sudan, and includes Mali, Niger and Chad. Compounding this Islamist expansion is the further problem that in Darfur

these Nigerian influences meet those of Khartoum, sub-Saharan Africa's main Islamist center.[32]

The most immediate threat posed by the rise of Islam in Northern Nigeria is to the unity and very existence of Nigeria itself. Clashes between the dominant Muslims and the minority Christians in the North have occurred for a long time, and the introduction of sharia has not helped matters. Recently, Christians have begun to answer in kind, especially in the central state of Plateau. There, some 1,000 people, mostly Muslims, were killed in September of 2001, and hundreds more in April and May of 2004. In response, Christians were slaughtered in Kano, while the central government declared a state of emergency in Plateau and appointed a retired general as governor.[33]

While these clashes are routinely described by the Western media as "sectarian," they are far more than that: they are religiously tinged clashes of ethnic identities over increasingly scare resources: land and oil money. The Hausa and Fulani think they have the numbers, but little else, not even food; the mostly Christian Yorubas and Christian Igbos have the skills and the oil.[34]

Somalia

In their March 14, 2007, article, "U.S. Allies in Africa May Have Engaged in Secret Prisoner Renditions," that appears in the McClatchy Newspapers, Shashank Bengali and Jonathan Landay recount how a network of United States allies in east Africa secretly transferred to prisons in Somalia and Ethiopia as many as 150 people who were captured in Kenya while fleeing the war in Somalia. Kenyan authorities made the arrests as part of a United States-backed, four-nation military campaign in December of 2006 and January of 2007 against Somalia's Islamist militias, which the George W. Bush administration officials had linked to Al Qaeda.[35] This claim was problematic because, according to *The Economist*, "America can be more heavily criticized for subordinating Somali interests to its own desire to catch a handful of al Qaeda men who may (or may not) have been hiding in Mogadishu. . . . None has been caught, many innocents have died in air strikes, and anti-American feeling has deepened. Western, especially

European, diplomats watching Somalia from Nairobi, the capital of Kenya to the south, have sounded the alarm. The governments have done little."[36]

The people arrested in Kenya, who included men and women of seventeen nationalities and children as young as seven months, were held in that country for several weeks before most of them were transferred covertly to Somalia and Ethiopia, where they have been held incommunicado. The transfers, which were carried out in the middle of the night and made public only after a court order in Kenya, violated international law. The program was driven by the United States, which has built a close relationship with Kenya and Ethiopia in the "War on Terrorism." At least one of the transferees is an American citizen identified on a flight manifest as Amir Mohamed Meshar. He was flown from Nairobi, Kenya's capital, to Baidoa, the seat of Somalia's transitional government, on February 10, 2007. His whereabouts and those of twelve other detainees aboard the chartered flight are unknown. American officials in Kenya declined to comment on the allegations that they were involved in the detentions and renditions. State Department officials in Washington had no immediate comment. Representatives of Islamic groups who had visited detainees in late January in their jail cells in Nairobi said they had spotted United States diplomatic vehicles outside the holding facilities. They also said that some detainees had reported being questioned by United States law enforcement agents. The Bush administration came under fire for the practice of extraordinary renditions: the transfer of detainees without court proceedings to foreign countries where they can be interrogated, often in secret, and sometimes subjected to torture. The allegations marked the first time that such renditions have been suspected in East Africa, where American-friendly regimes often treated prisoners in a very brutal manner.[37]

The December 2006 military intervention in Somalia was a well-orchestrated campaign involving four countries: Somalia's transitional government; Ethiopia (a country headed by one of Africa's worst dictators, Meles Zenawi, but was even permitted by the Bush administration to buy weapons from North Korea), whose ground forces drove the Islamists from power; Kenya, which sent troops to seal the border with Somalia and prevent fighters from escaping; and the United States, which gave the green light to the invasion, provided intelligence and training support to the Ethiopians and conducted surveillance of Somalia that apparently was used

to track the Islamists' escape. The United States also launched two air strikes on suspected terrorist targets (that turned out to be innocent herdsmen) in January. The campaign netted no Al Qaeda figures. Consequently, the allies conspired to illegally hold prisoners, many of whom were described by family members as teachers or small-business owners who went to Somalia in search of jobs. Details of the detention program, which received very little coverage in the Kenyan and international media, emerged only after a Nairobi-based consortium of community groups, the Muslim Human Rights Forum, challenged Kenyan authorities in court.[38]

After the Ethiopian invasion in late December of 2006, Kenyan security forces arrested at least 150 people on both sides of the Kenya-Somalia border, including 17 women and 12 children. The detainees included citizens of Somalia, Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, and Ethiopia. Kenyan police refused to permit Muslim leaders to visit the prisoners, among them a woman who had a bullet lodged in her back but was denied medical treatment and another who was nine months pregnant. The police shuffled the prisoners among several facilities in the Nairobi area to keep them out of sight. Under a judge's order, authorities produced flight manifests that showed that at least eighty detainees had been transferred to Somalia on three chartered flights: January 20th and 27th and February 10th. The manifest appeared to have been filled out hastily, with spaces for such details as the departure and arrival airports left blank. What has happened to the detainees since then remains unclear. One detainee telephoned the Muslim rights group in March of 2007 from Ethiopia to report that he and several other detainees had been transferred to a prison on the outskirts of Addis Ababa. The telephone line went dead before he could say more. Dozens of detainees are thought to be in a holding facility near the bullet-pocked airport in Mogadishu where a mounting insurgency threatened the fragile government's grip on power. Another forty five to sixty detainees, members of Ethiopia's Ogaden and Oromo rebel groups who allegedly fought alongside Somalia's Islamists, were flown directly to Ethiopia. At least nineteen people were set free in Kenya, and some British and United States detainees were deported to their home countries.[39]

Meanwhile, the United States worked very hard to raise troops from nearby allied states to take over the job in Somalia. Promises were made but, with one exception, remain unfulfilled. In a telephone conversation,

Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni promised President George W. Bush to provide between 1,000 and 2,000 troops to protect Somalia's transitional government and train its troops. The Ugandan troops arrived but were largely confined to their quarters and refraining from taking part in the effort to crush the opposition while the forces of the transitional government and Ethiopia shelled civilian areas in Mogadishu from the government compound they are supposedly guarding.[40]

Many observers around the world have asserted that the Bush administration's grand strategy in its "war on terrorism" in Africa was more about the continent's strategic natural resources and China's growing presence in Africa than it is about fighting terrorists. For example, as Pajibo and Woods, among many others, assert, the military-driven United States engagement with Africa was a reflection of the desperation of the Bush administration in its efforts to control the increasingly strategic resources in Africa, especially oil, gas and uranium. In what has become a multi-polar world with increased competition from China, among other countries, for those resources, the United States wants above all else to strengthen its foothold in this resource-rich region of Africa. Pajibo and Woods point out that Nigeria is the largest exporter of oil to the United States, and the West African region currently provides nearly 20 percent of the United States supply of hydrocarbons, up from 15 percent just six years ago and well on the way to a 25-percent share forecast for 2015. A new African Command, based potentially in or near oil-rich West Africa, would consolidate existing American military operations (U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, Pacific Command, and Indian Ocean Command) and bring core avenues of international engagement from development (United States Agency for International Development—USAID) and diplomacy (State Department) even more in line with United States military objectives.[41]

Even the United States bombing of Somalia has been explained as a hidden war for Somali oil. According to Bloice, on file are plans (which have been put on hold due to the continuing conflict) that allocate two-thirds of Somalia's oil fields to American oil companies Conoco, Amoco, Chevron and Phillips. He adds that the then United States-backed prime minister of Somalia, Ali Mohamed Gedi, proposed the enactment of a new oil law to encourage the return of foreign oil companies to the country.[42]

In a July 14, 2007, article titled "China Wins Permit to Look for Oil in Somalia" in *The Financial Times*, Barney Jopson reports that the Chinese state oil giant, CNOOC, won permission to search for oil in Somalia, a sign of China's willingness to brave Africa's most volatile regions in its search for natural resources. CNOOC and Somalia's transitional government officials hammered out the deal in a Nairobi hotel in September of 2006. The agreement would give the Chinese company exploration rights in the north Mudug region, some 500 kilometers northeast of Mogadishu. CNOOC and a smaller group, China International Oil and Gas (CIOG), had also signed a production-sharing contract with the transitional government in May of 2006 that would give the government 51 percent of oil revenues and was endorsed at a November China-Africa summit in Beijing. At a meeting in Nairobi on June 24, parts of the agreement were clarified by Abdullahi Yusuf Mohamad, the Somali energy minister, Chen Zhuobiao, managing director of CNOOC Africa, and Judah Jay, managing director of CIOG. Meanwhile, the United States Energy Information Administration insisted that Somalia had no proven oil reserves and only 200bn cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves, which have not been tapped.[43]

But after Gedi returned to Somalia from a quick trip to the United States in August of 2007, he denied that Somali officials had sold oil rights to the Chinese. He promised that the transitional government will not begin searching for oil until after parliament adopts a new petroleum law and the shattered country achieves peace.[44] Nonetheless, as Nick Wadhams reports on Voice of America News on August 8, 2007, Somali officials are looking to carve up oil rights. He adds that oil experts say the previous estimates about Somalia's small oil reserves are based on outdated technology and that Somali officials have quietly been laying the groundwork for a potential oil boom. The priority that officials are putting on oil, despite Somalia's turbulence, according to Wadhams, is another sign that many African leaders are looking to oil to jumpstart their economies.[45]

Discouraging Terrorist Activities in Africa

Addressed here is this chapter's third major research question: What can be done to discourage terrorist activities in Africa? There is no question that

when a country, especially a superpower for that matter, feels threatened, it will find ways to respond to that threat wherever it believes the threat may emanate. And as Shehu Sani, the president of the Kaduna-based Civil Rights Congress, points out, the parlous state of African economies, the poverty of its people and the desperation of many governments in Africa make survival the first commandment of life. The majority of the world's poorest nations are in Africa. Hunger, disease and chronic illiteracy are a way of life in many of those countries, where a dollar a day will be a privilege. These nations are laden with foreign debts in the billions of dollars, while their citizens battle with perennial droughts. But these countries are endowed with large deposits of natural resources and/or vast uninhabited territories that are conducive for military activities. And since they cannot export cars, like Japan, or computer chips, like the United States, or electronics, like South Korea, or missile technology, like North Korea, their natural resources and territories become simply market commodities.[46]

Saddam Hussein, we now know, did not seek to buy uranium from Niger; but had he wanted to do so, he could have obtained it from any one of several nations. Life is so harsh for the people at the southern edge of the Sahara that exporting any commodity that would provide hard cash—for health care, education, decent roads and shelter—would be difficult to resist.[47]

If the United States and other Western countries want to prevent "rogue" actors from getting their hands on Africa's uranium or prevent terrorist groups from setting up training camps in Africa, then they should make a serious commitment to help those poor nations. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West committed billions of dollars to help Russia secure its nuclear weapons to prevent them from falling into the hands of hostile states or individuals. If the West judged it strategically important to help Russia in this way, why not help African countries out of poverty to prevent them from resorting to selling their uranium to "rogue" actors or allowing their territories to be utilized by terrorist groups? Helping Africa to help itself would be good for the security of the West. The West should not wait until Africa feels that it has to no choice but to use its mineral resources and territories for saber-rattling and bargaining.

Furthermore, AFRICOM should be scrapped because it is not a prudent way for Africans to help fight terrorism. The initiative will simply end up hurting Africa and generate more anti-Western feelings on the continent. As Salim Lone, former spokesman for the United States mission in Iraq and now columnist with the *Daily Nation* in Nairobi, Kenya, poignantly argues, AFRICOM reflects America's primary reliance on the use of force to pursue its strategic interests. He adds that among the key goals for the new command is the assurance of oil imports from Africa, which have assumed much greater importance in light of the hostility the United States faces in the Middle East. AFRICOM will militarize relations between Africa and the United States and militarize numerous African nations. It will also tilt these countries' policies toward the use of force, inflame Muslim passions and create more angry militants opposed to a United States military presence in their countries or regions. The command's establishment will also provide the United States with new bases from which to project its force into oil-providing Middle Eastern countries.[48]

Lone also mentions that the misguided reliance on force is shown by the disastrous results of the United States forcibly toppling the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia, with the muscle of the Ethiopian military. In a smaller-scale reprise of the Iraq catastrophe, the military victory in January of 2007 was swift, but the plan to strengthen a client regime quickly went awry and a fierce insurgency continues. The relative peace the ICU had brought to Somalia has been shattered, and the arrival of the African Union force mandated by the United Nations Security Council has further exacerbated and internationalized the crisis. In the case of Iraq, both the United Nations and the region resisted sanctioning a multinational occupying force, but it is much easier for the United States to get its way in Africa, a continent that is too weak to resist such a powerful country. The Somalia war also made Kenya a major ally in America's "war on terrorism" after it pressured Nairobi to allow its territory to be used by American forces, and also because it handed over genuine refugees and suspected ICU supporters and fighters to Somalia, where they faced torture and death. The kidnapping of British citizens in Ethiopia might have been a consequence of the exacerbated pressures that confront Meles Zenawi, who is already beset by revolts against his ruthless repression of minorities.[49]

Also, Michele Ruiters, a senior researcher at the Institute for Global Dialogue, makes one of the best arguments against AFRICOM when she

states that the ideals of the initiative to bring peace and security to the people of Africa, and promote common goals of development, health, education, democracy and economic growth are commendable, but they are unilateral in their origin and their attachment to a military base or institutional framework leaves much to be desired. She adds that more importantly, as a result of military activity, whether it is foreign or local, a militarized community emerges. Military bases in Asia and South America have produced a culture and economy that are focused on servicing and serving the base. Local women and men become militarized as they seek ways and means to survive and thrive in the presence of the military base.[50]

Ruiters further reminds us that militarization is not only about protecting interests and resources, but also about the militarization of society that will give birth to a particular type of social relations, which entrench unequal relations between women and men. The military and its business are hypermasculine and based on power-wielding institutions that support the military apparatus. The increased poverty and patriarchal cultural practices continue to disadvantage especially women in all spheres of their daily lives, as both women's and men's lives are structured to support the military institution in particular ways that worsen these differences. The result is a political culture that resorts to conflict resolution through military means, where masculinity in the military is favored, and where women become vulnerable as a result of the increased presence of militaristic ideals and practices. Moreover, military bases bring unsustainable economic development to the area in which they are established. In countries where unemployment is rife and where most of the unemployed are women, sex work becomes a necessity when women and men need to feed their families. The consequence is women and men becoming more vulnerable and dependent on a patriarchal system for their daily subsistence.[51]

Given these realities, the West will be better served by providing assistance to the African Union and the Peace and Security Council that were established to entrench democracy, create economic development, and monitor and secure peace but have not been allowed to develop and mature enough to deal with the continent's problems. The last thing Africa needs is AFRICOM, a military initiative that will force Africa to engage with American interests on military terms.

Conclusion

The first decade of the new century is witnessing a continuation of the complex and profound changes in the international arena and the further advance of globalization. Development and peace remain the paramount issues of our times. On the one hand, promoting development, safeguarding peace and enhancing cooperation, which are common desires of all peoples, remain imperative. On the other hand, destabilizing factors and uncertainties in the global arena are increasing. Security issues of various kinds are interwoven. Development remains more pressing and peace more illusive.

Africa, which encompasses the largest number of developing countries, is an important force for global development and peace. Relations between Africa and the West face fresh opportunities under new circumstances. The two entities must therefore pursue objectives for vibrant and lasting relations and the measures to achieve them.

Africa, the home of humans, has a long history, abundant natural resources and huge potential for development. After many years of struggle, Africans freed themselves from slavery and colonial rule, wiped out apartheid, won independence and emancipation, thereby making a significant contribution to the progress of humanity. Africa still faces many challenges on its way toward development. With the persistent efforts of African states and the continuous support of the West and the rest of the international community, Africa will surely overcome the difficulties and achieve rejuvenation in this new century.

Thus, in pursuing its “war on terrorism,” the United States must rethink its policy within the framework of an equitable partnership with Africa. At the core, the United States with its Western allies must be cognizant of the fact that African states also have national interests. So, the appropriate approach would be for the Western and African states to work together within a framework of an equitable partnership and find ways in which their respective interests can be harmonized for the benefit of the people. Once this mind-set is established, it will then provide the crucible in which relations between Africa and the West will henceforth be conducted.

Africa must also realize that it exists in a world in which political and economic strength counts, where might is right, and not one which simply

operates on morality. For Africa to be heard and make a positive impact, it must seriously consider the conditions or structures that can sustain economic and political growth. This means that it must be stable and secure. The challenge to the various governments and peoples of Africa is to build an Africa that is noticed for its strengths and not for its misery and weakness. This calls for an Africa that is economically integrated, financially stable, and politically united.

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Chapter 6

Understanding Terrorism in Africa

John Davis

Introduction

Discourse on the subject of terrorism in Africa continues to accelerate. There are a host of disparate perspectives that indicate a burgeoning cottage industry. With respect to approach scholars have examined a number of dissimilar venues. A few examples are instructive. There is increasing interest in "Islamic Militancy in East Africa."[1] Still others are concerned about the dangers associated with "Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb."[2] Other scholars see terrorism in the region as "the next great game."[3] Then there are the concerns expressed by states in the region (as well as those outside the region, particularly the United States) about the continuing presence and expansion of foreign fighters that have established safe havens in Africa.[4] Finally, a host of scholars have examined the counterterrorist efforts that have been implemented by states to confront the threat of terrorism in Africa.[5]

There are two particular approaches that are of great interest to this chapter. In the first example, Jakkie Cilliers observes "Africa may come to play a central role in international terrorism. The motivation, means and targets all exist and these opportunities will not go unheeded for much longer."[6] In the second example, Andre Le Sage pointedly argues that his research conclusions "demonstrate that the US Government's system of lists [list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations in Africa (FTO), the Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL), and the list of entities and individuals annexed to Executive Order 13224]"[7] does not adequately describe the terrorist threat in Africa.

Having examined the works of Cilliers and Le Sage an obvious conclusion may be reached: the findings of both significantly add to the body of knowledge on terrorism in Africa. That said there are gaps in the research. Those gaps are the subject of this chapter. In the case of Cilliers he is correct in the explication that "Africa will play a central role in international terrorism." The information in the chapter not only validates this statement but it will address the dilemmas posed by the presence of sub-national and transnational terrorist groups and how they threaten stability across the continent. Similarly, this chapter addresses how counterterrorist responses, though inevitable, may further retard African governance capacities. Second, Le Sage too is correct that the U.S. system of "terrorist lists" does not adequately address the terrorist threat in Africa. The problem with Le Sage's conclusion is that he provides a sense of the "real terrorist threat" in the region but there are threats that are not entirely or sufficiently addressed.

This chapter addresses several queries on the subject of terrorism in Africa. Those queries include the following: To what extent have sub-national or domestic terrorist groups and transnational terrorist entities impacted the course of terrorism in Africa? Second, what are the areas within the region where the threat or specter of terrorism is likely to cause the greatest unrest? Finally, what are the prospects of al Qaeda establishing a new more robust presence in the region through a host affiliates, whether in the form of Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda in East Africa (EEAQ), or Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM)?

Sub-National Terrorism in Africa

In the current debates about terrorism far too many scholars incessantly argue that terrorism is a recent phenomenon in Africa. Quite the contrary. Terrorism in Africa existed during the polarizing Cold War and the chaotic post-Cold War period. A question begs: Why is there so much intense hyperbolic discourse about terrorism in Africa? The current discourse on terror in the region is based on the ever-evolving threat of transnational terrorism. At the heart of the transnational threat concerns the role played by al Qaeda. The Osama bin Laden-led network views two regions as the center of gravity: East and North Africa. To further understand the

transnational threat to stability in Africa it is essential to provide a brief analysis of the sub-national or domestic terrorist threat in the region.

In placing the subject of terrorism in Africa in its appropriate context Cilliers made this profound comment: "Although most contemporary writing on the subject focuses on the international dimensions or manifestations of terrorism, sub-national terror and even state terror has been a long standing feature of Africa. In fact, by any objective standard, Africa is the continent most afflicted by terrorism albeit not yet by international terrorism."[8]

Thus in the sub-national context terrorism in Africa is by no means new. Rather terrorism is a by-product of "decolonization" and it is therefore "more intimately linked to the failure to effect sustained development and to consolidate accountable and effective governance." The view is supplemented by historical evidence:

> It is reflected in the public mind by the activities of the Mai Mai in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda, the activities of warlords in Somalia, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Peace, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in Algeria, or the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone. These were all movements that relied heavily, but not exclusively, on the use of extreme violence against innocent civilians in pursuit of their objectives. As a result, some analysts would classify them as essentially terrorist organizations since they have employed terror as a systematic and widespread strategy. To a lesser or greater degree, the roots of their violent campaign originate deep in inequality, identity issues, poverty and marginalization from the political centre. No balanced account, for example, would oppose the view that the LRA benefits greatly from the exclusion of the northern Acholi tribe from profiting from Kampala's largesse or that the origins of the Mai Mai can largely be found in the beleaguered Kasai population's requirements for self-defense and protection.[9]

During the post-Cold War period terrorist attacks increased exponentially in Africa and there were a host of "spectacular attacks" that captured the world's attention. On the amplification of attacks Charles Goredema and Anneli Botha argue "Africa recorded 6,177 casualties from 296 acts of terrorism between 1990 and 2002, making it the continent with the second most casualties in the world, after Asia. There has been a marked increase in the number of attacks and their intensity (reflected in the number of casualties) since 1998."[10]

In the post-Cold War period a host of "permissive indicators" increased the specter of terrorism in the region. These permissive indicators include

but are limited to physical safe havens, porous borders, poverty, and ethnic terrorism.

Physical safe havens (often referred to as "ungoverned spaces") represent an issue of concern to states in the region and to states outside the area. Physical safe havens developed in part due to the local government's inability to control areas within their borders; these areas invariably fall under the control of terrorists who in turn use the territory to operate and plan attacks. Within Africa physical safe havens come in four primary forms: "dense urban areas (particularly "slums"), rural desert areas, maritime zones, and sections of "weak" or "failing" states that fall outside governments' control."[11]

Physical safe havens are particularly unsettling when one considers the case of Sudan under the leadership of President Omar Bashir and the National Islamic Front (NIF). Sudan's NIF played host to a plethora of terrorist groups to include but not limited to the Abu Nidal Organization, Algerian Islamic Jihad, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Eritrean Islamic Jihad Front, Hamas, Hezbollah, The Lords Resistance Army (LRA), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), to name a few. Equally troubling Sudan also became the initial post-Pakistan/Afghanistan haven for Al Qaeda and their leader Osama bin Laden. The Sudanese safe haven increased instability in parts of East and North Africa, and not to mention the Middle East. This instability came in a number of forms. In the case of the United States the Clinton administration led a United Nations effort that implemented a host of draconian sanctions aimed at destroying the safe haven and ending Sudan's state sponsorship of terrorism. Second, after considerable pressure from the U.S. and Saudi governments, the Bashir government ended the al Qaeda safe haven. While the bulk of the al Qaeda network returned to Afghanistan, a number of middle and lower level foot soldiers went underground in a host of East African countries. In time many of these al Qaeda members went operational and planned simultaneous attacks that destroyed the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August of 1998. In response to the attack the Clinton administration commenced their brief and unsuccessful "war on terror." The controversial cruise missile attack targeting the Al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan (the second attack involved a multi-cruise missile strike that missed senior al Qaeda members operating in the mountains of

Afghanistan) proved disastrous and quickly undermined the credibility of President Clinton. For Sudan the U.S. military attack offered a period of nationalistic fervor which overshadowed their role in terrorism.[12]

At another level porous borders remain a critical problem. Many scholars assert the issue of porous borders has always been problematic in the region, particularly as a result of weak governments that were unable to exercise authority throughout the state. In the post Cold War epoch the threat to the region became more pronounced insofar as the issue of terrorism threatened not only individual states but dissimilar regions within Africa.

> Sudan has long porous borders with both Ethiopia and Eritrea. At different periods in recent decades all three countries have supported dissident movements in one or both neighboring countries. Some of these dissident movements, particularly Eritrean Islamic Jihad that operated out of Sudan, used terrorism as a weapon. The Eastern Congo combines ungoverned territory with porous borders; the result is dissident groups that engage in domestic terrorist acts. The Sahel countries, especially Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad, all have porous and ungoverned borders with neighboring Algeria and Libya and among themselves. Heightened activity by Salafist groups and occasional acts of terrorism has recently been a feature in all four of these Sahel countries. Commonly referred to by the U.S. military as the new front in the war on terrorism, the International Crisis Group concedes that the situation in the Sahel countries justifies caution and greater Western involvement. It adds, however, that the Sahel is not a hotbed of terrorist activity. Northern Nigeria, the Swahili coast in East Africa, and the Comoro Islands are additional areas with weak governance and/or porous borders where extremism and terrorism have become a serious concern.[13]

In many states in the region domestic (and transnational) terrorist organizations view poverty as both a source of potential recruitment and a means to further undermine government legitimacy and promote instability. In the aftermath of September 2001 the Bush administration immediately recognized Africa as a future battleground. In recognition of the threat to the region the *2002 US National Security Strategy* observed "that weak states . . . can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders."[14] There are those scholars who continue to argue that there is no causal link between poverty and terrorism,[15] but among leaders of governments in Africa and select scholars the issue is by no means settled.

For obvious reasons African leaders recognized the link between poverty and terrorism. In a salient example the President of Tanzania Benjamin Mkapa remarked "It is futile, if not foolhardy to think there is no link between poverty and terrorism."[16] Greg Mills provides a more distinctive analysis arguing "the relationship between poverty and terrorism is not as clear as African leaders might prefer. Poverty alone does not foster terrorist movements, and extraordinary poverty is something with which Africans have long managed to cope. Rather, a sense of growing frustration with the lack of opportunity is inevitable on a continent that has failed to keep pace with global economic growth, even compared to other areas of the developing world."[17]

As the post-Cold War era unfolded several additional indicators of domestic terrorism took shape. With the U.S. and Soviet rivalry and proxy wars over in Africa a host of ethno-political conflicts took hold. These conflicts were often marked by ethnic-inspired terrorism. Daniel Byman was the scholar to draw attention to the problem of ethnic terrorism. According to Byman

> Ethnic terrorism differs considerably from violence committed for ideological, religious, or financial motives. Like other terrorists, ethnic terrorists attempt to influence rival groups and hostile governments. But unlike other terrorists, ethnic terrorists focus on forging a distinct ethnic identity and fostering ethnic mobilization. In contrast to an identity proposed by the state, ethnic terrorists strive for communal identity. They seek this identity through terrorist activities, which have a twofold effect. First, terrorism creates communal bonds that result from the retaliation of government or rival communities; secondly, the inevitable persecution that follows draws attention to their cause among the larger population, increasing their numbers and financial support. Yet another goal of many ethnic terrorists is to create a climate of fear among a rival group's population.[18]

Examples of ethnic terrorism predominate across the continent. Some of the more notable examples of ethnic terrorism include clan/sub-clan violence in Somalia that developed after the collapse of the regime of Siade Barre; the horrendous killings perpetrated by the *Interhamwe* in Rwanda that resulted in the death of nearly 1 million Tutsi, the recent ethnic-inspired violence in Kenya in the wake of the 2007 Presidential Election,[19] and the ongoing ethnic tumult in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, are just a few examples.

There is another important consequence of ethnic terrorism in Africa that receives too little attention: the fact that it "undermines the core

African pursuits of democratization and development."[20] On this point Le Sage makes the following statement: "In the aftermath of an attack, African governments are forced to undertake aggressive security efforts that often exacerbate preexisting national, regional, ethnic, religious, and class cleavages. The resulting increase in local political tensions serves to forestall continued democratic reform and may in fact lead to the resumption of dictatorial or authoritarian governance. Similarly, terrorism exacerbates the difficulties of economic development. Attacks or even the threat of attacks discourage trade, investment, and tourism; destroy national infrastructure; deplete national income; and displace African communities."[21]

Finally, throughout the Cold War and post Cold War periods amazingly the violence associated with terror in the region has been overshadowed by a host of factors endemic to the region and by factors outside the region. Within the region the assorted coups, the civil wars, starvation in Somalia (made worse by the clan and sub-clan violence), the genocide in Rwanda, the emergence of HIV/AIDS, the litany of problems that befell a host of weak and failed states, and not to mention the transnational criminal enterprises, collectively all garnered more attention and have overshadowed the threat of domestic terrorism.

In all of the aforementioned regional problems African states, more often than not, recognized the need to prioritize resources to confront the aforementioned challenges, and when African states lacked resources they turned to the international community for assistance or intervention (examples include Somalia, the Congo or confronting the HIV/AIDS pandemic).

Oddly irrespective of the plethora of issues that impacted African states the threat of domestic terrorism existed, but in just about every case the problem of terrorism was eclipsed by issues that simply resulted in more deaths. Similarly, in just about every country in the region that was impacted by any of the aforesaid stated issues domestic terrorism was and still is a part of the problem. Yet, the African Union, the United Nations, the United States, or the European Union all but omitted dealing with this essential piece of the puzzle.

This seems peculiar when one considers that across Africa many governments employ terror and intimidation as a means to disrupt and to

suppress anti-government forces that are deemed threatening to the ruling regime. From another perspective a host of states in Africa have to contend with the threat of terrorism. This is true in the case of Algeria, DRC, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Morocco, Somalia, and many other countries in the region. The threat of domestic terrorism is real in Africa. In the end sub-national terrorism never acquired international attention for several reasons: terrorist attacks in Africa were infrequent and the death toll associated with the terrorist violence was too small to attract international attention.

Transnational Terrorism in Africa

The issue of transnational terrorism has long been associated with the Middle East, Europe, and parts of Asia. Transnational terrorism in Africa is slowly receiving scholarly attention. Before addressing transnational terrorism in Africa it is important to define the concept.

Terrorism is said to be transnational if the "nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, its victims, and its ramifications [are] beyond national boundaries. Most important of all, transnational terrorism is not directly linked to or instigated by a state, but thrives in the absence of effective state control over those territories where it may operate from. The best-known example is, of course, al Qaeda."[22]

There is a growing scholarly debate about the significance and impact of transnational acts. Transnational acts impact both the interests and the citizenry of a country that are not directly associated with the conflict. To be certain transnational acts "can occur anywhere, both in the country where the conflict is occurring or elsewhere. Thus, for example, if the United States or the West is a target, then its citizens may be attacked in countries where the attackers are fighting the state, such as by Jihad in Egypt, or Moro separatists (Abu Sayyaf) in the Philippines."[23] This definition is critical to understanding the spillover that occurs as a result of transnational terrorism.

In Africa there are a host of perspectives about the increasing threat posed by transnational terrorism. In particular states that are experiencing state failure are more predisposed to transnational terrorist attacks "and disproportionately contribute to transnational terrorism that targets other

countries."[24] A host of states in the region are confronted by or have been associated with transnational terrorism. Among the more prolific are Somalia and Sudan. These states are major safe havens for terrorist organizations (a point to be discussed later) and therefore a point of origin for terrorist attacks.

The debates about transnational terrorism in Africa continue to evolve. In an important and controversial argument Tatah Mentan asserts that "Africa is the soft underbelly for transnational terrorism."[25] Mentan further argues the "great majority of African citizens exist in poverty and are locked under corrupt leaders who maintain control through tribalism, fraud, corruption, prebendalism and violence. It is through this perspective that Africa can be seen as a giant experiment in the genesis of terrorism. The seeds are being sown everywhere."[26] Thus in the view of Mentan because of the presence of an abundance of weak and failed states "Africa is captive to these networks of terrorists."[27]

Al Qaeda and Hezbollah have dominated scholarly discourse on the threat of transnational terrorist groups that have operated in Africa. Al Qaeda's operations in Africa, principally East Africa, were insidious during the period in which Bin Laden maintained an operational base in Sudan covering the period 1992-1996. For the purpose of operations that were in progress (the simultaneous attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania) this date should be extended to include those cells that went operational after bin Laden's transnational network was forced out of Sudan. During that period much of al Qaeda's cells operated and created attendant safe havens in Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia, and Uganda.

In examining al Qaeda's operations in Africa in the absence of the operational base in Sudan there is evidence the functionality of the transnational network is less menacing. Al Qaeda's inability to find a major operational base in the region to recruit, to train and to plan attacks is a salient representation of the damage the network endured during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. In the wake of the U.S.-led military operation components of bin Laden's network sought refuge in East Africa and elsewhere in the region. Many mid-level members of the network associated and penetrated the leadership of a host of radical Islamic elements in Africa but were unable to co-opt them. In the final analysis al

Qaeda members recognized their voice and experience were welcome but the networks' brand often had little traction.

Hezbollah is another major transnational terrorist organization that operates extensively in Africa. It is important to note that Hezbollah is not connected to terrorist attacks in the region. Rather in terms of operations Hezbollah is "the terrorist group with the widest ranging presence in Africa. The group's presence in Africa is directly linked to that of expatriate Lebanese business communities, primarily in West Africa but also in parts of Central and Southern Africa."[28] Similarly, Hezbollah maintained a major safe haven in Sudan throughout the decade of 1990s. The purpose of Hezbollah's presence in over a dozen African countries is to raise money that would fund the terrorist group's operations. In one example the transnational network invested heavily in diamonds in West Africa, particularly in Sierra Leone throughout the 1990s and much of the early part of twenty-first century.[29]

There is little doubt that al Qaeda and Hezbollah represent the principal non-indigenous transnational terrorist threats in the region. There are few that would quarrel with the validity of this point. Unfortunately too many writers on the subject of terrorism in the Africa incessantly argue incorrectly that al Qaeda and Hezbollah have great synergy with sub-national or local terror groups and therefore are able to establish affiliates that they are able to dominate and do their bidding. In fact the opposite true:

> Transnational terrorist organizations like al Qaeda and Hezbollah find it difficult to coordinate activities with local groups and have mostly given up attempting to organize them into larger associations and networks. The transnational groups find the clan-based warfare and seeming anarchy of acephalous societies like Somalia difficult terrain in which to recruit and prosper.[30]

Similarly, al Qaeda has operational difficulties in East Africa. A major source of tension is the continued Salafism/Sufi divide. There is evidence that some elites have gravitated toward Salafism, primarily the educated elites; however, al Qaeda regards Somalia as a largely inhospitable place. There are a host of additional reasons.

> Somali Islam, for instance, is strongly characterized by local traditions and syncretic practices, such as the *duco* (intercessory prayer after *salaat* in the mosque), the ecstatic *digri* ceremonies, the *siyaaro* or pilgrimages to the tombs of saints (practiced in particular by Sufis) and the celebration of *Mawliid* (the Prophet Muhammad's birthday). These practices are strongly opposed by Salafis and Wahhabis. Despite the effects of such externalities as the

proliferation of Gulf charities in the region, the strength of traditional Islam rooted in local cultures acts to retard the spread of extremist ideas.[31]

These regions illustrate why al Qaeda, which does have operations in Somalia, has nonetheless been unable to co-opt local Somali groups into its orbit. Instead al Qaeda has been forced to accept the reality that while there may be cooperation it will occur when there is a synergy of interests between Somali terror groups and the interests of Osama bin Laden's transnational network. All too often al Qaeda has been forced to accept that its agenda is subservient to local interests.

Transnational Terrorism in Horn and North Africa

Of great interest to this chapter is the abundance of indigenous transnational terrorist groups. These groups are primarily concentrated in East and North Africa. As in all cases transnational terrorism "is greatly enhanced by globalization which continues to serve as an important enabling factor in the spread of this form of terrorism to Africa."[32] Similarly, there is ample evidence that the prevalence of a host of factors to include the "Internet, cell phones and international travel" facilitate an environment "through which cells and units can liaise, coordinate and network."[33] Lastly, globalization permits transnational networks to breach regional and international boundaries with blinding speed to communicate plans, issue commands to implement operations, and to allow like-minded cells a safe haven that shields them from local and international authorities. Though less sophisticated than al Qaeda in this regard African transnational terrorist entities have dramatically increased their learning curve. There is little doubt that globalization positively impacted the expansion and threat of transnational terrorism in Africa. In this section the point is to examine two regions—East Africa and North Africa—where the major transnational terrorist groups operate and provide a window into the potential threats posed to the region security.

The Horn and East Africa

What event ushered in a new era of transnational terrorism in the East and the Horn of Africa? According to Jeffrey Haynes the 1998 East African embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania signaled a shift in terms of a security threat in the region and represented a virulent "interaction of domestic and transnational expressions of militant Islam."[34] The initial attack in Somalia in October of 1993 introduced the region to a "new front in Islamic militancy"[35] but because few understood the al Qaeda connections to the attack along with the small death toll the attack went underappreciated in terms of media attention and in scholarly discourse. Second, al Qaeda in 1998 introduced a methodology to the region that Hezbollah unveiled against U.S. and French peacekeepers in 1983: truck bombs that launched simultaneous attacks. No African transnational terrorist group used this methodology but they used another important approach: structure and operational cohesiveness are critical to a host of transnational organizations that operated in the region.

The transnational terrorism expansion in the Horn of Africa was aided by a number of factors. Those factors include weak and failed states, policies and governments that are oppressive and indifferent to its citizenry, sizeable Islamic populations, the increasing presence of political Islam, and porous borders provide just a sample of the instruments that increased the threat of transnational terrorist groups in the region. There are a host of additional explanations.

> The recent rise of Islamic militancy in East Africa suggest that its increased prominence is linked to the growing influence of regional networks with headquarters in various Arab countries known to be logistical hubs of Islamic militancy (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and United Arab Emirates). Various countries in the East African sub-region—including Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda—provide new opportunities for the recruitment and mobilization of new members for militant Islamic organizations, including al Qaeda, its affiliates and offshoots. Further, East Africa is said to offer favorable grounds for the spread of transnational Islamic militancy as a result of . . . widespread corruption, largely dysfunctional structures of law enforcement, endemic organized criminality (involving everything from drugs and people smuggling to weapons trafficking) and growing numbers of weak and failed states.[36]

The aforementioned factors provide a seriousness of threat and the interconnectedness between local and outside forces that continue to produce multiple transnational terror organizations that have dissimilar agendas but rely on similar operational methods with respect to recruitment, training, logistical and operational capacity.

Transnational terrorist organizations come in assorted sizes. The Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (ERIJ), for example, is a relatively small transnational organization. The objectives of the organization are fundamental: overthrow the Eritrean government of President Issayas Afewerki. The organization operates a safe haven in Sudan where it receives political and logistical support.

There are a several types of additional transnational organizations that operate in the region: those that are based in Somalia and another that despite its diminutive size seeks to acquire far greater regional responsibilities. The first transnational organization that will be the focus of this section is Al Shabaab; the second organization is Al Qaeda in East Africa.

Al Shabaab is a Somali-based transnational organization that is threatening stability in the region. Al Shabaab is formally the militant youth wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). Al Shabaab is a diverse transnational terrorist organization and it is linked to al Qaeda. There is sufficient supporting evidence on this point. Within the leadership of this radical Islamist group there are several veteran members of al Qaeda who have been trained in Afghanistan.[37] In a supportive message a senior member of Saudi origin (Said Ali Jabir Al Khathim Al Shihri) used a videotaped message that called for increased attacks "against the crusaders at sea and in Djibouti." Additionally, he issued this statement: "The crusaders, the Jews and the traitorous rulers did not come to the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden except to wage war against you in Somalia and abolish your newly established emirate, and by Allah, they shall be defeated. They shall bring a curse upon their people."[38]

There are a host of supplemental transnational characteristics associated with the organization. Eritrea, which routinely broadcasts their national security interests in Somalia, provides logistical and political support to Al Shabaab. The U.S. government has privately threatened Eritrea over its not so covert support for Al Shabaab.[39] To illustrate the audacity of the organization, Al Shabaab actively recruits not only in the Horn of Africa but even in the relatively large Somali community in the United States.[40] At another level Al Shabaab's 7,000 strong fighters (with assistance from Hawiye clan) continues to threaten neighboring Kenya. Additionally, elements of Al Shabaab have established safe havens in the northern part of

the country. This and other threats aside Al Shabaab has already established itself as an organization that is willing to engage in terrorism. During the period covering 2003-2004 while attached to the ICU the group killed four foreign aid workers. In June of 2007 a member of the group launched a suicide attack that unsuccessfully targeted the home of the Somali Prime Minister. During the postwar period of the Ethiopian occupation the group claimed responsibility for a host of assassinations of Somali government officials. In the opening months of 2009 Al Shabaab captured the Somali National Parliament in Baidoa and terrorized the city and in February the group launched, via a suicide car bomb, an attack that killed eleven African Union Soldiers. Finally, there is growing evidence linking Al Shabaab to piracy that continues to destabilize the region.[41]

A second major transnational organization with links to al Qaeda but is not necessarily considered an affiliate is Al Qaeda in East Africa (EEAQ). EEAQ is a major example of this trend. EEAQ is relatively small in size but its membership is dominated by highly trained and experience operatives (many of which are foreign fighters) that are believed to have received their terrorist education outside the region. The organization's operational chief Fazul Abdullah Mohammed is one of four individuals linked to the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings. Fazul and the other associates were instrumental in the creation of EEAQ but after the Ethiopian invasion in December 2007 they have forces outside of Somalia and they have been sheltered by the Islamic Union Courts and its offshoot Al Shabaab in Northern Kenya.[42] The organization operates across East Africa and is a threat to regional stability. The latter point is significant because EEAQ has obtained sophisticated tactics that if shared with other local networks could further destabilize already weak governments in the region. The U.S. government is expressing its own set of concerns. An official observed there is short- and long-term danger "that EEAQ and Al Shabaab may merge in training and operations, potentially spreading al Qaeda's more extremist jihadist beliefs to thousands of clan-based Somali militants, who so far have been engaged in internal squabbling."[43] As stated above the EEAQ's numbers are relatively small but there is concern about the organization's regional reach and its ongoing recruitment efforts.

North Africa and the Sahel

The transnational terror evolution in North Africa and the Sahel is far more threatening than in any other area of the continent. Examining the regions collectively the transnational terrorist threat is alarming for several reasons. Both North Africa and the Sahel are home to a host of al Qaeda affiliates and the regions themselves are littered with a host of local transnational terrorists. Additionally, a major factor that distinguished these groups from the Horn and East Africa transnational groups is that not only has al Qaeda launched several terrorist attacks in the region and beyond, but so too have the local transnational groups been active in advancing terrorist operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in parts of Europe.

In Algeria and the Sahel the major transnational terrorist organization in the region is The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat or Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC). The GSPS exists in a host of countries: Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Other countries—Chad and Niger—serve as transit points for the terrorist organization. In Mauritania and Morocco the GSPC existed alongside other transnational organizations. The threat of the GSPC is itself a major source of instability in Morocco, but the country contends with another terrorist challenge.

The region of the Sahel from northern Mali across to Mauritania at one point was considered a second theatre of operations for the GSPC. The Malian GSPC threat dissipated and the territory became more of a transit point for the transnational network.

For an extended period Mauritania had to confront a dual threat: GSPC and a homegrown offshoot, The Mauritanian Group for Preaching and Jihad (GMPJ). The GSPC was known be operating in northern Mauritania but the organization did launch attacks elsewhere in the country. The GMPJ is known to be inspired by al Qaeda and is linked to the now defunct GSPC. Not only did the GMPJ carry out terrorist attacks but the organization is known to be involved in a host of additional activities to include smuggling, fundraising, and "recruitment operations in Mauritania and in the region."[44]

Morocco is home to the GSPC and is the location of a major transnational franchise known as the Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain, or the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group (GICM). GICM is a very active and highly accomplished organization. The central objective of the organization involves the establishment of an Islamic government in

Morocco and supporting al Qaeda's jihad. The organization's operational reach is extensive, having cells in many areas of North Africa, much of Western Europe, and it operates in Canada. The GICM is known to have participated in a host of spectacular attacks. In May of 2003 twelve suicide bombers launched an attack in Casablanca that resulted in the death of forty five people.[45] In 2004 the organization attacked the public transportation system in Madrid killing 191 people and wounding nearly 2,000 others. Considered a major terrorist threat the GICM continues to operate despite facing a worldwide scrutiny as a result of the UN 1267 Committee. Similarly due to the GICM activities in Afghanistan, the United States, Britain and other European countries, these states have banned the GICM's affiliates including Salafia Jihadia.

Algeria is the major hub and locus of terrorist activities of the GSPC. The GSPC is a splinter group of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). The GSPC emerged around 1998 and like most Islamic organizations in the country its major objective is to overthrow the Algerian Government and then to install an Islamic regime. With regard to size and operations the GSPC was by far the largest and most lethal of the transnational organizations that operated in the region. The operational activities of the GSPC included Algeria, the Sahel, within parts of the Middle East (Lebanon and Syria), Canada, the United States, and much of Western Europe. Similarly, the GSPC facilitated al Qaeda cells in the region and in Europe.

Algeria for the life cycle of the GSPC was the organization's operational base. The transnational character of the organization is its ability to foment instability in the region. This ability according to Anneli Botha is central to understanding the strength of the network.

> While neighboring countries were predominantly used to support operations in Algeria during the 1990s, the GSPC realized the importance of neighboring countries as its influence in Algeria decreased. Through acting as a base of operations well beyond Algeria, the GSPC became a regional actor to be reckoned with. Although the Algerian activities of the GSPC declined gradually after 2001, its threat to stability in the region increased. The first exchange of light weapons fire between members of the GSPC and Mali security forces on April 11, 2004, 200 km from the Algerian border, served to announce the GSPC's intentions to extend its operations beyond Algeria's southern border. It became clear that the intention of the terrorists was not to kill members of the security forces.[46]

The GSPC's terrorist history is long and noteworthy. In November of 2002 the organization ambushed and killed nine Algerian soldiers. In a well-publicized attack in February of 2003 the GSPC kidnapped thirty two tourists. One year later the network ambushed a police patrol. The attack resulted in the death of seven police officers. Significantly the terrorists absconded with an untold amount of firearms that would latter be used against Algerian soldiers and other enemies of the organization. Not long before the transition to AQIM, in an attack in Ain Defla, Algeria, the GSPC attacked and killed eighty security guards.

With many skeptical of Algeria's counterterrorism capabilities, in 2004 the state's security forces killed the leader of GSPC Nabil Sahraoui. Separately the Algerian government took custody of Abderazak al-Para, a leader of a faction of GSPC (who had been capture in Chad), the mastermind behind the kidnapping of thirty two European terrorists a year earlier.[47]

The GSPC's transnational focus and its attempt to cooperate with, if not coordinate, militants from across the sub-region are symbolized in its merger with al Qaeda in 2006 and its subsequent adoption of the new name Al Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in January 2007.

There have been a number of events that illustrate the pivotal transformation of GSPC into the AQIM. The events include the following: "Three GSPC attacks using improvised explosive devices in October and December 2006 were the first GSPC activities inside the Algerian capital in years. In addition, the December explosion targeted U.S. and other foreign oil workers." Finally, by using the "AQIM banner, the GSPC is attempting to synchronize operations with jihadi militants in Morocco and Tunisia"[48] with the objective of restarting a movement that had appeared to collapse. AQIM would be headed by Abdelmalek Droukdel, alias Abu Musab Abdul Wadud.

In the end the alliance of al Qaeda and GSPC was natural and the cooperation benefited both entities. From another perspective there is evidence the collaboration between the two entities is one of convenience and borne of the failures attributed to each organization.

> The al Qaeda-North African Salafist alliance is a response to post-9/11 organizational and ideological problems. Al Qaeda's loss of its Afghan sanctuary and the break up of its command and control operations made it dependent on affiliates to recruit terrorists. The inability of the North African Salafists to overthrow any government in the Maghreb,

> moreover, requires the commissioning of a cause that could give them new life. The crossfertilization of al Qaeda and North African Salafists is a mutually beneficial arrangement designed to compensate for past failures.[49]

In spite of these dilemmas there are positive benefits associated with the merger between the GSPC and al Qaeda. According to Andrew Black, "The role of the GSPC's mobile training apparatus will be of vital importance in coordination and inter-group cooperation. As seen with the training camps in Afghanistan in the 1990s, the experiences shared by mujahideen in the camps can have a lasting impact through the establishment of an esprit de corps, which subsequently leads to high levels of trust and a willingness to cooperate."[50] The GSPC connection to Maghrebi loyalists in the region and in the émigré population in Europe provides a consistent source of funds, recruitment, individuals to conduct surveillance and experienced foot soldiers to conduct terrorist strikes in the region and in Europe.

AQIM's mission is far more expansive and requires a structural transformation necessitating modification of the organization's objectives. In a July 2008 interview with the *New York Times*, the leader of AQIM, Abdelmalek Droukdal, noted that "Our general goals are the same goals of Al Qaeda the mother."[51] The widening activities of the organization the "group's folding into the global al Qaeda structure may indicate a shift to take up the banner of global jihad and collude on future attacks in North Africa, Western Europe, and Iraq."[52] To assist in its evolution AQIM operates a number of small training camps for militants in Morocco, Tunisia and even in Nigeria.[53] These camps trained and harnessed the skills of new recruits for missions in the region and for attacks in Iraq and in Europe. There is another aspect associated with the creation of the Al Qaeda affiliate that receives too little coverage: the terror network operates a solid organization that consists of multiple and active components.

> By design, AQIM incorporated the GSPC with elements of Morocco's Islamic Combatant Group, Libya's Islamic Fighting Group, several Tunisian groups, most notably the Tunisian Combatant Group, and jihadists in Mali, Niger and Mauritania. However, in practice, the vast majority of the group's infrastructure came from the GSPC, and attacks since the founding of AQIM in 2006 have reflected this. Indeed, in spite of the many high-profile Libyan and Moroccan militants who serve as part of the al Qaeda core leadership, Libya and Morocco have been extremely calm since the emergence of AQIM, and the group has remained an Algeria-based phenomenon.[54]

In the first year of operations the organization conducted over thirty attacks, the vast majority targeted Algerian security forces and military facilities. AQIM targeted U.N. staff members as well. In one attack forty seven people were killed. Of that number seventeen members of the U.N. Refugee Agency were killed.

AQIM's activities forced the Algerian government to expand its counterterrorist response against the network. In response to the burgeoning AQIM threat the Algerian government reported that by the end of the first ten months of 2007 "369 people had been killed in violence involving AQIM."[55] The Algerian security forces concentrated on specific zones within the country in an effort to reduce the threat posed by the AQIM. The security forces recognized that the transnational organization had devised a strategy whereby each zone had specific responsibilities. Confronting and destroying these zones was critical to defeating the network.

> The security forces discovered a group active in the Ain Temouchent, Sidi Bel-Abbes and Tlemcen regions—the mountainous area on the border between Algeria and Morocco. During their search operations, the military discovered hideouts that housed material used to manufacture home-made explosive devices, as well as food. Approximately 15 suspects managed to escape in the direction of the Moroccan border. In August, furthermore, in the light of the increasing pressure on its members' movements, GSPC/AQLIM decided to move and to transport its home-made bombs, weapons and provisions on fishing boats to escape tightened security control and the several checkpoints on the roads. Zone 2 members, under the leadership of Soufiane Fassila, have already implemented this strategy throughout the whole coastline to move from Boumerdes Province to Tizi Ouzou (100 km east of Algiers) and Bejaia Province (300 km east of Algiers). The security forces believe that this strategy means that activities in the west of the country will be reactivated, especially in Mostaganem (400 km west of Algiers) and Ain Temouchent (470 km west of Algiers). . . . An investigation in December 2007 revealed that Yahia Djaouadi, alias Yahia Abu Ammar, was the present emir of Zone 9. Information also indicated that the activities in the south were controlled by two primary groups: the El Moulathamoun group under the leadership of Mokhtar Belmokhtar which focused its activities on Mauritania; and the Tarek Ibn Ziad Ou El Fatihine group under the leadership of Hammadou Abid alias Abdelhamid Abou Zeid which focused on Tunisia and north Mali. The fact that Belmokhtar was relieved as emir of Zone 9 further raised the possibility that he might operate in a semi-independent fashion, particularly since he feared for his life as a result of his differences with Droukdel. During 2007 southern Algeria, including M'sila, Djebel Boukhil and Ain Rich, was a terrorist hot-spot. In May 2007 Algerian security forces arrested six newly recruited members of a terrorist group between the ages of 20 and 25 in M'sila and six others in Ain Rich who were part of a support network.[56]

These and other movements illustrate that AQIM remain wedded to its overarching strategy. Within the region the network conducts operations in

four basic operational zones: Central-Algeria, East-Tunisia, South-Sahel, and West-Mauritania.[57]

To counter this expansion the Algerian security forces uncovered a series of important plans and captured and killed many members of the network. In 2007 alone the Algerian government "killed or captured an estimated 1,100 militants last year, nearly double the number in 2006, according to the State Department. But the group has begun using sophisticated recruitment videos to replenish its ranks with a new generation of youth that the State Department says is more hard-line."[58]

Unfortunately despite the mounting losses AQIM's terrorist campaign continued. In June of 2008 the transnational network claimed responsibility for the bombing of an army outpost. In the summer of 2009 AQIM ambushed and killed twenty-four Algerian paramilitary policemen. While there is evidence that AQIMs attacks have declined, the network is far from defeated, and its campaign of terror is far from complete.

Transnational Terror: The Reemergence of Al Qaeda

With the emergence of a host of transnational terrorist organization in the region does it follow that al Qaeda is itself resurfacing in Africa? History records that al Qaeda established a major operational base in Sudan until external pressures forced Osama bin Laden to relocate his organization to Afghanistan. Long after the operational base ended in Khartoum, al Qaeda retained cells throughout East Africa, in parts of North Africa, and token cells in other parts of continent. Thus al Qaeda retained a presence in the region even if that presence was greatly reduced from its zenith during the mid-1990s.

From another perspective it is important to note that even if al Qaeda's presence was reduced those mid-level operatives that remained in the region were active both in recruitment and in the sustainment of the network's brand. The residual al Qaeda remnants had several other responsibilities. A central objective of al Qaeda operatives in the region involved the development of relationships with local terrorist organizations. In this regard the network succeeded, providing logistical, political,

operational experience, and funding to a host of terrorist groups in the region. Another objective of the network involved efforts to control or to co-opt other groups and have them serve as affiliates of al Qaeda, and therefore these potential allies would be positioned to act on behalf or in support of bin Laden's causes in the region. This does not mean there were not setbacks. In East Africa and in the Horn where al Qaeda was not welcome, cells of the organization found these areas often inhospitable and difficult to penetrate and to establish long-term relationships. This is particularly the case in much of Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania.

This in no way implies that al Qaeda did not have successes. In East Africa several new movements sprouted. In Somalia, for example, a relatively new group Al-Muhajirun consists of 180-plus well-trained and battle-hardened fighters. The leader of the organization is Saleh Nabhan who is a seasoned veteran of al Qaeda. Several members of this organization are known to have been involved in jihads in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Muhajirun has also internationalized the conflict and brought some of the most dangerous terrorists in the world to East Africa's front door.[59] This group maintains connections to al Qaeda but it is not necessarily controlled by al Qaeda.

The growing threat of Al-Muhajirun and Al Shabaab prompted Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga to make the following the statement: "I talked to various agencies to help Somalia deal with the problem, and to also help us to deal with the influx of refugees into Kenya. There is also need to provide military assistance to deal with the situation in Somalia. I'm not saying that we will send forces to Somalia, we are consulting and will make an announcement soon."[60]

Al Shabaab is yet another threat that concerns regional neighbors. Al Shabaab is another al Qaeda-linked terrorist organization. This organization represents the principal regional threat. States routinely have warned of the need to openly confront Al Shabaab. This is the case with the governments of Ethiopia and Kenya. Conversely, the organization is receiving support from Eritrea, a decision that does not sit well with Ethiopia. Kenya is appealing to Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), and even the Obama administration to confront the terrorist organization. By pushing the diplomatic track the Kenya government is delaying and

perhaps avoiding a military response in connection to threats posed by Al Shabaab. Much of the Kenyan and Ethiopian response is a result of the following statement made by Al Shabaab spokesman Sheikh Ali Mohamud Raghe alias Sheikh Ali Dhere: "the first phase of the war against the government [in Somalia] and Amisom [African Union Mission in Somalia] is over. You will see the second phase with deadlier consequences."[61] This threat promises greater employment of IEDs, suicide attacks, and increased use of ambushes that will certainly challenge diplomacy and a chance of long-term stability in the region. For Kenya the refugee crisis and the continuing spillover effects of the Somali violence continue to impact resources and stability in Northern Kenya. In the case of Ethiopia having defeated the Islamic Union Courts it is unwilling to allow another entity—Al Shabaab—to obtain the capabilities of establishing a "stable operational base" in Southern Somalia and beyond.

Al Qaeda in East Africa (EEAQ) still represents an unknown threat. In terms of numbers the organization is small. EEAQ is dominated by foreign fighters who survived safe havens along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas and migrated to East Africa. What alarms terrorist experts inside and outside the region is that the sophisticated tactics that are a by-product of the previous training may soon be used to further disrupt the region. The regional players and the U.S. government are concerned by the on-going presence of dissimilar groups—local groups and external terrorist franchises—that continue to migrate to and further destabilize Somalia. There is an additional concern: the regional players and the U.S. government are concerned about the growing possibilities of joint activities and the linkage of objectives. If these realities occur there will be a dramatic spike in attacks and casualties forcing regional and external players to openly consider the prospects of military force. In the short term this reality will further destabilize an already weak and dysfunctional country.

In East Africa al Qaeda continues to rear its ugly head. The presence and threat of the transnational terrorist enterprise is absorbing and is undermining Somalia, the certain target of Osama bin Laden, and forcing regional and external players to come to grips with the network's presence and ability to shape and influence local and ever-growing transnational organizations that do not control but are nonetheless willing to work with al

Qaeda. These realities are forcing the states in East Africa and in the Horn to rethink their counterterrorist tactics.

In North Africa and the Sahel the al Qaeda presence is real and accelerating. In the Sahel region Al Qaeda established small bases and training camps. Though the al Qaeda presence is small, primarily as a result of the counterterrorism efforts of the TSCTI, the network continues to provide logistical and financial support to local groups and it uses the area not only as a base but as a playground for the transit of terrorists within the organization and those that are supportive of its aims and operations.

The states in the Sahel that al Qaeda is operating in and is maintaining a presence in include Algeria, Chad, Mali, and Mauritania. The Algerian connection will be discussed later in this section. During the zenith of its operations the GSPC operated in the desert or uninhabited regions of Chad, Mali, and Mauritania. Al Qaeda and the regional creation, AQIM, will undoubtedly benefit from the previously established safe havens and small camps in the area.

To illustrate the threat in Mauritania in 2008 AQIM leader Abu Mus'ab Abd el-Wadoud Raise argued for radical Islamists in the country to raise "the banner of jihad and let us bleed and have our limbs severed until we bring back a caliphate styled along the lines of The Prophet's way." The objective of AQIM in Mauritania is to install an Islamic government. AQIM is linked to Mauritanian Group for Preaching and Jihad (GMPJ) that is conducting attacks against government troops.

In Senegal the al Qaeda presence is small and below the radar but there are concerns that two organizations—Jama'at Ibadu Rahmane (JIR) and Moustarchidine wal Moustarchidates (MWM)—are becoming more radical and the cooperation with bin Laden's network is increasing.[62] Terrorist acts are relatively few and far between but there is growing concern the growing logistical support provided by al Qaeda to JIR and MWM may produce an uptick in terrorist-related violence in Senegal.

By way of AQIM al Qaeda's presence in Algeria symbolizes the significance of the network's presence in the region and how bin Laden's patience is being rewarded. To place the previous statement in context it is important to review al Qaeda's path from association with GSPC to cooperation that culminated in to the AQIM.

Long before the eventual collaboration that created AQIM the GSPC/Al Qaeda courtship quietly existed in a vacuum. Al Qaeda supplied logistical support to the GSPC for years. There is evidence that within the GSPC a rift developed over the extent to which the GSPC would cooperate and depend on al Qaeda. These internal fissures within the network set the stage for further division and eventual separation within the GSPC that only benefited al Qaeda's long-held objective of increased cooperation.

> The activities of the GSPC commanders in the Sahara seem to have been generally favored by Al Qaeda, perhaps due to the activities' international flavor. Mokhtar Belmokhtar is said to have been the only GSPC commander to have been recognized by Al Qaeda prior to the union. Belmokhtar is also said to have been at odds with Hassan Hattab. After Hattab, the next head of the GSPC was Nabil Sahraoui, better known as Abu Ibrahim Mustafa, who served in this position for approximately one year before being killed in an Algerian army attack on a GSPC mountain stronghold in June 2004. His positions were more radical than Hattab, but failed to lead to a breakthrough on the military front; in fact, during his time, the group suffered serious setbacks, culminating in his own death in battle. Abu Ibrahim Mustafa tried to develop closer relations with Al Qaeda. He released a statement widely interpreted as an oath of allegiance to Osama bin Laden, but this initiative did not develop into actual contacts with him. In fact, while giving his blessing to Al Qaeda and global jihad, he nonetheless held several positions that distanced him slightly from Al Qaeda. For example, he believed that jihad against "apostates" took precedence over jihad against "infidels," which in the GSPC context indicated that he would focus his activities on Algeria, and not on Europe. He expressed the same idea when he said that the GSPC would, in principle, be in favor of fighting outside of Algeria if it did not have its hands full on the home front. Abu Mus'ab 'Abd Al-Wadoud, the group's current Emir, was the successor of Abu Ibrahim Mustafa. Abd Al-Wadoud, whose real name is Abdelmalek Droukdal, instituted a more militant line, and developed the group's ties with Al Qaeda.[63]

The increased cooperation, as will be described later, resulted in a higher profile for al Qaeda in Algeria. Similarly, the increased GSPC/Al Qaeda cooperation expanded bin Laden's reach across North Africa and in parts of the Sahel.

With the precipitous decline of the GSPC apparent the network openly invited collaboration with al Qaeda. After the creation of Al Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb the new entity "vowed to organize extremist groups across North Africa and join the remnants of al Qaeda into a new international force for jihad."[64] As a continuation of the violence that developed in late 2007, in the summer of 2009 AQIM targeted "Western and African security forces as well as journalists in North Africa, principally Mali, Mauritania, and Algeria. The ambit of violence includes kidnappings, killings and bombings and is based on a similar pattern as the

early days of the resistance in Iraq, when Al Qaeda was trying to establish presence and forge alliances with the resistance groups."[65]

There is another way to analyze what may be the most disturbing trend associated with the AQIM: the transnational network should be evaluated in the context of international Islamist militancy. In this regard the AQIM is by the far the greatest threat to security in Africa. Consider the capabilities associated with the network. Although under the umbrella of al Qaeda GSPC retains access "to connections in Europe, expanding operations throughout Sahelian Africa, tunneling of African volunteers to fight in the Iraqi insurgency, and increasingly sophisticated internet propaganda."[66] These characteristics are problematic for the region, but there are additional problems that further illustrate why the AQIM poses a short- and perhaps long-term dilemma for local as well as outside (the United States) entities.

> Several important trends in international militant Islamism have converged in North Africa, creating an environment that fosters their symbiotic development. Together, these factors create a volatile mix in which Islamism—and in some cases Islamist violence—has become a powerful vehicle of political opposition. The growing prevalence of local self-radicalizing cells is particularly troublesome in Morocco, but has also extended to Algeria and Mauritania. In these countries, al Qaeda's global ideology intersects with local anger directed at undemocratic regimes that for years permitted mosques to be focal points of popular political activity. Simultaneously, al Qaeda has renewed its efforts to tap into local grievances, focusing them on the global jihad against the West. One of the keys to al Qaeda's resilience has been its ability to co-opt and exploit local, readymade networks to its ideological and operational advantage.[67]

Not only is there a growing presence of local threats in Algeria, but authorities in Morocco and Mauritania are concerned about the reach of AQIM. The network maintains its own presence in the aforementioned countries but it is providing logistical and funding support to a host of small and increasingly active organizations. The aim is to foment instability but more importantly to increase the specter of jihad.

Conclusion

The research associated with this study indicates the following. Terrorism in Africa existed during the Cold War, post Cold War, and post September 11 World. Second, Africa routinely confronted sub-national (domestic) terrorism and transnational terrorism. Third, ample information was

presented to illustrate that there were obstacles that precluded al Qaeda from co-opting and in some cases penetrating various sub-national groups in the region. Some of the reasons include the Salafist/Sufi divide, many terror groups refuse to permit al Qaeda to dominate their organizations (they often accepted logistical and financial support), and many local groups fear cavorting with bin Laden's transnational organization because it could increase external—the United States and other Western countries—interest that could result in increased intelligence activity or worse, the use of force against their organization which could hinder the organization's operations and destroy its safe havens.

There are other significant issues that were covered in this study. The chapter illustrated that although al Qaeda lost its operational base in Sudan in 1996 the terror network left behind significant operations across East Africa and a smaller presence in other areas in the region. In time al Qaeda increased their presence through logistical support to a host of local and transnational organizations. Having offered logistical support, elements of bin Laden's network subsequently assumed leadership positions to provide operational experience and invariably these attempts were used to directly control or at least influence local organizations. There was another avenue that was presented to al Qaeda: a merger. This happened in the case of the GSPC. The results of the merger produced AQIM. Viewed collectively, one thing is certain: the al Qaeda presence is real and there is evidence that it is accelerating. Of particular interest to this research is the emergence of several new patterns. Al Qaeda is keeping a low profile in the region to disguise their footprint. This strategy has kept U.S. and local counterterrorism efforts off balance. Second, there is ample evidence that terrorist attacks in 2007, 2008, and in much of 2009 have increased dramatically. According to a State Department report "Africa also saw a dramatic 96 percent rise in terrorist attacks, related primarily to continuing instability in Somalia."[68] These attacks are the result of increased activities of Al Shabaab, Al-Muhajirun and other smaller groups such as EEAQ. The report additionally mentions a dramatic increase in terrorist-related violence in Algeria and Morocco. The terrorism in these areas is associated with attacks by the AQIM. Third, what is increasingly alarming, and certainly undermining regional stability, is that many of the attacks are high profile attacks. Thus there is a growing fear of a "spectacular attack" against either U.S. interests or a high-profile soft target in the region.

Finally, the sub-national and transnational terror threat continues to evolve. In Somalia we have witnessed a new and perhaps more militant form of Islam with the emergence of Al Shabaab, an entity that supplanted the Islamic Union Courts. In Algeria and to a lesser extent in Morocco and Tunisia, GSPC and al Qaeda transformed into AQIM. What will prove interesting to watch in the future is how U.S. (particularly with regard to the CJTF-HOA, the TSCTI, and AFRICOM) and local counterterrorism efforts continue to adjust to a dangerous set of terrorist trends in the region. One reality is now certain: the world is witnessing an evolving front in the war on terrorism.

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Chapter 7

Confronting Disaster: Terrorist Safe Havens in Africa

John Davis

Introduction

Terrorist safe havens fall under a number of categories. The terrorist safe havens survive in areas that are "ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed areas of a country and non-physical areas where terrorists constitute" threats to regional security. Second, within these areas terrorists "are able to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, and operate in relative security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both." And third, "physical safe havens provide security for terrorist leaders, allowing them to plan acts of terrorism around the world."[1] According to Andre Le Sage, in Africa the issue of physical safe havens is a burgeoning dilemma. The scholar asserts ungoverned spaces subsist in four disparate categories: (1) "densely populated urban areas, (2) desert areas, (3) maritime zones, and (4) in sections of "weak" or "failing" states that fall outside governments' controls."[2]

The subject of terrorist safe havens is by no means a new one. On this point one need only examine Afghanistan and Pakistan to explore two of the worst examples of safe havens. That said the aforementioned states are by no means the only safe havens around the world. Other terror safe havens not yet at this level include but are not limited to the following states around the world: Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Yemen, and Venezuela.

There are however several increasingly alarming trends in Africa: a number of states have become active safe havens, and the activities of the

terror organizations have decreased or threatened regional security. A second debate concerns the growing concern about the evolving threat posed by the establishment of safe havens in Africa. The third debate, which is in many ways an extension of the first, is the development of strategies to curb or disrupt the safe havens in Africa.

In an examination of the aforementioned states several characteristics stand out. Those similarities include the following fundamental characteristics. The states involved in having or have had their territory used by terror groups in ungoverned areas; many of these states are unable to extend government authority throughout their state; safe havens often exist in border areas or international boundaries, and finally there is a fear that some states—namely Syria—that have actively supported and invited terror groups (Hamas and Hezbollah) to establish safe havens on their territory, may become even more active in permitting more terror groups to use areas within the country to conduct terrorist attacks.

The second deliberation is the shift or concern that Africa is emerging as the next phase of safe haven expansion. It is this debate that is the subject of this chapter. Finally, the list of terrorist safe havens in Africa is quite expansive. In this study the point is to provide an examination of some of the terrorist havens in select regions in Africa, with particular emphasis on East Africa and North Africa.

Terrorist Safe Havens in East Africa

Safe Havens have long existed in the region. Sudan, as described below, is a clear illustration. Interestingly safe havens in Sudan have declined dramatically while others have sprouted at an alarming rate elsewhere in the region. What accounts for this? There is no singular factor that accounts for this irregularity. In Somalia the absence of a central government permits groups like al Qaeda and affiliated organizations to flourish. Consistent with the expansion of al Qaeda is the growth of radical Islam, an issue that is taking hold elsewhere in the region but a level far less threatening than is the case in Somalia. Third, there is a burgeoning presence of Al Qaeda in East Africa (EEAQ). Though the organization is small, it nonetheless continues to operate, train and recruit in havens across the region. Finally,

the presence of weak states and the vast ungoverned territory in the region are other characteristics that additionally assist the development and sustainability of safe havens in East Africa.

Sudan

No serious examination of safe havens in the region of Africa can commence without serious discourse on the role of Sudan. During the early 1990s the government in Sudan actively supported terrorism. In fact the Islamic government led by President Omar Hassan al-Bashir provided safe havens to an alphabet soup of terrorist organizations: Al Qaeda, Abu Nadal, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), Gama'at al Islamiyya, Hamas, Hezbollah, Lords Resistance Army (Uganda), Eritrean Islamic Jihad, and Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (Ethiopia) and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) are all prominent examples. The wealth of transnational terror groups proved problematic enough for regional security but the plethora of groups posed an additional set of issues. The initial issue is the multiple safe havens—al Qaeda having the largest—meant that Sudanese sovereignty had been penetrated by a bin Laden's transnational enterprise. The presence of al Qaeda increased instability in the country, and increased Western pressure and sanctions against Sudan.

At another level the Sudanese government itself was involved directly in numerous terrorist attacks, including assisting and later harboring those who attempted to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 1995. These activities eventually produced another infamous title for Sudan—the hub of terrorist activity in the region.

Many scholars often opine the events of September 11, 2001, combined with pressure from the administration of George W. Bush altered the Sudanese government's support for safe havens. In actuality this is only a half truth. In reality Sudan implemented critical decisions that set the stage for ending an environment conducive to international terrorism. Perhaps the biggest decision was the arrest of Hassan al-Turabi and other National Islamic Front (NIF) extremists.[3] There were additional decisions.

According to the State Department's 2000 report on the Patterns of Global Terrorism, President Bashir made a number of decisions to signal Sudan's willingness to end the safe havens in the country. First Sudan

signed all twelve international conventions for combating terrorism and the government of Sudan ended its support for the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference.[4]

As one would surmise the final phase of Sudan's transformation occurred in the wake of the post September 11 pressure from the United States. On this point John Prendergast and Philip Roessler offer this fundamental assessment:

> After the terrorist attacks on September 11 and the opening of a counterterrorism base in Djibouti, the United States increased its engagement with the Khartoum regime. In May 2003, a U.S. military aircraft landed in Sudan for the first time in 10 years. U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell met with Sudanese foreign minister Mustafa Osman Ismail in May to discuss cooperation on the war on terrorism. The State Department is somewhat pleased with the cooperation to date, but made it clear the steps Sudan needs to take to be removed from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list: it must shut down the operations of extremist groups, including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and sign a comprehensive peace agreement.[5]

In the wake of the September 11, 2001, the network of Sudanese terrorist havens rapidly decreased. Unfortunately, there was an explosion of safe havens elsewhere in Africa. In the pages that follow the point is to examine some of the safe havens and the security dilemmas that developed as a result of the presence of terrorist organizations across Africa.

Somalia

Since the collapse of Somalia's central government, the country became a failed state, and of interest to this study, a haven for a multitude of terrorists organizations and pirates. A relatively small number of al Qaeda terrorists operate in Somalia, primarily in the southern part of the country. In the wake of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan the administration of George W. Bush dispatched a host of intelligence assets in and around Somalia to ensure that Osama bin Laden could not establish a new operational base in the strategic horn of Africa.

While al Qaeda is the major transnational network that established a haven in the country, a host of affiliated organizations have entered the equation. Some of the additional threats that have established a safe haven in the country include: Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), and most recently, al Shabaab. Like al Qaeda, these

organizations "are assisted by elements within the complicated Somali clan structure."[6]

The Islamic Union Courts were firmly entrenched in Somalia. In particular the ICU endeavored to establish control of Jowhar, Kismayo, Beledweyne, and the capital, Mogadishu. Once Ethiopian troops invaded in December of 2006, the Union Courts were the principal target of the Ethiopian military. In the aftermath of the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops the Islamic Courts Union are a shadow of the original organization, but a haven remains in the southern tip of Somalia, and in parts of Kenya.

Al Shabaab ("The Youths") once headed the military wing of the Islamic Courts Union, but as Ethiopian troops invaded, forcing the ICU to go underground, al Shabaab assumed an increasing leadership role in the southern region of Somalia. Recent reports indicate that al Shabaab "has taken control of important towns inland and along the coast, including the port towns of Kismayo, and Marka. The group has also reportedly entered into financial arrangements with pirates operating from port cities under al Shabaab's control. Al Shabaab's numbers are steadily rising; it's estimated that they now have up to 7,000 fighters."[7] Much like the Islamic Courts Union, al Shabaab maintains an al Qaeda presence throughout the organization. In particular, Fazul Abdullah Muhammad, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, and Issa Osman Issa are all experienced al Qaeda operatives in the region and all are wanted by the American government for their role in the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. It is the presence of the aforementioned individuals within the leadership cadre of al Shabaab that prompted President Bush's Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer to express deep concern acknowledging that "We have said over and over again that the people responsible for the bombing of our embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam, and we have evidence, are in Mogadishu. That constitutes a safe haven. We do not want it to become a further safe haven."[8]

These threats notwithstanding there are additional groups that carved out a haven within Somalia. The first organization is relatively unknown in the West, but in the Horn of Africa Al Takfir wal-Hijra is entrenched. The Somali branch of al-Takfir wal-Hijra (the organization is an off-shoot of the parent organization that was created in Egypt) is led by Sheikh Hassan Turki. Al Takfir wal-Hijra is a long-established extremist group with links

to al Qaeda. This group, along with remnants from Al-Ittihad al-Islami, operated a training facility in Ras Kamboni near Somalia's southern tip near the Kenyan border.[9] This loosely confederated organization remains under the radar primarily because not much is known about the network's membership and its objectives. One thing is certain, the Somali Takfir dates back to the regime of Siad Barre. Thus the haven predates the U.S.-led war on terror. Still many of the terrorist attacks against Ethiopian troops were carried out by followers of Takfir. It is these attacks that offer a glimpse into the organization's mission: killing the occupiers and those allied to the United States.

The second group involves the ever-present existence of Pirates which routinely operate off the Somali coast. Equally troubling, many Somali Pirates are connected to terror groups that maintain havens in the southern part of Somalia. The issue of piracy has created a number of issues for Somalia and for the international community. For starters piracy emanating from Somalia has increased two-fold since 2008. Since early 2008 nearly 200 hundred vessels have been attacked. In the summer of 2009 Somali Pirates detained twenty vessels and had captured nearly 300 hostages. In an attendant consequence the Pirates have hijacked and later sought and received ransom payments before releasing individuals and their cargo. The Pirates are innovative. They have their own intelligence apparatus whereby they receive information on the movement of vessels from informants in London. Thereafter that information is transferred via satellite phone and the Pirates then set out to capture the vessels. Second, there is a growing concern within the international community the ransom obtained in exchange for the crew and their cargo is funding terrorist organizations within Somalia, most notably Al-Shabaab. Third, "The high level of piracy is making aid deliveries to drought-stricken Somalia ever more difficult and costly. The World Food Program has already been forced to temporarily suspend food deliveries."[10] Fourth, the international community, led by the United States, in response to the delay of oil shipments, increased their naval presence in and around the waters near Somalia. This response, while anticipated, will add to the already dangerous situation in and around Somali waters. In the final analysis there is little doubt the United States and its allies could destroy the pirate haven in Somalia, but unless central authority is restored across the country, any military solution will produce only short-term stability.[11]

The burgeoning presence of transnational terrorist groups and transnational criminal enterprises in Somalia provides evidence to discredit previous scholarly literature that argued that such groups could not operate in a failed and now a collapsed state such as Somalia. The reality is that, at least up to now, transnational criminals and terrorists "have found zones of complete state collapse to be relatively inhospitable territory out of which to operate."[12] What is certain is that Somalia is and has been a host to indigenous and external terrorist groups that collectively have operated with near impunity since the tragic events of September 11, 2001.

Kenya

Kenya remains a key component of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). That said Kenya remains a haven for both al Qaeda, residual elements of the Islamic Courts Union, and Al Shabaab. There are many reasons for the continuing havens within Kenya. Chief among them is the failure of the Kenyan Parliament to adopt stringent anti-terrorism legislation. To accentuate this point consider the Kenyan Parliament refused to adopt the highly controversial 2003 "Suppression of Terrorism Bill." In 2006 after considerable revisions a second opportunity to adopt anti-terrorism legislation failed. For the Kenyan government these defeats have proven highly embarrassing because Kenya signed U.N. Conventions on terrorism but has yet to adopt any domestic anti-terrorism legislation to augment its policies to thwart terrorist havens in the country.[13]

In 2008 the Kenyan government introduced steps to confront terrorists within its borders. After consulting with the United States the Kenyan government accepted assistance from the American military to develop a Kenyan Army Ranger Strike Force. The objective of the strike force is to create "an elite counterterrorism unit capable of conducting operations against infiltrators and armed groups." Additionally, "The United States also gave training and unspecified equipment to the Kenyan Navy for maritime interdiction operations in Kenyan waters."[14]

In response to recent threats made by Al Shabaab in April of 2009 that the Islamic organization is planning to take over the North Eastern Province and institute Sharia law the Kenyan Foreign Affairs Assistant Minister Richard Onyonka warned "Kenya is a sovereign country. We have the

capacity and the ability to stave off any incursions."[15] The message delivered by Mr. Onyonka is critical but the al Qaeda-linked Al Shabaab knows that it can exploit a significant dilemma inside Kenya itself: because of the large Somali population in Northern Kenya the organization can use this to its advantage and to continue to establish havens, and when appropriate launch terrorist attacks against soft targets in the country.

Evolving Safe Havens Within North Africa and the Maghreb

Much like East Africa, the Maghreb region is rapidly becoming a major haven for terrorism. Islamic radicalism existed in the North Africa long before the advent of the U.S.-led war on terrorism. Many observers strongly assert that the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq accelerated the development of radicalism in the region. Many local or domestic terrorist groups sent members to Iraq for training and in some cases those individual terrorists participated in attacks against U.S. troops.[16] With the advent of the surge strategy and the defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq in much of the country, many of these individuals have returned to their domestic locale and are using techniques acquired in Iraq to launch suicide and other terrorist tactics against targets in their home states. There is another issue of great significance: there is a burgeoning fear that Europe will develop as principal target of terror groups that have found safe havens in Northern Africa. Equally important many of these groups, as described below, formed an alliance with al Qaeda which dramatically increased the threat of terrorism within Maghreb countries.

Algeria

Algeria long served as a haven for terrorist groups. In the 1980s and much of the 1990s a host of terrorist organizations called Algeria home. Some of the major terrorist groups that operated in Algeria include the Armed Islamic Group (AIG), Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), Movement for an Islamic State (MIS), Al Jama'a al-Islamiyya, Army of the Prophet Muhammad, United Company of Jihad, and the Armed Islamic Movement

(AIM).[17] The increasing corruption contributed to the growth and spread of radical Islam in the country both from indigenous groups and from Islamic clerics that were connected to The Muslim Brotherhood. Collectively they combined to assist in advancing the cause for "the return of Islam."

Al Qaeda's presence represents another factor in the growth of groups and safe havens in the region. In fact in August of 2006 Ayman al-Zawahiri announced that al Qaeda created an alliance with the former Algeria-based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) which is headed by Abdelmalek Droukdel, alias Abu Musab Abdul Wadud. As a result of this cooperation a new group, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), was born. Within a year a spike in AQIM violence developed.

> Although Algeria has seen a gradual decrease in the number of deaths in the past few years, the year 2007 witnessed a change in tactics, with particular reference to a resort to suicide attacks—a tactic not previously familiar in Algeria. Understandably, the Algerian government and its security forces consider the activities of GSPC/AQIM as limited in comparison to the height of the extremist campaign of the 1990s. Despite this common perception, 75 people died in political violence in September 2007, including 60 killed in suicide blasts; this was more than double the number killed in August. By 1 November 2007, 369 people had been killed in violence involving AQIM and the security services in the first ten months of 2007.[18]

The increase in attacks is by itself a cause for concern; however, threats by AQIM to launch attacks across North Africa and in Europe have amplified attention on the group by the Algerian and French governments. The French for their part view the AQIM as a major terrorist threat. According to French counterterrorism magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguière, "We know from cases that we're working on" the AQIM's "mission is now to recruit people in Morocco and Tunisia, train them and send them back to their countries of origin or Europe to mount attacks."[19] To further illustrate the fears of Europe consider the "Southern European interior ministers held a conference with their North African counterparts on May 21 and 22 agreeing to step up the fight against the terrorist threat in the region. As al Qaeda terrorist networks expand, and as local populations become more and more sympathetic to the Islamist cause, however, the time will come when Europe will react with more than just conferences."[20] Finally, while the AQIM threat evolves the organization continues to maintain operational bases in the sparsely inhabited Trans-Sahara region which provides safe havens for terrorist groups operating in North and Northwest Africa.

Morocco

The terrorist groups operating in Morocco can best be described as below-the-radar organizations. Many of the more active terrorist groups are splinter groups or those that have operated in the country for years. Some of the more prominent organizations include Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain, or the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group (GICM), Salafia Jihadia or the Jihad for Pure Islam (which later morphed into the splinter group the As-Sirat al-Mustaqim (the Good and Righteous Path), the Moroccan version of Al-Takfir wal Hijra, and of course there is the ever-present al Qaeda. There is a commonality among these groups: many of the senior leadership of the aforementioned organizations are Afghan veterans of the jihad against the Soviets, or they have engaged in lesser known jihad wars in Bosnia and in Chechnya.

Experts assert, "The growth in the prevalence of local self-radicalizing cells"[21] in Morocco is the singular threat to governmental efforts to thwart small cell terrorist activity within the country. Irrespective of the number of groups, Moroccan security authorities have worked to apprehend and jail numerous cell leaders. These counterterrorist activities have been highly productive. Several examples are instructive. Authorities from the Interior Ministry in August of 2006 arrested forty members of the previously obscure Jammaat Ansar El Mehdi (El Mehdi Support Group). Equally significant a cache of weapons and safe houses were uncovered and eliminated. In another example, the Interior Ministry "dismantled Jama'at al-Tawhid wal Jihad fil Maghrib (Unification and Jihad), a cell suspected to have links to the AQIM, as well as members of the Hizb Attahrir al-Islam (Islamic Liberation Army)."[22]

Tunisia

Tunisia during the post-liberation period embraced Islamic groups as a counter to communist and other leftist organizations in the country. Some of the major Islamic organizations that carried out this function include Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami, or the Islamic Liberation Party (ILP) and Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami, or the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI). These organizations, and many others, operated on university campuses and

within neighborhoods to quell or reduce the influence of leftist organizations that promoted Democracy or Marxism. Those who espoused such views were considered un-Islamic. Later the ILP and MTI became active in politics and both morphed into political parties.

In the 1990s small Islamic organizations sprouted across the country. Many of these groups openly supported Osama bin Laden. In time these groups openly called for the destruction of the government and the installation of an Islamic state. There are a plethora of safe havens throughout Tunisia. The safe havens protect groups like The Tunisian Combatant Group, which has links to al Qaeda. The terrorist organization was created in 2000 by Tarek Maaroufi and Saifallah Ben Hassine. Thanks to Italian and U.S. intelligence a plot by The Tunisian Combatant Group to destroy U.S., Algerian, and Tunisian embassies in Rome, Italy was disrupted. The activities of the organization since late 2004 have been limited to recruitment and training for operations outside of the country.

A second terror group, the Tunisian version of the AQIM, operates primarily in the Tebessa region of Tunisia. The AQIM trains extremists, and it is linked to the Ennahda group. This organization is led by the exiled leader Rached El Ghannouchi who resides in London. The AQIM conducts cross-border operations involving extremists from Algeria and Tunisia that continue to cause disruption and have forced increased anti-terrorism activities by the government. According to Botha, "Algeria and Tunisia have strengthened their joint border surveillance, [successfully] using electronic sensors and drones. This heightened security aims to improve the monitoring of the covert terrorist withdrawals across both sides of the border."[23]

Another group maintains an operational, albeit small base, in Tunisia. The Soldiers of Assan Ibn Al Fourat represents a new organization that has captured the attention of Tunisian security forces. In November 2007 and in late December of 2007 the terrorist organization plotted major attacks against the ruling government. In the attack in 2007, thirty two members of the organization were arrested in a conspiracy to attack security forces and most alarming to unseat the government.[24]

The safe havens continue to decline in Tunisia. Much of the counterterrorism activity is due in part to cooperation and assistance from partners operating in the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI).

The growth of the military and increase in counterterrorism operations dramatically reduced the safe havens in the country.

Terrorist Safe Havens in the West Africa

In West Africa safe havens remain a central problem for states in the region.[25] Some of the characteristics that have induced these sanctuaries include the following: porous borders, ungovernable territory, corrupt governments, the rise in Islamic radicalism in the region, poverty and ineffective military organizations.[26] These characteristics represent some of the problems that created safe havens for terrorists in the region.

Mali

The Algeria-based Salafist Group Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) routinely operates a safe haven in the northern desert of Mali. The AQIM continues to conduct a host of activities in the area to include recruitment, training, and smuggling activities. In the aftermath of the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the Malian military did not engage the AQIM. Rather a group of "Malian Tuareg rebels, known as the Alliance for Democracy and Change (ADC), engaged in two firefights with the AQIM/GSPC in northern Mali."[27] Given the porous borders, the limited resources of the Government, and when one combines the ineffective military, problems that hamper all Sahel countries, it is little wonder why the AQIM still maintains its safe haven in the country.

The evolution of the TSCTI assisted the Malian military in addressing the threat posed by the AQIM. As a result of the TSCTI there is now a regional counterterrorism approach to confront the AQIM problem. Quietly the Malian government instituted its own efforts that its hopes will alleviate the threat posed by the al Qaeda-linked organization.

> Mali worked to combat terrorism and responded on terrorist financing issues. In May, Mali's National Section for the Processing of Financial Information (CENTIF) began operations. The CENTIF, which reports to the Ministry of Finance, is responsible for processing information on money laundering and terrorist financing. In July the Malian National Assembly ratified a new counterterrorism law that classified terrorist financing as an act of terrorism. Mali also created an interagency counterterrorism commission composed of senior level officials from

> the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Interior Security, Defense, Territorial Administration, and Justice. A member of the Intergovernmental Anti-Money Laundering Group in Africa, Mali's mutual evaluation report was discussed and adopted by the plenary body in November 2008.[28]

These efforts illustrate that Mali is addressing what experts acknowledge is an increasing transnational threat. In the long term, collective actions, particularly the cooperation advanced by the TSTCI, will eventually contain if not end the AQIM threat.

Mauritania

Mauritania is home to several al Qaeda-linked organizations. The Mauritanian Group for Preaching and Jihad (GMPJ) and AQIM are the two leading terrorist groups that operate in the country. In the case of GMPJ for years this terrorist organization "conducted supply, smuggling, fundraising, and recruiting operations in Mauritania and the region."[29] The AQIM is far more dangerous: it is an organization with far more resources and its members are far more experienced. To illustrate the organization's abilities consider the following attacks. In December of 2007 AQIM killed four French tourists and launched an attack against Mauritanian soldiers. The attacks were noteworthy for a number of reasons. It should be noted the government warned it would no longer tolerate the al Qaeda-linked organization conducting terrorist operations on the territory of the country. Second, the attacks developed in a country that is a participant in the U.S.-led Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative. In the wake of the attacks, the Government of Mauritanian is forced to confront a series of realities:

> The Government of Mauritania continued working to prevent terrorist organizations, notably AQIM, from using its territory. These efforts remained constrained, however, by limited resources and training, and by the inherent challenges of controlling the sparsely-populated and porous regions bordering Algeria and Mali. The government continued to identify and respond to AQIM cells operating in country. Western Missions warned their citizens of AQIM efforts to target westerners in Mauritania, particularly those involved in the petroleum industry.[30]

In February of 2008 AQIM attacked the Israeli Embassy and a nightclub in Nouakchott.[31] The attack yielded inconsequential results. In a far more vicious attack in September of 2008 AQIM ambushed and killed twelve Mauritanian soldiers in the northern village of Tourine. Not only did the

organization kill soldiers but the AQIM endeavored to send a message: the bodies of the twelve soldiers were decapitated. These and other attacks were in response to the August 6, 2008, bloodless coup led by General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz's that ousted the democratically-elected President Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi that "resulted in U.S. government suspension of all non-humanitarian assistance, including most military cooperation and counterterrorism training to the junta-led Mauritanian government."[32] Islamist organizations openly denounced the military government. In one example, El Khadim Ould Esseman, the suspected leader of Al Qaeda in Mauritania called upon Muslim countries not to recognize a government he identified as an "infidel regime."

The counterterrorism programs implemented by the government have significantly impacted the activities of the AQIM and the GMPJ in the Northern and Eastern areas of a country. It is the porous border that accounts for the cross border activities of AQIM from neighboring states. Despite this dilemma the government has arrested nearly one hundred members of AQIM during the period 2007-2008.[33] In the final analysis the safe havens remain even if the activities of the AQIM have dramatically declined. The government of Mauritania acknowledges that in time the threat will dissipate.

Conclusion

This chapter endeavored to demonstrate that safe havens are emerging as a clear threat to stability within states and across the continent of Africa. In terms of characteristics that exist among the terrorist groups that operate within states since September 11, 2001, there are three disturbing realities. The first is the growing presence of al Qaeda. Second, there is an indigenous footprint; that is domestic terrorist groups have reared their head in the wake of the decline of safe havens in Sudan. Third, there is disturbing cooperation between al Qaeda and homegrown terrorist groups in select regions of Africa.

On the burgeoning presence of al Qaeda and the establishment of safe havens in the region, the reality is that this remains an ongoing problem. Consider the Osama bin Laden-led transnational network is able to establish

havens in just about any country within Africa. Al Qaeda is able to enter most African states due in part to the porous borders and as a result of the areas within states that are ungovernable or where the capacity of the military is itself limited. From another perspective al Qaeda creates safe havens but the organizations works hard to keep its footprint small. This affords the organization cover and time to do a number of significant tasks: establish links with local radical Islamic organizations; second, having established these links al Qaeda begins a process of recruitment; and third, bin Laden thereafter commences the process of cooperation with local affiliated terrorist groups. Finally, viewed collectively al Qaeda's strategy indicates that it does not require a large presence of a transnational network (small cells appear the method of choice) to foment instability within a country.

The rise of indigenous terrorist organizations is another concern. Foreign terrorist groups like al Qaeda have established safe havens, but states within Africa now have to deal with the evolution of domestic terrorist organizations. As a result of this issue, several questions should be addressed. How is it that in the wake of the decline of Sudan's safe havens an explosion of sanctuaries developed elsewhere across Africa? To what extent does the presence of weak, failed and collapsed states contribute to the emergence of safe havens in Africa? In answering the first question one could argue there is no direct correlation. Indeed Sudan's decision to eliminate many of the safe havens was based on political calculations. President Omar Bashir of Sudan recognized that U.S.-led sanctions were having a dramatic affect on the Sudanese economy. To take this point one step further the Sudanese government recognized the pending pressure that developed in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001. Thus ending the safe havens is a clear recognition of both internal requirements for the Sudanese government combined with considerable pressure from the United States.

With regard to the explosion of safe havens elsewhere in Africa, a number of dynamics need to be considered. First, domestic terrorist organizations, like foreign organizations, took advantage of porous borders and ungovernable areas within select Africa states. Second, long before the collapse of many of Sudan's safe havens radical Islam was evolving. Experts assert the U.S. invasion of Iraq increased Islamic radicalism in parts of East Africa, North Africa, and West Africa. In time many terrorist

organizations used the U.S. occupation of Iraq as a recruitment instrument, and thus this accounts for the increase in membership in many of the terrorist groups in the aforementioned regions of Africa. Third, the presence of weak, failed and collapsed states in the region increased safe havens primarily because states lacked the authority and resources to counter the rapid emergence of terrorist sanctuaries.

Another reason for the rise of safe havens concerns the cooperation between local terrorist organizations and al Qaeda. Al Qaeda provides leadership, training and resources to advance not only their agenda but the network permits local organizations to conduct many of the attacks. Similarly, when there is need to "push the envelope"—to directly confront local governments for their support of the United States in Iraq or for hosting U.S. troops, al Qaeda calls for the creation of larger more effective organizations that become beholden to Osama bin Laden. A few examples are instructive. To further advance their interests in Somalia and elsewhere in the region a relatively new organization, Al Qaeda in East Africa (EEAQ), was created. In North Africa Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) operates in the region and in parts of West Africa. These organizations are the wave of the future because they launch more brazen attacks using the latest techniques and tactics employed in Iraq or Afghanistan. Equally important the leadership of these organizations is far more experienced then the local counterparts. Thus the leadership of the EEAQ and AQIM is harder to capture. Similarly, the sanctuaries of these organizations are difficult to destroy due in part to the size of the organizations, and there is this additional issue: the military forces assigned to capture the terrorists and to eliminate the safe havens are small and often ineffective.

In conclusion, as Michael Innes argues in his book *Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens*, if states can not eradicate the shelters that permit transnational enterprises to thrive and impact local and regional security, then the war on terror will ultimately fail. Within African states the denial of safe havens may remain as problematic as in the case of Afghanistan. In fact there is a commonality of characteristics between Afghanistan and select states in Africa: there is the presence of corrupt governments, poverty, absence of civil institutions throughout the countries, the presence of foreign and domestic terrorists, and of course multiple safe havens. If the war on terror is to be won the sanctuaries in the region will

have to be removed. The starting point for success is the dissipation of the aforementioned characteristics. If and when states in Africa resolve these issues then the prospect for permanently ending safe havens may proceed, otherwise the region is in for an extended period of instability.

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PART III

Regional Solutions to the Threat of Terrorism

Chapter 8

Rethinking Developmental Practices as a Panacea for Terrorism in Africa

Ben K. Fred-Mensah

Introduction

In this chapter I intend to assess the idea[1] that developmental practices in Africa are a panacea for terrorism in the region.[2] The central argument of the chapter is that our thinking about Africa's development must go beyond the situation in which it found itself in the Cold War period when development was tied to the superpower interests, where in the West it was thought to be a panacea for the spread of communism.[3] Conceived this way, the chapter will show that for development to be sustainable in Africa, it must primarily be concerned with the building of societal capacity, capable enough of dealing with the increasing stress and pains of state-building and issues of human security.

For the purpose of this chapter, terrorism will be conceptualized as a state of "unexpected, shocking and unlawful violence against noncombatants. It includes an attack on "symbolic targets and other groups such as "off-duty military and security personnel in peaceful situations."[4] As Hudson observed, these acts are normally perpetrated by clandestine groups or agents for the "psychological purpose of publicizing a political or religious cause and/or intimidating or coercing" governments and/or civilian populations into accepting demands on behalf of a particular cause."[5]

Even though this definition is generic, largely applicable to all manner of terrorism—domestic and international—my emphasis is on international

terrorism, that is, terrorist attacks or terrorist threats in Africa that are primarily aimed to inflict harm on foreign nationals and or damage their property. Thus, the word "terrorism" will be used interchangeably with the expression "international terrorism" to refer to a particular state of international affairs, which will exclude all manner of violent activities used by non-state and sub-state actors as a means to draw attention to perceived abuse or injustice on the part of their national government.

Human Welfare in Africa

Similar to Brown's observation in the Pacific Islands,[6] Africa's security problems are essentially African and intrastate. By linking development in the developing world to the fight against communism, the postwar North-South relations were cast in the idiom and politics of development assistance.[7] However, considering the vast amounts of resources said to have been transferred to these countries in an attempt to promote development vis-à-vis the extent of poverty that exists in them today, it is right to say that something is wrong with the relationship, thus raising the question as to in whose interest have the resources been transferred—the more advanced donor countries or the less developed recipient countries?

Nowhere in the developing world is this issue more relevant than in Africa.[8] In a 1989 publication, the World Bank[9] noted that Africans, overall, were as poor as they were thirty years earlier. This observation was made almost twenty years ago, even though today, in spite of over two decades of economic and political reforms in most of its countries, Africa has yet to generate the needed structural transformation in order to sustainably generate growth that is capable of providing jobs and improving the welfare of its people.

As shown by the various international development reports, annually published by organizations like the United Nations Children's Fund, the World Bank, and United Nations Development Programme,[10] human development and welfare indicators in Africa are still some of the most deplorable. Even though there have been improvements in welfare indicators in some of the countries in recent years, the region as a whole still witnesses falling per capita income, while poverty, hunger,

malnutrition, and infant mortality are generally some of the worst in the world. For most of the countries, international debt, the specter of HIV/AIDS, institutional fragility, economic mismanagement, and the apparent intractable and horrendous civil and communal wars have continued to cripple their economies. In other words, compared to the other regions of the developing world—Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, the Pacific Islands, and South Asia—Africa's overall performance on the basic welfare indicators such as human development index, life expectancy at birth, maternal and infant mortality, food security, and per capita growth rates lags behind those of the rest of the world.

Developmental Practices as a Response to Terrorism in Africa?

There is a view that the persisting problems of development in Africa in general will provide fertile grounds for terrorism to thrive in the region. As a response to this view, four questions fundamental to development in Africa are worth posing: What is the nature of African development? In what way can our understanding of the nature of contemporary African international relations provide a clue to the understanding of the region's development needs? How analytically useful is it to seek an explanation to the persisting development quandary in Africa from the contemporary global processes in which the national interest is the driving force? In other words, in what way can development be a response to terrorism in Africa? The essence of these questions lies not only in the fact they direct attention to the international dimension of Africa's development, it also lies in the fact that they draw attention to the question as to whether a country or region can achieve self-sustaining development if it relies on a development agenda conceived from the external world where the national interest is the paramount concern.

On the issue of terrorism there is no denial of the fact that the phenomenon has become an issue of great concern in the contemporary international system, including the African region.[11] Also, there is no denial of the fact that effective state-building and economic development in Africa generally lag behind those of the other regions in the world, lending weight

to the view that the region could serve as a safe breeding ground for terrorism.

In fact since the late 1990s terrorist attacks and terrorist threats have become real in Africa. For example, in August 1998, there were attacks on the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 people (including 12 Americans) and injuring almost 5,000. Also, there was an attempted attack on the same country's embassy in Uganda around the same time. In November 2002 a suicide bomb exploded in the Paradise Hotel in Kenya's coastal holiday resort in Kikambala. That, too, resulted in the death of fifteen people. This was immediately followed by a firing of an anti-aircraft missile on an Israeli-chartered Arkia Airlines commercial plane, leaving the Mombassa airport in Kenya for Tel Aviv in Israel.[12] Since then, increasing terrorist threats in that country and in other parts of Africa have been reported, compelling the governments of "the U.S., Britain, and Australia to issue travel warnings to their citizens."[13]

Thus, it is an undeniable fact that terrorism and terrorist threats pose a threat to state stability in general and human security in particular in Africa. The continuing collapse of the state in Somalia, making it possible for organizations such as al-Ittihad, which is said to be in contact with al Qaeda and other terrorist networks, no doubt poses real and potential threats to that country itself and the adjoining countries such as Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya.[14] However, as horrendous and unjustifiable as these attacks and threats are, their occurrence should not be confused with Africa's development needs, if the region is to design and implement a sustainable development agenda. Terrorism in Africa is fundamentally directed at foreign interests, particularly at the United States and states and facilities in the region. This is summarized in a statement by Muhula which he made with reference to the attacks in East Africa in the 1990s: "For the U.S., it was the first sign that the international security debate was about to shift in unprecedented proportions. A new war was about to begin with a non-state actor with vast international networks and resources."[15]

Referring to the increased intensity of the war and the search for allies in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001 on its own soil in New York, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania, Muhula noted that ". . . America will need allies in the war on terror from all corners of the world. Kenya and

Tanzania had unwittingly been drawn into a new war. Both had to search for their role, embrace America's emerging unilateralism, or face isolation."[16]

Given the fact that the type of terrorism under discussion here has an outward focus, that is primarily directed at foreign governments and their interests in Africa, it can be argued that any attempt to see a substantial link between it and the much-talked about poverty in Africa, particularly as noted by Ted Dagne and cited by John Davis,[17] is historically, empirically, and analytically questionable. Unlike the social strife in which some of Africa's states have been engulfed, there hardly is any credible relationship between development and terrorism in the region. Thus, to see a fight against terrorism as a prerequisite for development in Africa or to conceive of development as a panacea for defeating terrorism in the region amounts to nothing short of framing.[18] As the socio-economic background of some of the individuals who took part in the September 11 attack on the United States showed, individuals or groups anywhere may be driven to or made to cooperate with acts of terrorism irrespective of their socio-economic status. In other words, our search for the reasons why people may choose to become terrorists or lend their support to terrorism in Africa in particular must go beyond the much talked about development issues in the region.

Issues that must be of primary concern to development in Africa and to which attention and resources must be devoted are the ravaging conflicts and their implications for political stability, economic development, and human security in the region. Mills noted that

> It is critical to understand that African leaders are primarily concerned about fighting local terrorist, whereas Westerners are often more concerned with those terrorists who threaten Western interest and happen to operate in Africa. These positions are not necessarily contradictory, but they produce nuances that must be understood in the context of African domestic priorities.[19]

As the author accordingly showed, "African responses toward U.S. policies on the war on terrorism (including U.S. decision to go war in Iraq) have been mixed and African and Western leaders maintain disparate priorities when it comes to combating terrorism."[20]

If terrorism has raised "Africa's profile," as some analysts have observed,[21] it may not be for the right cause. This is because of the region's experience with the so-called communist threats in the Cold War era, which, too, "raised its profile." As Clapham noted, if the superpower rivalry

in the Cold War time had any implications for Africa, it certainly was not in promoting its development. Not only did the Cold War distort development efforts in Africa, particularly by its zero-sum nature, it also contributed to the proliferation of deadly weapons, which were transferred to both governments (mostly dictatorial regimes) and rebel groups in their apparent ideological confrontations.

In this regard, one can readily recall the Cold War-sponsored ideological fights in countries like Ethiopia, Somalia, Mozambique, and Angola. Also, it was the interests of the superpowers—the United States and the former Soviet Union—that increasingly made it difficult to defeat the apartheid system in South Africa and the granting of genuine self-determination to the then-Congo Leopoldville, now Democratic Republic of the Congo, South West Africa, now Namibia, and Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. Furthermore, there is no denial of the fact that some of the military takeovers that almost became the political culture of some of African countries were sponsored by the superpowers. A typical example of the Cold War-sponsored military interventions in African politics was Ghana's February 1966 coup, which removed the country's first post-independence president, Kwame Nkrumah, from office. It was, therefore, not surprising that the immediate post-Cold War period in the region was marked by horrendous intrastate conflict, mostly in states that had received assistance, particularly in the form of military weapons, transferred from the superpowers.[22]

Thus, by viewing the fight against international terrorism in the ideational context provided in President George W. Bush's version of the old dicta: "you are either with us or you are with the terrorist,"[23] Africa will once again be made a victim of a zero-sum mentality, hence the continual distortion of its development agenda and the destruction of any room for national discretion in development policy making. It is thus necessary for Africa to extricate its development agenda from foreign-focused, anti-terrorist policies of international actors in order to deal with the constraints imposed on its development efforts by the youthfulness of its own states and the violence with which it is predictably associated. Referring to this youthful nature of the state and its associated problems in the Pacific Islands, Brown noted that "While the peoples of the region have long, deeply rooted traditions, states as such are young. Across the region a slow, difficult, but also potentially creative process is under way as governments

and communities grapple with profound social, economic and political change. Many of the problems of the region reflect the turbulent nature of these processes.[24]

Development Sustainability in Africa

Having made the point that terrorism in Africa, as defined in this chapter, is externally-directed and that efforts aimed to combat it should not be confused with the region's development agenda, I now turn attention to what I consider to be the key issue in the region's development. So much has been said and written about development in Africa. It must be recalled that since the late 1980s there have been discussions relating to the foundation on which African governments have been seeking to build their development strategies. The foundation is said to be fragile, accounting for the widespread failure of the region's development policies. Receiving great attention in this regard are issues relating to developmental capacity, which by definition is an issue of national governance.[25] For example, in a 1991 publication the World Bank[26] argued that to be effective policy must be sustainable and this sustainability requires efficient state personnel and viable state institutions.[27] This thus means that to meet the challenges of Africa's development, there is the need to build and/or strengthen the capacity of the state, which *ipso facto* calls for increased investments in the training of state personnel and the building and/or strengthening of state institutions.[28]

Given the generally fragile nature of the state in Africa it is not surprising that attention has been focused on the viability of the state in the region. As Brautigam observed, a viable state is the one that is able to formulate and implement its policies in order to accomplish its development goals.[29] However, this thinking has raised questions. For example, is governance effectiveness a result of changes focused primarily on the public sector or on broader sets of actions affecting the private sector and civil society too? Should capacity-building initiatives primarily, if not exclusively, focus on efforts to improve the quality of state personnel and state institutions or it should incorporate human resources and institutions in the wider society?[30] These questions draw attention to both the

importance of the state in the development process and the dynamic interaction that must necessarily exist between it and the wider society in order to ensure the sustainability of the development efforts.[31] Contrary to the quintessence of these questions, however, the capacity-building initiatives in Africa in general have primarily been focused on the training of state officials and the building of state institutions. However, as the results from these initiatives have generally shown, the dream has not come true along the underlying assumptions. This is because even though the capacity of the African state is a matter of concern, poorly performing state officials and state institutions in the region must be seen as symptoms of *disconnect* between the development philosophies of the states[32] and those of the wider segments of the society. Referring to a similar situation in the Pacific Islands, Brown observed that

> Across much of the region there is a fractured relationship, and at times a deep disconnection between the institutions of the state and society. . . . The institutions of state, however from parliaments to police systems, do not mesh automatically with customary or local community governance mechanisms and cultural norms. This "thin" connection between society and the institutions of state weakens the legitimacy of institutions, citizens, and democratic participation. It can work to distort the proper functioning of both state institutions and community processes, and so has profound effects on the potential for violent conflict and crime. . . .[33]

While this disconnect between state and society in Africa can create conditions that are favorable for terrorism to breed in the region, its overall impact on the region must be assessed, first and foremost with reference to region's own development priorities.

Conclusion

In the foregoing discussion, I have examined the idea as to whether developmental practices in Africa can serve as a panacea for contemporary international terrorism in the region. On historical, empirical, and analytical grounds, the chapter has questioned the validity of the idea. This study does not, however, deny the fact that terrorist acts and terrorist threats are present in Africa. Also, the current chapter does not disagree to the view that state weakness and abject poverty can provide grounds for external terrorists to exploit to carry out their terrorist plans. Furthermore the discussion is not in

any way opposed to any efforts meant to combat and eradicate terrorism from the region. It is also necessary to note that this study does not set out to oppose Africa's using external assistance to reform its security sector. This chapter thus endorses the mutually-accepted military assistance being given to the region, particularly the ongoing African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), now renamed the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA), and other forms of joint military exercises with foreign troops.

The primary concern of the chapter is that as heinous and as morally objectionable as terrorism is, plans and policies meant to deal with it in Africa must not be made to obscure the region's development efforts. Any attempt to relate African development to the ongoing international fight against terrorism will not only amount to distorting its development priorities, it will also amount to promoting the interest of foreign actors at the cost of the region's development, a situation similar to what happened in the Cold War period. One important normative argument in this regard is that in discussing international terrorism in Africa and efforts meant to combat it, there is the need to distinguish between it and the ongoing civil strife in the region, the latter of which is a symptom associated with state-building. As I understand it, it is these intrastate conflicts that Mills referred to as "local terrorism"[34] and Davis as "political terrorism."[35]

It must be borne in mind that the perpetrators of the international terrorist acts in Africa are often Arab Muslims with connection with Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda networks who act through local Muslims. In other words, the source of the anger that appears to be giving birth to terrorism in Africa is foreign and the resultant terrorist acts and terrorist threats are primarily directed toward external interests rather than Africans and African governments *per se*. It is thus arguable that development, with all the associated welfare benefits, even if equitably distributed among a country's population, will not necessarily deter committed terrorists from carrying out their plans. While it may be true that there is a growing disenchantment in some Muslim communities against their government, as observed by Muhula,[36] disenchantment (usually engendered by the continuing political and economic deprivation) is a widespread problem in the region. In other words, disenchantment within Africa's Muslim communities is not a sufficient factor to dictate the direction of the region's development agenda.

It is therefore necessary to note that in the instances in which non-state actors direct anger at their governments in Africa, it is usually in the form of civil war as demonstrated by the conflicts in the Mano River Union and its adjoining countries in West Africa,[37] in the Great Lakes Region, of which Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi are the key battlegrounds,[38] and on the Horn, particularly the situation in Somalia and the apparently intractable devastation in Sudan's Darfur region.[39] Perhaps, this was what Mills meant when he observed that the real terrorist threat in Africa is an internal one.[40] The key message here is that there is the need for building effective state capacity, a state-building exercise which must be linked to the building of the capacity of civil society organizations and the private sector institutions. This exercise, as I noted elsewhere, must go hand in hand with the building of norms of trust.[41] This is because, as I argued, effective norms of trust—the key elements of social capital—serve as the mechanism that holds a people together and as meso-level phenomena[42] ensure viable micro-macro or state-society relations.[43]

The burden on the modern state, including the relatively newly-independent ones in Africa, is unquestionably enormous.[44] Citing a Charles Tilly publication, Mohammed Ayoob noted that unlike Western European societies "during the analogous stage of state making," the tasks of state making in contemporary developing countries are complicated by claims for political participation and social and economic justice.[45] There is no denial of the fact that this complication has been at the root of most of the conflicts in Africa, hence their intrastate nature. Thus, state-building in Africa cannot ignore this reality if the process is to enjoy the needed legitimacy. In their ongoing efforts to design and implement a sustainable development agenda in their multinational societies,[46] Africa's state builders must recognize and mobilize the potentially productive cultural and human resources of their various ethnic constituents. In doing so, I will argue, they will utilize all available productive resources in the development process. By bringing together people with divergent and conflicting interests for collective decision making, the state-building efforts will provide not only the opportunities for mutual learning, critical analysis, collective problem solving, and shared visioning, it will inhere the potential of evolving into a mechanism for facilitating the interaction and cooperation among the people.[47]

Notes

1. The word "idea" is used here in the same way it was used by Boas and McNeill to mean a concept that influences development policy (see Morten Boas and Desmond McNeill, "Power and Ideas in Multilateral Institutions: Towards and Interpretative Framework," in Morten Boas and Desmond McNeill, eds., *Global Institutions and Development: Framing the World?* New York: Routledge, 2004, 1.

2. Unless otherwise stated, Africa is used in this chapter to refer to the so-called sub-Saharan Africa, excluding the Arabic countries of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco.

3. This was conveyed in President Harry Truman's 1949 inauguration speech in which he noted that since the Soviet Union at the time had "begun an industrialization process without adopting capitalism," there was "a real fear that Third World countries would follow" its example. Thus, in part, development was "launched to counter such as move" (see Knut G. Nustad, "The Development Discourse in the Multilateral System," in Morten Boas and Desmond McNeill, eds., 2004, 15-16).

4. This definition has been adapted from Rex A. Hudson's *Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why* (Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press), The 1999 Government Report on Profiling Terrorists, 18. See also Greg Mills, Africa's New Strategic Significance," in John Davis, ed., *Africa and the War on Terrorism* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company 2007), 25.

5. Rex A. Hudson, ibid.

6. M. Anne Brown, "Security and Development: Conflict and Resilience in the Pacific Island Region," in M. Anne Brown, ed., *Security and Development in the Pacific Islands: Social Resilience in Emerging States* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2007), 6.

7. See Mark Hobart, "Introduction: The Growth of Ignorance?" in Mark Hobart, ed., *An Anthropological Critique of Development: The Growth of Ignorance* (New York: Routledge, 1993).

8. There are active debates going on regarding the relationships between foreign aid and development in Africa. One most recent one was on Fareed Zakaria's *GPS* program on CNN between Dambisa Moyo, the author of the bestselling book, *Dead Aid*, and Jacqueline Novogratz, the CEO of Acumen Fund on July 5, 2009.

9. World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1989), 1.

10. See various editions of the United Nations Children Fund's *The State of the World's Children*, The World Bank's *World Development Report*, and the United Nations Development Programme's *Human Development Report*.

11. See various contributions in John Davis, ed., *Africa and the War on Terrorism* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007). Also, see Princeton N. Lyman, "The War on Terrorism in Africa," in John Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Africa in World Politics: Reforming Political Order* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008), 276-302.

12. Raymond Muhula, "Kenya and Global War on Terrorism: Searching for a New Role in a New War," in John Davis, ed., *Africa and the War on Terrorism* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007), 43-52. Also, see Greg Mills, ibid.

13. Raymond Muhula, op. cit., 51.

14. See Peter Woodward, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 140-157.

15. Raymond Muhula, op. cit., 43.

16. Ibid.

17. See John Davis, "Africa's Road to the War on Terror," in John Davis, ed., *Africa and the War on Terrorism*, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007), 2.

18. My conception of "framing" in this study is similar to the way it was used by Boas and McNeill. The two authors defined it as an exercise of power that serves to limit the power of alternative ideas and in doing so weakens their capacity to effect change. To the authors, effective "frame," is one which makes favored ideas seem like common sense, and "unfavored ones as unthinkable" (Morten Boas and Desmond McNeill, "Power and Ideas in Multilateral Institutions: Towards and Interpretative Framework," in Morten Boas and Desmond McNeill, eds., op. cit., 1–2).

19. Greg Mills, op. cit., 22.

20. Ibid., 25.

21. See Greg Mills, op. cit., 18-19.

22. See Christopher Clapham, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), chapter 6.

23. This statement dates back Jesus Christ, according to Mathew 12:30 and versions of it attributed to Vladimir I. Lenin, George Orwell, Benito Mussolini, and Hillary Clinton. President Bush used it in an address to joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001.

24. M. Anne Brown, op. cit., 2-3.

25. The concept of "governance" in this context simply refers to the "exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens articulate their interests" (United Nations Development Programme, *Governance for Sustainable Human Development* (New York: UNDP, 1997), 2-3, cited by L. Emerij, R. Jolly, and T.G Weiss, *Ahead of the Curve? UN Ideas and Global Challenges* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 188.

26. World Bank, *African Capacity Building Initiative* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1991).

27. See M. E. Hilderbrand and M.S. Grindle, "Building Sustainable Capacity in the Public Sector: What can be Done?" in Merilee S. Grindle, ed., *Getting Good Government: Capacity Building in the Public Sectors of Developing Countries*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Institute for International Development, 1997), 31-56.

28. The World Bank, 1989.

29. See Deborah Brautigam, "State Capacity and Effective Governance," in B. Ndulu and N. van Walle, eds., *Agenda for Africa's Economic Renewal* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996). For a deeper insight into the concept and reality of developmental state, see Ziya Onis in "The logic of Developmental State," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1991.

30. Merilee S. Grindle, "The Good Government Imperative: Human Resources, Organizations and Institutions," Merilee S. Grindle, ed., *Getting Good Government: Capacity Building in the Public Sectors of Developing Countries* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Institute for International Development, 1997), 5.

31. See Wilfred L. David's critique of economic orthodoxy in his *The Humanitarian Development Paradigm: the Search for Global Justice* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2004).

32. To recall, the modern states in Africa were crafted and imposed on the indigenous societies by European colonizers, with little, if any, regard for the preexisting indigenous sociopolitical arrangements (see Mamadou Dia, *Africa's Management in the 1990s and Beyond: Reconciling Indigenous and Transplanted Institutions* [Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996]).

33. M. Anne Brown, op. cit., 12.

34. This is similar to what Mills referred to as "local terrorists in Africa (see Greg Mills, op. cit., 22.)

35. John Davis, "Introduction," in John Davis, op. cit., 4.

36. Raymond Muhula, op. cit., 43.

37. While the Mano River Union consists of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea (Conakry), the adjoining areas referred to here include Cote d'Ivoire, the Casamance region of Senegal, the northern districts of Niger, Guinea Bissau, and the Niger Delta areas of Nigeria, see Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashi, eds., *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2004).

38. See Gilbert Khadiagala ed., *Security Dynamics in Africa's Great Lakes Region* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2006).

39. See Peter Woodward, op. cit.

40. Greg Mills, op. cit., 17.

41. The word "trust" is used here to simply refer to the "faith and confidence" that people in the form of transactions have in each other believing that they will do the "right thing." It is conceived of as the key element of social capital—a concept which I used to refer to the capability of social laws, rules, norms, and customs, among others, to hold members of a group together by setting and facilitating the terms of their relationships; see Ben K. Fred-Mensah, op. cit, 2004; "The Rise and Fall of *Nugormesese* in a West African Community: Issues in Institutional Building and Social Capital Viability in Africa," *Research Review*, Vol. 23.2, 2007; and "The True Cost of Africa's Conflicts," *African Business*, June 2008. See also Fergus Lyon, "Trust, Networks and Norms: The Creation of Social Capital in Agricultural Economies of Ghana," in *World Development* 28, No. 4, 2000, 664.

42. By conceiving of institutions as the key embodiment of social capital, nationwide institutions are meso-level phenomena that serve as links between the state and society as a whole. Often conceived of as an institution, markets are meso-level phenomena that link micro-level producers of goods and services with macro-level state policies and actions (see Ben K. Fred-Mensah, op. cit., 2004).

43. See Ben K. Fred-Mensah, op. cit., 2004; and "State Capacity or Receptive Societal Capacity?: Rethinking the African Development Agenda," *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Winter/Spring, Vol. V, Issue 1, 1998. Also, see S. Fukuda-Parr, Carlos Lopes and Khalid Malik, "Institutional Innovations for Capacity Development," in Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Carlos Lopes and Khalid Malik, eds., *Capacity for Development: New Solutions to Old Problems* (Sterling, VA: Earthscan, 2002).

44. The nature of the burden on the modern state is explained by the "managerial state" concept, as defined by Opello and others. See Walter C. Opello, Jr., and Stephen J. Rosow, *The Nation-State and Global Order: A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2004), 133-158.

45. Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and International System* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1995), 39–41.

46. Apart from Somalia, African states are multinational, compromising societies which, until the onset of the colonial state-building period, were in great measure independent of each other.

47. See Ben K. Fred-Mensah, op. cit., 2004.

Chapter 9

The Imperative of Good Governance and Strong Democratic Institutions to Spur Development and Prevent the Expansion of Terrorism in Africa

Abdul Karim Bangura

Introduction

Africa's economic, political and social state has been a hot topic of discussion since decolonization. If underdevelopment can be seen as a major cause for Africa's problems, the experience of the past four decades implies that there is still a vague understanding of what to actually do about it. This is not to say that there are not any working theories. It is actually precisely the opposite; there are thousands of books, articles, assessments, theories and suggestions advising Africans how to turn their situation around. Liberal democracy, central direction and structural adjustment programs are only a few of the reforms that have previously been put in place but have resulted in failure. This chapter focuses on governance and suggests that good governance and strong democratic governmental institutions are an absolute necessity for development and the prevention of the expansion of terrorism in Africa. The thesis proffered is that the failure in previous development efforts and the fact that terrorist activities have taken place on the continent are because the programs offered to solve Africa's economic, political and social problems did not tackle a number of issues relating to creating sustainable constitutions for national governance and did very little to establish accountable political institutions.

The goal of the chapter is therefore fourfold: first, to characterize the major streams of contemporary thoughts on governance, democratization, leadership and their impacts on development; second, to understand the

relationships between civil societies and socio-economic change; third, to introduce a discussion about rule of law and its necessity for Africa's future; and finally, to show how good governance is critical to prevent the expansion of terrorism on the continent. To properly analyze these issues, the chapter takes a broader continental viewpoint, albeit without making generalizations.

Governance

Before any analysis takes place, it is necessary to understand the meaning of governance as employed in this essay. Governance is defined as the act of affecting government and monitoring (through policy) the long-term strategy and direction of a country. In general, governance comprises the traditions, institutions and processes that determine how power is exercised, how citizens are given a voice, and how decisions are made on issues of public concern.[1] According to this definition, governance is bound to have an everlasting impact on the rule of law, local and national institutions, leadership, public administration issues and, of course, Africa's goal of sustainable development and the prevention of the expansion of terrorism on the continent. Good governance has become a fashionable phrase in recent development literature, but treating it as a buzzword would be short-sighted.

A government as an institution can be seen as a structure of rules, both written and unwritten. To engage in governance then is to attempt to enforce the rules that make up governments.[2] Behind the rules that are created by governments, there is another set of rules that are constitutional in nature and regulate persons engaging in enacting the rules of government. Great power is held in the hands of individuals and groups that have authority to alter constitutional regulations in any form without consulting the people. The concentration of power determines the character of political process and must be given a great deal of attention when it comes to Africa. When a small group of people or a single person has the resources to establish and enforce a set of constitutional rules, one should expect a high level of danger and instability, because that group or individual will design unilateral advantages and biases into the rules to

benefit the group or the person and in turn ignore the rights of the majority.[3] Among the negative prospects of such regimes are corruption, economic inefficiency, eroded legitimacy and, eventually, economic and administrative decline, as has been witnessed in many cases in Africa.[4]

Such regimes are, thus, very weak in nature because the rule of law that enables them to survive is constructed on the backs of an oppressed people. The mass support for these regimes is shallow and does not reach outside the capitals. Their attempt to lead any sort of significant social or economic change or even to deliver basic services for the most part is short lived.[5] Perhaps this could explain the reluctance of these governments to allow the development of more local leadership and institutions. Upon close inspection, the story of most post-colonial African states clearly shows concentration of power and centralization.[6] Local autonomy is able to breed leaders and create cohesion which eventually will challenge the elite class. Unfortunately for most cases, because governments do not foster good local governance, Africans have not been able to have a united movement against oppression from their leaders, like the one that led to the rejection of colonization.

Despite the negativity surrounding Africans, the people have managed to survive. For the most part, social order has been kept and civilizations have been maintained. Voluntary associations, churches, mosques and traditional ruling structures foster community living. Democracy is not a new introduction to Africa; the indigenous populations have been practicing it for centuries through use of consensus and chiefs.[7] In African societies, there is a basic building block for more contemporary democratic solutions to address current problems. Some in support of the traditional system of local governance have argued that local institutions could give birth to viable state systems by using a bottom-up approach. It is not the purpose of this paper, however, to determine whether the bottom-up strategy will work, but rather to merely indicate that the central state strategy in Africa has failed and traditional political structures and complicated intermixing of cultures seem to be the reason why Africa has not completely crumbled. On the other side, the bottom-up approach has been associated with romanticizing the workings of pre-colonial regimes. But, regardless of the method used, because of the specific nature of African demographics, the intermixing of several ethnicities, national governance should focus on

representation, discussion and consensus building. One of the main road blocks in post-colonial Africa is the fact that current governmental systems do not allow for constructive public participation.

It is therefore instructive to note what Jacques Mangala says about good governance as it pertains to Africa:

> Good governance is not only a government duly put in place by the people, but which stays in close touch with the needs of people in the formulation and implementation of national policies. Good governance is not about the mechanics of policies but their ends. Good governance in this sense is intimately linked to the pursuit of a democratic agenda, which seeks "ownership" by the people of reform and development program enunciated by the state/government. Participatory democracy, decentralization of economic and political decision-making centers of power are central to this broad democratic agenda, which should constitute the measure of "good governance," especially when assessed against the background of state sovereignty.[8]

Indeed, Mangala's points bring some restoration of intellectual sanity to the discourse on good governance, for they highlight the truism that good governance is fundamentally a political necessity grounded on the notion of legitimacy.

Civil Societies

Some have asked if there is a true civil society in Africa that is able to challenge the elite. For the purpose of this chapter, the definition of civil societies provided by John Makumbe is employed: that is, "an aggregate of institutions whose members are engaged primarily in a complex of non-state activities—economic and cultural production, voluntary associations—and who in this way preserve and transform their identity by exercising pressures or controls upon state institutions."[9] In terms of this working definition, civil societies would include trade unions, professional associations, and resident, student and business organizations. Makumbe explains that although civil societies in Africa in the 1980s and 1990s had been seen as anti-state, the truth is that the African experience of civil society has largely focused on the people's struggles against despotic leaders. He goes on to mention that civil societies serve crucial functions of limiting the power of the state, challenging abuse of authority and, most importantly, strengthening the rule of law. He also suggests that civil

societies are responsible for building steps toward raising the level of material development in communities and building a constituency for economic as well as political reform. It is not clear from Makumbe, however, whether civil societies in Africa perform these duties.

Colonial governments throughout Africa destroyed much of the civil groups and organizations that existed prior to colonial rule. Colonial leaders understood that these groups could challenge their leadership and approached them with suspicion. Makumbe is not saying that African tradition prior to colonialism included or supported current definitions of civil society, but it is nonetheless true that pre-colonial African political systems recognized the role of popular participation. A good example of this is Bantu groups in Southern Africa which embraced popular participation and traditional civil societies at the heart of their local institutions.[10]

In most of Africa, civil society has been effective in bringing about social and political change; but, half a century of oppression in many nations has slowed the momentum toward this development. In post-independence Africa, nearly all nations had a drive toward authoritarian regimes. The main argument in support of the move dictated that a one-party state was African in nature while a multi-party system was seen as splitting the people and as an enemy to national unity.[11] Democracy was seen as a luxury in a continent that was in need of development. In retrospect, it is easy to debunk the theory; but at the time, the plan sounded practical because African leaders were in a hurry to show the rest of the world the continent's potential.[12] It started with national heroes stepping up during the revolution to grab power but eventually ended up with all the state's power at their disposal; thus, political leaders became invincible. Some, as we see today, have become lifetime presidents, and they virtually use the states' power to crush their opposition. Civil societies were threats to the central government and were nearly abolished. Africa's intellectual power gradually started moving elsewhere, living in exile, in fear of prosecution. The leaders started to deploy an economic agenda that was not particularly sustainable. Economic decisions were made emotionally, and feasibility studies were not being done well. It is true that most of the leaders led rebellion movements that afforded them a seat as leaders, but they lacked experience as good public administrators. The bigger problem

was not the fact that they did not have ample experience; rather, it was the leaders' unwillingness to relinquish their power that led to compounded mistakes.

Leadership and Outside Actors

In Africa, public participation started to dwindle because citizens were being persecuted for their beliefs. Most countries still do not have free media. Dishonest leaders rarely face trial for their crimes but, rather, retire to luxurious exile. Peter Anyang Nyong describes the state of civil societies and African governance as follows:

> Political changes that the African people have been calling for are based on their concrete experiences: years of dashed hopes, frustrated aspirations, misdirected efforts and fruitless investments. All of these things happened because people trusted their governments too much, let them bite off more than they could chew, entrusted them with public resources that were either squandered for personal gain or more tragically were simply left to be gnawed by mice or carried off by the ants of the savannah.[13]

While the West, especially the United States, is advocating the spread of democracy around the world, corrupt leaders in Africa that are sympathetic toward Western interests are left to exercise absolute power, violating national and international regulations. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was standing right next to President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea, stating their long-lasting friendship in April of 2006.[14] Ironically Rice's State Department had routinely been denouncing Obiang for his brutality. This is a clear example for the need to understand the historical background of African authoritarian regimes and their Western supporters. During the Cold War, the United States supported any enemy of their enemies. Some African dictators were allies against the Soviet Union and the Libyan regime. The Cold War is now over and, as a result, authoritarian regimes are stronger. More recently, natural resources such as petroleum and the "war against terrorism" have replaced the Cold War as factors to support some corrupt governments.

It is critical to understand the impact of outside actors on Africa's deteriorating governance and economic well-being. In the past, Western forces played a monumental role starting from colonialism to neo-

colonialism that has affected Africa's governance. Recently, there have been growing concerns about the connection between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and its influence in Africa. The PRC aids and abets some oppressive and destitute African dictatorships by legitimizing their misguided polices and praising their development models because of China's own economic and strategic interests.[15] China is encouraging Africa's most repressive regimes, thereby fostering bad governance. The Chinese government has secured exclusive access to African natural resources for its growing population, by the use of an aggressive political campaign integrating itself with some corrupt leaders. In 2004, for instance, despite the United States and European Union's arms embargo against Zimbabwe, China sold weaponry worth $200 million to that country. China's current association with Africa is only one example, and one must understand that there are several outside actors that have throughout the years benefited from holding back good governance. If China's and Western nations' foreign policies are not adjusted, they will continue to pose a significant challenge to glimmers of democratization in some African countries.

Democratization

Sometimes, whether by the use of force or delaying tactics, most incumbent regimes in Africa have managed to prevent movement toward democratization. In some cases, even when elections are held, existing political elites sometimes remain in power where the military has played an important role for their continuity. In Kenya, for example, the opposition Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) fragmented fatally, allowing Daniel Toroitich arap Moi's ruling party to win several highly contested elections.[16] In Ethiopia, in another highly contested and opaque election, Meles Zenawie and his party won the coveted seat. Hundreds of students who protested were gunned down in the street, journalists were detained, and a curfew was decreed to prevent social movements from gaining momentum. Even when a discredited regime is replaced by election, the successor normally does not find it a simple task to put in place the necessary economic reforms to better the country. In Zambia, Fredrick Chiluba found it hard to control corruption and reform the economy.

Mostly, citizens who are eager to see changes are quickly disappointed because change is not available or it is delayed.[17] The point is to emphasize the fact that the establishment of democracy is by no means a panacea for all socio-economic ills. This brings back a previous point: that is, sustainable government that is able to spur economic, political and social progress should be built upon strong institutions that support accountability and governmental legitimacy in order to see long-lasting change.

Whether multiparty democracy is a luxury to be enjoyed only by the wealthy nations or a precondition everywhere for sustained economic progress is a different issue that remains still unsettled. Nonetheless, there is a tenacious link between open democratic forms of government and good economic performance. Whatever the truth may be, today most students of development seem to agree that the effective participation of the general population in the formation and implementation of public policies is essential for successful development. The breakdown of the structural adjustment program (SAP) is attributable, at least in part, to the failure to build popular consensus in support for the measures.[18]

Indeed, as Kelechi Kalu agrees, there is clearly a need for a constitutional democratic framework for governments in sub-Saharan African countries. But he also argues that such a system of government will not succeed in the context of declining investment in socio-economic infrastructures. Thus, he insists that the objective of a viable constitutionally-based government must not be to further fragment the different but yet similarly situated social formations in Africa; instead, it should strive to unify them in the context of a just governance structure within which strength in diversity and unity in collective action are promoted.[19]

Information as a Tool

Accountability and good governance exist where there is a facility to disseminate accurate information. Availability of information allows citizens to understand and articulate their interests to their leaders. Pierre Landell-Mills notes that chiefs during the pre-colonial era had a hard time hiding their actions because their domains tended to be small. Their actions

were largely known by the public and made them more accountable to the people. In today's Africa, however, leaders are able to erase their mistakes from the books of history by using leverage and power. But recently, a remarkable information revolution has taken place in the West and is transitioning over to Africa. The global village is shrinking; and, as Landell-Mills also points out, current leaders are being forced to be more accountable. The explosion of Western mass media might be confusing and the West is becoming more desensitized to Africa's growing problems; but overall, media growth has affected Africa positively. Inside Africa, political debate is growing as citizens are becoming more educated about their leaders. Lagos alone has fifty newspapers; and in Nairobi, there are nearly one hundred periodicals. Nonetheless, in other parts of the continent, there are countries that have limited or no free press.[20] Ethiopia has been known to arrest journalists without due process for unjustified reasons. In Sierra Leone and the Gambia, journalists have been harassed and killed. But overall, explosion of publishing is happening all over the continent. On top of traditional media such as newspapers, television and radio, electronic mail, Internet, and videotape are providing a huge amount of information to the people. The spread of information is projected to bring down unaccountable leaders, even if it takes time.

In Zambia and Zimbabwe, in the late 1990s, several journalists were detained and tried for stories that they had published which were deemed hostile by their governments.[21] Furthermore the Zimbabwean government is notorious for punishing newspapers by denying them advertisement rights which severely limits their economic viability. Another tactic governments have used is to limit imports of printing presses and issue permits to newspapers that go along with the states' political agendas. Even though there is an information revolution taking place, there is still a lot of self-censorship on the part of private media outlets. A lot more needs to be done in this area if African civil society is to have meaningful access to information in the movement toward development.

Reports from the African Union (AU), the Alliance for the Reformation of Governance in

Africa (ARGA), and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)

In recent years, the collapse of Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, Angola, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia has taken place, as well as continuing civil wars in the Sudan, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (this has been characterized by some observers as Africa's "international/Third World War"). Corruption has been a gaping hole in African economies, leading to the loss of billions of dollars. Governments are not willing to make the necessary changes to become more accountable. It is anticipated that recent debt relief granted to some African countries will go a long way to overcome obstacles of development. If corruption is not rooted out of the African economies, however, the debt relief will not be felt by the people.

A joint incentive of the African Union Commission (AUC) and the Alliance for the Reformation of Governance in Africa (ARGA) formulated action proposals to promote good governance in Africa following a workshop in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in December of 2005.[22] It is ironic that the same governments in Africa that are accused of corruption and human rights violations sat in a roundtable and discussed good governance. As expected, the results from the roundtable are less than satisfactory; but, nonetheless, the discussions are fostering admirably new ideas. Issues discussed were corruption, elections, and facilitating the emergence of local dimensions of good governance.

A councilor of the city of Windhoek, Gerson Kamatuka, who represented the Association of Local Authorities in Namibia, stressed that there should be a move to incorporate local government associations in the African Union. Historically, the African Union has had its own set of problems; but as Kamatuka pointed out, fostering local rule could be an essential move toward good governance. Such a move will allow the voices of local people in different countries to be heard on a continental level. If discussions could take place, then there is a chance that solutions could emerge. Africa needs to collectively conceive and put in place a system of governance within which different actors can be recognized and participate. Local leadership should be a key to good governance.

On April 14, 2006, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) issued a statement that explained how governance is improving but challenges

remain. The African Governance Report (AGR), launched in March of 2006, is a culmination of a three-year survey of experts and households in twenty seven African countries which was aimed at gauging citizens' perceptions of the state of governance. Although there have been numerous significant political events during the time of the survey (2001-2004), there have been no major changes in the perceptions of governance. The research shows significant improvements in political governance indicators, especially in comparison to the past two decades. Many African nations now have multiparty regimes, with varying levels of stability. The study also shows that political systems, political party freedoms, and power distribution are the indicators that got higher scores. One must keep in mind that present results are compared to past results from within the continent and not compared to globally accepted standards, thereby showing a more positive picture. The governance report goes on to say that there is a lot of room for improvement. People's rights continue to be violated, opposition parties lack access to resources and security, and electoral commissions are not well resourced and lack full independence.

The AGR also stresses the fact that corruption and lack of transparency of governments pose a serious challenge. Corruption in Africa has undermined economic development and poverty reduction in numerous ways. It also reduces respect for the law, facilitates crime, and generates cynicism. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has indicated that corruption caused by lack of good governance can reduce a country's growth rate by up to 0.5 percent a year.[23] Estimates of the cost of corruption in monetary terms are key to understanding the problem, but one must note that quantifying corruption could not be done with utmost certainty. The cost of corruption is not just the amount of money lost but also retarded development and increased inequalities.[24] A report by the African Union (AU), presented in Addis Ababa in 2002, estimated that corruption costs African economies an excess of US$148 billion a year. Ironically, this figure exceeds the aid that Africa gets by several billions of dollars. It may be necessary to point out that at this time, even though corruption has become extremely potent in some African countries, countries such as Botswana, Tunisia, South Africa, Mauritius and Namibia do not fare badly in international comparisons.[25]

Corruption in Africa would not have devastated the economies as badly if the funds that were stolen actually stayed in the continent. Instead, African political leaders and other elites do not trust their own governments and financial institutions, so the funds get stashed away in financial safe havens like Europe and the United States. For instance, former Kenyan President Moi was accused of stashing away a fortune of about a billion dollars under his name.[26] In addition the World Bank has estimated that 40 percent of Africa's aggregate wealth is stored outside Africa. This outflow of funds has an incredibly negative effect on the continent's economies.

Corruption poses a serious development challenge. It undermines democracy and good governance. Corruption in elections and legislative process reduces accountability and distorts the representation of policymaking and compromises the rule of law. Since resources are siphoned off, public offices are bought and sold and institutional capacity of government to work properly is reduced. Good governance requires fair legal frameworks that are enforced impartially, but corruption stands in the way, rotting African institutions from the inside out.

Terrorism

On August 7, 1998, the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were bombed by terrorists, killing more than 250 people. To retaliate for the bombings, the United States on August 20 used sixteen cruise missiles to bomb the Al Shifa Pharmaceuticals Industry plant in Khartoum, Sudan, claiming that the plant was a chemical weapons-making plant connected to Osama bin Laden. On May 17, 2003, terror blasts in Casablanca, Morocco, left twenty-six people dead. What these cases show is that Africa is not immune from terrorist attacks. And what the first case in particular makes very clear is that when a country, especially a superpower for that matter, feels threatened, it will find ways to respond to wherever it believes the threat may emanate.

There is no question that the parlous state of African economies, the poverty of its people and the desperation of many governments in Africa make survival the first commandment of life. The majority of the world's poorest nations are in Africa. Hunger, disease and chronic illiteracy are a

way of life in many of those countries, where a dollar a day will be a privilege. These nations are laden with foreign debts in the billions of dollars, while their citizens battle with perennial droughts. But these countries are endowed with large deposits of natural resources and/or vast uninhabited territories that are conducive for military activities. And since they cannot export cars, like Japan, or computer chips, like the United States, or electronics, like South Korea, or missile technology, like North Korea, their natural resources and territories become simply market commodities.

Saddam Hussein, we now know, did not seek to buy uranium from Niger; but had he wanted to do so, he could have obtained it from any one of several nations in the Saharan region. Life is so harsh for the people in the southern edge of the Sahara that exporting any commodity that would provide hard cash—for health care, education, decent roads and shelter—would be difficult to resist.

That good governance is critical to prevent the expansion of terrorism in Africa and other regions across the globe is underscored by the discussions held at the United Nations 63rd General Assembly Plenary 7th and 8th Meetings of September 24, 2008, appropriately titled "Good Governance, Democratic Institutions Crucial in Combat against Terrorism, Organized Crime." During the sessions, world leaders denounced organized crime fueled by illegal drug trafficking and the wave of terrorism "spreading like wildfire" across the globe. They also expressed unwavering support for improved legal frameworks, institutional capacity-building and, in some cases, full transition to democracy to provide a hedge against future destabilization.[27]

A Radical Solution

In light of the problems associated with lack of good governance and corruption, some individuals like Patrick McAuslan have come up with a radical solution. McAuslan, a professor of Law and Urban Management at University College in London, proposes that "international involvement in Africa should be drastically scaled back and in some cases cease all together" and further notes that "a new deal, via a legally binding

international agreement, a concordat which ties aid to strict conditions on good governance and the ending of corruption" must be implemented. Repeatedly in African history, Western governments and international aid agencies have looked the other way and continued to supply aid after being aware of misconduct of bureaucrats in African nations. Even though recently the World Bank and the IMF have become more proactive in setting standards for African leaders before loans are given out, misappropriation of aid is still a huge problem.[28]

It would be a gross mistake to simply cut off all aid to Africa, as suggested by McAuslan, because a certain percentage of aid actually reaches the people and is able to maintain their subsistence. Cutting off all aid would be a bluntly harsh move and would compromise the lives of millions of people. Conditionality of good governance on aid could be a good way to exert pressure. But outside donors should also focus on eliminating military aid and rewarding governments that are implementing policies toward good governance.

The Rule of Law

It is widely recognized that the absence of the rule of law forms a barrier to economic growth and hinders good governance. The absence or inability of the law to function properly has resulted in failure. African nations derived their drafting and interpretation of the law from their colonizers. The Dutch, French and English made tremendous contributions to the formation of law in most African countries. The common law introduced by the West, however, was seen as a law for the rich and the powerful. Most of the African population was governed by customary and Islamic law.[29] The common law, then, did not affect the lives of many people, and its ideologies, assumptions and rationalizations had very little relevance to the people.[30] To a certain extent, this is still true for much of the rural populations, while law in African's big cities is quite similar to Western law structures.

Looking back just fifty years ago, there was only one African lawyer in Tanganyika (known today as Tanzania) and only ten out of the 300 lawyers in Kenya were Africans.[31] Lawyers were seen by colonizers as a nuisance

during colonialism; but after independence, they were regarded as the custodians of the rule of law and other legal values. The task of nation-building and economic development by creating new institutions, fashioning new legal systems, and managing foreign diplomacy became the responsibility of a few educated African lawyers.[32] The opening of several law schools in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s helped spread new, innovative systems not only from England but also from countries such as the United States.

Yash Ghai, who has done extensive research on law and development in Africa, states that in the last thirty years there has been enormous growth in institutions of legal learning and scholarship in Africa. The prospects of the future, however, look somewhat mixed. During the period immediately following decolonization, law was expected to play a crucial role in the transformation of African societies, because many post-colonial leaders discussed the subject a great deal. The promise of democracy and economic growth that was supposed to be built on the rule of law has not, however, been fulfilled. For years, Africa has been shackled with economic stagnation, and political freedoms have been discarded. Ghai explains the frustration with African legal systems as follows:

> No one appears to set much store of legitimacy through law: the search for consensus is over and compliance is secured through coercion. Law has played little role in political and economic development. Nor have lawyers been the central actors in promoting and mediating change; they are peripheral to the system of political economic power.[33]

Since the establishment of the rule of law compromises the power of the leaders, some governments have purposely taken funding away from research and development.[34] Today university posts are not highly regarded in African nations. A career in politics, civil service or the private sector is much more rewarding. Thus, professors of law and others who are able to educate the next generation of law makers are opting out of teaching and leaving the field. Research has become more difficult because of restrictions placed on it by governments. Research priorities are determined by governments, limiting the capability of the educated to bring about new ideas. Research is at times confused with legal activism which is seen as an attack on governments. The excesses of Idi Amin, or the intolerance of Hastings Kamuzu Banda, are extreme versions of official cynicism about the manipulation of law and the attrition of the democratic process.[35]

Good governance and economic betterment of the African people require fair legal frameworks that are enforced impartially. Without a properly defined and functioning legal system, it is almost impractical to assume that foreigners will invest in Africa. Even though returns on African investments are enormous because of the availability of resources and labor, Africa has been struggling with an image problem that has prevented inflow of capital. It is seen as too risky to invest because most governments are unstable and the rule of law is not present. Thus, the establishment of proper legal systems is necessary. Funding needs to be allocated to university professors and researchers in order to come up with institutions and legal systems that can help not only the people in the city but the majority who live in the rural areas. Furthermore, there needs to be more cooperation between nations to come up with frameworks that are able to integrate different legal systems in order to strengthen Africa's unity.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the developmental capacity of African states and their inability to ensure that terrorism does not expand within their territories will hinge partially upon their degree of legitimacy. The absence or weakness of institutions of good governance in Africa means that the vast majority of Africa's peoples have neither a role nor a voice in nation-building. Some have suggested that the current state of Africa's economies is caused by Africans themselves, which is a myth that needs to be eradicated. There needs to be a clear distinction between the ruling class and the majority of working-class Africans. The majority of the population depends on an agrarian-based economy, disconnected from the ruling class. The cause of most of Africa's problems comes from a combination of outside actors, via colonialism and neo-colonialism, and also from powerful African leaders and elite who have acted, like the colonizers, in their own self-interests and have become wealthy on the backs of the African masses.

African civil societies have been active in taking back power from the elite, but these institutions need to be nurtured in order to become more functional. The existence of civil societies has led to the liberation of South Africa from a racist settler regime. The worker-led national strike in Swaziland was followed by democratization in 1997. The rejection of the

one-party system by civil groups in Malawi resulted in the drafting of a multi-party system.[36] In essence, the resurgence of civil protest in virtually most of the sub-Saharan African nations since the 1980s has resulted in the transformation of the continent's governance and political systems. Civil groups are demanding that their governments be democratic, transparent and accountable, and results are becoming visible. There is, however, much to be done in Africa. Civil societies need more material, financial and moral support from outsiders, governments and citizens in order to see more change.

Furthermore, civil societies become more proactive when there is a system for the mass education of the people. Education for more citizens, particularly females, would give Africans added power to transform their countries. Educators should be able to obtain the basic materials to do their jobs, instead of being forced out of the profession. The future of Africa depends on the next set of skilled employees. Economic transformations in all parts of the world took place because there were educated people who were innovative enough to make impacts on their economies. Thus, governments should invest in the future by educating the majority and enticing educated Africans to stay in their countries and become productive members of their societies, as opposed to indirectly forcing people to immigrate to other countries.

In some African states, the rule of law is still absent; neighboring countries should work together toward transforming Africa as a whole. Strong institutions that are well respected by citizens are able to reduce transaction costs, which will foster investment. Establishment of the rule of law will reduce corruption, which is one of Africa's main problems. It will also foster the rights of individuals and private organizations, which will lead to free media that will then be able to boost the flow of information to benefit the people.

The weakness or absence of institutions of local governance in Africa has given more power to national structures that reflect the interests of the ruling class which marginalizes the masses. These systems are centralized, lack legitimacy, and are ineffective, but they continue to operate by the help of the military. As mentioned earlier, African states should focus on building local governance. The slow bottom-up approach by which a true

public constitution is built has to be implemented, and local governments should be seen as agents for building such a system.

The challenges toward development remain the same and will depend greatly on the willingness of public administrators to remain open to the mass public and to embrace the virtues of consultation and consensus. Problems could be solved by discussing issues with the people who are directly affected. This is not done just by letting go of bureaucratic government assumptions, but would require leaders to yield power and give freedoms to citizens. This, then, would allow citizens and governments to jointly address problems that arise. There needs to be a move toward basing public policy on the concrete experiences of the people, as opposed to a top-down approach which has failed numerous times in the past.

A modern state will only become and remain democratic if there are strong, inherent systems of political accountability. There is no one clear solution for all African problems. This chapter does not try to validate or invalidate other theories of development but states that before one tries to apply reforms, one has to consider first the issue of good governance and the rule of law. Without these two, no approach will be successful in transforming the current state of Africa's economies and security. This suggests that Africa has to first build a solid institutional base to facilitate sustainable development. African civil societies, governments, outside donors and international organizations all play a significant role in Africa and must work together toward change.

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Chapter 10

Evaluating Counterterrorism in Africa

John Davis

Introduction

As the issue of terrorism continues to evolve in Africa one is tempted to inquire how states within the region have reacted to homegrown and foreign terrorist organizations that could and have impacted stability on the continent. In a search for an answer the essential starting point is to evaluate the African Union (AU) response to terrorism.

Just over a month after the September 11, 2001, tragedy the AU convened the African Summit Against Terrorism in Dakar, Senegal, in October 2001. The member states adopted the Dakar Declaration against Terrorism which condemned the heinous Al Qaeda attack that used commercial airliners to destroy the World Trade Center, attack the Pentagon, and caused considerable loss of life in the fields of Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Similarly, the declaration called for the strengthening of the 1999 Algiers Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism.[1]

In a subsequent AU conference held in Algiers on September 11-14, 2002, the Inter-Governmental High Level Meeting convened to adopt a Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa. The Plan of Action itself was endorsed by member states and called upon the AU to adopt specific guidelines for policy actions to confront terrorism in the region.[2] According to Martin Ewi and Kwesi Aning, the objectives of the Plan of Action were high-minded.

> The purpose of the Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (the Plan of Action) was to provide a concrete expression to the commitments and obligations of African countries, to combat terrorism and to enhance their access to appropriate counterterrorism resources. It sought to provide robust guidelines and strategies for collective and individual

> state action against terrorism by incorporating continental and international standards for combating terrorism with particular attention to the provisions of Resolution 1373. The Plan of Action was conceived as a handbook or an elaborate document of strategies for African counterterrorism endeavors. It built on the conviction that the eradication of terrorism requires joint action and a firm commitment by member states to pursue common objectives and coordination particularly in the areas of border surveillance, illicit import/export and stockpiling of arms and explosives. It also assumed that "severe conditions of poverty and deprivation experience by large sections of African population provide a fertile breeding ground for terrorist extremism." An innovative contribution of the Plan of Action is its provision for the establishment, in Algiers, of an African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT).[3]

The overall objectives of the Plan of Action were comprehensive and designed to ensure that member states implemented a host of U.N. resolutions that were adopted in the wake of the events circa September 11, 2001. There were a number of issues that stood in the way of "full" implementation of the Plan of Action. Most conspicuously there were two dilemmas associated with member states: states themselves have disparate priorities and, second, due to the increasing presence of weak and failed states many member states lack the resources to fully confront the challenges associated with fighting the war on terrorism.

The AU's post-September 11 preventive measures to preclude the spread of terrorism include a host of other legal and institutional actions. The most significant measure is the adoption of a Protocol to the Organization of African Union (OAU) convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism on July 8, 2004, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.[4] The central purpose of the Protocol ostensibly involved the enhancement of the "effective implementation of the Convention and to give effect to Article 3(d) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, on the need to coordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and combating of terrorism in all its aspects, as well as the implementation of other relevant international instruments."[5]

Overall the AU provided a foundation by which member states could move forward with individual and regional counterterrorist agendas to confront terrorism in Africa. Most member states in the region however lack resources. Thus terrorism and counterterrorism, due to the presence of HIV/AIDS and other transnational issues, are viewed as low priorities among member states. There are additional assorted reasons for the failure of other member states of the AU to implement counterterrorism measures, most significantly the absence of democratic governance, weak militaries

and the presence of internal strife whether clan, ethnic or religious-related violence.[6] These variables indicate why the vast majority of states in Africa have not enacted meaningful counterterrorism programs. A question begs: what states in the region have adopted counterterrorism measures? Second what accounts for the successful implementation of counterterrorism programs in those states? Third, if these programs are so successful, why have so few states in Africa involved themselves in efforts to confront the challenge of terrorism? These issues form the basis of this research endeavor.

The Combined Joint Task Force

Quietly the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is one of the more significant post-9/11 partnerships. Formerly under the command by Central Command (CENTCOM), now under the authority of Africa Command (AFRICOM), CJTF-HOA was established in 2002 with the purpose to provide a forward coalition contingency in East Africa designed to detect and disrupt terrorist activities in the strategic Horn of Africa. The area of responsibility for CJTF-HOA includes the participation of several African countries: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Yemen, a non-member of the task force. There are three supplemental areas of interest to include Comoros, Mauritius, and Madagascar. There are several reasons requiring the need for increased counterterrorism. The obvious reason is the fear of al Qaeda establishing a presence or an alliance with local insurgent or terrorist organizations. Second, there is increasing fear of al Qaeda's manipulation of the local Muslim populations. Consider that states in the region have "predominantly Muslim or have significant Muslim minorities: Comoros (98 percent), Djibouti (94 percent), Eritrea (50 percent), Ethiopia (50 percent), Kenya (10 percent), Somalia (including the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, 100 percent), Sudan, Tanzania (35 percent), and Uganda (16 percent).[7]

Invariably when one discusses counterterrorism in Africa one cannot dismiss the involvement or participation of the U.S. military. This in no way devalues the role of African governments or their military personnel in the

Horn. Rather the point is to illustrate in the "so-called new war" one should recognize the obvious: with partnership comes dollars and increasing access to U.S. military training and assistance. Several states in the region—Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenyan (as the brief case studies will indicate)—significantly increased their counterterrorism practices.

Djibouti

In the wake of the strategic planning associated with the war on terror Djibouti emerged as a centerpiece in the post-9/11 strategic calculus of the Bush administration. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld observed that Djibouti is and will be a significant piece of the war on terror. According to the secretary, with radical Islam's burgeoning growth in the Horn of Africa, "We need to be where the action is" and that "There's no question but that this part of the world is an area where there's action. . . . There are a number of terrorists, for example, just across the water in Yemen and in the southern part of Saudi Arabia. These are serious problems."[8]

With war underway in Afghanistan the decision was made: Djibouti would serve as the locus of activity in the administration's efforts to stem the tide of indigenous terrorist activity in the region and to preclude al Qaeda from establishing additional bases in the wake of the opening phase of the war on terror. Headquartered in Camp Lemonier, the CJTF-HOA illustrated Djibouti's growing significance in confronting terrorism in the Horn of Africa. As the "center of gravity" in the war on terror CENTCOM deployed 800 elite Special Operations Forces (presumably Delta, Green Berets, and perhaps Navy SEALs) to Djibouti with one objective: to pursue alleged al Qaeda members in Yemen and Somalia.[9] In the early months of 2002 additional U.S. forces, in the form of Army Rangers, and the elite pilots of SOAR, were deployed to conduct operations in neighboring countries in the region.

With few exceptions Djibouti did not launch any major counterterrorism initiatives on their own. Instead Djibouti participated in bilateral exercises with U.S. military forces and multilateral exercises that consisted of ground and naval forces with coalition partners.

The second reality involved the contingency for war. The contingency discussed herein involved two scenarios, Somalia and Yemen. In the case of

Somalia, American and coalition Special Forces in Djibouti were given the task of intelligence and "snatch," the notion that critical al Qaeda operatives in Somalia would be captured, and if necessary, killed by these deadly operators. In the case of Yemen, the author reported in *The Global War on Terrorism: Assessing the American Response*, Djibouti was poised to play a pivotal role in an emerging conflict with Yemen. In short order CENTCOM "gave the go orders" for U.S. SOFs to begin preparations for involvement in an operation to kill al Qaeda forces that established safe havens in the ungoverned mountainous regions in Yemen. In the end, however, "U.S. Special Operations Forces continued their preparations for a showdown that while predicted," never materialized.[10]

Third, Djibouti, along with Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, is a beneficiary of training through the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI). In another significant program, Djibouti (as is the case with Kenya, Tanzania, Mauritius, Niger, Chad, Senegal, Mali, Liberia, Ethiopia, Botswana, Malawi, Uganda, Zambia, Angola, and Mozambique) receives additional training through the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA). The ATA initiative provides training, equipment, and technology to elite military personnel in Djibouti. This multifaceted support is offered to participant members in the Global War on Terrorism.

Fourth, in yet another initiative, Djibouti, as with all African states that participate in a U.S. sponsored military partnership (CJTF-HOA, EACTI, and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), via the African Coastal and Border Security Programs (ACBS) that are administered by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs in the Department of State, they received additional training and assistance.[11] Through the ACBS Djibouti receives patrol vessels and the tiny African country received night vision devices along with electronic monitors and sensors. The ACBS is considered by the U.S. government as a critical opportunity for Djibouti and all partners to "improve their ability to patrol and defend their own coastal waters and borders from terrorist operations, smuggling, and other illicit activities."[12]

Ethiopia

Of the participants in the task force few would have thought that Ethiopia would perform a significant role. The military facility known as Camp United near Dire Dawa, Ethiopia, remains a best-kept secret among task force participants.[13] This facility remains a hotbed of military activity because of the significant number of joint exercises that take place within the confines of the facility. Additionally, a number of major U.S. military units including the 10th Mountain Division, which has participated in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan, along with troops from other countries associated with the war on terror, have trained at or have had stopovers at Camp United. Similarly, U.S. SOFs have had the largest presence in Ethiopia. By now it is no longer a secret that U.S. SOFs increased the training of Ethiopian forces (much of this training commenced at Camp United). Though Ethiopian border troops received the bulk of the anti-terrorist and counterterrorist training, the 12th Army received its share of training as well. Many regional military experts argue that this unit played an essential role in the December 2006 invasion of Somalia.

The invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia came as a surprise to many experts. The growing presence of U.S. Special Forces, the presence of other specialized assets, along with the tempo of training and movements of Ethiopian forces, indicated that an operation against Islamic extremists was inevitable. With regard to Ethiopian security interests the operation proved successful. John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen provide details on the security dilemmas prompted by the emergence of the Islamic Courts:

> Senior [Islamic Union] Court officials made clear that they intended to incorporate Somali populations in the Somali region of southeastern Ethiopia into a greater Somalia. They were already backing Ethiopian opposition groups such as the Ogaden National Liberation Front and, in southern Oromia, the Oromo Liberation Front. This support was a direct challenge to Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who, after a decade and a half of rule, faces internal political pressure from ethnic groups that feel underrepresented.[14]

In the wake of the military operation the Ethiopian government had to confront domestic, regional and international fallout of their occupation of Somalia.[15] Similarly, its assistance to warlords in Northern Somalia exacerbated the tensions within the task force. In the end with the defeat and dispersal of the Islamic Courts Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi honored his pledge to remove his troops from Somalia.

Interestingly, the Zenawi government opined the operation in Somalia represented a clear demonstration of Ethiopia's counterterrorism maturity.

The Ethiopian Ministry of Information observed, "The Government of Ethiopia, after conducting a counter offensive . . . in response to threats against its security and in support of the internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, battled insurgents and extremists that were formerly affiliated with the Council of Islamic Courts, including the Al Qaeda-affiliated Al-Shabaab militia."[16] Additionally, the government claims that once the main force transited out of Somalia, many units received additional counterterrorism training.

Like many of the Task Force members a central aspect of Ethiopian counterterrorism involves border security, intelligence sharing with neighboring countries, and interdiction. The National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) is vested with broad authority in the above areas but maintains additional responsibilities to include criminal investigation and overall counterterrorism management. At another level, the porous Ethiopian banking system received significant assistance from the U.S. government. Specifically, the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) and the United States Department of the Treasury "signed the terms of reference and work plan for a technical assistance package to strengthen Ethiopia's anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing regimes."[17] The successful cooperative effort aided the "NBE in establishing a financial intelligence unit and provided training to Ethiopia's government-owned and private banks."[18]

The Ethiopian government continues to improve in all facets of counterterrorism, but a major problem remains that could undermine the progress: the Zenawi government, as is the case of leaders of Eritrea and Uganda, has used the war on terror and "the imperative of counterterrorism as an excuse to crack down on political opponents and restive populations at home."[19]

Finally, in a highly significant move the Ethiopian Parliament enacted antiterrorism legislation designed to enable the federal police, national intelligence and security services, and the ministry of justice to combine their efforts to confront terrorism. Second, the bill vested the courts with the authority to permit the police to detain suspected terrorists for a considerable period while collecting evidence.[20] The police and other security forces used the legislation to increase anti-terrorism actions in the country.

Kenya

Of the members of the CJTF-HOA Kenya continues its advancement in the development of a number of counterterrorism initiatives. With assistance from USAID the Kenya government in February 2003 created the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU). The central mission of the unit concerned the prevention and disruption of terrorist attacks within Kenya that are aimed at U.S. or other Western interests. The necessity of the unit was prompted by the destruction of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi along with the al Qaeda attacks on an Israeli commercial jet in 2002. There is evidence the unit training and operations have been successful. According to Kenyan foreign minister Kalonzo Musyoka, the anti-terrorism police unit—along with assistance from the National Intelligence—in 2003 disrupted several terrorist conspiracies aimed at Western targets. Additionally, the police units discovered several Al Qaeda safe houses in Mombassa.[21]

Second, in February of 2004 the government created the Kenyan Counterterrorism Center (KCC) which is under the auspices of the National Security Intelligence Service. The KCC is organized around a multifaceted strategy that involves the development of a long-term approach to combating terrorism that emanates within and from neighboring states. Additionally, a major responsibility of the KCC involves intelligence, particularly along the porous border with Somalia. Successful intelligence could preclude cross-border entries by al Qaeda-linked Somali terrorist organizations. Third, equally important the center is charged with investigating and eliminating "money laundering, narcotics trafficking, and illegal arms proliferation."[22]

A genuine target of Kenyan counterterrorism strategy involves the capture of fleeing al Qaeda-linked Somali Islamic organizations, most notably the Islamic Union Courts. Kenyan troops tracked and in some cases detained members of the Islamic Courts that were driven from power by U.S.-backed Ethiopian troops that assumed authority over Mogadishu. Currently, officials in the KCC are concerned that Al Shabaab, the new power center in southern Somalia, and their incessant threats to launch a "jihad" if "Kenya does not end its training program for the Somali Transitional National Government (TNG), could cause untold instability

with their country. As a counter to Al Shabaab, Kenyan security forces have agreed to help train 10,000 new TNG soldiers."[23]

In another initiative in May of 2009 the Kenyan government established a four-week course in counterterrorism. The course endeavored to instruct law enforcement officials (twenty five trained in the initial class) in a host of subjects to include "theories and typologies of terrorism, terrorist behavior and motivation, migration related crimes, crisis management, community policing, terrorist profiling, international legal assistance and extradition, border security management, intelligence, and surveillance, role of INTERPOL, interdepartmental cooperation, principles of interviewing and interrogation, detection of deception, terrorist financing, crime scene management, respect for human rights, concepts in counter terrorism, the international legal regime in countering terrorism, pre-incident and incident measures, and alternative strategies to counter terrorism."[24] The counterterrorism program is deemed critical because it provides Kenyan officials with opportunities to keep abreast with the changing tactics and those aspects of international law governing counterterrorism.

Kenya's counterterrorism tactics have come under domestic and international scrutiny. The central issue involves the Kenyan government's mass detention and brutality employed by elements within the Kenyan military on those captured. The following excerpt provides a vivid example of the dilemmas associated with the negative components of counterterrorism in Kenya.

> The Kenyan approach to counterinsurgency in Mount Elgon district was strikingly reminiscent of the British in their brutal suppression of the Mau Mau rebellion in the 1950s. Soldiers went from village to village rounding up nearly all of the male population of the district and taking them to military camps for "screening." On the way and upon arrival in the camps the men were beaten severely; some died. Then the survivors were forced to line up and bite the back of the man in front of them. Informers in a Land Rover with blacked-out windows decided who was a member of the militia and those deemed innocent were then set free. Human Rights Watch interviewed dozens of victims of the military screening who complained of problems breathing, urinating, walking, and sleeping after severe beatings. Prison officials say they treated dozens for severe injuries who were delivered to the jail after being detained in the military camp. Some 800 suspects were remanded in jail and between March and May 4,000 were screened in total.[25]

Many experts assert the tactics used by the Kenyan military are far worse than the techniques employed by the U.S. government at Guantanamo, Cuba, or in Abu Ghraib detention facility in Iraq. The British

government which trains many of the Kenyan units threatened to suspend training if the tactics were not eliminated and if there is no clear evidence of professionalism and the respect for human rights among Kenyan military units. There is this additional issue confronting the British government: Kenya serves as the hub for a British government-run program that trains African forces for peacekeeping operations.[26]

Given Kenya's strategic location the country serves additional counterterrorism purposes for the Combined Joint Task Force. One of the central roles of the U.S. SOFs requires that they interact with and train the military forces of all task force members. Kenya is no exception. Unlike most members of the CJTF-HOA, the Kenyan military maintains a well-established relationship with the U.S. military, and specifically with U.S. Special Forces. Long before the establishment of the CJTF-HOA, U.S. Special Forces have interacted with Kenyan military forces. This is a process that commenced during the Clinton administration.

> Compared to conventional units, special operations forces routinely deploy quickly in small units to remote locations with austere or nonexistent support bases. In July 1996, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Campbell, KY, deployed and established a Combined/Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters (CJSOTF) in Kenya to participate in a Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise. The exercise's purpose was to foster the working relationship between the United States and the Kenyan military. Participating U.S. units were elements from three services and two components: a Special Forces company from 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), A-Teams from the U.S. Army Reserve, 19th Special Forces Group (Airborne), U.S. Navy SEAL Team 3 and elements of the U.S. Air Force 16th Special Operations Wing. Training alongside the U.S. military was a joint Kenyan staff, their 20th Parachute Infantry Battalion and Navy Clearance Dive Unit.[27]

In the wake of the events of August 7, 1998 (the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania), U.S. SOFs reentered the theatre to renew their acquaintance with Kenyan forces. After the tragic events of 9/11, the SOF-Kenya relationship returned to previous levels. However, the numbers (SOF soldiers) eventually surpassed the levels that existed during the year 1996 (what is often described as the pre-East Embassy bombing period).

There were additional characteristics that symbolized the changing characteristics of the military to military contact between Kenyan forces and their trainers, the U.S. SOFs. The first is transparency. Previously in the post-Cold War era U.S. SOF operations were conducted below the radar. In the post-9/11 world the missions of the SOFs remain secret. The Bush administration announced that its long-term objective involved sending a

message to al Qaeda and its East African regional affiliates: “the region is off limits” or “no new safe havens will be permitted in the region.” Thus the SOFs were rarely visible but al Qaeda and its allies in the region were keenly aware of their presence.

To provide support for the Bush administration’s policy the president tasked the Department of State to create the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI). The participant members of the EACTI include: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. The U.S.-led program exceeded $100 million. Though all member states of the EACTI reaped the benefits, there is little doubt that Kenya profited the most from the program.

The success of the EACTI aside, the second indicator of the Kenyan-U.S. SOF relationship concerned the tempo of the training, the rapidity of the operations, and the danger associated with the missions. Dealing with the latter, SOFs accompanied Kenyan forces along the Somali-Kenyan border and in some instances SOFs and Kenyan forces ventured deep inside Somali territory in what was described as “probes.” It remains unclear if SOFs and Kenyan forces encounters with the Union Courts or Al Qaeda produced any casualties.

During the period 2006-2007 the tempo of the operations moved to a new level as the U.S.-Kenyan forces participated in a host of operations designed to test the Kenyan military’s ability to absorb the training administered by the U.S. SOFs. Much of this training occurred on the huge Manda Bay naval complex near Lamu. This base supported joint exercises, one of which was dubbed Operation Edged Mallet.[28] In the view of Kenyan military authorities the exercises demonstrated that should it become necessary that Kenyan forces were to engage in prolonged conflict with terrorists, or to assist coalition partners, they are now capable of handling reconnaissance and patrols without U.S. military support.[29]

During this and subsequent exercises a normally secretive U.S. Special Forces Unit began to shoulder the load of training Kenyan forces as Army Special Forces rotated to other CJTF-HOA countries, Iraq and even Afghanistan. The new U.S. SOF unit came in form of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC). These units are consistent with their Army counterparts: small, elite and professional. Within the MARSOC there is another unit referred to as the Foreign

Military Training Units (FMTUs) that were also deployed to Kenya to speed the development of counterterrorist training in the wake of movement of U.S. Army SOFs.[30]

Finally, Kenya remains one of the many "imperiled fragile democracies" in the region. The concern is that too much focus concerns the subject of terrorism, and too little on the internal strife, roaming criminal enterprises and the ongoing corruption in the government. The solution to these issues will require a greater balance between counterterrorism combined with good governance and human security solutions.

Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI)

The TSCTI builds on the modestly successful Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) launched after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to prevent terrorists from setting up safe havens in Africa. The PSI program targeted four Sahel countries (Chad, Niger, Mali and Mauritania). Under the PSI program many of the poorest countries in the region received training and guidance along with U.S. assistance. Similarly, the initiative set the stage for increased focus from member states that endeavored to prioritize counterterrorism as a national interest. Second, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger were in agreement on one significant reality: Islamic missionaries from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were undermining their fragile societies. Here again the PSI assisted member states in locating the problem but a glaring dilemma remained: member states failed to construct workable governance strategies to confront internal issues such as poverty, ethnic divisions and corruption. In the final analysis, the imperfections—lack of funding and limited counterterrorism training, along with ongoing corruption and human rights challenges within many of the Pan Sahel states—set the stage for a new initiative that would be far more robust and would include additional countries ignored in the PSI.

Much like the CJTF-HOA the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative or TSCTI represents another successful experiment in counterterrorism in Africa. Replacing the modestly successful Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), the TSCTI represented a far more substantial partnership that encompassed

nine states. To measure the viability of the initiative, consider the following quote:

> [The TSCTI] strengthen[ed] regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhanced and institutionalized cooperation among the region's security forces, promotes democratic governance, and ultimately benefits our bilateral relationships with each of these states. Key aspects of the TSCTI training would include basic marksmanship, planning, communications, land navigation, patrolling and medical care.[31]

The initial funding for the TSCTI was reported at $100 million a year for five years or $500 million to cover the life of the program. The TSCTI targeted nine countries—Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia—with the objective of building indigenous capacity and to facilitate cooperation among host governments within the region in partnership to preclude Islamic extremism in the Sahel region.[32] In broader terms the objectives include "engaging with participating" countries:

> To assist in protecting their borders and exploiting opportunities to detect and deter terrorists by providing basic training and equipment and train additional forces. The TSCTI also envisions engagement with more countries than PSI with a greater emphasis on helping to foster better information sharing and operational planning between regional states. EUCOM would fully coordinate TSCTI efforts with U.S. Country Teams to ensure that the total U.S. effort.[33]

In a recognition of the PSI program, the State Department recognized the deficiencies of the program and referred to it as "a little bit of a Band-Aid approach" to the "security crisis in the region." According to Theresa Whelan, deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs during the Bush administration, the PSI was a "stepping stone" and the bridge to the TSCTI.[34] The deputy assistant explicated that antiquated Cold War and post Cold War approaches would do nothing to preclude the development of safe havens in the vastly unpopulated areas in the region. Thus said Whelan, "If we revert to bilateral, stovepipe programs, we simply won't be as effective" and it was therefore imperative that "we can maintain a multilateral effort."[35]

Much like the PSI, the State Department was charged with running the overall interagency initiative; however, the Department of Defense continued to focus on military operations. Previously under the PSI, U.S. SOFs were involved in training "a company" at time, a policy limited by

the inconsequential funds made available to the program. The TSCTI's substantial funding now permits U.S. SOFs to train at the battalion level, a decision that as the initiative dissipates will ensure that targeted militaries will truly benefit from the program. According to Cyril I. Obi, TSCTI is an organization that has both positive and negative benefits for participant members:

> Apart from building up regional defense and security capacities, the TSCTI aimed to "train additional forces, include more countries and help foster better information sharing and operational planning between regional states, considered as important as creating new units." The U.S. policy thrust is also to build facilities and bases (airports, ports, buildings) in West Africa from which the U.S. military can launch missions in the region. It would appear, then, that the U.S. and West Africa share a common interest in the fight against global terror. This may be so, but it is also clear that the 'partnership' is an unequal one in which the U.S. is clearly the dominant party. This raises the critical point of West African states being held captive by external security interests and projects that may undermine the long-term interests of the region and its people. However, the reality is that U.S.-West African counterterrorism initiatives exist and are probably here to stay. What remains is to deepen the analysis of the considerations that drive and sustain this partnership and its short to long term implications.[36]

The principle SOF unit for the TSCTI previously served under the PSI. That unit was the 10th Special Forces Group that would be joined by the National Guard's 20th Special Forces Group.[37] It is important to note the SOF group that had regional responsibility for Africa (the 3rd Special Forces Group) was assigned to Iraq. This is an important admission since the 3rd SOF group had the cultural and language prerequisites that the 10th and the 20th SOFs groups lacked. In short, these SOFs trainers were forced into a mission that they, like the targeted countries, were forced to learn on the job. The first test of the TSCTI emerged during Flintlock 2005, an exercise that formerly "kicked-off" the Saharan counterterrorism initiative.

Operation Flintlock, which began on June 6 and ended on June 26, 2005, was designated by the Bush administration as the largest American military exercise in Africa since World War II. In this SOF-led operation, in which there were over 700 Special Forces participants, supported by an additional 2,100 troops from the nine North and West African states, the opening phase provided a terrorist scenario that would be used to train 3,000 ill-equipped Saharan troops in counterterrorist techniques designed to share intelligence, prevent terrorist interdiction, and to protect/patrol the borders.

The exercise received major attention outside of the United States, but within America itself there was little mention of its significance. Even the

Pentagon attempted to downgrade its import:

> Flintlock is a series of military exercises conducted with America's theater security cooperation partners in Africa. European and NATO partner nations also participate, either directly or in an advisory role. The principal purpose of the training is to ensure all nations continue developing their partnerships and further enhance their capabilities to halt the flow of illicit weapons, goods and human trafficking in the region.[38]

In subsequent phases U.S. SOFs led individual training in Algeria, Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad. The training permitted the soldiers from the aforementioned countries to obtain a variety of skills—airborne operations, small-unit tactics, security operations, land navigation, marksmanship, medical skills, human rights training, and land warfare—that were designed to sharpen their understanding of counterterrorist and other tactical techniques.[39]

Once Flintlock 2005 concluded the Bush administration and participant countries hailed the exercises as a complete success. On the surface the administration had much to celebrate. Member states received and were receptive to the training; the U.S. military obtained additional forward bases and al Qaeda and its affiliates were contained.

In the period since Flintlock detractors of the administration's "new front" in the war on terror have been skeptical of the existence of the terror threat and have been concerned the administration partnered with some of the most corrupt authoritarian governments in the region, with the government of Chad standing out as one of the most salient examples.

The brunt of the criticism is two fold: an exaggerated terrorist threat and the presence of U.S. troops will act as a "magnet for Islamic extremists." On the former, the International Crisis Group (ICG) noted that at the time there is yet to be an independent confirmation to support the Bush administration's claim of terrorism in the region (a claim that has since dissipated). In an example of the latter, Jeremy Keenan, a self-described Saharan specialist from the University of East Anglia, observed: "If anything the [TSCTI] will generate terrorism, by which I mean resistance to the overall U.S. presence and strategy."[40] In another example, Moussa Ould Ham, editor of *Le Calame*, offered a similar perspective. The editor asserts that a new strand of the GSPC (the organization is now referred to as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb or AQIM) but added this disclaimer, "Wherever the Americans are, whether it's Iraq or wherever, an Islamic

resistance rises up, and perhaps it's this Islamic resistance that we are seeing appearing in Mauritania today."[41]

The Bush administration's response to the disparagement of its claim of terrorism in the region and to the TSCTI has been anything but muted. The administration admitted that there is indeed a terrorist threat, albeit a singular one from the GSPC. The evidence of the threat, according to defense and state department officials, is overwhelming. For starters the GSPC announced an offensive against "infidels and their supporters" which is salient reference to the presence of U.S. troops and to their TSCTI supporters.

In support of their claims the administration reminded its critics that thirteen Algerian soldiers were killed and another seven wounded after the GSPC placed a large explosive device under a vehicle ferrying a troop convoy on June 8, 2005. Prior to this attack the same Salafist Group ambushed twelve troops on May 17. On June 4, 2005, the Mauritanian government reported that fifteen of its soldiers were killed and an additional seventeen were wounded after the GSPC "attacked a remote outpost."[42] In a press conference in the capital of Nouakchott, the Mauritanian Defense Minister Baba Ould Sidi stated, "They killed in cold blood the soldiers they had taken prisoner before fleeing."[43]

Second, the administration acknowledged that there is substantial evidence of a nascent threat, and the objective of the TSCTI is to ensure that no "Wahhabist ideological entrepreneurships" are permitted to set up shop in the region. A statement by the GSPC provided additional support to the administration's argument. According to the GSPC the terrorist offensive is intended as a "message that implies that our activity is not restricted to fighting the internal enemy but the enemies of the religion wherever they are."[44]

Third, the Bush administration asserted the history in Iraq indicates the initiative is designed to preclude another Ansar Al-Islam from emerging in Africa. Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Zarqawi-led terrorist organization established an enclave in Northern Iraq that killed Kurdish leaders and attacked Shiites, and later coalition forces in Iraq. The GSPC was by no means dormant prior to the arrival of U.S. military personnel and the evidence indicates that their activities increased dramatically in the wake of the evolution of the TSCTI. Interestingly the GSPC was

unsuccessful in mounting any attacks against U.S. military personnel but instead directed the "on-going offensive" toward American regional partners.

Fourth, the Bush administration had another issue that occupied its attention: Islamists from North Africa received training in a variety of terrorist enclaves throughout Iraq. Officials within the European Command (EUCOM) presented evidence that "25 percent of [the] suicide bombers in Iraq are Saharan African."[45] Equally troubling for both EUCOM and CENTCOM (AFRICOM now has command responsibility thereby displacing EUCOM and CENTCOM) is that the "fighters are being trained in Iraq and then sent back to Africa with the ability to teach [these] techniques" to others in the region. This according to AFRICOM officials could translate into increased attacks against U.S. military forces that are attached to the TSCTI or perhaps those involved in the CJTF-HOA. It is for this reason the administration adopted the "drain the swamp" approach with the ultimate objective of precluding the establishment of a terrorist enclave in the region.

This approach to counterterrorism could not have been successful without the efforts of the African members of the TSCTI. In particular, Algeria, Mauritania and Mali performed critical roles in dealing with the cross-border activities of GSPC/AQIM. Particularly, at the close of the Bush administration and now during the administration of Barack Obama, the efforts of the aforementioned states quietly reduced the threat of the GSPC/AQIM. Currently the TSCTI is confronting the challenge of the AQIM. Member states acknowledged that a new phase of counterterrorism in the region is underway.

Conclusion

The TSCTI has succeeded where the PSI failed. That is the PSI was criticized from its conception for its exclusivity, that it did not include the more significant Sahel and Maghreb countries whether in the form of Nigeria, Algeria or Morocco. Similarly, the PSI was woefully underfunded. Significantly, the planners in Washington learned a valuable lesson and dramatically increased the support to the TSCTI program.

There were other significant indices of success. For the first time all participant members of the initiative share intelligence, member states of the initiative have witnessed a significant upgrade in military equipment (especially in the case of Chad, Mali, and Mauritania, and Niger), there is a substantial increase in bilateral and multilateral cooperation in border patrol activities, and most significantly, all partners within TSCTI have upgraded their counterterrorism capabilities. Second, due in part to the length of the initiative all member states benefit from having more troops trained in counterterrorist tactics to ensure the prevention of new safe havens within their borders. Third, thinking in terms of domestic policy, all member states have made counterterrorism a priority within their respective countries. Lastly, there is another advantage that will have untold positive consequences for decades to come: the notion that these member states had the opportunity to work with and adjust to U.S. tactics will bode well in the event that such countries are called upon to work with the U.S. in joint operations, but more importantly, should a crisis arise in the region member states will be positioned to jointly participate in peacekeeping or peace enforcement activities.

Additionally, border security increased throughout both regions. The Sahel countries (Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania) in particular have dramatically increased the presence of troops along their borders helping to prevent the emergence of safe havens in the expansive desert areas within the region. If there is a weakness among these states, it is that the armed forces of Mali remain too small and thus would require assistance from other states to protect their borders. Additionally, in the Maghreb region the armed forces are much larger and therefore the capabilities of the states are greater. That said many states—Tunisia and those in Senegal—will require far more training to bring them up to speed with the forces of other members of the region. Elsewhere, there is another problem that rarely receives focus: the dilemma associated with Nigerian troops. By far the most capable of all troops within the TSCTI, elements within the Nigerian military during participation in peacekeeping operations have been involved in a host of human rights abuses. These dilemmas indicate the TSCTI has been highly successful but it (along with problems within members) indicates that it is by no means perfect.

This dilemma aside the institutional cooperation among participant states was exemplary. It is this institutionalization that is the legacy of the

TSCTI. The manifestation of both may be viewed this way:

> Counterterrorism (CT) programs . . . create a new regional focus for trans-Saharan cooperation, including use of established regional organizations like the African Union and its new Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism in Algiers. These programs include training to improve border and aviation security and overall CT readiness; Continued specialized Counterterrorism Assistance Training and Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) activities in the trans-Sahara region and possible regional expansion of those programs; Public diplomacy programs that expand outreach efforts in the Sahel and Maghreb regions, Nigeria, and Senegal and seek to develop regional programming embracing this vast and diverse region. Emphasis is on preserving the traditional tolerance and moderation displayed in most African Muslim communities and countering the development of extremism, particularly in youth and rural populations; Military programs intended to expand military-to-military cooperation, to ensure adequate resources are available to train, advise, and assist regional forces and to establish institutions promoting better regional cooperation, communication, and intelligence.[46]

These elements and the importance of democratic governance represent another aspect of the legacy of the TSCTI. This point is fundamental because it is clear the success of the TSCTI in the short term and long-term will depend on its member states' ability to adopt and to implement democratic principles.

The TSCTI is not without its problems or potential dangers. The most significant problems are internal. African scholars continue to point to the fact that member states, as exemplified in the case of Mauritania, suppress democratic movements and therefore use the war on terror to stifle viable opposition. In Mauritania, as a result of President Maayoya Sid'Ahmed Ould Taya's human rights abuses, he was deposed in a military coup. Since that time a small and burgeoning vocal minority continues to call for ending Mauritania's participation in the TSCTI.

Similarly, all member states have to work to reduce corruption and foster an environment where government authority extends to the whole of society as opposed to tribal or clan loyalties. Third, there is no doubt the member participants of the TSCTI have benefited from U.S. assistance, both military and economic; however, as the armed forces of the region, to borrow the words of Bush in Iraq, are able to "stand up" then the U.S. military presence should dissipate, allowing African countries to deal with terrorism without the presence of western forces. This will reduce and contain extremist revivalism in the region, but equally important it will force the reduction of anti-Americanism.

The major danger concerns U.S. SOFs themselves. It is one thing to train the troops of the TSCTI in the region, but a dangerous proposition could develop if the Special Forces repeat the unfathomable error that was made in Chad. In Chad the battalions that that were being trained are loyal to President Idriss Deby. Worst the SOFs are training his "small but powerful" Zagawa tribe that dominates the government. Within Chad there are those who believe the Bush and Obama administrations are viewed as taking sides and turning a blind eye to overt human rights abuses in order to retain the participation of the Deby government. The Deby government is itself a source of discord. In particular there is dissention within Deby's ethnic group along with increasing defections within the military. Regionally, the failure of the Bush and now the Obama administration to end this corruption and discord within the Chadian government could undermine the TSCTI and dramatically increase anti-Americanism and increase the use of terrorism as a utility to drive U.S. military forces from the region.

At the close of the Bush administration the TSCTI received additional funding that will add two additional years and $250 million to the counterterrorist program. In the case of President Barack Obama he has yet to make a statement on how he will deal with the future of the TSCTI.

In the final analysis it will take years to measure the long-term impact of the program on the nine member states of the initiative. It is equally certain that critics will continue to assert the initiative is nothing more than a neo-imperialist impulse to protect another national security commodity of the United States: oil. Thus there is a growing perception that when one examines the participant states a major commonality emerges: several members of the TSCTI are oil-producing states, whether in the form of Nigeria, Algeria, and Mauritania.

Finally, the CJTF-HOA, EACTI, PSI, and the TSCTI each played a dramatic role in the development of counterterrorism in select regions and among select countries in Africa. Still counterterrorism remains a work in progress. In particular, more states, given greater assistance from the United States and other Western countries, should learn and become active participants in counterterrorism in the region. There are other additional obstacles that need to be addressed. In the words of H. E. Amine Kherbi, Ambassador of Algeria to the United States of America, "Counterterrorism efforts in Africa still face quite a few obstacles. A significant deficit in

training and fighting capabilities needs to be urgently resolved thanks to the mobilization of African resources and international cooperation. The major challenges facing us are those of security, development, and effective handling of interdependencies. To do that, we will need to strengthen and increase our capacities to govern and regulate, in conformity with the rule of law, and harmonize and complete them through a collective capacity able to modify the forces that generate tension and uncertainty around the world. Such are the requirements for a significant contribution by Africa to an efficient global and coherent fight against transnational terrorism."[47] Time will tell if participant states, and future states that will join the effort, will overcome these significant obstacles. If they do there is little doubt that counterterrorism will continue to excel in Africa.

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Chapter 11

Vital Cog: African Intelligence Efforts and the War on Terrorism

John Davis

Introduction

The subject of African intelligence and the war on terror has received insufficient scholarly treatment. The reason for the unsatisfactory discourse is based on the perception of the growing presence of U.S. assets, whether in the form of the CIA, or intelligence assets. That is with the presence of significant U.S. and other western intelligence services in Africa, there is the perception that local assets are miniscule or do not exist at all. This point aside several indicators demonstrate the increasing professionalization of African intelligence services. In a sign of the times "many African governments improved their cooperation and strengthened their [anti-terrorism] efforts,"[1] particularly in the area of intelligence. Second, the role and activity of African intelligence organizations continues to evolve. Third, as will be described in greater detail later, the intelligence cooperation among African states along with bilateral and multilateral collaboration with the United States continues to accelerate.

To illustrate the viability of intelligence by states in the region consider the "CIA, the FBI and the National Security Agency (NSA) continue to request assistance from Algeria, which has acquired invaluable experience in fighting terrorism."[2] Additionally, Algeria's Department of Intelligence and Security (DRS) is critical to the disruption of the Osama bin Laden-linked terrorist group Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

Kenya's National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) tracks terrorist groups and financing in East Africa. In response to the evolving threat of

terrorism the government of Kenya established the National Counterterrorism Center (NCC). The NCC's principal task involves the prevention and disruption of terrorist operations in the region. Second, the NCC acts as a "government clearinghouse to serve Kenya and neighboring countries" efforts to disrupt a host of terrorist acts and also capture or kill local and foreign terrorists. The cutting edge counterterrorist organization places Kenya as the dominant intelligence organization in the Horn of Africa.[3]

In this chapter the author assesses the bilateral and multilateral intelligence relationships by African states in their disparate efforts to confront the threat of terrorism. Second, this chapter explores the continuing problem of reciprocal intelligence sharing. In particular this chapter explores the extent to which two-way intelligence cooperation has increased among African states and U.S. intelligence agencies.

Bilateral Intelligence Cooperation

Djibouti

Djibouti's intelligence contribution in the war on terrorism is unique. The prominent intelligence organizations—Service de Documentation et de Sécurité (SDS) (Documentation and Security Service) and Brigade Spéciale de Recherche de la Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie Special Research Brigade)—serve multiple functions. The aforementioned spy agencies are very active in border security, elements of the SDS train with western intelligence agencies that operate within Djibouti and the spy organization collaborates with its sister African intelligence organizations.

Beginning in June of 2002 Djibouti assumed a prominent role in the war on terror. After the government of Djibouti permitted the U.S. government to establish the headquarters of the Combined Joint Task on the base at Camp Lemonier, a host of benefits accrued to the tiny country. Most notably Djibouti received economic assistance, military training and additional counterterrorism funding from the U.S. government.

The military base in Djibouti coordinates the bulk of intelligence operations in the Horn and East Africa. The military facility at Camp

Lemonier is a short distance from Yemen and it is in close proximity of the Bab el Mandeb Strait, which remains "a critical choke point where the Red Sea meets the Gulf of Aden."[4] As is the case in previous wars Djibouti's strategic location once again makes the country an attractive source of intelligence activity.

With respect to intelligence, the base in Djibouti is teaming with U.S., French, and British intelligence assets. Beginning in 2002 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) conducted a host of operations from Camp Lemonier. In a well-known example the CIA used the airfield on the base to conduct a mission in which the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle was deployed and destroyed a Toyota SUV that contained six al Qaeda operatives in October 2002.[5]

There is ample evidence that Djibouti will remain a long-term vibrant operational base for U.S. and task force intelligence operations. Similarly, coalition anti-terrorist training, from border patrol, basic communications with neighboring intelligence organizations and other guidance originate from the base in Djibouti. In many cases the United States conducts operations on its own. It is been reported that "Fishermen from the Somali southern city of Raas Kambooni . . . stumbled onto U.S. intelligence cameras and other electronic devices, installed on the depopulated rocky island of Burr Gaabo near the Kenyan borders, but within Somali territorial waters."[6] This operation represents an example of the type of intelligence operations that originate from Djibouti. Additionally, these types of intelligence operations indicate why Djibouti remains at the forefront in the war on terror.

Sudan

Sudan's intelligence capabilities are considered among the best in Africa. On the issue of terrorism the government of President Omar Al Bashir not only recognized the reality of Sudanese prowess in intelligence, but the leader of Sudan understood there are political rewards associated with his country's capabilities. The government does share intelligence with states within Africa. However, the intelligence cooperation with the United States is both controversial and politically more lucrative.

The evolution of U.S.-Sudan intelligence cooperation predates September 11, 2001. Toward the closure of the administration of Bill Clinton the U.S. government finally accepted the overture of Sudan for counterterrorist cooperation and intelligence sharing. Beginning in May of 2000 a private agreement calling for joint CIA, FBI, and Department of State cooperation with Sudan's intelligence organization the Mukhabarat was implemented. Equally significant American intelligence worked assiduously to cement a relationship that covered "everything," particularly al Qaeda's movements in Sudan and elsewhere in East Africa.[7]

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the former Bush administration official U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Walter Kansteiner confirmed that U.S.-Sudan cooperation increased "some time before the World Trade Center attacks, and that this cooperation had reached new levels"[8] thereafter. U.S. intelligence officials privately gloated about the budding relationship with the brutal regime of President Bashir. The intelligence relationship was described this way:

> Behind the scenes, however, Sudan was emerging as a surprisingly valuable ally of the CIA. The warming relationship has produced significant results, according to interviews with American and Sudanese intelligence and government officials. They disclosed, for example, that: Sudan has "given us specific information that is as important, functional and current," said a senior State Department official who agreed to discuss intelligence matters on condition of anonymity. The official acknowledged that the Mukhabarat could become a "top tier" partner of the CIA. "Their competence level as a service is very high," the official said. "You can't survive in that part of the world without a good intelligence service, and they are in a position to provide significant help."[9]

In Khartoum the Sudanese government recognized that a cooperative intelligence relationship during the war on terror could prove productive in transforming a dormant relationship. In the words of Sudanese Intelligence chief Major General Salah Abdallah Gosh, "We have a strong partnership with the CIA. The information we have provided has been very useful to the United States." Another senior official, Major General Yahia Hussein Babiker, offered this description of the relationship: "American intelligence considers us to be a friend." That is, because of the information that Sudan provides to the U.S., the government in Khartoum could achieve "a complete normalization of our relations with the CIA."[10]

The U.S. government's policy with Sudan is described by many as schizophrenic. On the one hand President Bill Clinton instituted tough

sanctions on a regime he correctly recognized as a haven for terrorists (particularly for providing support to Osama bin Laden) and for Sudan's human rights abuses during the decade-old civil war. In the wake of the destruction of two U.S. embassies in East Africa and in recognition that American intelligence was nonexistent in Africa, the Clinton administration quietly established a nascent intelligence relationship in exchange for a reduction in sanctions against the Sudanese government.[11]

The Bush administration's relationship with Sudan is equally troubling. In late 2001, Gosh the intelligence chief of Sudan, visited the United States for the purpose of consultation. Human rights organizations were outraged by the decision to permit an individual known to be a participant in abuses during the civil war and in Darfur. During this meeting it was reported that "Sudan's secret police had begun to crack down on suspected Islamists, had shared evidence with the FBI and allowed U.S. personnel to interrogate al Qaeda suspects."[12] Almost two years later, after information provided by the Mukhabarat, "Sudanese security forces raided a suspected terrorist training camp and deported more than a dozen, mainly Saudi, militants."[13]

In a definitive turn in the relationship, Secretary of State Colin Powell did what the U.N. and AU refused to do: he accused the Bashir regime of carrying out a brutal genocide in Darfur. Months later the CIA further solidified its relationship with Sudan's intelligence service. In recognition of the relationship it was reported by the *Guardian* that Sudanese intelligence agents penetrated "networks [both in Middle East and Africa] that would not normally be accessible"[14] to the United States. Additionally, Sudanese agents are critical to U.S. intelligence because they provide a treasure drove of information on Islamic organizations in Somalia and the Mukhabarat, in spring of 2005, detained a host of foreign fighters that were prepared to join "the jihad" against U.S. troops in Iraq.[15] In the end the Bush administration savored its relationship with the Mukhabarat even as it sought sanctions to pressure the Bashir regime to end the genocide campaign in Darfur.

Many hope that President Barack Obama will pursue a policy that will punish the Bashir regime and end the U.S. association with Sudanese intelligence. The desire is that President Obama will end what experts refer to as this "hypocrisy and make human rights," not the so-called "war on terror," the unambiguous top priority in U.S.-Sudan relations. Bilateral and

U.S.-led multilateral diplomatic pressure has little credible effect when Sudanese officials know that despite whatever State Department officials say, U.S. intelligence agencies will continue to coddle them. John Prendergast of the Enough Project has aptly described the task faced by U.S. diplomats as "Sisyphean," as negotiators struggle to build leverage against Khartoum but are undercut by "senior national security officials eager to maintain friendly intelligence sharing relations with the regime. This two-faced policy is outrageous, unacceptable, and should be reformed."[16]

Ethiopia

Ethiopia's National Information Security Service (NISS) is considered one of the best intelligence organizations in Africa. NISS's responsibility includes the traditional intelligence tasks and other duties to include border security, and criminal investigation, and counterterrorism management.

After the September 11, 2001 tragedy, members of the NISS assumed a dual responsibility. Within Africa the spy agency immediately assumed a role as "an active participant in African Union (AU) counterterrorism efforts, served as a focal point for the AU's Center for Study and Research on Terrorism, and participated in meetings of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA)."[17]

Second the NISS had an additional responsibility that called for establishing and solidifying a partnership with U.S. intelligence agencies that encompass the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The singular objective of the NISS-US intelligence partnership called for the disruption of al Qaeda and other Islamic safe havens in the Horn of Africa.

Many assert the evolution of the partnership occurred during clandestine visits by U.S. intelligence officials in the latter months of 2001. Others point to former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's visit to Ethiopia for discussions with officials of the government that cemented the cooperative intelligence relationship. It is noteworthy that once the meeting concluded Ethiopia committed itself to "high-level attention to the fight against terrorism" and "agreed to a number of new initiatives and continued to cooperate in efforts to collect and share intelligence on terrorist groups."[18]

The cooperation between the NISS-U.S. intelligence agencies shifted to a new level prior to, during and in the wake of U.S.-backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in December of 2006. U.S. intelligence and Special Forces units trained Ethiopia's Agazi Commandos who dealt with border security and even conducted counterterrorist operations inside Somalia. Equally significant the Agazi units were pivotal during the Ethiopian offensive onslaught that overwhelmed the Union Courts during the invasion of Somalia.

Many experts assert the invasion of Somalia highlighted the NISS and U.S. intelligence cooperation. One analyst observes the "Ethiopians are the primary suppliers of intelligence," but he also notes "it was almost inconceivable that the U.S. would not have sent its special forces into Somalia ahead of the Ethiopian intervention. "You are going to want to have your own people on the ground." In return the "United States is believed to have provided the Ethiopians with arms, fuel and other logistical support for a much larger intervention than it has previously mounted in Somalia. It has also made available satellite information and intelligence from friendly Somali clans, a former intelligence officer said."[19] Additional intelligence cooperation encompassed the following:

> The raid, conducted by an AC-130 gunship early Monday on a remote island at the southern tip of Somalia, was done in "close cooperation" with Ethiopia, a U.S. ally in the war on terror, said the U.S. official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity surrounding U.S. Special Operations missions. "We acted on time-sensitive intelligence and made the strike in cooperation with the Ethiopians," the U.S. official said, who is based in the region. He said Ethiopia provided the intelligence tip. A single AC-130 gunship handled the raid on a group of "senior al Qaeda operatives," the official said.[20]

According to Michael R. Gordon and Mark Mazzetti, the United States' "largely clandestine relationship with Ethiopia also included significant sharing of intelligence on the Islamic militants' positions and information from American spy satellites with the Ethiopian military. Members of a secret American Special Operations unit, Task Force 88, were deployed in Ethiopia and Kenya, and ventured into Somalia, the officials said."[21]

Having overrun the Union Courts, Ethiopian intelligence proved essential in tracking, detaining, and in some cases killing members of the remnants of the al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic organization.

While the West, particularly the United States, which is a beneficiary of Ethiopian intelligence there are growing concerns about human rights abuses within Ethiopia. In one example the U.S. State Department stated, "Although the constitution and law prohibit the use of torture and mistreatment," "there were numerous credible reports that [Ethiopian] security officials often beat or mistreated detainees. Opposition political parties reported frequent and systematic abuse of their supporters by police and regional militias."[22]

The intelligence cooperation between the United States and Ethiopia yielded additional fruits for the Ethiopian government. In what is considered a clear contravention of the U.N. restrictions on arms sales from North Korea, quietly the Bush administration acquiesced in January of 2007 during the Meles' government's "secret arms purchase from North Korea."[23] The deal represents a clear indication of "the difficult, and sometimes contradictory, compromises the Bush administration has had to make in the war on terror."[24]

For the foreseeable future Ethiopian intelligence cooperation with states in the Horn of Africa and most certainly with the United States are deemed to be critical for a credible war on terror and obviously for the protection of U.S. and regional interests. There is little doubt that Ethiopia will continue to use its proclivities in intelligence for additional benefits from its regional and U.S. partners.

Morocco

During a meeting with U.S. President George W. Bush, King Mohammed VI declared that the government of Morocco would accelerate "our cooperation, our collaboration in all fields,"[25] particularly in the area of terrorism. This statement unleashed the evolution of U.S.-Moroccan cooperation in the war on terrorism.

According to Marvine Howe, Morocco represented one of the first Muslim countries to formally commit its intelligence network, the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), to confront global terrorism. In the words of Howe, "For their cooperation, Moroccan intelligence agents were invited to take part in the interrogation of terror suspects imprisoned at Guantanamo. As a result, Moroccans tracked down a suspected Al Qaeda

cell in Casablanca accused of plotting terrorist attacks on NATO ships in the Gulf of Gibraltar. Moroccan security services also uncovered a clandestine network of cells said to be part of a nebulous Islamic movement called Salafiya Jihadia (Combatants for Purity), which was said to be linked to al Qaeda and widespread arrests followed."[26]

The DST is by no means a traditional intelligence partner of the United States. Prior to the announcement of the war on terror U.S. intelligence collaboration existed with such countries as Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and of course the United Kingdom. In the post-9/11 world other significant partnerships emerged with France, Germany, and Pakistan to name a few.[27] The DST was not considered among the elite intelligence organizations but the Bush administration recognized the strategic utility of the spy organization.

U.S. intelligence did consider a partnership with Algeria; however, the Bush administration backed away from a definitive, cooperative relationship. Because Algerian intelligence services "provided deceptive and self-serving intelligence about terrorist modus operandi within its territories" the administration established a cooperative relationship with the DST instead.

There is little doubt the Moroccan government understood and took advantage of the proposed cooperative venture with the U.S. government. The benefits for the Moroccan government were obvious:

> Morocco will have added access to U.S. military provision programs allowing it to upgrade its military hardware. Under the auspices of the Foreign Military Training Programs, its military personnel will benefit from the advanced training courses U.S. military schools and academies offer; in fact, Moroccan intelligence officers are already training in U.S. military schools such as Ft. Huachuca, AZ and Quantico, VA. The U.S. DoD will also provide funding to refurbish Moroccan bases, ports, and airfields. The Moroccan coast guard will gain the assistance of the U.S. Navy in its interdiction operations in the Strait of Gibraltar. The government's offensive against Islamic extremist cells will also stand to benefit from U.S. intelligence capabilities and U.S. funds set specifically for anti-terrorism operations in Africa. Other agencies, such as U.S. AID, governed by the U.S. Department of State will be involved, providing a much needed boost to social and economic reforms.[28]

The U.S. government recognizes the intelligence partnership with Morocco is burdened with dilemmas. In the words of Geoff Pingree and Lisa Abend, to confront domestic terrorism "the country not only risks endangering the fragile civil rights its government has begun to encourage,

but it must contend with the uncertain effects of emerging moderate Islamist movements."[29] Second, the growing presence of "Islamism in politics and Moroccan society will be a difficult test of the nation's proclaimed dedication to democratic reform."[30] Third, Morocco is confronting an ever-evolving challenge; a number of Islamic terrorist organizations exist within its borders and are mounting a local regional threat to security.

> The emergence of trans-Muslim consciousness in an age of inter-confessional conflict can best be seen in the international brigades that fight in various global brush wars. Moroccans, Syrians, Algerians, Saudis, Tunisians, Egyptians, and many other nationalities have formed the shock troops and suicidal warriors of international jihad.[31]

Fourth, many of these organizations are linked to al Qaeda. In a vivid example, after hearing the September 2006 message of Ayman al-Zawahiri that called upon the GSPC to integrate with Morocco's Islamic Combatant Group, a new entity was created, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This entity ignited additional instability within Morocco and across the region. The principal objective of AQIM was to create a new front in North Africa, a goal the organization most certainly achieved.[32]

Fifth, Moroccans have joined the jihad against U.S. troops in Iraq. Similarly, governments in North Africa fear that returning jihadists, after obtaining training and experiences in Iraq, may launch terrorist attacks in the region against those governments cooperating with the United States. Finally, the Moroccan government had a hard time accepting a painful reality: many Moroccans participated in several attacks in Europe. The Madrid bombings represent an instructive example.

> Intelligence and law-enforcement officials in Spain, France and Belgium say that their Moroccan colleagues have refused to face the fact that Moroccans have banded into autonomous terror cells that can carry out attacks without outside organization, logistical support or money. The day after the Madrid bombings, senior Moroccan officials were shown a video made by the bombers in which a masked man explained in Arabic who was responsible for the attack. The Moroccans insisted that the voice was that of a European, while the Spanish authorities said he was Moroccan, according to Moroccan and Spanish officials.[33]

The dilemmas aside, the U.S. government recognizes the DST's intelligence capabilities have yielded considerable information. For example, after Osama bin Laden launched the deadly terrorist attack on

September 11, 2001, the DST shared considerable information on al Qaeda with the CIA. In a reciprocal gesture in the wake of the bombings in Casablanca May 16, 2003, the CIA shared intelligence with the Moroccan government about those behind the attack.

The DST's intelligence assisted in a major operation that produced the capture of 317 members of the *Ansar al-Mahdi* group during the period between August and December 2006. Members of *Ansar al-Mahdi* created safe havens and "training camps in the Rif mountains [along] with several cells in Sale, Sidi Yehia El Gharb, Sidi Slimane, Al-Yousifiah and Casablanca, with the aim of establishing an Islamic government in Morocco. Suspected targets included hotels, foreign missions, and vital facilities in various coastal towns frequently visited by tourists."[34]

In another example the DST, along with other components of the Moroccan government released a 110-page report in February 2005. The report noted "Islamist terrorist organizations have branched out into other criminal activities as a means of financing their operations. It suggested that much of the money used to finance the 11 March attacks in Madrid had come from drug trafficking."[35] Second, the report listed "terrorist plots that the police have discovered and managed to prevent, among them attacks against foreign interests, including embassies, hotels and fast-food restaurants, churches, and synagogues. Nonetheless, the report argued that Moroccan security forces have managed to 'dismantle the most important' terrorist networks in the country, arresting more than 2000 people for terrorism-related crimes."[36]

With the continuing presence of the AQIM the work of the DST is needed to prevent instability in Morocco and elsewhere in North Africa. One thing is certain: the DST intelligence collaboration with the United States continues to evolve. However, for the sake of long-term stability the DST will have to improve its collaboration with its North African counterparts.

Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation, Africa and the War on Terrorism

As one would surmise multilateral intelligence cooperation among African states is shrouded in secrecy. Oddly the locus of the cooperation is the United States, where the CIA, DIA, FBI, and the military intelligence is essential in the ever-expanding collaboration between the United States and African states that are partners in the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI). Similarly, these two organizations are critical to intelligence cooperation among states that participate in the aforementioned initiatives.

The success of the CJTF-HOA is based on the reliance on cooperative efforts of member states. Intelligence cooperation among member states (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Yemen, Seychelles, Comoros, Mauritius, and Madagascar) of the CJTF-HOA proceeded apace since the commencement of the partnership.

Intelligence collection and collaboration among members of the CJTF-HOA is heavily reliant on Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and a host of U.S. intelligence assets. The U.S. deficiency is in the area of human intelligence and its strength is comprised of a host of technical assets from satellite, to signal, and the use of other sources. The American intelligence decline occurred in the wake of the dissipation of the cold war. Once the Soviet threat in Africa evaporated, the U.S. government rapidly downsized its intelligence apparatus across Africa.

Conversely, the weakness of African intelligence is on the technical side and its strength is in the area of human intelligence. Since the 9/11 attacks the U.S. government routinely relies on African spy agencies for intelligence collection and to prevent threats to U.S. interests. Task force members are therefore essential to the preservation of U.S. interests. Rarely discussed is the collaboration by members of the task force that confront local terrorist threats and the use of reciprocal intelligence to confront terrorists along the borders. Additionally, intelligence is employed in another venue: members of the task force use intelligence to track and to curtail terrorist financing.

Members in the task force provide essential intelligence. In the case of Ethiopia, this member of the task force received and transmitted intelligence to the United States during its invasion and subsequent occupation of Somalia. During the postwar phase the two-way intelligence entered a new phase during the tracking, capture, and bombing of members

of extremist Union of Islamic Courts that sought to avoid Ethiopian troops. There is little doubt the NISS in Kenya received and transmitted its share of intelligence as remnants of the Courts sought sanctuary in Northern Kenya.

The partnership is not without problems. The long-simmering tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea continue to impact task force cohesion. There is speculation that Ethiopian intelligence cooperation with the United States remained steady but Eritrean cooperation with member states of the task force declined. One would suspect that given the historic rivalry between Ethiopia and Eritrea that no intelligence cooperation exists. Moving forward such dysfunctions could undermine the long-term viability of the task force.

The Pan Sahel Initiative or PSI demonstrated the nascent intelligence cooperation that would become the hallmark of the TSCTI. The PSI called for military cooperation, training and counterterrorism collaboration among four countries: Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. These states were trained by the U.S. Army 10th Special Forces Group. According to many experts the strategy behind the PSI owes its existence to John Arquilla, a professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. In the words of Arquilla, "Networking, in this instance, consists of widespread sharing of information and cooperation in the field between intelligence, military, and law enforcement organizations in all countries involved. It means preemptive attacks will result from shared intelligence and will feature multinational assault forces. It means that nobody leads, but rather that all strive together toward a common goal."[37] This approach essentially developed into the strategy that governs the PSI. Similarly, the success of the PSI (and its replacement the TSCTI) owes itself to a fundamental statement: "[The] Foreign intelligence community is best equipped to identify terrorist hubs operating"[38] in the region.

The success of intelligence [albeit military intelligence] cooperation among member states of the PSI is exemplified in the 2003 incident involving Algeria's Abderrezak "El Para" group. The leader of the GSPC organization was the notorious Amari Saifi.[39] The former Algerian Army officer devised and implemented a kidnapping operation that netted thirty-two European tourists. Saifi was tracked by U.S. Navy P-3C Orion surveillance aircraft across the deserts of Mali, Niger, and Chad. As a result

of the intelligence cooperation of the aforementioned states Saifi is serving a life sentence in an Algerian prison.[40]

Sahara specialist at the University of East Anglia in Britain, Jeremy Keenan commented that U.S. intelligence is the region is sparse and that "If anything, [the TSCTI initiative] will generate terrorism, by which I mean resistance to the overall U.S. presence and strategy."[41]

Quite the contrary: the TSCTI is a source of terrorist prevention, and for the purposes of this section, a weigh-station for ever-increasing intelligence cooperation among states that participate in the initiative. There are several components of the TSCTI that deal with intelligence. The first involves the "Continued specialized Counterterrorism Assistance Training and Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) activities in the Trans-Sahara region and possible regional expansion of those programs" and second concerns "Military programs intended to expand military-to-military cooperation, to ensure adequate resources are available to train, advise, and assist regional forces, and to establish institutions promoting better regional cooperation, communication, and intelligence sharing."[42]

The TIP program involves sophisticated software that operates in computers at coalition airports to prevent the movement of terrorists from country to country that employs a computerized name check system that allows border and immigration officials with the ability to track suspected terrorists who may be operating in Africa.[43] Additionally, the TIP program allows participating countries with "increased capability to collect, compare, and analyze traveler data and contribute to the global effort to understand terrorist methods and track their movements." When combined with intelligence organizations within the Sahel the program is deemed critical in the tracking, capture and detention of terrorists in this part of Africa.

There are those who focus on the role of U.S. intelligence collaboration (whether in the form of the CIA or U.S. military intelligence) among states in the TSCTI. However, this approach overlooks the significance of African partners and the leading intelligence roles they perform. Nigeria, for example, is one such country that continues a leadership role in providing intelligence that prevents terrorist threats to U.S. interests and to those of neighboring states.[44] Similarly, Nigerian intelligence is working to improve intelligence sharing with its neighbors and its military employs specialized

units to improve counterterrorism, particularly in the area of border security.

The Continuing Problem of Reciprocal Intelligence Sharing

Back in 2007 the author provided a discussion of the contentious issue of reciprocal intelligence sharing. Reciprocal intelligence sharing remains contentious but select states in Africa have seen a dramatic change in the intelligence relationship with the United States. Before addressing the changes it is essential to restate my previous comments on the subject:

> The issue of reciprocal training is one that will not dissipate. Though partners of the United States, those in the CJTF-HOA, TSCTI, and individual states, whether in the form of Kenya, Egypt, Morocco, to name a few, reciprocal intelligence sharing remains largely one way: flowing in the direction of the United States. . . . Beginning in 2001 U.S. intelligence officers visited their counterparts in Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea and the CIA even worked with elements (warlords) inside the Transitional Governmental controlled territories to monitor events in Somalia. There was indeed sharing among the allies. The concern for American allies in Africa is that U.S. intelligence platforms—the CIA, DIA, SOFs, the use of the Predator Drone, Naval ships that monitored communications, occasional satellite photography, and other assets—often conduct surveillance without the approval of its regional partners, perform military operations without the consent of its partners, and worse, long after many missions ended, the U.S. officials refused to share critical information with their African allies.
>
> On the surface coalition leaders do not publicly express their displeasure regarding this issue. Instead, numerous complaints are sent through private channels. Making matters worse for U.S. regional partners, these complaints, on balance, have received little attention and more often than not have been ignored. There are two issues at work: the U.S. has taken its allies for granted and second there is a view within the region that the failure of reciprocal intelligence sharing is another illustration that the Africa partners in the war on terror have not received the benefits commensurate with other American allies, most notably Pakistan. Even after consultations with the State Department, though there has been an increase in military assistance to some frontline states, the U.S. government remains indifferent to direct intelligence sharing with its African partners.
>
> In the short term the U.S. is concerned that many rogue elements will likely develop (as was the case with Pakistan's ISI) within African intelligence services that will work to aide the cause of al Qaeda or indigenous terrorist organizations. This perception though understanding is nonetheless problematic. Accordingly, throughout the continent African's cannot understand how the U.S. government promotes cooperation among states within the region but simultaneously refrains from sharing critical intelligence with its partners. This "one way" intelligence relationship engendered mistrust and remains an issue that could potentially lead to a split between the U.S. and selected coalition allies.[45]

A question begs: so what has changed in the last two years? The first issue is the dilemma posed by the continuing chaos in Somalia. After the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Mogadishu, within days the al Qaeda-linked Al Shabaab quickly filled the power vacuum in parts of Southern Somalia. During a period in which the extremist organization endeavored to consolidate its power, Al Shabaab thereafter threatened both Ethiopia and Kenya. Alarmed by the threats the United States increased its intelligence to both states, and for their part Ethiopia and Kenya reciprocated, providing what information they obtained on the movements of al Shabaab.

The United States, Ethiopia, and Kenya's intelligence cooperation is at an all-time high. For the United States intelligence is essential because of the threat of a widening unrest between Ethiopia and Eritrea or between Al Shabaab and Kenya. In the case of Ethiopia, the Meles government is increasingly alarmed at the reality that Eritrea is arming and providing recruits for Al Shabaab. Throughout much of May 2009 the government of Eritrea deployed several aircraft which transported "weapons, food and medicine in Balidogle airstrip near Mogadishu to the Al Shabaab and Hisbul Islam spiritual leader Dahir Awes."[46] As one would anticipate the Ethiopian government does not like the fact that Eritrea is openly working to destabilize Southern Somalia and openly challenging its interests in the country.

Kenya too is alarmed by events in Somalia, albeit for dissimilar reasons. The open threats by Al Shabaab to invade the North Eastern region of Kenya have forced the Kenyan military on high alert. The Kenyan government for its part continues to warn the leadership of al Shabaab from instigating a conflict that it is incapable of winning. In response, NISS, the Kenyan intelligence service, increased its activities along the border between the two countries, and conducts operations within southern Somalia to obtain information about a possible al Shabaab incursion however unlikely.

The United States (and other western countries) has once again increased its intelligence in and around Somalia. There is a noticeable difference. Kenya and Ethiopia openly expressed the "shared commitment" associated with gathering and sharing intelligence on the movements and activities of al Shabaab and al Qaeda in Somalia. The United States, like, Ethiopia, and Kenya have a vested interest in seeing The African Union

Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) succeed. This alone requires the need for increased intelligence cooperation.

Outside of the Horn of Africa reciprocal intelligence cooperation has increased among the United States, Algeria and Morocco, two of the more essential states in the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative.[47] The issue that links the United States, Algeria and Morocco concerns the influence of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Long after the decision by al Qaeda and GSPC to consolidate their organizations in September of 2006, the presence of terrorist organization in the aforementioned countries (along with Tunisia) represents the catalyst that set the stage for increased intelligence collaboration.

The U.S.-Algerian intelligence cooperation reemerged after September 11, 2001. The cooperation proved critical in establishing a political rapprochement between the two countries. The emergence of the GSPC further strengthened the intelligence ties between the two allies. The growth and operational capabilities of AQIM only increased the need for reciprocal intelligence cooperation.[48] The fear of AQIM establishing safe havens in Algeria, which they did, along with their attempts at co-optation of Islamic groups in the country, increased the necessity of United States-Algerian-Moroccan intelligence cooperation. For the United States and the Algerian government there is another fear: "Algerian terrorists [particularly those associated with the AQIM] have contributed heavily to the stream of foreign fighters entering Iraq."[49] One should be mindful that AQIM in late 2006 launched and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) that "detonated at an affiliate of the U.S. oil conglomerate Halliburton in a western suburb of Algiers."[50] The joint United States-Algerian intelligence cooperation disrupted this threat, and the same cooperation continues to decrease the presence and operational capability of the AQIM. Finally, because of the growing reciprocal cooperation between the United States and Algeria, European intelligence organizations are expanding their cooperation with Algeria's spy agency.

The U.S.-Morocco intelligence cooperation, as in the case of Algeria, accelerated after the emergence of AQIM. The Moroccan DST worked to disrupt the AQIM network within Morocco, but the Moroccan government and U.S. intelligence feared two additional issues: the growing presence of cells that obtained experience in Iraq and were now capable and prepared to

target their own country. Second, there was the increasing worry that Moroccan AQIM cells could target Europe. These threats assisted in necessity for reciprocal intelligence cooperation between the United States and Moroccan spy agencies.

If reciprocal intelligence cooperation is a measure of trust between the United States and its African partners in the war on terror, then one should conclude there is growing cooperation but because the trust is limited there is a long way to go before one can conclude the issue is resolved.

What stands in the way of more reciprocal cooperation between the United States and other African intelligence agencies? The central issue from the American perspective is professionalism and lack of experience associated with African intelligence organizations. African states charge that while this is indeed an issue they assert that given the paucity of U.S. intelligence assets throughout the contingent the U.S. government should be thankful that states are willing to cooperate at all. Moreover, those states that do cooperate argue the U.S. government should provide what information it has to all, not just some, of its allies. According to analysts in the region this issue will determine the long-term prospects of U.S.-African intelligence cooperation against extremists in the region. There is little doubt the long-term viability of the war on terrorism hangs in the balance.

Conclusion

Experts routinely highlight the role of U.S., British, French, German, Pakistani and Israeli spy agencies in dealing with the evolving threat of terrorism. No one doubts the contributions of these states and their individual and collective efforts to confront the scourge of international terrorism. Overlooked and certainly discounted is the role of African intelligence and its contributions in meeting the challenges of dealing with terrorism in the region.

The research objective in this study endeavored to assess the role and operational viability of African intelligence in dealing with the threat of terrorism in the region. On three levels, bilateral, multilateral, and in the area of reciprocal sharing, there is ample evidence to indicate an

extraordinary role being performed by states within the Combined Joint Task Force and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative.

In the Combined Joint Task Force there are two types of activities that illustrate the growing importance of states in the partnership. The first is the burgeoning bilateral intelligence cooperation among member states in the partnership with U.S. and other Western intelligence services. Second, the evolving intelligence cooperation among states within the task force continues to accelerate. While no one can dismiss the significance of the intelligence proclivities of selected states in the partnership, there are areas of concern. In a salient example, human rights groups have expressed concern about the U.S.-Sudanese intelligence relationship. There is little doubt about the intelligence benefits accruing to the United States, but many are concerned that Bush and now the Obama administration is unwilling to pressure the Bashir government out of fear of losing critical information on the movements of al Qaeda or indigenous terror groups in the region. Similar human rights concerns are expressed in the U.S.-Ethiopian bilateral intelligence relationships where once again the previous and the current President of the United States is turning a blind eye to government well known for mistreatment of its citizens.

Multilateral intelligence cooperation among states in the Combined Task Force is at a level never anticipated by the participants or the United States. Consider that prior to the existence of the task force multilateral intelligence cooperation was at best uneven and infrequent. Second, many states in the Horn of Africa had no intelligence cooperation at all. Because of the need to confront the cross-border movements of a host of terrorist organizations and weapons, multilateral intelligence cooperation is not only a national security priority but given the threat of terror to individual states such collaboration is second nature.

Much like the Combined Joint Task Force, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative dramatically improved bilateral and multilateral intelligence cooperation. The TIPs program mandates the necessity of intelligence cooperation. Additionally, given the ongoing problem of porous borders in the region the need for information sharing among member states of the TSCTI is essential. Evidence of the importance of intelligence sharing is now even more essential given the threat of the AQIM.

The major problem associated with intelligence among member of the TSCTI is that several states are using intelligence information and interrogation against anti-government forces. In other words legitimate opposition leaders and groups (many of which are democratic groups) are being threatened, arrested and in some cases killed to protect corrupt and undemocratic regimes (these issues are particularly acute in Chad and Mali). The paradox is obvious: organizations that have been improved to disrupt and to defeat terrorism may in fact be setting the stage for future "blowback" that will almost certainly result in a new round of terrorism from domestic groups.

An additional problem associated with the ongoing improvement in African intelligence capacity oddly is the growing cooperation itself. Earlier a host of benefits had developed as a result of associating with U.S. intelligence agencies. However, the Bush administration's rendition program required the need for states to host "high-value" terrorists for the purpose of detention and torture. Morocco and its intelligence organization the DST have been reliable partners in the U.S.-led rendition program. The United Nations and human rights groups have expressed outrage and have condemned the program and the all-too-willing governments that have permitted the use of their detention facilities for the purpose of torturing terrorists.

Finally, as the war on terror continues to evolve terrorist analysts can no longer discount the role and significance of African intelligence. Successful intelligence operations occur behind the scenes and it will be years before scholars will learn about the most significant and certainly the most successful intelligence operations that have occurred in the region since September 11, 2001. Irrespective of this reality it is time to give African intelligence organizations the recognition they deserve for disrupting a host of terrorist conspiracies and capturing hundreds of terrorists across the contingent. There is little doubt that African intelligence efforts are a vital cog in the war on terror.

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Chapter 12

Transforming the War on Terrorism: Human Security Solutions in the Horn of Africa

Adrian Taylor

Introduction

Examining war and terror in the Horn of Africa we find that Somalia was the epicenter of regional insecurity, generating aftershocks throughout the region, engulfed by the former George W. Bush Administration's global war on terror (war on terror) and Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda's "Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders."[1] To understand this problem the war on terror in the Horn of Africa will be critically examined in this chapter. Specific attention concerns the competing international, regional and humanitarian interests during the former Bush Administration. Moreover, this chapter will attempt to ascertain how the matter of regional terrorism can be realistically transformed, as portrayed by the emergent Human Security discourse, a "bottom-up" participatory discourse that values the voices and choices of everyday people in the Horn of Africa, and examines the consequences of policies on people, not just States.

The War on Terror in the Horn of Africa

> There is instability in Somalia. The first concern, of course, would be to make sure that Somalia does not become an al Qaeda safe haven. [That] It doesn't become a place from which terrorists can plot and plan. And, so, we're watching very carefully the developments there and we will strategize more.
>
> George W. Bush[2]

> We will fight its [U.S.] soldiers on the land of Somalia . . . and we reserve the right to punish it on its land and anywhere possible . . . We warn all of the countries in the world not to respond to America by sending international troops to Somalia.
>
> Osama bin Laden[3]

International Interests

Reviewing the primary international interests, the former Bush Administration had short and long-term interests in the Horn of Africa. In the short term, former President Bush put the world on notice: "You are either with us or you are against us in the fight against terror."[4] In the Horn of Africa, the former Bush Administration attempted to protect its citizens, assets, allies, and strategic-interests, like the oil routes through the straits of Bab el Mandeb, from the threat of al Qaeda, and what was framed as "extremist" Islamists in Somalia and the Horn of Africa. Other interventions included freezing the financial assets of alleged terrorist entities, like the contested closing of the al-Barakaat remittance services in Somalia. The $100 million East African Counterterrorism Initiative, alongside the U.S. Central Command's Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, based at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, with about 2,000 troops, was deployed. The CIA was operative, in partnership with warlords (resembling the "Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism") and the intelligence services in the region.[5] Regional States aligned, supported by the opening of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia. The former Bush administration sponsored the fall 2006 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1725, sanctioning the contested African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Preemptive war was sanctioned, as headlines reported, "U.S. Defends Ethiopian Action in Somalia, But Urges Restraint."[6] U.S. military air, land and sea resources were deployed by the former Bush administration in Somalia, producing operational benefits and humanitarian costs.[7] And, as of May 17, 2007, Ambassador John M. Yates was appointed as special envoy to Somalia, based in the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, to address the conflict radiating from Somalia.

In the long-term, the former President Bush made his *tough* strategic vision clear, stating that he intended to "rid the world of the evil-doers," believing he could "rout terrorism out of the world," though cautioning,

"This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while."[8] For the former President Bush, "This crusade, this war on terrorism" was framed as *The Freedom Agenda*,[9] dispensing $508,284,778 in "Humanitarian Assistance to the Horn of Africa."[10] Other interventions included working with the International Somalia Contact Group and the International Advisory Committee for the National Reconciliation Congress—urging reconciliation between the Transitional Federal Government/Institutions and Islamic Courts Union elements, bound by the framework of "The Transitional Federal Charter and Transitional Federal Institutions," toward a program for democratic elections in 2009.[11] The former Bush administration authorized a continental military command for Africa, United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), to effectively address more than just U.S. humanitarian, strategic interests in Africa: counterterrorism, oil security, opening up markets for U.S. firms and to pose as a counter to the enlarging influence of India and China in Africa.[12]

The other primary international actor in the region during the former Bush Administration was al Qaeda.[13] Foundationally, it can be said al Qaeda's ideology has three pillars, from the words attributed to Osama bin Laden himself:

1. The Sovereignty of Allah and Sharia (Islamic Law)[14]: "We seek to instigate the [Islamic] nation to get up and liberate its land, to fight for the sake of God and to make Islamic law the highest law and the word of God the highest word of all";[15]
2. The Liberation of Muslims Land from Occupation: "We want our land to be freed of the enemies, we want our land[s] to be free of the Americans [the Zionists and Apostates]." Further, "We believe that it is our religious duty to resist this occupation with all the power that we have and to punish it using the same means ["reciprocally" killing civilians as] it is pursuing against us."[16]
3. The Centrality of Jihad: "Jihad is the sixth undeclared element of Islam. Every anti-Islamic element is afraid of it, Al Qaeda wants to keep this element alive and active and make it part of the daily lives of Muslims. It wants to give it the status of worship."[17]

Consistent with Roger A. Pape's comprehensive database of all suicide terrorism from 1980-2005, we find a *rational*, strategic logic: "The specific goal sought in almost all suicide terrorist campaigns in modern history [whether secular and/or religious] is the same: to compel a democratic state to withdraw combat forces from territory prized by the terrorists."[18] In this stream, al Qaeda has had enduring interests in the Horn of Africa,[19] as was

the case in 1993 (the "Black Hawk Down" conflict in Somalia), 1998 (the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania), 2002 (the hotel and airline attacks on Israeli-interests in Kenya) and at the time of publication, as al Qaeda provides "virtual,"[20] and operational support to former, reactionary Islamic Courts Union elements in Somalia, principally Shabaab al-Mujahideen (aka the Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin, al-Shabab, Shabaab, the Youth, Mujahidin al-Shabaab Movement, Mujahideen Youth Movement, Mujahidin Youth Movement).[21]

Regional Interests

Somalia, a "failed state," seemingly engaged in two decades of *civil war*, was the frontline of the war on terror in Africa for the Bush Administration, with the contest between the Transitional Federal Government and associated Islamic Courts Union elements at the center of the problem.[22] Upon the Islamic Courts Union's seizure of power, in the summer of 2006, they attempted to bring order to southern Somalia for the first time in sixteen years, through the imposition of their Salfist interpretation of *Sharia*, before being deposed by Ethiopia, backed by the former Bush Administration. Addressing the possibility for conflict transformation, the interests of insurgent Islamic Courts Union elements were, and continue to be accessible, and consequential, with Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, former head of the Islamic Courts Union Shura (Consultative/Legislative) Council, factional leader (i.e., Hizbul Islamia), and suspected al Qaeda associate, *reasoning* that (1) "Somalia is a Muslim nation and its people are also Muslim, 100% therefore any government we agree on would be based on the holy Quran and the teachings of our Prophet Muhammad,"[23] such that (2) "We are going to liberate Somalia from Ethiopia. Then we will form a government of national unity."[24] Accordingly, the Islamic Courts Union elements, alongside suspected al Qaeda operatives from the U.S. Embassy bombings in 1998 (Fazul Abdullah Mohammed), and the 2002 attacks in Kenya (Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan and Issa Osman Issa), had the greatest war on terror value for the former Bush administration, since key Islamic Courts Union elements (Mukhtar Robow, Ahmed Abdi Godane, Ibrahim Haji Jama and Hassan Abdullah al-Turki) were reported to have operational links to al Qaeda.[25]

Ethiopia and Eritrea have been interminable combatants—with other reports of conflict in Ethiopia's ethnic Somali Ogaden region, and border clashes between Eritrea and Djibouti, leading Djibouti's President to declare war against Eritrea.[26] Initially, Ethiopia was committed to challenging the "threat" of Islamic Courts Union terrorism and irredentism, in support of the Transitional Federal Government.[27] Many argued that, in effect, Ethiopia served as a proxy for the former Bush administration's revised counterterrorism policy.[28] Further, Eritrea was known to host former Islamic Courts Union elements. Reports suggested that Ethiopia and Eritrea were supporting their own allies with troops and arms, motivated by their war of 1998–2000 (claiming around 80,000 lives), their unresolved Badme border dispute, and a history of supporting each others' oppositional factions.[29]

Sudan was thought to be cooperating with the former Bush administration in Somalia and abroad, providing actionable intelligence. Apparently, this helped to curtail substantive U.S. pressure on what the former Bush administration maintained was genocide in Darfur.[30] Also, sources suggested that Sudan gave tacit support, if not more, to Islamic Courts Union elements as it vacillated on the (initial) deployment of AMISOM.[31] Kenya was known to be active in the region, as it chaired the Intergovernmental Authority on Development; participated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; was engaged with the International Contact Group; and consistently worked to create a functional, secular government in Somalia. However, Kenya was faced with many challenges as it tried to resolve its own problems from the tragic Presidential elections of 2007; address the influx of refugees fleeing conflict in Somalia; resolve the problems with its own dispossessed, coastal Muslim population; while providing basing and port access to the United States. Also, Djibouti was in a quandary. On the one hand, Djibouti allowed the U.S.-led Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa to establish a military base in the country; helped to establish a number of reconciliation conferences; and was at "war" with Eritrea. On the other hand, Djibouti's President stated that he supported the territorial integrity of Somalia, publicly voicing his displeasure with reports of U.S. military attacks in Somalia being launched from Djibouti. The latter orientation was consistent with the will of many Somalis who were in support of the Islamic Court Union's rule,[32] who

viewed Ethiopia as an "occupation" force and publicly demonstrated against the former Bush Administration's military attacks in Somalia.[33]

Humanitarian Interests

Human Security eluded the Horn of Africa during the former Bush administration, whether we address the freedom from fear or the freedom from want. Addressing the freedom from fear, we find that "about 8,000 Muslim fighters were killed in the brief war, while the Ethiopians lost just 225, with 500 wounded" in Somalia, after the former Bush administration-backed, Ethiopian-Transitional Federal Government intervention.[34] There were reports that 3,000 civilians were killed and up to 700,000 newly displaced people in Somalia,[35] with "some 315,000 of them in neighboring [*sic*] countries, including Kenya, Yemen, Ethiopia and Djibouti."[36] The United Nations Secretary-General focused on the consequences of armed conflict on children in Somalia, reporting "a number of parties to the conflict [were] responsible for recruiting and using child soldiers" where "children are being killed and maimed as a result of military actions by Ethiopian forces in the course of confrontations with anti-Government forces and civilian demonstrators." In addition, there was an "increase in reported cases of rape and other grave sexual violence against children."[37]

In Ethiopia, there were reports of unaccountable, Guantanamo Bay-like prison-interrogation facilities, implicating Kenya and U.S. intelligence services.[38] In Ethiopia's ethnic Somali Ogaden region, the Ogaden Liberation Front, with alleged links with the Oromo Liberation Front, attacked an oil installation claiming the lives of nine Chinese and seventy-seven Ethiopians. This prompted Georgette Gagnon, from Human Rights Watch, to report that "The Ethiopian army's answer to the rebels has been to viciously attack civilians in Ogaden," prompting allegations of war crimes.[39] In Sudan, the conflict in Darfur remained unresolved, with reports of some 10,000 to 300,000 civilian deaths and 2.5 million people displaced since 2003.[40] And the 2005 peace agreement between the Northern and Southern regions of Sudan were tenuous, reminding people of the two-decade civil war that killed over 1.5 million people and displaced over 200,000.[41]

Addressing the freedom from want in the Horn of Africa, the region continued to have one of the worst Human Development Indexes in the world,[42] facing what the USAID characterized as a "Complex Emergency." In light of poor governance and underdevelopment, it was apparent that many of the challenges in the Horn of Africa were compounded by irregular rainfall, drought, conflict over natural resources, rising food prices and restricted humanitarian relief access.[43] The emergencies in the region were complex during the end of the former Bush administration's term, with 80,000 people negatively affected by drought in Djibouti; 1.7 million people in need of emergency assistance in Eritrea; 4.5 million people in need of emergency assistance in Ethiopia; 291,454 people displaced by the post-election crisis in Kenya; 2.6 million people in need of emergency assistance in Somalia; and reports from UNICEF that the health and lives of six (6) million children, alongside the lives of the often marginalized, pastoralist and agricultural populations in the region were also threatened.[44]

Human Security Matters

Reviewing Human Security matters, before critically examining the possibilities of moving toward a realistic-pragmatic Human Security framework to transform terrorism in the Horn of Africa, we find that the Human Security discourse grew out of an assessment of the "human" consequences of development economics in the early 1990s. This shift in orientation was informed by the data that there was no automatic correlation between national growth and development, when marginalized communities were accounted. This paradigm shift was initiated by economists like Mahbub ul Huq and Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen and the creation of the annual *Human Development Reports*, sponsored by the United Development Program. Foundationally, this perspective focused on developing human capabilities and enlarging people's freedoms,[45] complimented by the Human Development Index, to be read alongside traditional economic metrics. This paradigm shift, from national aggregates to individual human life-worlds, fostered the conditions for the "democratization" of the national security discourse, and the two primary trends in the Human Security discourse that have emerged, attempting to:

(1) secure "the freedom from want" and (2) secure "the freedom from fear"—though "the freedom from want" was seemingly privileged, based on the comparative advantages of many of those who initiated the discourse, economists.

As the discourse developed, the reorientations that were introduced by the *Human Development Reports* influenced the convergence between human development and security studies, as portrayed by the foundational texts in the discourse.[46] Surveying the discourse, we find an enlarging debate on how to operationally define Human Security. On the one hand, we have who favor the original, more "comprehensive" approach, which the researcher is calling "Revolutionary Human Security,"[47] and on the other hand, we have those who are in favor of a more "narrow" approach, which the researcher refers to as "Reformist Human Security."

Revolutionary Human Security

Addressing the scope of the original framework, Human Security is essentially "aimed at mitigating threats to the insecurity of individuals" and not just States, enabling people to enlarge their capabilities and freedoms.[48] At its best, the Human Security *attitude* is dialogic and deeply democratic, consistent with the Human Security "methodology" introduced by the research of Richard Jolly and Deepayan Basu Ray.[49] It is dialogic in that it is a participatory framework that focuses on the interactions between civil society, the State and the International Society, informed by the "democratically" expressed will and/or public opinions of a given population. Once this will is determined, it is used to prioritize policy objectives, to the degree that it is a comprehensive framework that can help secure the foundations of human development, toward conflict transformation.[50]

Assessing the core values of Human Security, we can find empathy and responsibility.[51] These values challenge people to identify with the human dignity of "the suffering other," taking personal responsibility, to the extent that is possible, to help people become self-reliant. This framework recognizes that we all want security and freedom, no matter our culturally-informed, ontological referent, whether Allah, or The Enlightenment's God of Nature, "Reason,"[52] conscious that there are other ways of being in the

world, even in "democracies." Human Security has four core elements. It is (1) people-centered: focused on the diverse lives that people have reason to secure; (2) multi-dimensional: as it seeks to address the complex issues that inform contemporary insecurities; (3) interconnected: recognizing that a threat to one can pose a threat to all, be it a social, religious, political, economic, environmental or health-related threat; and (4) universal: to the degree that this orientation values the disparate interests of the globe's citizens, as we all want (culturally-circumscribed) liberty.[53]

Furthermore, Jolly and Ray developed an essential set of Human Security questions, challenging analysts to ask: (1) does a given policy enable "the capacity of people to exercise agency over choices and strengthen their capabilities"? (2) do the policy "measures in one country weaken the conditions of human security in another country"? and (3) does a given State's policies "make military weapons and overwhelming military force the main mechanisms for achieving human security"?[54] If any answer does not effectively value Human Security matters, we are faced with what the researcher is calling a "Human Security deficit."

Reformist Human Security

Addressing a narrower concept of Human Security, the research of S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong helps to inform the growing debate that is more in line with the valuations in *Human Security Brief* 2007.[55] For MacFarlane and Khong, Human Security is defined as securing the "freedom from organized [political] violence." This definition supposes that "humans are insecure insofar as they are in danger of being injured, maimed, or killed by those who organize to harm them." Thus, threats to Human Security would include "genocide, internal/civil wars, terrorist attacks, interstate war, ethnic cleaning policies, organized rape, torture and the laying of land mines." This interpretation is deemed feasible since "it seems possible to respond to such security threats by going to the source."[56]

Critically reviewing the research of MacFarlane and Khong, we are presented with a conscious attempt to make the Human Security discourse more "mainstream," so that there is buy-in, in various academic and policy circles, informing the narrower definition of Human Security.[57] Yet the data suggests that more humans suffer from threats addressed under the more

comprehensive framework of Human Security than those who are threatened by organized (political) violence.[58] Effectively, the "Human" in Human Security loses its value. Beyond MacFarlane and Khong's assessment of the noteworthy "Promises and Achievements" of Human Security praxis, their criticism of what they see as "Conceptual Overstretch" by those who advocate for a more comprehensive valuation is remarkable, focused on what they see as:

> 1. False Priorities and Hopes: Too much is covered by the Revolutionaries, where "the concept loses all its meaning and coherence." One might first ask "for whom?" since we can assume, by their text alone, that they were able to ascertain the concept's "meaning and coherence." Maybe others can construct "meaning and coherence" too? Also, the authors found problems with relabeling issues Human Security concerns, since it leads to "an inability to prioritize, or the creation of false priorities." However, since choosing priorities is an inherently inter-subjective process, it is hoped that the authors are not proposing a new form of "benevolent hegemony," presupposing their singular-access to *True Priorities and Hopes*.
> 2. Causal Confusion: The authors suppose, "if military, economic, environmental, health, and gender-related threats to the individual are all lumped as threats to human security," then "the task of isolating the causes of these threats are all the more difficult." Yes, but unless the authors are appealing to a metaphysics, where all problems are reducible to *one* solution, we may want to proceed more carefully. At worst, all we can do is help to foster the (pre)conditions that enlarge people's capabilities and freedoms, which cannot be reasonably denied, even if we "save" someone from organized violence. In this stream, it appears that complex problems, require complex solutions, assuming that we are not circumscribed by powerful interests and are focused on addressing the security fears of as many *Humans* as possible, despite inherent difficulties; and
> 3. Securitization and Military Remedies: The authors contend, "Because states already have a tendency to associate issues with the concept of security so that they can bring force to bear, the human security approach, by introducing and legitimizing a whole new set of issues . . . that can be securitized may unwittingly lead to military solutions to political or socioeconomic problems." Albeit relevant, the authors are fallaciously shifting the burden of proof. It is not the fault of Human Security analysts if States try to apply "military solutions to political or socioeconomic problems." Moreover, it appears that powerful States will trample over nations, people and *surely concepts* in pursuit of their National Security Interests, as has been evidenced by the former Bush Administration's contested invasion and occupation of Iraq,[59] even in the name of Freedom, as *Operation Iraqi Freedom*.[60]

Human Security is a contested concept. The Revolutionary or Reformist aspect of Human Security will be used and/or completely discarded, due to the values, choices, experiences—contingencies—of a given researcher and the scope of one's research problem. Realistically, maybe all Human Security can encourage is a change in attitude and focus, as in, a focus on the short- and long-term consequences of policies on people, not just states.

Toward a Realistic Human Security Framework

Upon the winter 2006 Bush Administration-backed, Ethiopian-Transitional Federal Government overthrow of the Islamic Courts Union, the evidence suggests that the Human Security realities in the Horn of Africa were clear, present, dangerous and escalating. Utilizing the Human Security questions developed by Jolly and Ray to judge the practical consequences of the war on terror, it is also clear there is a "Human Security deficit" in the Horn of Africa.

For example, the former Bush administration's war on terror was focused on State security (e.g., securing U.S. counterterrorism interests and privileging the contested interests of Ethiopia and the Transitional Federal Government); was ruled by seemingly zero-sum calculations that appeared to privilege the United States and allies no matter the likely effects of the war on terror on civilian populations, despite monetary aid (e.g., 3,000 civilians were killed, 700,000 people were displaced in need of aid, and child soldiers proliferated, following the U.S.-backed, Ethiopian-Transitional Federal Government overthrow of the Islamic Courts Union); and the intervention was heavily focused on procuring the resources and energy for war (e.g., securing military-centric counterterrorism initiatives, a regional military base in Djibouti, contested CIA operations, diplomatic efforts in support of military initiatives like the Ethiopian "occupation" of Somalia, the deployment of AMISOM forces, and the development of a continental military base, AFRICOM).

Consequently, it can be said that the lives and securities of ordinary Somalis were marginal, at best, and expendable, at worst, producing aftershocks throughout the region when it came to the former Bush administration's war on terror. If the costs outweigh the benefits when read against the latter administration's war on terror, then the literature on containing the threat from organized political violence matters, as a realistic-pragmatic Human Security matter for the administration of Barack Obama.

Containing the Threat of Organized Political Violence

Consistent with the historically responsible, six-part counterterrorism framework proposed by Louise Richardson,[61] integrating an examination of the former Bush Administration's interventions in the Horn of Africa,[62] the following is recommended toward a realistic Human Security framework:

Have a Defensible and Achievable Goal

The Obama Administration was correct when it dropped the term the "War on Terror."[63] Simply put, an "emotion," terror, and a "tactic," terrorism, cannot be "defeated" by war. It is logically/experientially impossible, as war produces more "terror" (i.e., "shock and awe").[64] And based on the data, terrorism increased sevenfold (globally "607 percent"),[65] soon after the former President Bush began what he called "This crusade, this war on terrorism" in Iraq. Beyond the historical allusions and strategic miscalculations of framing "This crusade," as a "war on terrorism," alienating national and international publics,[66] confirming the global Muslim suspicion that the war on terror was a "War on Islam,"[67] playing into the frame of al Qaeda, we have to be honest with ourselves: the former President Bush could neither "rid the world of the evildoers," nor "rout terrorism out of the world." And even if it were possible, genocide and war crimes would likely follow, since non-state terrorists tactically blend into civilian populations. Further, if the Obama Administration's replacement frame for the war on terror, "Overseas Contingency Operations," entails the realistic objective of *containing* the threat of war and terrorism (along with a broader strategy that is focused on Humanitarian Relief and the possibilities of *Sharia* supported by Somalis and the "Muslim World"), then we are operating within a realistic/achievable framework. Reframing the goal, as containment, as such, is more likely to allow the International Society to counter the terrorist threat, simultaneously undermining the consequential rhetorical practices of al Qaeda.[68]

In the Horn of Africa, this would entail the strategic redistribution of defensive assets (in and) around the Somalia border, consistent with

Ethiopia's withdrawal from Somalia, rather than support any perceived "occupation" force. In this context, all occupation forces become problematic, whether it be al Qaeda's anti-reconciliation "foreign occupation," the contested presence of AMISOM, the reentry of Ethiopia, and/or the re/deployment of U.N. troops (Arab, or otherwise).[69] Though this recommendation might cost the viability of President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed's "new" Transitional Federal Government, alongside the fifteen other failed attempts at nation building post-1991, and produce some short-term violence, it has some potential long-term benefits: it privileges the "Transitional" nature of the Government, and even the very name of the "Transitional Federal Government," given its connotations with a tragic regime and policy; it undermines any notion of United States-Ethiopian-U.N.-AU-backed "Christian-Apostate-Secular" *occupation* or *Holy War*, mounted by Somali Nationalists and/or al Qaeda; it fosters the conditions for an "organic" Somali State to rise, as the former Islamic Courts Union "naturally" did, before being deposed, ideally based on "the will of the people," especially if that will privileges *Sharia*, similarly acknowledging the realities of self-declared Somaliland and Puntland;[70] and it helps to contain/defend the surrounding States against the terrorist threat. Any order that would emerge in southern Somalia would have normative responsibilities. Aggression, terrorism and human rights abuses are not options, and there are inter/national statutes to deal with said occurrences, however challenging.[71]

Live by Your Principles

To effectively transform terrorism, the Obama administration has to make sure that there is no room for any kind of "Freedom Agenda" that leaves civilian populations dead by the hundreds of thousands, people displaced by the millions, people un-free from "occupations" despite the will of the people,[72] and "Enemy Non-combatants" stripped of their human rights/dignity, as we saw during the global war on terror in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and the Horn of Africa. As many observed, the war on terror was too easily seen as antithetical to the best of democratic values and the rule of law. This is being supposed since it is reasonable to assume that people would rather have the freedom from death, displacement, "occupations," "enhanced interrogation techniques" (with Retired U.S.

Major General Antonio Taguba, the Army general who first investigated the abuse at Abu Ghraib, asserting that "The commander in chief and those under him authorized a systematic regime of torture")[73] and "unlawful" detentions (whether in Guantanamo Bay or suspected sites in the Horn of Africa), instead of *The Freedom Agenda*, as such.

Here we are talking about realizing Human Security, national and international accountability, negotiating the possibilities of bringing alleged terrorists and war criminals to justice within a regime that is true to the United States and International principles, beyond situational appeals to pragmatism/centrism, apparently placing politics over the rule of (international) law.[74] Reframed, the agenda is about the rule of law, undermining any notion that "Might Makes Right" born of fallacious special pleading.

Know Your Enemy

We have to know what "the enemy" wants, to undermine the threat, effectively utilizing all source intelligence, in the pursuit of justice, discriminately. The insecurities of those who resort to the tactic of terrorism, or insurgency, appealing to the rhetoric and/or realities of "popular" notions of injustice, must be recognized.[75] In other words, the appeals of the adversary, whether al Qaeda, al-Shabaab, or Hizbul Islam-like factions—"to end occupations"—and the counterterrorist literature suggests that former President Bush was misguided when he simply contended that "They hate our freedoms."[76] This oversight must not happen again. The "enemy" wants freedom, security and autonomy too, albeit informed by another ontological framework.[77] Additionally, terrorists are "normal" and human. They are not just "evil," according to the research of forensic psychiatrist and former CIA operations officer Marc Sageman.[78] To realistically counter the threat we are forced to renegotiate the "occupations" and "injustices" that exist in the "Muslim World" and engage "the enemy" whose critique of U.S. foreign policy is consistent with the "Muslim World" [79] and much of global public opinion, during the former Bush Administration.[80]

Separate the Terrorists from Their Communities

We have to win the battle of "hearts and minds." This is more likely to be the case to the degree that more people have the capabilities to enlarge their freedoms, before and after any counterterrorism intervention. So long as civilian populations are killed, displaced, believe that Muslim men are being detained indefinitely, and feel like they are being "occupied" by foreign forces, this "ideological" or "Overseas Contingency Operations" will be ceded to the terrorists. Terrorists will not be isolated, and containing the enemy will become more difficult. The idea that we have baser motives in the "Muslim World" (e.g., oil control, support of "Apostate" dictators to suppress Islamists and unconditional support of Israeli policies) will simply be confirmed. Consequently, the mujahideen (Holy Warriors), in Somalia (and beyond), will continue to be viewed as the protectors of their communities and defenders of the faithful, spawning a new generation of believers. Even more, the enlarging and powerful critics of al Qaeda, from former members and respected clerics,[81] will be undermined along with the possibility of winning over as many "moderates" as possible.

Engage Others in Countering Terrorists with You

If realistic, President Bush's declaration to the world that "You are either with us or you are against us in the fight against terror" has to be looked at as a fallacious false dilemma and unproductive when trying to engage others. One could reasonably be against the framework of the former Bush administration's war on terror" and Osama bin Laden's "Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders." Moreover, if trying to practically engage others, regimes would be less inclined to act unilaterally in war when an attack is not proven to be imminent, and would work with others in the International Society based on each other's comparative advantages. A global challenge needs global engagement, one cannot "go it alone" as we can see in (Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and) the Horn of Africa. In theaters of insecurity, responsible actors would be required to work cooperatively with international, regional, and individual constituents (especially "the Enemy" to secure a negotiated peace) at (post) nation building, recognizing that doing otherwise will continue to cost, in blood, treasure and legitimacy.

In Somalia this would require a Somali-based peace agreement and power-sharing arrangement to emerge. This would require a post-Transitional Federal Government (and Charter) and overt foreign

support/involvement, led by Somalis (businesses, civil society, etc.)—which would take seriously the problems of "occupations" and the support of "puppet" regimes when trying to transform terrorism. Somalis can govern themselves, though it will be a struggle given past and present realities.[82]

Short of a "surge" of overwhelming international force (like we saw in Iraq), or a total withdrawal of *overt* international support for the Transitional Federal Government, both unlikely with attendant challenges and opportunities, there are limited options on the immediate horizon if present iterations maintain: the Transitional Federal Government can marginalize the insurgents and consolidate power; the insurgents can defeat the Transitional Federal Government, provoking another "occupation" of Somalia by Ethiopia, further destabilizing the region; the insurgents can defeat the Transitional Federal Government, but potentially fracture due to internal tensions; and we can see a revert to the status quo, where the whole country is effectively divided and ruled by warring factions, among other possibilities.[83]

In the broader Horn of Africa the problems need to be disaggregated so that regional states do not continue to inflame the insecurities in Somalia—as in, Sudan, Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Additionally, one of the first conflicts that needs to be transformed is between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Eritrea needs to be diplomatically engaged and won over. As such a final settlement needs to be reached between Ethiopia and Eritrea's border dispute so that Somalia does not continue to be a theater for proxy war.

Have Patience and Keep Your Perspective

This orientation challenges those who want to effectively transform terrorism to shift the frame from being committed to "the long war," to being committed to securing "the long peace," for human development, toward conflict transformation—or submit to present, "occupation" or "neo-colonial," realities. This framework recognizes that realizing Human Security takes time, and that it is quite humbling when we find out that we do not have the monopoly on virtue.

Conclusion

Examining the former Bush administration's global war on terror in the Horn of Africa, we found that there were a number of competing international, regional and humanitarian interests affecting the realities in the region. Further, we found that the war on terror had a "Human Security deficit." The insecurities of everyday people in the Horn of Africa were enlarged (not just states) as a consequence of the war on terror. In other words the war on terror was focused primarily on state security; was ruled by seemingly zero-sum calculations, that appeared to privilege the United States and allies no matter the likely effects of the war on terror on civilian populations; and the intervention was heavily focused on procuring the resources and energy for war. The war on terror did not work, on the former Bush administration's own unrealistic grounds (e.g., the goal to "rid the world of the evil-doers," or the attempt to "rout terrorism out of the world")[84] or on the grounds advanced in this chapter, that Human Security matters (whether "Revolutionary" or "Reformist").

In light of the war on terror's Human Security-deficit, it is being supposed that realistic pragmatism (e.g., Containment, Humanitarian Relief, and the will of the people, exploring the possibilities of *Sharia*) should trump non-negotiable ideology when it comes to transforming terrorism, emanating from Somalia. Moving toward a realistic counterterrorism framework, we are seeking to evaluate and potentially apply what works and what can be effective, beyond former President Bush's rhetoric of being "tough" on terrorism, and the Obama Administration's overt support of the Transitional Federal Government and "occupation" forces, in light of (Human) Security realities and consequences.

If realistic most people in the International Society would choose effectiveness over the perpetuation of security dilemmas. As such it is contended by Louise Richardson that "if we have a more modest agenda—if our goal is to contain the threat from terrorism and if in doing so we play to our strengths and abide by our principles—then we can definitely succeed."[85] Looking at the consequences of the war on terror in the Horn of Africa, and beyond, the six-part counterterrorism framework proposed by Richardson, rooted in the valuations of Human Security matters, is appearing more realistically pragmatic than not, in the attempt to transform terrorism.

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Chapter 13

From Blueprint to Implementation: Assessing the Progress of the African Union in the Fight Against Terrorism

Samuel Moki

Introduction

Though the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) was adopted in 2000, the organization was officially launched in Durban, South Africa, on July 9, 2002. The AU was created to replace the crippling Organization of African Unity (OAU) that was created in 1963 to provide solidarity and unity of purpose among African states. For almost four decades after its creation, these goals remained distantly elusive because of the selfishness of the various states and their suspicion that their sovereignty would be endangered. Increasingly, the Organization of African Unity tilted more toward the Organization of African Disunity. The resultant marginalization of Africa within world politics became apparent in the economic, social, financial, development, security and political domains. A new sense of insecurity swept through the continent, gravitating African leaders to reexamine the role of the OAU. Attempts to restructure the OAU failed as there was general consensus that a new, empowered organization would be the more acceptable remedy. In a world where regional solidarity seemed an emerging approach toward global politics and international relations, the African states had little choice but to rethink their strategy. Looking at the solidarity and united approach of other regional organizations like the European Union, African leaders decided on creating a more unifying and purposeful organization.

It is in this spirit that in September 1999 African leaders gathered in Libya and issued the Sirte Declaration imploring the creation of the African Union. Mindful that true collective security is also tantamount to individual security, the declaration was followed by intense and sustained efforts to transform the Declaration to reality. In 2000, these efforts materialized as African leaders adopted the Constitutive Act of the African Union in Togo. The following year, the modalities of implementation were agreed upon in Lusaka, Zambia, and in 2002, the new organization was officially launched in Durban, South Africa.

Immediately after its creation, the African Union faced many significant problems. Indeed, the African Union inherited the many problems that plagued the defunct Organization of African Unity. It had to deal with the prevalence of poverty, deplorable educational and healthcare conditions, massive trade deficits and external debts, stagnant and in some cases negative economic growth, armed conflicts between African states, civil wars, and other security-related issues like piracy and terrorism. Immediately, however, the fight against terrorism became a major preoccupation of the African Union. In assessing the progress of the African Union in combating continental terror, it is first helpful to present some historical information that documents why terrorism became a major preoccupation of the African Union. Second, this chapter will discuss the justification of inquiring into the effectiveness of the African Union's counterterrorism program. Third, a glimpse of the Constitutive Act is warranted because it lays down the institutional framework or the blueprint of the African Union's determination to confront the threat of terrorism. Finally, seven years after launching the African Union, it is prudent to assess its actions vis-à-vis the fight against terrorism. This study will examine the actions that have been taken and those currently being taken by the African Union to confront continental terrorism. This analysis will examine prominent provisions of the African Union's Plan of Action and assess if these provisions have been implemented in terms of concrete actions. Ultimately, the task here is to explore the successes, failures, challenges and recommendations for a more successful counterterrorism program for the African Union.

Why Terrorism Became a Major Preoccupation

By its very definition and nature, terrorism is a strategy and phenomenon that must be confronted, defeated or at the very least, checked. The United States Law Code defines terrorism as "premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents."[1] The frenzy that followed the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States resulted in the passage of United Nations Resolution 1373 on September 28, 2001. Faced with the devastating consequences of terrorism, the international community under the United Nations banner proceeded to pass Resolution 1373 which it declared binding on all member states. The resolution described in detail the measures that each member state must adopt and implement to deal with terrorism. Unfortunately, in a haste to take action, the United Nations Security Council failed to define terrorism in this resolution. To remedy this shortcoming, the Security Council on October 8, 2004, defined terrorism as "criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act."[2] On its part, the European Union defines terrorism as offences and acts which "given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organization were committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population; or unduly compelling a Government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization."[3] In addition to these definitions, there are dozens of others. While the definitions may differ in their construct, there are fundamental commonalities that leave little doubt as to the meaning and nature of terrorism. These commonalities include the threat and use of violence, intimidation, the killing of innocent civilians and noncombatants, destruction of property and the destabilization of the economic and social order.

The manifestation of terrorism in Europe, the United States, Africa and other parts of the world from the seventies to 2001 catapulted terrorism as a major preoccupation on the world stage. It was not, and is not an American problem, a European problem or an African problem; it became and

remains a world problem at the level of the United Nations as manifested through Security Council Resolutions 1373 of 2001 and 1566 of 2004.

Though not reflective of a complete list or a statement of United States policy, the United States Department of State documents 246 significant terrorist incidents from 1961 to 2003.[4] It is evident going through these terrorist incidents that just about all the continents and nationals from diverse countries have been targeted. Some specific instances of relatively recent acts of terrorism are instructive.[5] In 1993 the World Trade Center in New York City was bombed killing 6 and injuring 1,000 people. In Sri Lanka in 1996 the Tamil Tigers bombed the country's Central Bank killing 90 civilians and injuring over 1,400 others. In East Africa terrorists attacked American embassies Kenya and Tanzania killing scores of Americans, Kenyans and Tanzanians. In 2000, the *USS Cole* was targeted by terrorists while anchored in a port in Yemen. In that attack 17 sailors were killed while 39 others were injured. On September 11, 2001, al Qaeda operatives using United States commercial planes unleashed several sophisticated, well-coordinated and devastating terrorist attacks in New York, Virginia and over the skies in Pennsylvania. The attacks killed a total of 3,025 American citizens and those of other countries. The total destruction of the World Trade Center, the symbol of America's capitalist tradition, and the significant destruction of the Pentagon, left no doubt on how emboldened the terrorists had become. If they could hit prime targets in the United States, they could hit any target in the world. Though there have been several terrorist attacks since then, September 11, 2001, remains the preeminent contemporary reminder of the threat and destructiveness of terrorism.

The enormity of the attacks in Kenya and Tanzania (the injured, the dead and the massive destruction) signaled to Africa and the world the continent has been targeted as the new front for terrorism. Compounding the situation was the reality that Africa fit the profile of a promising recruiting ground for terrorists. It appeared to be the geographical region with the least protection for Western and American interests. In addition with the prevalence of poverty in the continent young Africans are more likely to be attracted to the comparatively lucrative "opportunities" and the "ideological" brainwashing offered by terrorist organizations. Africa seems to be the weakest link and the terrorist organizations seem poised to exploit the opportunities. These bleak possibilities dictate the high priority that

African leaders must give to combating terrorism. In order to be more effective in this fight, a collective and coordinated African approach begs for implementation. In view of the dramatic attacks in East Africa in 1998 and the September 11, 2001 attacks, it is not surprising that African leaders engaged in frantic efforts between these periods to create the African Union. In 2002 the African Union was officially launched with a mandate to (among other things) provide a collective approach and implementation strategy to combat terrorism in the continent. The African Union's motivation for developing a regime to quash this cankerworm is captured in the words of Mr. Geofrey Mugumya, the organization's director for peace and security. He lamented that "the toll of terrorism and the price Africans have had to pay for these outrageous criminal acts can hardly be estimated in statistical figures" and then cautioned that "as a threat to both human and state security. . . . It's now time for African countries to come up with formidable measures to end this vice."[6] Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf expressed similar sentiments reflective of the Africa's view that "We also resolve, as all civilized nations have, to join the global effort to fight terrorism anywhere in the world recognizing that it is today the most single challenge to world peace and collective freedom . . ."[7] These sentiments reflect the mode that triggered the creation and subsequent launching of the African Union in 2002.

The African Union has done an excellent job of conceptualizing and creating the institutional and legal framework to enhance a collective fight against terrorism. Seven years after its official launching, it is prudent to assess the degree of transformation from the blueprint to implementation. This assessment is critical in view of the reality that the African Union's Plan of Action and other instruments cannot per se provide security against terrorism. To be successful there has to be significant progress toward implementing the blueprint. Without such progress the war against terrorism is doomed. In view of the fact that the legal and institutional framework constituted the foundation of such assessment, it is logical and rational to first examine the blueprint of the African Union's fight against continental terror.

The Blueprint: The African Union's Plan of Action

The African Union must be given credit for moving swiftly in orchestrating a plan of action to deal with continental terror. The Plan of Action of September 2002 was historic in that it was the first comprehensive and collective document by African states to fight terrorism. The striking resemblance between the African Union's Plan of Action and United Nations approach to fighting terrorism indicates that the African Union is a cooperating partner in the global fight against terrorism. The Plan defines terrorism, calls for the ratification and implementation of the Algiers Convention of 1999 on the prevention and combating of terrorism; stipulates compliance with international agreements dealing with terrorism, the creation of the Peace and Security Council to implement The Plan; the creation of the African Center for the Study and Research of Terrorism (ACSRT) by virtue of a subsequent protocol tied to the Plan; police and border control, harmonization of legal and judicial measures, a strong information exchange regime and measures designed to curtail the financing of terrorism.

The African Union's determination to implement the blueprint is spurred by the reality of terrorist attacks that continue to take place around the world but more so within the African continent. One such attack that spurred a strong verbal condemnation from the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Alpha Oumar Konare, occurred in Algeria on December 11, 2007. His condemnation statement put out by the African Union also captures the organization's determination to combat terrorism: "The Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union has received, with outrage and horror, the news of the bomb attacks which took place in Algiers, Algeria, [on] December 11, 2007 [that] has led to the death of many innocent people including children . . . He strongly condemns these barbaric acts and, once again, unequivocally reaffirms Africa's commitment to put an end to the scourge of terrorism. He uses this occasion to call on the international community to renew its efforts to collectively address this scourge not only in Africa, but also in the world at large."[8]

The African Union's Definition of Terrorism

Problem of definition is critical to problem solution. The manner in which an issue is framed or defined bears implications on how to deal with it. The African Union, mindful of the significance of the terrorism, provides a definition of terrorism that leaves little doubt as to its undesirable and destructive tendencies. The fact that the definition of terrorism is located in the preamble of the Plan of Action is a testament that the African Union was anxious to set the tone in this document to point out the seriousness of the threat posed by terrorism in the regions. In its preamble the African Union defines terrorism as:

> A violent form of transnational crime that exploits the limits of territorial jurisdiction of States, differences in governance systems and judicial procedures, porous borders, and the existence of informal and illegal trade and financing networks.[9]

The substance of this definition is clear-terrorism is a violent form of transnational crime that infiltrates, destroys and destabilizes a political system. The seriousness of the threat of terrorism basically influenced the recommended strategies in the Plan of Action.

Ratification and Implementation of the Algiers Convention of 1999

The Algiers Convention was a counterterrorism document that was drafted under the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Though the initial response was positive, the OAU could not get its Member States to ratify the document so that it could go into force. This failure was disappointing being that only fifteen of the over fifty member states needed to ratify the document before it could go into force.[10] Consequently, the African Union (AU) made the ratification and implementation of the Convention its top priority. The Plan calls on Member States to: "Sign, ratify and fully implement the Algiers Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and, where necessary, seek assistance of other Member States or the international community to amend national legislation so as to align such legislation with the provisions of this Convention."[11]

Compliance With International Agreements

The Plan also makes it mandatory for Member States to sign and respect all international agreements initiated to fight terrorism. It implores Member States to: "Sign, ratify and fully implement all relevant international instruments concerning terrorism and, where necessary, seek assistance for amendments to national legislation so as to comply with the provisions of these instruments."[12]

It is not surprising that The Plan mirrors provisions of international agreements initiated under the United Nations. Such an approach is designed to show the unity of purpose between Africa's approaches to dealing with terrorism and those of the international community. For example, the substance of The Plan's Article 13 bears striking similarity with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 on disrupting the funding sources for terrorist activities.

The Creation of the Peace and Security Council

The creation of the Peace and Security Council is at the heart of The Plan. Indeed, it mirrors the fundamental inquiry of this chapter—the importance of implementation. The African Union decided that to be successful, it must create an implementation watchdog to monitor the implementation of The Plan by Member States. The littered lessons of its predecessor, the League of Nations, served as a constant reminder that without effective implementation, the African Union, like the League, could be reduced to a toothless bulldog that barks but cannot bite. The creation of the Council is an indication that the African Union understands that ultimately its efforts toward fighting continental and global terrorism would be judged more by what actions it takes rather than by the words in The Plan. It is important to inquire whether Member States have complied with the requirement to provide to the Council "on an annual basis" the "steps taken to prevent and combat terrorism and, where appropriate, on the implementation of the Algiers Convention."[13]

The African Center for the Study and Research of Terrorism

Also, the African Union created the African Center for the Study and Research of Terrorism (ACSRT) as a structure under the Peace and Security Council. The Center serves to "centralize information, studies and analyses on terrorism and terrorist groups and develop training programs by organizing, with the assistance of international partners, training schedules, meetings, and symposia."[14] The Center is another critical piece in the fight against terrorism because it provides the opportunity to understand the psychological and sociological foundations of terrorism. Its activities would unveil crucial information on what attracts individuals to terrorism. Such information will help African countries to develop counterterrorism strategies to steer their citizens away from terrorism.

Police and Border Control

The African Union's Plan of Action amplifies the importance of police and border control in the fight against terrorism. It calls on Member States to:

> Enhance border control and surveillance, as well as the necessary means to prevent the forgery and falsification of travel and identity documents; ensure identity documents contain advanced security features that protect them against forgery; . . . keep a passport stoplist containing information of individuals whose application would require special attention or who may not be issued with travel documents . . . develop and upgrade the regulations governing border control and security procedures including land, sea and air exit and entry points so as to curb infiltration and promote cooperation among police agencies having due regard for relevant provisions of relevant regional and continental agreements on the free movement of persons and goods.[15]

It is clear from this provision that the African Union understands that without these stringent police and border control measures, terrorists can avoid prosecution by using false passports to leave the country where the terrorist act was committed. Passport forgeries also mean they can mask their identity.

In addition to these measures, The Plan also calls for computerizing all points of entry to maintain a more accurate arrival and departure record, and to ensure the authenticity of all passports. It also requires that Member States make substantial investments in human resources by training immigration officers to profile travelers and detect forged travel documents. The Plan tightens the asylum process by denying political asylum to anyone

who is directly or indirectly involved in acts of terrorism. If implemented, The Plan has dislodged from terrorists a major instrument of survival.

Harmonization of Legislative and Judicial Measures

The African Union's Plan also contains provisions to create a uniform legal framework for prosecuting terrorists. Terrorists are also entitled to a fair trial. The Plan calls on Member States to:

> Amend, where necessary, national laws relating to bail and other criminal and procedural issues so as to give effect to the requirements of expeditious investigation and prosecution of those involved directly or indirectly in the crime of terrorism. These measures should include issues such as the protection of witnesses, access to dockets and information, and special arrangements on detention and access to hearings; harmonize the standards and procedures regarding proof for terrorism-related crimes; promote specialized training and reinforce the capacities of the judiciary [and]; harmonize legal frameworks pertaining to the prevention and combating of terrorism.[16]

The shortcoming of the current individualistic approach is that different laws and different punishment apply to terrorist acts within Africa depending on where it occurs. It gives terrorists the option to commit acts of terrorism in countries where the laws dealing with terrorist acts are weaker. Moreover, the harmonization of the extradition regime which is also part of The Plan would deprive terrorists the luxury to shop for, or escape to, sympathetic countries. This was the case in 1976 when hijackers seized an Air France plane from Athens to Paris.[17] They commandeered the plane ultimately to Uganda, a country that was sympathetic to their Palestinian cause. Though he recognized that terrorism and hijacking were international crimes, Uganda's President, Idi Amin, never considered turning the terrorists over to France nor did he mention possible prosecution in Uganda. In addition, The Plan makes it more difficult for terrorists to shop for a safe haven by addressing the issue of extradition under Article 12. It requires Member States to:

> Conclude extradition and mutual legal assistance agreements, where necessary, and adopt the legislation that would enable Member States to cooperate effectively; identify, if need be, the national authorities for processing extradition and mutual legal assistance requests and, where necessary, establish mechanism to ensure coordination between competent national authorities in this regard [and]; review existing extradition and mutual legal assistance legislation, and adapt such legislation with a view to ensuring effective and expeditious handling of extradition and mutual legal assistance requests.[18]

Mindful of other complications that could possibly hinder an effective extradition regime, The Plan prohibits the use of political considerations as grounds to deny an extradition request. It also makes it incumbent on the country in which the terrorist is residing to prosecute the terrorist if he or she cannot be extradited for whatever reasons.

Information Exchange

Conscious of the fact that the war on terrorism cannot be won within an information vacuum, the African Union's Plan calls on Member States to: "Enhance intelligence exchange, training and capacity-building (with the assistance from INTERPOL), including basic and improved specialized training for staff in charge of combating terrorism; identify individuals, groups and entities engaged in terrorist activities . . . share lessons learnt and experiences gained on counterterrorist tactics; establish a common Terrorism Activity Reporting (TAR), schedule as data collection instrument on names of identified organizations, persons, places and resources by Member States. The TAR should then provide the source information to the content of an AU database that shall provide timely information. . . ."[19]

Terrorists, as documented previously, manage a massive global operation. They communicate and coordinate their activities using sophisticated communication technology. Terrorism cannot be defeated or checked without information sharing and coordination by African States and with the international community. This blueprint empowers African States to monitor terrorist planning and prevent terrorist attacks not only within Africa, but also, throughout the world.

Implementing the Blueprint: An Assessment of Progress

The first major challenge that the African Union assigned itself was to get the required fifteen states to ratify the Algiers Convention of 1999 without which it could not go into force.[20] The African Union's fight against terrorism is dependent on the implementation of this Convention which was drafted under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity. It seemed this would be an easy target to meet since the African Union is made up of fifty three Member States. Initially, for different reasons, Member States

hesitated. However, a sustained campaign led by the African Union Commission culminated in a Senior Officials' Meeting in Algiers during which more than the required fifteen ratifications were obtained. The sustained efforts paid off by the end of 2006 when all Member States, except Zimbabwe and Sâo Tomé and Principe, became parties to the Algiers Convention.[21] Was this a signal that African states were now prepared to move forward with the implementation of the blueprint?

To demonstrate that Africa was committed to the global war on terrorism, the African Union required its Member States to also sign unto and respect all other international agreements dealing with the fight against terrorism. The agreements, among others, include the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism which was passed in 1999. To the African Union's credit there have been consistent efforts to urge and remind Member States to sign and ratify all international agreements dealing with the fight against terrorism.[22] This consistency is the reason why a solid majority of African states have signed and ratified not only the 1999 Convention, but also all international agreements to combat terrorism.

The blueprint of creating the Peace and Security Council to oversee the implementation of The Plan became a reality in 2004. Since its creation, the Council has held approximately 200 meetings many of which focused on dealing with terrorist threats and acts of terrorism on the continent. At its 80th meeting on July 18, 2007, the Council strongly condemned terrorist activities in Somalia that were aimed at further destabilizing the political process in that country.[23] Though facing funding issues, it is the Peace and Security Council that manages peacekeeping operations for the African Union. Under its direction, African Union forces under the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) are dealing with both the civil war and related terrorist activities imbedded in the war. It has maintained, and continues to maintain, a constant drumbeat to Member States to implement the African Union's counterterrorism instruments. The Council is the leading organ that forcefully and consistently condemns terrorism. In an environment of more pressing economic and social problems, the Council continues to remind Member States that terrorism is a threat to economic and social development and must be confronted. In addition, it continues to establish relationships with other international organizations—like the European

Union, International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the United Nations—in seeking more financial and technical assistance to help African countries fight terrorism.[24]

To help the Peace and Security Council fulfill its tasks, the African Union created the African Center for the Study and Research of Terrorism (ACSRT). The Center has made substantive progress in bolstering the African Union's counterterrorism capacity. Some of the activities that the Center has implemented include holding a meeting in 2005 to discuss the threat of terrorism in Africa, conducted a training program on explosives in 2006, holding a seminar on "Terrorism and Religious Extremism" in 2007 in Algiers, organizing a meeting in 2007 on the topic "Building Capacity in African Sub-Regional Organizations with a Focus on West Africa" and holding two meetings for its national focal points (Member States).[25] Constantly seeking partnership to secure technical assistance, the Center sought the collaboration of the United States' Department of State and the Defense Department through its Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS). Jointly, ACSRT and ACSS conducted an African Capacity Building Counterterrorism Workshop in December 2008 designed to combat terrorist financing in North and West Africa.[26] In addition, the ACSRT held other counterterrorism seminars in Algeria and Congo to help these countries and their respective regions assess the threat of terrorism, their capacity to deal with these threats and the nature of technical assistance needed.[27]

The African Union has also taken steps to enhance the harmonization of legislative and judicial measures concerning the fight against terrorism as specified in the blueprint. The extreme difficulty of this task cannot be overemphasized if left to individual Member States. This difficulty is heightened by the fact that the fifty three countries that make up the African Union have different laws, cultures, values and legal systems. It is encouraging that through persistent persuasion, several African countries have already enacted counterterrorism legislation. However, there is still a long way to go. Mindful of this difficulty, diversity and the need for a delicate balance, the African Union has taken up the responsibility of facilitating the achievement of this goal on behalf of its Member States. The efforts of the AU in this regard are captured in the following statement by the United States Department of State:

> In 2005, with Danish funding, the AU hired a consultant to draft a counterterrorism Model Law to serve as a template to assist member states in drafting language to implement counterterrorism commitments. In December 2006, an AU-sponsored group of experts drafted counterterrorism language, which was in the process of being legislated. The group of experts decided to retain options for both broad and specific laws and determined that new legislation was needed to combat money laundering and other financial crimes. In August 2008, the AU Peace and Security Council requested that the AU Commission expedite the development of the African Counterterrorism Law.[28]

The Model Law may not provide all the answers nor will it guarantee a seamless transition toward achieving this goal. Nonetheless, it represents a substantive effort by the African Union to enhance the harmonization of legislative and judicial measures to counter terrorism.

Challenges

In spite of many commendable achievements by the African Union in implementing its counterterrorism agenda, there is little doubt that the organization continues to face major challenges seven years after coming into existence. African countries through the African Union have certainly demonstrated the political will to fight terrorism. The creation of the African Union reflects the continent's desire to create a stronger and more structured organization that would more effectively deal with continental issues like terrorism. Through hard work and determination, the African Union set out quickly after its creation to put together a solid, comprehensive counterterrorism agenda. For seven years, however, it has struggled with the task of implementation. The modest transition from blueprint to implementation has been the result of the African Union's development challenges like poverty, high unemployment, deplorable healthcare systems, and its lack of financial and technical capacity.

The African Union's fight against terrorism is complicated by the fact that Member States are facing more pressing development problems like poverty, significant unemployment rates, high crime rates, declining educational systems, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, and deplorable healthcare systems. While terrorist attacks are real, their occurrence in Africa is relatively infrequent compared to the daily experience of poverty, declining educational systems, high unemployment rates, HIV/AIDS, high crime rates and underperforming healthcare systems. To the Member States,

they must prioritize these options because of the lack of funding resources. Based on the two options, Member States have decided to invest most of their limited resources on dealing with their development problems rather than against terrorism.

In addition the developmental requirements are more pressing and affect ordinary citizens more; their resolution or lack there of, may have serious implications for the war on terrorism. Pervasive economic problems (poverty, crime and high unemployment) produce a fertile breeding ground for recruitment of terrorists. Terrorist organizations are known to exploit these situations by offering recruits money and other luring "privileges." These "privileges," among others, range from basic needs like food, shelter and healthcare. Therefore, improving economic and social conditions is another avenue to fight terrorism in Africa. A major challenge in improving economic and social conditions is the endemic corruption, favoritism and tribalism in Africa. African leaders are leading the charge to empty their respective treasury for their personal and family benefit. Civil servants see their government jobs as a means to enrich themselves rather than improving the lives of their fellow citizens. It is common for monies allocated for economic and social development to end up in the private accounts of government officials in European and American banks. Unless these attitudes are reversed and economic and social conditions improve, Africa will continue to provide breeding grounds for terrorists thereby complicating the African Union's counterterrorism efforts.

The lack of financial and technical capacity is another major challenge. Member States lack the financial and technical capacity to transform the African Union into a fully operational organization. Realistically, many of the action items remain largely in blueprint form because of these financial and technical deficiencies. For example, to control the movement of terrorists, the African Union's counterterrorism strategy calls for among other measures, to adopt technology that prevents passport forgeries, computerize all points of entry to manage travel information and train immigration officers on how to profile travelers. In view of the fact that each African Country has several points of entry, these measures would require substantial investments in technology and human resources. African countries simply do not have the required resources vis-à-vis the many economic and social problems they have to deal with. It is, therefore, not surprising that many Member States have not been able to computerize all

their points of entry. In the majority of cases, entry and departure records are processed manually. The continuing inefficient and ineffective approaches do not bode well for the African Union's fight against terrorism. If this task is to be achieved, the United States, Europe and the rest of the international community must step up to assist the African Union with the financial resources and technical expertise to implement these measures. The African Union has done an excellent job during several of its Peace and Security Council meetings to remind the international community of the need for financial resources and technical assistance. Also, through its implementing organ, the Commission, the African Union has petitioned for substantial technical assistance through its dealings with the U.N. Counterterrorism Committee, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union and the United States. If the African Union is to succeed in the fight against terrorism then technical assistance, from the West and the international community must be more substantive, not "mainly advisory and capacity-building program. [29] The international community and the Western developed countries must understand that Africa is an integral partner in the global war against terrorism. Western efforts to deal with individual African countries, like those of the United States' Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) in 2002 (and later its replacement, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative [TSCTI]), is a good approach designed to assist Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania in securing their borders, combating terrorism and tracking the movement of persons. Such efforts should now be coordinated with the African Union within their over all Plan of Action to combat continental terrorism. If the African Union fails in its efforts to stem terrorism, it will also mean a failure in the fight against global terrorism. When the famous terrorist bombings took place in Kenya and Tanzania the thrust of the al Qaeda attacks was not aimed at African targets. Instead, they were directed against United States embassies. However, in terms of human lives and economic implications to the tourist industry in both countries, Africans bore the brunt of these calamities.[30] The point is that symbolic technical assistance to the African Union is unacceptable.

Complicating these border inefficiencies are the known corrupt practices of border and security officers in Africa. Bribery and corruption reign at points of entry in African countries. It is not uncommon for individuals without proper documentation to bribe their way across borders. Worse still,

it is not uncommon for individuals to bribe their way through points of entry with prohibited items. Could some of these items be used in terrorist acts? That is a real possibility.

Other challenges that were experienced in the immediate years following the creation of the African Union persist to this day. In 2004 two years after launching, the Chairperson of the African Union reported that many Member States have not provided their points of contact for appropriate coordination as provided for in Section E, Paragraph 15 of the Plan of Action.[31] This deficiency in providing information, information exchange and meeting reporting requirements persists even in 2009 seven years after the African Union came into existence. The lack of financial resources and technical capacity plaguing the African Union is in large part a correlation of the lack of financial resources and technical capacity on the part of Member States. In order for the African Union to successfully implement its counterterrorism agenda, Member States must develop, fund and implement foundational programs in their respective countries to support and provide all requested information. Lack of resources—both financial and technical—have limited the ability of Member States to meet certain fundamental obligations. This in turn has complicated the African Union's ability to carry out a more effective coordination and implementation of its counterterrorism policies.

Conclusion

Seven years after coming into existence the African Union can boast of many substantive accomplishments in developing and implementing an African regime to prevent and combat terrorism. The organization must be commended for putting together a comprehensive blueprint to counterterrorism in Africa. For over seven years, it has engaged in a tedious and complex process on implementing the blueprint. While many aspects of the various instruments have been implemented successfully, many challenges have slowed down progress on several fronts. Needless to say, the blueprint is an ambitious agenda that requires extensive financial and technical capabilities to implement successfully. Unfortunately, Member States of the African Union are deficient in those capabilities. The

correlative consequence is that they cannot provide the African Union with adequate levels of funding and technical capacity required to implement the counterterrorism plan. The only other option for the African Union is to request assistance from Western powers and the rest of the international community. While the African Union has done an excellent job in exposing this need to the international community, the response—in terms of substance—has been disappointing. This is a global war of which Africa is an integral part. If the counterterrorist strategies fail in this region due to lack of financial resources and technical capacity, the entire world will bear the consequences. It is not too late both Member States and the international community must rededicate themselves to this course. Borrowing from the healthcare industry, prevention is better than cure.

Notes

1. U.S. Code Title 22, Chapter 38, paragraph 2656 f (d) (2).

2. See *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566* of October 8, 2004.

3. See the European Union's Article 1 of the *Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism*, June 13, 2002.

4. United States Department of State, "Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961–2003: A Brief Chronology." http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm. The site was accessed August 10, 2009.

5. Unless otherwise stated, the instances mentioned in this paragraph are found in the above citation.

6. Dave Opiyo, "Africa: Continent At High Risk of Terror Raids," http://allafrica.com/stories/200710292078.html. The site was accessed August 10, 2009.

7. These remarks were delivered at the 61st Session of the United Nations General Assembly Meeting in New York City on September 19th, 2006.

8. African Press International, AU Condemns Algeria's "Barbaric" Bombing," http://africanpress.wordpress.com/2007/12/14/au-condemns-algierias-barbaric-bombing/. The site was accessed on August 9, 2009.

9. African Union, "Plan of Action of the African Union for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism," September 9, 2002, Preamble, Article 7.

10. OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999, Final Provisions, Article 20 (1) and (2).

11. African Union, "Plan of Action . . ." General Provisions, 10 (a).

12. Ibid., General Provisions, Article 10 (b).

13. Ibid., Specific Provisions, Article 16 (b).

14. Ibid., Specific Provisions, Article 20.

15. Ibid., Specific Provisions, Article 11 (a) to (f).

16. Ibid., Specific Provisions, Article 12 (a) to (d).

17. "1976: Israelis Rescue Entebbe Hostages," *BBC*, July 4, 1976. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/4/newsid_2786000/2786967.stm. The site was accessed August, 11, 2009.

18. Ibid., Specific Provisions, Article 12 (f), (g) and (h).

19. The plan of Action, Article 14 (b), (c), (d) and (e).

20. Ibid., General Provisions, Article 10 (a).

21. African Union, "Profile: African Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT)." http://www.iss.co.za/static/templates/tmpl_html.php?-node_id=2395&slink_id=4579&slink_type=12&link_id=3893. The site was accessed August 10, 2009.

22. For an example of such urging and reminders see, African Union, "Declaration of the Second High-Level Intergovernmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism." http://www.africaunion.org/Terrorism/DECLARATION%20Algiers%20REV.pdf. The site was accessed August 10, 2009.

23. African Union, "Communiqué on the Situation in Somalia." http://www.africaunion.org/ROOT/UA/Conferences/2007/juillet/PSC/18%20juillet/Communiqu%C3%A9%20Somalia%20Eng.doc. The site was accessed August 10, 2009.

24. African Union, "Communiqué of the 151st Meeting of the Peace and Security Council." The site was accessed on August 10, 2009.

25. African Union, "Profile: African Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACRST)." http://www.iss.co.za/static/templates/tmpl_html.php?node_id=2395&slink_id=4579&slink_type=12&link_id=3893. The site was accessed on August 10, 2009.

26. Department of State, "Country Reports on Terrorism 2008." http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2008/122412.htm. The site was accessed August 10, 2009.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. See Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Implementation of the 1999 OAU Convention and the Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, October 13-14, 2004, Article 22, 6.

30. In terms of human lives see, National Public Radio, "Terrorist Bombings in Kenya, Tanzania Remembered." http://weblogs.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93366949. The site was accessed August 11, 2009.

31. See Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Implementation of the 1999 OAU Convention and the Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, October 13-14, 2004, Article 22, 6.

Conclusion

The African Response to Terrorism: An Assessment

John Davis

Introduction

The multifaceted objectives of this study called for analyzing the diversity of the terrorist threat among states (Somalia and Weak States in Africa) and the growth of terrorism in specific regions whether in East, West or North Africa. Another objective called for the examination of the regional terrorist threats. Particular focus centered on "Terrorism and Islam in Africa," "Understanding Terrorism in Africa," and "Confronting Disaster: Terrorist Safe Havens in Africa." The third objective of this study called for the exploration of a series of regional solutions—"Rethinking Developmental Practices," "The Imperative of Good Governance" and "Strong Democratic Institutions," "Evaluating African Counterterrorism," "African Intelligence Efforts," "Examining Human Security Solutions in the Horn of Africa," and "The African Union Response to Terrorism"—as a response to the threat of terrorism in Africa. Viewed collectively, this study endeavored to provide a clear picture of evolving terrorist threat and the regional solutions to terrorism in Africa.

In the pages that follow the conclusion addresses three issues. The conclusion commences with an examination of a host of alarming trends—the proliferation of safe havens, weak states, and the reemergence of Al Qaeda and the growth of transnational terrorism—that indicate the danger and instability caused by the expansion of terrorism in Africa. Second, the conclusion focuses on the multifaceted African response to terrorism. The response includes an examination of intelligence and counterterrorism

efforts, and the extent to which the African Union has entered the fray. Finally, the assessment closes with the answer to a rudimentary but important query: Is the African response sufficient enough to counteract the current expansion of terrorism and terrorist-related violence?

Alarming Trends

There are a number of distinctive features that indicate an alarming trend. These indicators illustrate that terrorism, often overshadowed by HIV/AIDS, regional poverty, corruption, transnational crime, whether in the form of Piracy, Drugs, the rise of Human Trafficking in the region, Money Laundering, is emerging as a national security issue in many states in the region. This reality would have been unthinkable a few years ago. What accounts for the change? A number of variables account for the expanding threat. The number of terrorist groups—both subnational and transnational—continues to expand in the region. Second, terrorist recruitment continues to accelerate. Third, terrorist-related violence is exploding, particularly in the Horn and in North Africa. Fourth, there is this issue: the growth and persistence of sub-national or domestic terrorism. Sub-national terrorism is rife in Africa. Terrorism expert Jakkie Cilliers offered this statement about the dilemmas posed by this version of terrorism in the region: "This particular brand of terrorism is partly a hangover of the process of decolonization, but is more intimately linked to the failure to effect sustained development and to consolidate accountable and effective governance."[1] Viewed in the current context, these factors—the failure to effect sustained development and to consolidate accountable and effective governance—indicate the region is rife with terrorism and terrorist-related violence. The section that follows provides information on additional variables that symbolize the alarming trends of terrorism in Africa.

Safe Havens

Terrorist safe havens have exploded across Africa. As noted earlier there are several types of safe havens: physical areas (remote, urban, maritime) or non-physical areas (virtual). These sanctuaries are exploited by terrorists who operate in weak and failed states. Having established a safe haven,

homegrown and foreign terrorists then use these areas to organize, recruit, to conduct training, and these sanctuaries are often employed to conduct cross-border terrorist attacks.

The remote or ungoverned spaces offer terrorist organizations a tactical advantage that they use to further impact state sovereignty in Africa and worst, undermine stability in the region. The use of remote areas is particularly acute in the Horn and North Africa. There are a number of commonalities associated with states in these regions. First, there has been a dramatic increase in safe havens among states in the two regions. Second, the safe havens themselves are occupied by al Qaeda and their affiliates. Third, as an attendant consequence al Qaeda and their affiliates have used these areas to increase instability in both regions of the continent. Finally, there is this reality: if states in the aforesaid regions do not dramatically reduce the proliferation of safe havens one can anticipate seeing a substantial increase in terrorist attacks across both regions.

Weak States

The aforesaid factors notwithstanding there are other critical variables that assist in our understanding of the negative trends associated with terrorism in the region. The continuing presence of weak states in the region is developing into a major indicator of the threat posed by terrorism. As Hailu so eloquently articulated in chapter 2

> Weak states unable to fulfill the obligations of protecting their populations from external threats or domestic responsibilities of providing human security to their citizens expose not only the people under their political jurisdictions but also great numbers of states in their region. Terrorism greatly empowered by the forces of globalization with the increased lethality of weapons, developed means of transportation and advanced systems of communication and mobilization looms large over African countries posing the dangers of political and social disintegration for many. Numerous analysts have maintained that terrorism is a problem hyped by the industrial states and not an issue for Africa, but, whatever definitions are employed, terrorism in its African form still threatens to bring major destruction and dissolution to the continent. For weak states already teetering on the brink of social breakdown, terrorism inflicts the final blow not only on the failing state but the social fabric of the community that exercised governance without government as well.

Whether in East, West, or North Africa, weak states litter the landscape. States in these regions are breeding grounds for terrorist activity. There are additional attendant consequences: terrorist groups and their allies further

undermine both state sovereignty and government authority by attacking soft and hard targets, and recruit or cooperate with anti-government groups to further reduce government support within states. Similarly, weak states are undermined by the presence and proliferation of safe havens. Viewed another way, safe havens are an illustration and certainly symbolize why state weakness is so pronounced in Africa. There are those that argue that unless state weakness is reduced and eventually eliminated terrorism is likely to continue to expand in the region.

Al Qaeda and Transnational Terrorism

As demonstrated in chapter 6 a major negative trend is the reemergence of al Qaeda. In the 1990s Osama bin Laden's transnational network was a fixture in the region, even establishing an operational base in Sudan. After external pressure from the United States and Saudi Arabia the government of Sudan closed al Qaeda's base, forcing bin Laden to establish a new base in Afghanistan before being evicted by the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom in December of 2001.

The eviction was viewed by many as a victory and a clear illustration that transnational terrorism no longer had a place in the region. Unfortunately, while the operational base in Sudan was expunged from the region, al Qaeda retained a network of cells that existed across the region. Over the past five years these cells became active in extending the al Qaeda brand (as described in chapter 6 they were not always successful). For evidence of al Qaeda's success one need only examine the emergence of subnational groups that are linked to the network. Associated with these groups, whether in the form of Al Shabaab or Al-Muhajirun, and many other smaller organizations, is the increasing instability and terrorist violence.

Far more troubling is the growing cooperation among al Qaeda and many local organizations. As mentioned earlier, in North Africa and the Sahel the al Qaeda presence is real and accelerating. In the Sahel region al Qaeda established small bases and training camps. Unable to co-opt local organizations al Qaeda has cooperated with these groups with the dual objective of spreading the network's authority and recognizing that in the absence of outright control an alliance would be a welcome substitute. These twin realities assisted in the creation of two new entities, Al Qaeda in

East Africa (EEAQ) and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In the case of the latter, because the old entity (GSPC) was already firmly entrenched in the region, obtaining funding sources, recruits and a labyrinth of safe havens, AQIM was uniquely established to create regional instability. Within months after its founding AQIM conducted a series of attacks to demonstrate that it was an organization to be reckoned with and that the states in which it operates—Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia—would have to work collectively to disrupt their activity. What is alarming to local and U.S. counterterrorist officials is that even after major arrests of senior operatives within the AQIM, the network continues to conduct attacks against Algerian military units, soft targets within the country, along with attacks in Morocco, and now there is a growing fear of attacks in Europe.

The Multifaceted African Response to Terrorism

With regard to an African response, though hardly coordinated, in the face of increasing terrorism the reaction of select states in the region is noteworthy. As will be described below, states in the region have endeavored to cooperate (this is best illustrated among states that participate in the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and those in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI)) to confront the increasing specter of terrorism in the region.

The Growth of African Intelligence Capabilities

In order to confront the threat of terrorism states in the region will have to increase their intelligence capabilities. As pointed out in chapter 11 there is little doubt that regional intelligence capabilities have risen to the challenge of terrorism in Africa. There is a growing bilateral and a multilateral intelligence response that dramatically reduced terrorism in select areas in the region. The bilateral response occurs in two ways. First, many states—Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Sudan, Tunisia, and others—have conducted joint intelligence operations with United States intelligence organizations (the CIA, the DIA, and the FBI). In many cases the U.S. government has worked to improve the professionalization of many intelligence organizations in select states in the

region. The professionalization comes in a number of forms. A salient change occurred in increasing the numbers and skill-set of African intelligence officers and analysts. Second, the United States launched a number of programs to increase the border capabilities of intelligence organizations in a host of states in the region. This fundamental capability is essential to monitor existing safe havens and eventually eliminate them. Third, other intelligence programs have been launched to track terrorists at airports across Africa. Fourth, in another important capability the U.S. government is working to increase the trust among states in Africa to directly share intelligence. It should be noted that before the advent of the war on terror the vast majority of states in Africa rarely shared intelligence. In the post-September 11 environment states in Africa have increasingly shared intelligence. The sharing of intelligence is essential to eliminate sanctuaries that exist on shared borders. That is terrorists have operated on both sides of joint borders, where they have recruited, obtained funds, and conducted attacks and then returned to their sanctuary across the border. In this environment sharing intelligence between states represents an important strategic tactic to eliminate not only the sanctuary itself but the threat of cross-border terrorist strikes. On this front the on-going activities of bilateral cooperation are proving essential in not only destroying safe havens but in mounting a direct response to terrorism itself.

Multilateral cooperation is essential to turning the tide in the war on terror. The bulk of the multilateral collaboration occurs in states that participate in the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI). States that operate in CJTF-HOA and the TSCTI routinely share intelligence. There are a number of examples to illustrate the point. With the growing presence of the GSPC/AQIM the cooperation between the intelligence agencies in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia (and to a lesser degree one can not dismiss the involvement and the cooperation of the Mauritanian intelligence services) is pivotal in containing the largest transnational terrorist presence in the region. While the AQIM threat still continues, the on-going intelligence collaboration is working to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries within their respective countries and elsewhere in the region; the intelligence cooperation has been pivotal in the numerous arrests of GSPC/AQIM leaders and the disruption of numerous terrorist attacks.

In East Africa there is evidence of intelligence cooperation between the U.S., Kenyan, and Ethiopian intelligence services in the hunt for al Qaeda in Somalia, in capturing fleeing members of the Islamic Union Courts, and now the cooperation is moving to another level as the aforementioned states confront the threat posed by Al Shabaab.

Viewed collectively, there is little doubt the intelligence capabilities of select states in the region have risen to the challenge of terrorism. There are several issues that remain troubling. First, reciprocal intelligence sharing from the United States has improved but remains uneven. Second, too few states are sharing intelligence and far more states need to do so.

Counterterrorism

Beginning in October of 2002 counterterrorism became the most important method for confronting terrorism in Africa. Originally, the Bush administration created the CJTF-HOA to prevent fleeing al Qaeda members from establishing an operational base in East Africa. In this regard the Combined Joint Task Force succeeded. However, always seeking a tactical advantage, al Qaeda recognized that the creation of an operational base consistent with the one formally established in Sudan would only lead to disaster. Thus the transnational network made a strategic decision: bin Laden's al Qaeda foot soldiers opted instead to establish a small footprint by creating small active safe havens that stretched across East Africa and in some ungoverned spaces in North Africa and the Sahel.

How did African governments react to the aforementioned tactic by al Qaeda? After a host of strategy sessions in late 2006 member states of the CJTF-HOA—particularly Kenya and Ethiopia—launched an offensive that targeted safe havens within their territories. In the case of Kenya, for example, the Northern part of the country which maintains a sizable Somali population, developed as the critical area for a host of counterterrorism raids aimed at eliminating al Qaeda, members of the Islamic Union Courts, their allies, and currently supporters of Al Shabaab. The operations, many of which relied on U.S. intelligence and Special Operation Forces, proved highly successful. Operations of this type involving other members of the CJTF-HOA were commonplace in 2008 and in the early months of 2009.

Interestingly, the tempo of counterterrorist operations in the TSCTI far exceeded those of the CJTF-HOA in 2008 and in the early months of 2009. There is a salient reason for the pace of operations by the TSCTI: the objective of the strategy concerned the necessity to counteract the scope of operations and the effectiveness of the AQIM. The threat posed by the AQIM is far more expansive than the one posed by Al Shabaab. The threat posed by the Al Shabaab principally impacted Somalia, but the organization's tactics caused instability in Kenya and Ethiopia. Second, the membership of the AQIM far outnumbers that of Al Shabaab. Similarly, AQIM maintains safe havens and a sizeable support structure in over seven countries in North Africa and the Sahel. Finally, the AQIM conducted far more terrorist attacks and inflicted a greater amount of terrorist-related violence than is the case with Al Shabaab.

In response to the threat posed by AQIM the collective and individual actions and strategies by Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, Mali, and Libya were critical in slowing and now containing the threat posed by AQIM. These actions and those of other states not officially participants in the TSCTI are critical to the long-term success of the counterterrorist organization.

What is clear is that counterterrorism has made remarkable progress. It is important to note two telling issues could determine the continuing success or mark the decline of counterterrorism in Africa.[2] The first is that after several years can we say that those states participating in the aforementioned partnerships are now ready to go-it-alone or are they still dependent on the United States? Second, there is another telling issue: will President Barack Obama authorize additional funding to extend the life of the TSCTI, or will the U.S. president allow the current funding to dissipate and force member states to pay for the program in the future? The answers to these issues will provide an answer to the future of counterterrorism in the region.

The AU Enters the Fray

In the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, the African Union's (AU) response to terrorism in the region was immediate. As pointed out by

Samuel Moki in chapter 13, the AU's actions were expansive. Initially, the AU convened the African Summit Against Terrorism in Dakar, Senegal, in October 2001. Second, the AU held a conference in Algiers on September 11-14, 2002. The Inter-Governmental High Level Meeting convened to adopt a Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa. The objective of the Plan of Action "sought to provide robust guidelines and strategies for collective and individual state action against terrorism by incorporating continental and international standards for combating terrorism with particular attention to the provisions of Resolution 1373."[3] Later in July of 2004 the AU held a conference on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.[4] The central purpose of the gathering involved the enhancement of the "effective implementation of the Convention and to give effect to Article 3(d) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, on the need to coordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and combating of terrorism in all its aspects, as well as the implementation of other relevant international instruments."[5]

Conferences such as those described above are essential to ensuring a regional face—as opposed to total reliance on the United States—on how member states of the AU should confront terrorism. Though the earlier conferences were critical, H. E. Ramtane Lamamra, the Commissioner for Peace and Security, acknowledged progress was made in confronting terrorism, but he admitted there were errors. In speaking before members at the African Union Regional Workshop on Security Sector Reform (SSR) at Addis Ababa, on March 23, 2009, Lamamra made the following statement:

> Given these negative but unintended consequences of early SSR initiatives, it is not surprising that African states have tended to regard the concept of SSR with suspicion. The African Union SSR Policy among other objectives such as democratizing the security sector also aims to assist African states to address the national security imbalances created by earlier not-so-well-planned SSR initiatives. One of the factors that undermined early SSR efforts on the African continent was the lack of a coherent regional and African continental policy on SSR.[6]

This statement is a clear recognition that more coordinated efforts were required if there were to be a region-wide response to terrorism. Unfortunately, the statement to date has not produced a dramatic change in the actions or attitudes of those states that have not joined the struggle against terrorism. In fairness many of these states have issues that they believe are of greater priority than terrorism, or they are concerned that too

much focus on terrorism could detract from funds needed to confront HIV/AIDS or poverty.

In terms of direct response, the AU is involved in seeking and sustaining unity in war-ravaged Somalia. The AU expressed concern about the violence associated with the Islamic Union Courts and now Al Shabaab, organizations linked to al Qaeda and other entities determined to undermine efforts to build a strong and viable national governments in the region. To illustrate this point consider that Al Shabaab targeted troops belong to The African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). In June of 2009 elements within Al Shabaab openly threatened to attack and force the withdrawal of AMISOM. The mission itself, while an important starting point, is unlikely to succeed. The reasons validating the aforementioned statement include the following: the absence of a substantial force (the total force at time of this writing is around 4,000, less than half of the projected 8,000), the mandate is not well conceived, and there are insufficient funds (the AU pledged $11.6 million for the mission and it is certain the mission will require additional funds to sustain the mission. At issue, how much is required to sustained the mission?), and there is no clearly defined exit strategy.

With regard to the threat posed by the AQIM, the AU applauded the counterterrorist efforts of regional states but in the summer of 2009 in the wake of the al Qaeda-linked organization's kidnapping of Western tourists and diplomats, the AU Peace and Security Commissioner Lamamra warned that member states should avoid paying ransom to terrorists to secure their release. He went on to state, "We should be firm on this. Paying ransoms will reinforce terrorism."[7] Additionally, Lamamra warned Mali that it would have to do more to eliminate the AQIM's safe haven in the ungoverned areas in the Mali Desert.

These and other efforts indicate that it is clear the AU is engaged in responding to the threat posed by regional terrorism. Similarly, the AU continues to prod member states to expand counterterrorism efforts. There is little doubt the organization has a long way to go in its objective to ensure that member states ratify U.N. resolutions and conventions on terrorism. In another effort the AU continues to work with those states whose response to terrorism has been inadequate. In the end the AU should be applauded for its efforts but there are short comings.

In salient example The African Centre for the Study and Research of Terrorism (CAERT) is a tremendous accomplishment. However, there is a glaring weakness: few states use the CAERT and member security forces are lacking in the most rudimentary skills in counterterrorism. Second, the AU's central response is to act as an organizing platform for ideas for member states on how to confront terrorism. Since the advent of the U.S.-led war on terror the AU has succeeded in this regard. The dilemma for the AU is it does not possess an army (like NATO) in which to confront terrorism and therefore it depends on member states to individually use their military resources to confront the threat. It is in this area where membership responsibility is lacking.

Conclusion

In examining the overall reaction to the growing presence of terrorism in Africa a questions begs: Is the regional response sufficient? The solutions discussed above and still others that were delineated in Part III indicate that Africa has come a long way in its struggle against terrorism. In the Horn the states in the CJTF-HOA and those Northern states participating in the TSCTI have devised a number of strategies to confront terrorism in their respective regions. Unfortunately, no regional solutions have yet come to the fore to deal with the evolving terrorist challenge in West Africa and those nascent threats elsewhere on the continent.

There is another issue that affects the regional response: the regional response is not always coordinated. To be clear one may argue the responses to the threats in the Horn and in North Africa and the Sahel are coordinated, but it is clear many aspects of those responses are externally orchestrated by the United States. There is no doubt however that these responses have proven successful.

Another frustration is that there is not now and there is unlikely to be an African framework for directing an "Africa-led" war on terrorism. Rather, due to logistical, leadership, and funding issues, among others, no one should expect an Africa-centered response in the near term. Until there is considerable growth and professionalization among the armed forces of many of the states in the region along with the ability to launch sustained

military operations against sub-national and transnational terrorist organizations, one should anticipate the continuation of a U.S.-dominated war on terror in the region. To buttress this point we should recognize another dilemma that confronts the vast majority of states in the region: the reality that many of the states are poor countries and dramatically altering the size of many local militaries is unrealistic during a period of global financial crisis. Additionally, there is another dilemma that militates against an Africa-led war on terror: most states have other priorities. Confronting the challenge posed by poverty, HIV/AIDS, developmental crises, transnational crime, sustaining democratic governance practices, civil wars, many of which are ethnic or religious based, to name a few, represent issues that some states consider to be of greater importance than dealing with the threat posed by terrorism. Thus given that fighting terrorism is not the priority among a high number of states in the region this further reduces the likelihood of an African framework that expands the regional response to terrorism.

What is more likely is a dual set of frameworks: one commissioned by the African Union and the other led by the U.S. government. The latter has already paid dividends and permits African states, whether in the CJTF-HOA or the TSCTI, to eventually have the means to operate independent of the United States. Currently, that reality only exists among a select few in the aforesaid partnerships. The AU is increasing its involvement in the war on terrorism but it is not NATO, lacking troops, leadership, and logistics to perform a similar role. As Moki points out in chapter 13, the AU must overcome many challenges, some of which are beyond the capacity the organization.

> The lack of financial and technical capacity is another major challenge. Member States lack the financial and technical capacity to transform the African Union into a fully operational organization. Realistically, many of the action items remain largely in blueprint form because of these financial and technical deficiencies. For example, to control the movement of terrorists, the African Union's counterterrorism strategy calls for among other measures, to adopt technology that prevents passport forgeries, computerize all points of entry to manage travel information and train immigration officers on how to profile travelers. In view of the fact that each African Country has several points of entry, these measures would require substantial investments in technology and human resources. African countries simply do not have the required resources vis-à-vis the many economic and social problems they have to deal with. It is, therefore, not surprising that many Member States have not been able to computerize all their points of entry.

Moki's point is that the AU has made extraordinary strides in its objective to ensure a continent-wide struggle against terrorism. However, the AU is learning that even its best intentions will have to confront the realities that exist among member states.

Finally, some argue that until the African response, whether performed by the AU or in concert with regional partnerships, expands beyond a military solution and includes an increasing role for developmental practices and human security, the region may be in for a long cycle of violence. Here's hoping that tactical adjustments by the AU and greater investments by those states not participating in the war on terror will reverse the negative and alarming perspective that terrorism remains a regular and evolving feature of the landscape in Africa.

Notes

1. Jakkie Cilliers, "Africa, Root Causes and the 'War on Terror,' " *African Security Review*, October 2006, 60.

2. The point has nothing to do with the CJTF-HOA. There are no funding restrictions currently and thus the organization's long-term viability is secure.

3. Martin Ewi and Kwesi Aning, "Assessing the Role of the African Union in Preventing and Combating Terrorism in Africa," *African Security Review*, Vol. 15, No. 3, October 2006. http://ww.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=22&slink_id=4493&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3. The site was accessed on August 5, 2009.

4. Permanent Observer Mission of the African Union to the United Nations, New York on the subject of Counterterrorism, January 29, 2008. http://www.aumissionny.org/counterrorism.htm. The site was accessed on August 5, 2009.

5. Protocol to the OAU convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism on July 8, 2004 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. www.africaunion.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/The%20Protocol%20on%20Terrorism%2026July2004.pdf. The site was accessed on June 29, 2009.

6. Future of Security Sector Reform (SSR) on the African Continent Towards an African Union Policy on SSR. Address by H. E. Mr. Ramtane Lamamra, Commissioner for Peace and Security, African Union Commission At the African Regional Workshop on Security Sector Reform Addis Ababa, 23rd March, 2009. http://www.africa-union.org/.../Commissioner%20Speech%20on%20SSR%2023%20March%20200. The site was accessed on August 5, 2009.

7. "African Union Seeks Crackdown on Ransom Payments," *Reuters*, June 23, 2009. http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LI406281.htm. The site was accessed on August 5, 2009.

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Terrorism in Africa

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